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The title of this dissertation —Edward Hopper beyond the commonplace— 
alludes to the fact that, although the work of Edward Hopper is widely acknowledged in 
the history of the twentieth century art, critical literature focused on it has resorted to a 
number of labels (Americanness, alienation, loneliness and the like) which, over time, 
have become clichés with very little critical insight and with very weak theoretical and 
visual foundations. My first aim is, therefore, to develop a different critical framework 
which is up to the task of analysing the indisputable visual relevance of Hopper’s work. 
I shall argue that this critical support can be found in Walter Benjamin’s concept of 
“poverty of experience”, which I shall re-examine in the Part I of the dissertation. But my 
main aim is to test this framework in the analysis of Hopper’s oeuvre, and to show that 
not only the notion of poverty of experience can enrich this analysis, but also Hopper’s 
works can enrich the concept coined by Benjamin. So, in the rest of the dissertation, 
besides reviewing the existing literature, I shall construct an interpretative hypothesis to 
account for the interactions between technology and tradition underlying the development 
of American painting (Part II), the complex relationship between painting and 
technological reproducibility in Hopper’s artistic project (Part III), and the emotional 
meaning of Hopper’s pictures (part IV). I hope that this critical approach improves the 
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INTRODUCTION: EDWARD HOPPER AND THE 




1. WHAT IS KNOWN (AND UNKNOWN) ABOUT HOPPER 
 
 Perhaps one of the main paradoxes about Edward Hopper is the fact that he is at 
the same time all too familiar and quite unknown. Familiar, firstly, because the valuable 
cataloguing work and biographical research of Gail Levin1 outlines a complete 
historiographical map of Hopper’s life and work (LEVIN: 1980; LEVIN: 2007, 
LEVIN:1995)2 . Hopper is also familiar because of his considerable influence in 
contemporary art history: his inspiration is not only present in Pop art, but in works by 
recent sculptors, filmmakers and photographers [Figs. 1-2] His pictures have become part 
of the collective imagination worldwide, and they have been reproduced countless times 
                                                             
1Gail Levin (1948), an American art historian specialized in the work of Edward Hopper, has written 
numerous monographs about him, including biographical essays and the Catalogue Raisonné of his works; 
she has also edited Hopper’s prints and illustrations and a book about the places depicted by Hopper. Her 
main works are listed in the Bibliography. 
2Born in Nyack (Rockland, New York) in 1882, in a Baptist prosperous family of Dutch descent, in 1899, 
following his parents’ advice, Hopper entered the Correspondence School of Illustrating. Then he studied 
engraving in the New York School of Art (also known as Chase School), being his teachers Arthur Keller 
and Frank Vincent DuMond. He also took painting lessons under the teachings of William Merritt Chase, 
Kenneth Hayes Miller and Robert Henri. Once he had finished his studies, in 1906, he travelled to Paris 
and stayed there for almost a year. He came back to Europe in 1907 and 1910 and did not leave the American 
continent again, but he often travelled to different places around the United States (with a marked preference 
for South Truro) and Mexico. He was an artist based in New York, where he rented a studio from 1913 until 
his death, in 3rd Washington Square North. In 1904, The Sketch Book published one of his sketches, but 
Hopper's first paintings did not cause any impact. He took part in an exhibition in 1908 in the upper floor 
of the old Harmonie Club, in a show organized by Henri’s students, and also showed his works in the 
Independent Artists Exhibition organised in 1910 by Sloan, Henri, Davies and Kuhn (GOODRICH: 1978, 
19, LEVIN, 1980: 26). But, again, the critics did not show interest. In 1913, during the Armory Show, he 
sold his first painting, but he did not sell any other in the next ten years. He called negatively the critics’ 
attention in 1915, when he showed Soir Bleu in a collective exhibition organised by Henri in MacDowell's 
Club. The painting was considered too influenced by the European artistic movements in a moment in 
which American nationalism was at its peak. His fortune changed dramatically during the 1920s. In 1920 
he had a one-man show at the Whitney Studio Club, an institution founded as a space where American 
painters could show their work. In 1923, thanks to his future wife, the painter Josephine Nivison, the 
Brooklyn Museum of New York exhibited his work. Critics saw in this exhibition the end of his Parisian 
nostalgia and his return to American themes. In 1924, The Frank K. M. Rehn Gallery organised his first 
solo exhibition in a commercial gallery, where he sold eleven watercolours and five oils. From that moment 
onwards, Hopper focuses on his oil paintings. In 1933 he had a one-man show at MOMA. In 1937, Life 
magazine observed that Hopper was “accepted as one of America’s best living painters”. By 1939, the 
Boston Museum of Fine Arts, the Brooklyn Museum, the Chicago Art Institute, the Fogg Art Museum, and 
at least nine other museums and galleries held Hopper’s works. His paintings were shown in dozens of 
exhibitions throughout the decade, and prizes multiplied until his death in 1967, the same year when the IX 
Biennale de Sao Paolo showed his works along with the ones of Pop artists. 
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— from textbooks and monographs to mugs, posters and mouse pads, from Hitchcock to 















[Fig. 1] Edward Hopper, Morning in a city, 1944,112.5 x 152 cm Williams College 







[Fig. 2] Gregory Crewdson, Woman at a Vanity, 2004, 144.8x223.6cm Digital 
chromogenic print. 
 




 However, in a sense, Hopper is also a great unknown. He was extremely reserved 
about his work, and he gave only a few interviews and wrote a short number of statements 
on art. While the interviews are frustrating because of his evasive answers (“I don’t have 
anything else to say”), his statements on art often include a quote from Goethe which 
summarizes his conception: “representing the world that surrounds me by means of the 
world that is in me” (WAGSTAFF: 2004, 17); but this romantic language strongly 
contrasts with the stark look of his paintings. He describes his method as painting from 
memory, So, the main responsibility for the interpretation of his works relies on critical 
literature. Among the texts consulted for the development of this PhD I would like to 
highlight Gail Levin’s monographs (LEVIN: 1979, 1979-1, 1980, 1984, 1995, 1998 and 
2007), containing a deep knowledge of Hopper’s art and personality. Mainly 
chronologically ordered, monographs written by Wieland Schmied (SCHMIED:1995), 
Robert Hobbs (HOBBS:1987), Ivo Kranzfelder (KRANZFELDER:1998), Gunter Renner 
(RENNER:1991) or Walter Wells (WELLS:2008) hint at interesting elements of Hopper’s 
oeuvre, addressing different issues recurrently pinned to Hopper’s art. Scarce as Hopper´s 
statements were, the interviews and writings of those who knew Edward Hopper are also 
revealing and helpful to put his work in its context: among others are the book by Lloyd 
Goodrich (GOODRICH: 1978) and interviews with the painter conducted by J. Morse 
(MORSE: 1959), Katharine Kuh (KUH: 2000) and Brian O´Doherty (O’DOHERTY: 
1988). Catalogues derived from Hopper’s exhibitions from MoMa’s first one-man show 
in 1933 onwards provide an interesting source of Hopper’s critical readings, 
demonstrating a shift in approach, from an art-historical point of view to interdisciplinary 
studies. Equally interesting is the catalogue of the “Edward Hopper and the American 
imagination” exhibition held at the Whitney Museum of American Art in 1995 (LYONS 
AND WEINBERG: 1995), wherein several fiction writers such as Paul Auster, William 
Kennedy, Norman Mailer, Walter Mosley, Grace Paley or Ann Beattie contribute with 
short stories inspired by Hopper’s scenes. The catalogue edited by Sheena Wagstaff for 
the Hopper’s Tate exhibition in 2004 (WAGSTAFF: 2004) suggests multiple links 
between Hopper and film or photography. As Wagstaff points out, nowadays the more 
interesting contributions to understand Hopper’s oeuvre can be found in articles. The ones 
by J. Gillies (GILLIES: 1972), L. Nochlin (NOCHLIN:1981), A. Hemingway 
(HEMINGWAY, A.: 1992) and J.P. Naugrette (NAUGRETTE: 1995) are discussed in 
different Parts of my dissertation. Among ones appearing more recently, I shall mention 
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those by Margaret Iversen (IVERSEN: 2003), W. Fluck (FLUCK: 2004), J. Updike 
(UPDIKE:2005), J. Barter (BARTER: 2007-1) and T. Ryall (RYALL: 2013). 
 
 In general terms, the main issue in Hopper literature is the social or sociological 
reading of the paintings. The emphasis in the search for social meanings in Hopper’s 
works, I suggest, has not to do with particular ingredients of his paintings, but with the 
fact that they are realist paintings. The nature of such “realism” will be discussed at length 
in my thesis, but for the moment I would say that realism became an uneasy position in 
the twentieth century because of the increasing awareness that perceptual reality was 
being quickly and deeply transformed by technology, and that reality is, at least in part, a 
social construction plenty of hidden injustices. So, the relationship between reality and 
representation became conflictive: in artistic matters, reality seems to escape 
representation, and representation seems to escape reality. Realism often appears as an 
ingenuous or misleading artistic standpoint, as if figurative painting was only ethically 
(not aesthetically) justifiable as social realism. Although from the beginning it was clear 
that Hopper’s work did not fit into this category, the dominant critical readings have 




 Three critical discourses   
 
 There are three main critical discourses about Hopper’s work, which correspond 
to the three periods that can be discerned in Hopper literature. During the 1920s and 
1930s, especially in the United States, Hopper’s paintings were often celebrated as 
specifically American art, in a time when critics and museum officials were involved in 
the definition of American cultural identity. So, Hopper was often included in the 
“American scene” movement. He explicitly rejected such claim, but he felt part of the 
struggle for America’s artistic self-affirmation. A second period begins in the post-war 
years, when Hopper is already a renowned artist, in which a new kind of critical discourse, 
that continues to this day, becomes dominant: the view of Hopper’s work as focused on 
alienation and loneliness as consequences of industrial urban life. And, although not with 
the widespread acceptance as this last discourse, the third reading appears in the late 
twentieth century and remains so far: in this case, Hopper’s works are interpreted as the 
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visual recreation of a male, white and bourgeois America addressed to a middle-class 
audience which mourns its fading (if it ever existed!) and enjoys the image of an 
unproblematic city, sidestepping “the other side” of New York and flavouring this 
recreation with a “cool” redefinition of alienation and a “neon-existentialist” aesthetics 
(FLUCK: 2004, 335). I shall not argue that these critical readings are wrong, but I do 
think they are unsatisfactory. 
 
 Regarding the first discourse, I have no doubt that Hopper wanted to be an 
American painter, but, even if his declarations about the ‘American Scene’ or about 
artistic nationalism are ignored, what, in Hopper’s paintings, allows us to speak of their 
‘Americanness’, excluding the crude fact that they were painted in America? The easily 
understandable efforts of Museum curators and critics to construct an internationally 
recognisable American art should not be confused with Hopper’s artistic intentions or 
realizations, even if the appraisal of his paintings could benefit in the 1930s from such 
context. What is meant when it is said that his works are perfectly American3? The 
theoretical weakness of this claim is attested by the fact that, when the United States 
finally became an autonomous cultural power, the debate about American cultural identity 
immediately grew less important. The second one of the mentioned critical discourses, 
being by far the most prevalent, shows similar problems. It is undeniable that Hopper’s 
compositions have something to do with modern life, and to a certain extent terms such 
as “alienation” or “loneliness” can express some features of the modern condition. But, 
is there a firm foundation to assert that Hopper’s Gas [Fig.22] or Office at night [Fig.30] 
call into question the capitalist alienation of the worker? Is it justifiable to assume that 
Morning sun [Fig.51]or New York Movie [Fig.69] are metaphors of urban loneliness or to 
describe Sunday [Fig.63] as a comment on economic depression or Nighthawks [Fig.23] 
as a reference to the American mood after the Pearl Harbor bombing? What is the 
effective contribution of these terms —alienation, loneliness and the like— to the 
meaning of Hopper’s pictures? Could it be said, as Hopper suggested about loneliness, 
that also “the alienation thing” is overdone? Both terms are external to Hopper's 
vocabulary. Particularly, ‘alienation’, when deprived of its specific meaning in the 
philosophical tradition of Hegel and Marx, becomes a vague psychological disorder 
                                                             
3Among others, Edward Alden Jewell wrote that “Edward Hopper, an American painter, paints only as 
an American can paint” (BARTER: 2007-1, 203-204). 
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affecting the figures in the paintings without anyone really knowing the reason behind it. 
The readings suggesting that Hopper paints the America of the Great Depression inform 
us about the context wherein Hopper is developing his art, but, do they not clash with the 
fact that his paintings never reveal an explicit criticism of the modern world, a nostalgic 
view of the preindustrial one or a progressive enthusiasm about industrial civilization? 
 
 The third critical discourse is, at first sight, the one which has a better theoretical 
foundation. One of its more interesting representatives, Andrew Hemingway, referring to 
the abovementioned images of Hopper as an advocate of American nationalism and as a 
critic of American capitalism, has written something that I find incontrovertible: both 
interpretations, he says, “need to be set within particular ideological frameworks and not 
treated as effects of some inherent quality in the works” (HEMINGWAY, A.: 1992, 399). 
Only I should add that this is also certain of the third image of Hopper, which Hemingway 
supports: Hopper as the painter of a “racial and masculine (…) nostalgic vision, which 
appealed to a particular bourgeois liberal fraction” interested in “a relatively innocuous 
realist art” (HEMINGWAY, A: 1992, 396). I am sure that Hopper’s paintings, no more or 
less than many others, have been used with ideological purposes. And I am aware that 
Hopper was a male, white bourgeois citizen living in a racialized and masculinized 
capitalist society. But I am not sure that Hopper’s paintings can be reduced to such 
sociological markers. I doubt that, as an artist, he was a supporter of American 
nationalism, just as I doubt that he was a critic of capitalism. But my question is: is there 
anything else than ideological frameworks in the appraisal of artworks? Should the 
critical discourse, in order to avoid such frameworks, be reduced to the evaluation of 
compositional and formal features, refusing any account of the meaning of such works? 
I do not think so. I do appreciate the intellectual struggle to highlight the ideological 
frameworks underlying aesthetic and artistic stands: they have a great critical relevance 
and they have a valuable informative weight in critical interpretation, as they bring to 
light the political and sociological background. But I oppose the reduction of art criticism 
to such a struggle and the reduction of artworks to such a background. I am suggesting 
that the predominance of social-ideological (and, so to speak, anti-ideological) critical 
readings of Hopper’s work in terms of Americanness, alienation, loneliness or class-
analysis are responsible for the facts that such work, notwithstanding its widespread 
outreach and acknowledgement, remains to a great extent unexamined, and that the 
questions about the reasons for such an acceptance and, therefore, about the cultural 
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meaning of Hopper’s work remain open. 
 
 I shall not invoke on my behalf “some inherent quality in the works” of Hopper 
which would univocally lead to the meaning of the paintings that I shall propose. The 
“inherent quality” of the artwork are the formal and compositional features which, acting 
as the limits of interpretation, make possible a tentative critical reading aiming at 
improving the understanding of the work. Cannot this interpretation be founded on a 
theoretical framework not only constructed to support unconfessed political interests, but 
in the interest of knowledge? Although it sounds a bit old-fashioned, I am sure that this is 
also the ultimate interest of ideological criticism. I do not conceive of my interpretation 
as the right one (I do not even know if this expression makes sense regarding artworks) 
but only as another contribution to Hopper critical literature. However, I should not 
describe my project exactly as what Hemingway calls “yet another account of the 
meaning of Hopper’s works” (HEMINGWAY, A: 1992, 399), but as an attempt to 
resurface Hopper’s work (as a critical subject) out of the limited readings that years have 
piled upon it. Nothing can be done to overcome the silence of Hopper about his work, but 
something should be done, in my view, to overcome what Hemingway calls “the critical 
mythology” about Hopper, and to supply a better theoretical foundation for the critical 
discourse on his work, in order to re-evaluate the commonplace ideas about 
Americanness, alienation, loneliness or unproblematic art. Searching for this alternative 
theoretical framework, I have resorted to Walter Benjamin’s writings on art, and 
especially to the concept of “poverty of experience”. My reasons to approach Benjamin’s 
thought as a critical tool in the interpretation of Hopper’s work were threefold: the first 
and the main one is that the notion of modern art which Benjamin constructs in his 
writings on Baudelaire seems to be especially suitable to Hopper’s conception of art. The 
second reason is that, when reading Benjamin’s writings, I found that the concept of 
poverty of experience, precisely because it is developed by Benjamin in relation to the 
main issues facing modern art, is more useful to think about the experience of modernity 
appearing in Hopper’s oeuvre than the topics that the topics of alienation or loneliness. 
The third reason is that, in The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility 
(BENJAMINN: 2002-2), Benjamin provides adequate conceptual instruments to inquire 
about the relationship between painting and technological reproducibility, which is a 
major theme in Hopper’s work. I shall discuss these questions in the next section, but 
before this, I would like to call attention to a methodological particularity of this 





 When I began studying Benjamin, I found out that, to make his notions suitable 
for the purposes of the critical discourse that I am exploring, I could not content myself 
with referring to the meaning of such notions as something commonly accepted and 
previously known by the reader, ignoring or overlooking their problematic features. The 
reason is that my dissertation is also written from the theoretical standpoint of art’s 
autonomy, a standpoint obviously not shared by Benjamin. So, starting from Benjamin’s 
writings, I have tried to construct a methodological and theoretical framework, without 
disregarding the problems and difficulties involved in such writings, and clarifying as far 
as possible my position concerning them. As I will emphasise, Hopper’s view on 
modernity is not focused on the return to an archaic past or in the avant-gardist 
progression towards a utopian future, the two options that Benjamin thought to be the 
artwork’s contemporary destiny: Hopper did not dream of a subjugation of painting to 
politics, but he claimed its artistic function. And he was seriously attentive to the figure 
of the modern individual. But his experience of the technological innovations in America 
still has something of the innocent attitude of surprise, mixing attraction and repulsion, 
which Benjamin masterly describes in his writings on Baudelaire’s Paris; and even the 
city of Paris which Hopper visited three times was not so far from the city in which 
Baudelaire lived (certainly, Picasso and Gertrude Stein were already there, but Hopper 
was not involved in their circles). The evident relationship of Hopper’s work with 
mechanically reproducible images, as in the case of Benjamin, cannot be reduced to the 
binomial alternative “rejection/acceptation”. The question obsessively repeated in 
Benjamin’s work —how is art possible in a word menaced by “the liquidation of the 
traditional value of the cultural heritage” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 103)?— is, to a large 
extent, also the question of Hopper’s painting. And Benjamin’s inventory of intellectual 
and artistic references contains a series of names (Bergson, Proust, Freud, Brecht, 
Simmel, Kafka or Kracauer) that, though most of them obviously were not among 
Hopper’s readings, are, to my view, much more representative of the atmosphere of ideas, 
words and images of Hopper’s times than other more contemporary authors sometimes 
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2. POVERTY AND EXPERIENCE 
 
 
 Walter Benjamin coined the expression “poverty of experience” 
(Erfahrungsarmut) in a short but important text from 1933: “Experience and poverty” 
(BENJAMIN, 1996-7, 731-736). As with many of his essays, its rhetorical efficacy lies 
on the strength of metaphors. His contemporary readers knew very well the poverty 
caused by the terrible German inflation in the 1920s. As a consequence of the financial 
crash, savings stored by many families lost their economic value before they could be 
inherited by descendants, who found themselves suddenly empty-handed. And, as a 
consequence of war, the material neediness tragically disturbed the plans of the majority 
of the population for the future, splitting their lives into two halves which could no longer 
compose a whole unity. Benjamin uses this commonplace of his time as a symbol of 
another kind of poverty, a cultural (“internal”, he says in one line) poverty. The story in 
the beginning of “Experience and poverty” shows clearly that, in a traditional society, the 
sayings and refrains, informally learned in an implicit way, are moral and materially 
useful to address basic needs even in an environment of material scarcity and without 
scholar education. What the article states is that, in the same way that inflation or war 
destroyed the transmission chain of material goods, something happened in this historic 
moment which devalued the stored experience of the communitarian memory. 
Considering the most dramatic of Benjamin’s examples, it could be said that the soldiers 
returning home in 1918 found themselves in a world which was no longer the one they 
left when they went to the frontlines in 1914. And in this new world their cultural heritage 
─the learned experience ─ was as useless as the banknotes that war and financial 
breakdown turned into waste paper. 
 
 This “completely new poverty” is presented as a crisis of culture as a whole, a 
poverty of experience affecting humanity, what forces men to “start from zero”. That is 
what Benjamin calls a new state of barbarism in which the contemporary man, naked, 
“lies screaming like a new-born babe in the dirty diapers of the present” (BENJAMIN, 
1996-7, 733). What is the source of this regression from culture to barbarism? In 
Benjamin’s text, it appears only named as “this tremendous development of technology”, 
and if we read just the first three paragraphs of the article, we could take Benjamin’s 
description as the mourning of the demise of the old concept of experience (SALZANI: 





 But the following lines discard this impression. Certainly, for Benjamin there is 
an evil side to barbarism: the one of the privileged few who, because of their external 
wealth, can also conserve fragments of the old world where experience retains its internal 
richness, though they are surrounded by the new impoverished realm, something that the 
rest of the people cannot afford. But Benjamin had written that “only for the sake of the 
hopeless ones have we been given hope” (BENJAMIN:1996-6, 356), and this seems to 
apply to this tragic situation. Along with the traumatic image of the soldiers who return 
speechless from war, the avant-gardist artworks appear as illustrations of barbarism “in 
the good way” (BENJAMIN: 1996-7, 735), a poverty of experience that is a dignified 
poverty. They are the early monuments of a world as naked as this new-born 
contemporary man, something that Benjamin links to the new “glass culture” 
(BENJAMIN, 1996-7, 734). It is the same utopic world that emerges in the final lines of 
The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 101-
133) under the name of “communism”, a world that has overcome art and abolished aura 
(Fiat mundus, pereat ars). And the reader feels that, in these texts, Benjamin “celebrates 
the dawn of a new era” (SALZANI: 2009, 129) and that, if technology creates the problem 
(the fall of the old world), technology can also solve it, raising a new one. This would be, 
perhaps, a very reductionist and simplistic interpretation, but the central role played by 
The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility (1935-1936) in the 
theoretical reflections in the art criticism of the last decades has contributed to a 
“postmodernist” reading of Benjamin which has also attracted to its orbit “Experience 
and poverty”, promoting the analysis of the Benjaminian concepts of “aura” and 
“experience”, among others, in the light (often in the exclusive light) of this text4 . The 
fact that some of Benjamin’s writings have been the object of a post-modernist 
interpretation is just consistent with his target of announcing a world which would come 
after modernity (although not exactly with the meaning which the term “post-modernity” 
has acquired in contemporary cultural criticism). I will not follow this interpretation, but 
it is interesting for the purpose of my argument to understand its roots in Benjamin’s text 
itself. 
 
                                                             
4On this predominance in Benjamin’s contemporary readings and its post-modernist interpretation, see 
COSTELLO:2015, 164-184. 
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 Benjamin’s work as a two way street 
 
 “Experience and poverty” is, in my view, one of the crossing points of two of the 
main movements running through Benjamin’s intellectual project and personal biography. 
The first of these movements is linked to the historic and personal circumstances of 
Benjamin. After failing in his attempts to achieve an academic professional status, a 
change in his cultural perspective came about in the late 1920s through his contact with 
the Berliner avant-gardist troop that we know today as “Group G.”, frequented by 
architects and other artists of diverse tendencies (especially Dadaists, Surrealists and 
Constructivists5 ). In his relationship with this group of artists, Benjamin received the 
influence of the technological optimism which dominated the atmosphere of these artistic 
movements, a feature that we can find from time to time in Benjamin’s essays, as it 
happens in “Experience and poverty”. In the decade of 1930, he adds to these intellectual 
ingredients his acceptance of Marxism, after his expedition to the USSR with Asja Lacis, 
his friendship with Bertolt Brecht and his reading of History and Class Conciousness by 
G. Lukács (JENNINGS: 2004, 20). In this historic moment, the communist experiment 
of the October Revolution appears to many thinkers as a political avant-garde more or 
less clearly linked to the artistic insurrection, and this is also the case of Benjamin. But to 
this practical engagement is added his theoretical embracement of materialism as a 
methodology for historical analysis. The clearest symptom of Benjamin’s proximity to 
avant-gardism is his experimental book One Way Street (1928), composed as a literary 
collage or photomontage in which a great deal of avant-gardist techniques is used. It will 
induce a methodological shift that is the source of a lot of short and often hermetic texts, 
supported in symbols or allegories which, as in the case of “Experience and poverty”, 
capture immediately the reader’s attention. As it has been repeatedly observed 
(JENNINGS: 2004, 29), these texts are like flashes of lucidity in which, with a great 
economy of resources, a surprising abundance of imbedded signification effects are 
reached, with many resemblances of Kafka’s writing style. All these essays are vibrant 
examples of the new kind of cultural criticism Benjamin was searching since the late 
1920s, and the writing style he reaches in them constitutes the powerful attractiveness of 
                                                             
5Between 1922 and 1923 a new avant gardé movement emerged in Berlin, compose of artists from different 
nationalities and various aesthetical orientations. L. Moholy-Nagy, Mies van der Rohe, El Lissitsky, Hans 
Richter, Raoul Hausmann, Kurt Schwitters, Hans Arp, George Grosz, John Heartfield, Hannah Höch, Naum 
Gabo, Antonine Pevsner, Nathan Altmann, Mies and Ludwig Hilberseimer, Tristan Tzara, Man Ray and 
Max Burchartz were the members of this “Group G” (JENNINGS: 2004, 24). 
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his mature prose; but it is also the reason of the difficulties of clarification of many of his 
essays, whose hardly reducible ambiguity has produced sometimes, to my view, 
contradictory or opportunistic interpretations. 
 
 Probably, Benjamin himself was aware of these problems of interpretation. He 
always kept in mind the need of a more ambitious, complex and wider work about the 
culture of modern industrial cities, which would constitute the background in which these 
“snapshots” should be rooted and understood. This is the second of the movements I 
mentioned above: a sustained and long-range reflection on the meaning of experience. 
The persistence of his interest in this question is attested since 1913, when he writes an 
early article entitled “Experience” (BENJAMIN: 1996-2, 3-5), in which he considers its 
role as a rhetoric strategy used by adults to intimidate young people6 . The question has 
gained density and importance in his essay from 1918, “On the program of the coming 
philosophy”, where after a review of the meaning of experience in Kant’s philosophy, he 
denounces an impoverishment of the concept of experience since the eighteenth century, 
when it loses an important part of its scope because of its restriction to experimental 
validity in scientific knowledge, missing its connection with language. He proposes then 
a wider idea of experience which would include all kind of cultural practises, even the 
religious ones (BENJAMIN,1996-4, 100-110). He comes again over this theme ─ the 
opposition between “experimental legitimacy” and “life experience” ─ in a quite cryptic 
essay from 1932 (“Zur Erfahrung”), where he says that “there is no greater error than the 
attempt to construe experience —in the sense of life experience— according to the model 
on which the exact natural sciences are based” (BENJAMIN: 1999-4, 553). The term 
acquires a stronger connection with historic present in “Experience and poverty” and 
other essays of the same years. Due to his intellectual philosophical and literary education, 
he was initially oriented to a systematic approach of his themes, like the one he practised 
in his early works (BENJAMIN: 1996-1 and 1996-3). But, forced by circumstances to 
leave academic discourse aside, he often writes in a sort of state of emergency, and he 
develops his leading investigations about this matter, commenced a decade before, in his 
last writings on Baudelaire, very particularly in his essay from 1939 “On some motifs in 
Baudelaire” (BENJAMIN: 2006), the only reasonably finished investigation of this kind 
                                                             
6Benjamin reminds this sense of the term in the first lines of “Experience and poverty”, imaging the words 
of an old person about a young one: “‘Still wet behind the ears, and he wants to tell us what’s what!’, ‘You’ll 
find out (erfahren) soon enough!’” (BENJAMIN, 1996-7, 731). 
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which, in other circumstances, would have been integrated in the Arcades Project 
(BENJAMIN:1999-7), where the systematic approach would have received the new 
writing form. 
 
 From my point of view, “Experience and poverty” is one of these short texts 
located between the two movements of Benjamin’s project I have referred to: his political 
and aesthetical commitments (clearly exposed in the essay on reproducibility), on one 
hand, and, on the other hand, the larger investigation on modernism that he never 
accomplished to the extent he had planned. If this article is read only in the context of the 
essay on technological reproducibility (whose importance I am far from neglecting, as I 
hope to make clear in the following), one will focus either on an archaic world in which 
experience is not yet impoverished, or in a technologized world where this 
impoverishment is almost resolved. So, one will simply neglect the modern world in 
which the work of art has acquired its proper sense, that is to say, the world described in 
the writings on Baudelaire and, to my view, the only one in which the poverty of 
experience manifests itself in all its essence. 
 
 As I have suggested above, understanding the meaning of “experience” in 
Benjamin is not possible but by fixing attention on his writings on Baudelaire. Observed 
under the light of these writings, it becomes clear that the cultural poverty which 
Benjamin refers to is not only a punctual historic event occurred in the twentieth century, 
as it could be suggested by the mention of First World War in “Experience and poverty”, 
but a specific and sustained process of transformation of the frames of experience and of 
the cultural structures of perception which defines the whole configuration of modernity. 
The historical horizon of a world without aura, completely immersed in the exhibition 
value of technological inventions like photography and cinema, as it appears in the essay 
on reproducibility, is very problematic in the background of Benjamin’s writings on 
Baudelaire. Of course, the difficulty raised by this two ways of the Benjamin’s theoretical 
street could be easily saved if it was possible to “complete” the chronological scheme by 
inserting his theory of modern culture (and of the artwork’s place in it), contained in the 
essays on Baudelaire’s Paris, between his views of the archaic world and of the political 
utopia, contained in The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility. But 
the problem is that this intersection does not result in a consistent argument: the two ways 
do not always seem to belong to the same street. 
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 The aim of my thesis is not to solve this problem (if a solution is ever possible). 
My purpose here is not to reconstruct the genesis and the complex structure of Walter 
Benjamin’s thought, but to draw out from some of his writings the notion of “poverty of 
experience”, which I consider key to understand the way in which Edward Hopper —who 
probably never heard about the author of “Experience and poverty”— illuminated the 
same transformations of modern age that constitute the object of Benjamin’s work. In 
other words, it is possible to interpret the notion of “poverty of experience” in the spirit 
of Benjamin’s essay on art reproducibility (and the results of this interpretation reflect an 
actual dimension of Benjamin’s conceptions), but it is also possible to make it in the 
pathway of his writings on Baudelaire7 . Indeed, my decision to follow this last path rather 
than the first is based on my confidence in that option to open more fruitful opportunities 
for art criticism, especially in the case of artists of the interwar period like Hopper. 
 
 Anyway, I shall not ignore the tensions of this interpretation with regard to the 
other option, and I will come back when necessary to these tensions, because the different 
cultural reactions to the impoverishment of experience that Benjamin registers in his 
writings, leaving aside the political issues (which will not be the matter in this thesis), 
allow to obtain an interesting map of the aesthetical conjuncture of the interwar period. 
And, to my view, this map could be specifically appropriated to the situation of visual arts 
in the first half of the twentieth century, because of the significant role that plays in it the 










                                                             
7Nevertheless, even if “On some motifs in Baudelaire” is one of the clearest and most defined texts written 
by Benjamin, ambiguity or irresolution are never completely excluded from its pages, because they are an 
integral part of the author’s style; so, my reading will be, in many points, unescapably interpretative, and 
sometimes I will go beyond Benjamin’s words, in a direction which is not the only one possible, in an 
attempt to clarify their meaning. 
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The thesis is divided into four Parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first Part 
(“Art and the poverty of experience”) is focused on the construction of the theoretical 
framework which will be the support of my approach to Hopper’s works. According to 
the twofold character of Benjamin’s approach, which I have just discussed, the first 
chapter (“The impoverishment of experience”) is an analysis of the main themes of “On 
some motifs in Baudelaire”, and the second chapter (“About cult and exhibition values”) 
is focused on The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility and the 
conceptual pair “cult value/exhibition value”, which according to Benjamin is the 
methodological key to art history. However, I shall not consider the frameworks 
developed in Part I in terms of an abstract conceptual scheme which could be 
mechanically applied to artworks, as if such works were mere illustrations of the 
theoretical device. On the contrary, I will show that not only this framework can 
illuminate the meaning of the paintings studied in the next chapters, but also such works 
can illuminate, enrich, qualify and even modify and force further developments of the 
meaning of the conceptual scheme, which after all is only a tool for interpretation. 
 
  This is made clear in Part II (“Hopper’s America”), dedicated to the identification 
of Hopper’s place in American visual arts in the early twentieth century. In chapter 3 
(“The image of America”), I will show that Benjamin’s distinction of cult and exhibition 
can acquire a richer content when referred to the debate on American artistic identity, 
which at first sight appears as a confrontation between the upholders of the primacy of 
‘life’ on art, and the defenders of art for art’s sake. From chapter 4 (“A house by the 
railroad”) onwards, every chapter will have, as its main reference, one of the major 
Hopper’s paintings (although in the argument I shall also refer to other works). In this 
case, House by the railroad will be analysed according to a provisional interpretative 
hypothesis, which will be tested in the next Parts, and which includes a tentative 
explanation of the ‘uncanny’ atmosphere that critical literature has identified in many of 
Hopper’s motifs. The main subject of Part III (“Nighthawks and painting in the age of 
technological reproducibility”) is one of the most renowned of Hopper’s paintings, 
Nighthawks. In chapter 5 (“Nighthawks: the sequels”) I will discuss the affinity of 
Hopper’s pictures with reproducible images. Because of this undeniable affinity, it has 
been frequently assumed the influence of photography and film on the painter, but this 
assumption, I shall argue, is not compatible with the fact that many of the images cited as 
an example of such influence postdate Hopper’s canvases presumably inspired by them. 
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I will suggest another way of understanding this affinity, which will lead me, in chapter 
6 (“Nighthawks: the painting”), to reformulate my interpretative hypothesis in an 
extended focus: instead of invoking an external influence of technological reproducibility 
on Hopper, I shall argue the presence of an internal cinema in his paintings. 
 
 Finally, in Part IV (“Hopper’s times”), drawing the consequences of the 
hypothesis tested in the previous Part, I shall discuss the nature of the emotional charge 
of Hopper’s images, paying special attention to the topics of “loneliness” and “alienation” 
mentioned in the beginning of this Introduction, and focusing on Hopper’s representation 
of time. In chapter 7 (“The fading of the argument”), mainly referring to Morning sun, I 
shall insist on the paradoxical coexistence, in Hopper’s paintings, of an obvious stage-
design element and an equally obvious impossibility of attaching a narrative argument to 
the scenes, this being a manifestation of the poverty of experience, so to speak, as a 
positive feature in modern art. In chapter 8 (“A little theory of windows”), centred in 
Hopper’s Sunday, I shall discuss the problems which arise in determining the quality of 
the (allegedly intense) affective mood of Hopper’s pictures in the frame of the changes 
occurred in the pictorial representation of feelings, and I shall take the risk of naming a 
Hopper emotion or, in other words, the affective mood of modernity. 
 
 Although each chapter will be accompanied by illustrations that will help to give 
a better understanding of the hypothesis proposed, there will also be an Appendix with all 
the images mentioned in the text. Unless otherwise stated, all of them are oil on canvas. 
Bibliography includes the monographs and articles used to develop the visual part of the 
dissertation, the works by and about Walter Benjamin corresponding to the theoretical 




                                                             
8As a general rule, I have used English translations of the works originally written in other language, when 
they existed and they were available for consultation. I have only resorted to German or French original 
texts to emphasise some concepts which could be ambiguous in translation (especially, in the case of 
Benjamin’s writings, Erlebnis, Erfahrung, Ferne, Abstand, etc.) or when I have quoted Baudelaire’s poems, 
whose translation is always an unfinishable task. 








  In this Part, consisting of two chapters, I shall develop the analysis of the 
impoverishment of experience in Benjamin’s writings. My aim is to construct, by means 
of this analysis, the elementary theoretical tools of the critical framework I shall use to 
analyse Hopper’s works. Some of the consequences of this critical frame will be 
elaborated throughout the progress of my argument, in an intimate connection with the 
problems awakened by the interpretation of the paintings which I will refer to. My 
proposal in this Part is to analyse the concept of poverty of experience through three 
features: (a) the transformation of the traditional idea of experience (Erfahrung) in a new 
kind of subjective perception (Erlebnis); (b) the reduction of the distances (including 
aesthetic distance) produced by the social applications of technological development; and 
(c) the failure of language traditions, that is to say, the new relationship between words 
and images created by the generalization of reproducibility; I will call this feature “the 
loss of words”, because Benjamin exemplifies it with the image of the soldiers who return 
“in silence” (verstummt) from the battlefield; but it should be noted that this does not 
mean a literal loss of words, but a cultural silence or a loss of meaning in language. The 
first feature, which will be the object of chapter 1, is the only one of the three explicitly 
advanced by Benjamin. However, I find indispensable to a wider understanding of this 
transformation to refer to the philosophical background of the concept of experience, 
which operates as an implicit assumption in Benjamin’s texts. Based on this background, 
I will try to make clear that, to my view, the impoverishment of experience is not a 
particular situation of European culture occurred in a precise moment, but a structural 
change in the conditions of experience that can be interpreted —this will be the main 
objective of chapter 1— as a change in the experience of time, something not openly 
stated by Benjamin. Moreover, I shall underline that, in “On some motifs in Baudelaire” 
(which will be my main reference text in the chapter), Benjamin’s interest is always 
centred on the consequences of such a transformation in the realm of art and poetry. 
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 Features (b) and (c) will be treated in chapter 2, where the main text considered is 
The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility. The objective of chapter 2 
is to clarify the concepts of “cult value”, and “exhibition value”, which are the centre of 
gravity of Benjamin’s essay, and which will play a major role in my thesis. I shall insist 
in the fact that Benjamin presents this foundational ambiguity of the work of art as a 
methodological instrument for art history, and I shall try to strengthen this position with 
different examples. As I have just signalled, the expressions “reduction of distances” and 
“loss of words” do not feature in Benjamin’s terminology, but they are part of my own 
approach to the impoverishment of experience. I argue that they are crucial to give this 
concept the weight that Benjamin himself assigns to it. Finally, in chapter 2 I shall also 
discuss the limitations of my commitment to Benjamin’s theory of art as presented in the 
essay on reproducibility (especially regarding the heteronomy of art that he defends). 
Nevertheless, I shall try not to make this argument it in a purely external manner, but on 
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CHAPTER 1. THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF EXPERIENCE 
 
  Benjamin does not provide a definition of experience, but he approaches the 
subject through successive examples. Considering the philosophical relevance that he 
attributes to the question, I shall draft a brief scheme of the classic concept of experience 
in western thought, to make clear from it the anthropological meaning of this 
impoverishment (“1.1. Reflecting on experience”). I shall then develop the aspect of the 
poverty of experience most openly thematised —and terminologically marked— in 
Benjamin’s writings: the transformation of the traditional experience into a new type of 
perceptual structure (“1.2. From Erfahrung to Erlebnis”). This implies a displacement 
from the original birthplace of the word “Erlebnis” to the realm of the industrial city and 
the mass culture, which will later be significant in my approach to modern visual culture 
in the twentieth century. 
 
 This process of transformation implies, firstly, the degradation of the traditional 
scope of experience, which turns into an aggressive environment in industrial cities. And, 
secondly, it involves the emergence of a protective strategy to face it, in the form of a 
systematic reconstruction of conscious perception (“1.2.1. The falsification of 
experience”). Such reconstruction might be considered as a counterfeit experience, but it 
does not diminish its practical relevance (“1.2.2. A plea for Erlebnis”). This reconstructed 
experience (Chockerlebnis) presents as an essential feature its “bad infinity”, i. e., its 
attempt to disguise finitude. This feature can be found in high culture (the mystical or 
genial effort of exceptional individuals) and in the mass entertainment. The knowledge 
gained in these sections opens the way for my most personal contribution to Benjamin’s 
interpretation: following this process of transformation as a qualitative change in the 
experience of time (“1.3. Modern times”). 
 My second aim in this chapter is to focus on the main reason which moves 
Benjamin to this reflection: the possibility of art in conditions of poverty of experience. 
Once he has defined the traditional artwork in terms of experience, the question seems 
especially difficult. The modern artist cannot turn back to the traditional experience 
(because it is damaged by the breakup of tradition), but the protective reconstruction 
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erected to manage this breakup, no matter how useful it is for practical tasks, is 
aesthetically sterile (“1.3.1. Modern beauty: a general view”). Finally, I will signal a 
difficulty in Benjamin’s writings, concerning the concept of modern beauty, its difference 
with the ancient notion of the work of art and its presumed political overcoming in an 
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1.1.REFLECTING ON EXPERIENCE 
 
 The concept of experience has a very long history in Western thought. What are 
the links of Benjamin’s notion of experience with this long tradition? Just because 
Benjamin does not offer an explicit definition of experience and does not present the 
background of the concept, I propose to take a brief look at its past in order to 
contextualize Benjamin’s reflections. In the Western philosophical tradition, 
“experience” has been understood as a kind of aptitude combining two elements: (i) the 
knowledge of individual things, and (ii) the ability to capture similitudes between them 
by accumulative memory, finding repetition patterns which allow, by means of 
imagination, the application of this knowledge to new cases. 
 
 Focusing on the first element, it could be said that an expert man is someone who 
does not speak about things based on hearsay, but someone who knows things first hand 
and deals directly with them. But the second element ensures that this immediate 
handling, stored in memory, can make it possible to assign a meaning to the perceptive 
realm. Experience is, therefore, a process of accumulative apprenticeship (storing in 
memory past experiences) which draws from the past some awareness and projects it into 
the future. This is always a “trial and error” process, because future can always disappoint 
expectations coming from the past, compelling us to change the rule we are working with. 
But the newness cannot be thought but as an unexpected phenomenon occurring in the 
background of the customary (ARISTOTLE: 1975: A). 
 
 Analytically, these two elements can be distinguished, but it is clear that the first 
one (direct contact with individual events) is not enough to define experience, because 
nobody becomes expert only through the senses. The recurrence of these sensations (or 
similar ones), and its preservation in memory, is the condition to institute rules of relation 
relations between them. These relations enrich the information derived from the punctual 
or instant sensation; and, when projected to the future as expectations, they constitute a 
piece of knowledge about the matter which goes far further than what can be obtained 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
27 
 
from the very sensation. Many of the thinkers who have written about this problem9 have 
used music as an example to show this difference: what our senses actually perceive are 
only the single notes of a melody, which have no particular meaning as such. What gives 
them a meaning, turning them into a sequence with a beginning, a middle and an ending, 
is the connection we establish between them or, as I have just said, the discovery of a rule 
of connection that, retaining what we have heard before, allows us to anticipate what we 
will listen to after and, therefore, to enrich the single notes apprehending its melodic 
sequence, in the same sense that we enrich the individual sensations and turn them into a 
meaningful experience. There is no experience without sensation, just as there is no 
melody without notes, but there would not be experience or melody if there were only 
sounds or sensations. This second element, that permits us to go beyond sensation, is 
called, in this tradition, a habit. 
 
 Moving from individual to collective range, going from philosophy to 
anthropology, habits become patterns of social action supported by pragmatic beliefs, i. 
e., shared views whose validity does not come from theoretical reflection but from 
practical efficiency. From an anthropological point of view, the whole of these patterns, 
transmitted by tradition, is what can be called culture. As such, these behaviour’s patterns 
exist as implicit rules. They are not the object of a theoretical teaching, but they are 
learned tacitly, with the exercise of a given way of life. So, experience shows from the 
beginning a chronological scheme, as it involves a connection between present 
(sensation), past (memory) and future (imagination). But, in collective terms, tradition is 
what sustains a culture in time, linking its past (stored in memory) with its future (which 
is expected to repeat such a past), in a cyclic conception of time. This is the reason why 
we often call societies which work in this way traditional societies. The connection 
between past, present and future (i. e., cultural time) is also the connection between past, 
present and future generations, which depends on the transmission of these patterns and 
on their projection to forthcoming times. As happens in musical examples, we could say 
that this cultural temporality has a narrative structure, because events occurring in it show 
meaningful connections, and are collectively experienced as a part of a whole story which 
can be told. And this narration is, in a certain sense, the narrative identity of such a culture. 
                                                             
9LOCKE: 1999: II, 28; HUME: 1896, I, II, 3; PEIRCE: 1986, 257-276; SARTRE: 2004, 192. 
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Every particular event happened to the members of this society takes part in such totality 
and finds in it its meaning. 
 To my view, in a very schematic form, this is the theoretical background in which 
Benjamin draws his concept of “poverty of experience”. Let us note that the way in which 
the advent of an industrialized way of life has forced, according to Benjamin, a 
transformation of experience, affects the two ingredients I have mentioned. On the one 
hand, it involves hypertrophy of the first element, multiplication of sensations. But these 
sensations are seldom a direct contact with natural things: they are more and more 
technologically inflected. And, on the other hand and most outstandingly, the new 
technology has caused a sort of atrophy of the second element (memory and imagination), 
which makes modern men inexpert subjects, hardly able to make sense of what they 
perceive. It seems as if it were no more possible to draw from the past a useful knowledge 
for the future, because future is no longer a cyclic repetition of past, but a constant 
breaking of the cycle. And it is as if expectations were systematically frustrated by a 
newness which, instead of appearing in the background of the usual and customary, 
happens as an unconnected event which cannot be located in the timeline chain of sense. 
If the work of memory and imagination enriched sensation in traditional societies, the 
partial atrophy of these faculties is what impoverishes experience in modern societies. 
And this impoverishment has a fundamental effect on the role of art and artists. In fact, 
the impact of the transformation of experience is so important that it turns art, which was 
a well-adapted and well-defined activity in traditional societies, into something difficult 
and exceptional. To deepen this problem, I will develop what I have defined as the first 
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1.2. FROM ERFAHRUNG TO ERLEBNIS 
 
  
 The essay “On some motifs in Baudelaire” (1939), like the one the reproducibility 
of the work of art, reflects on the condition of art in modernity. Indeed, the first seeks to 
make clear the birth of modern art, whereas the second seems to describe (or rather to 
prophesize) its death. In Benjamin’s descriptions, the foundation of modern art is a 
historic event10 . On the contrary, the end of art announced in the writing on 
reproducibility is the utopian wish for a new historical (or maybe post-historical) age. But 
the post-war world did not fulfil such utopian expectations. Therefore, the status of art in 
a post-artistic era cannot be examined, because this era has never come into existence (or, 
at least, not in the way anticipated by the utopian hope). In contrast, the foundation of 
modern art can perfectly be the object of a cultural inquiry (and this is what Benjamin 
does in studying Baudelaire’s procedures), and the knowledge so obtained about its nature 
can also help to understand the meaning of its possible decline in contemporary times. 
And the central issue in Benjamin’s essay is the role of experience in the foundation of 
modern art. So, how Benjamin understands experience? 
 
 Experience (Erfahrung) “in the strict sense of the word” means, for Benjamin, that 
the individual past reaches its complete sense when it is combined, in memory, with the 
collective past (BENJAMIN: 2006, 316). And this happens, in traditional societies, by 
means of “rituals, with their ceremonies and their festivals” in special dates of the 
religious cult calendar. The task of art and poetry is intimately linked to these rituals. 
Benjamin does not pay special attention to this issue, but what is passed by tradition in 
these ceremonies is not exactly an actual historical event, it is rather a story repeated 
through the years, which includes non-realistic elements coming, so to speak, from a 
timeless anteriority, and whose credibility relies on the authority of tradition. Poetry and 
storytelling are a part of a communicational craftsmanship which mixes everyday life 
events with miracles and wonders in a way that is only understandable in the context of 
                                                             
10According to Benjamin, the work of its main founder, Baudelaire, “cannot be categorized merely as 
historical, like anyone else’s, but it intended to be so and understood itself as such” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
318). 
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an organic community with a shared stock of accumulated lived practises and beliefs. 
Experience is “a matter of tradition, in collective existence as well as in private life. It is 
less the product of facts firmly anchored in memory than of a convergence in memory of 
accumulated and frequently unconscious data” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 314). So, it is not 
world war, economic inflation or technological development, but the complete fading of 
the traditional community produced by political and industrial revolutions in modern 
society as a whole which interrupts tradition and devaluates experience. This historical 
transformation is what Benjamin regards, probably under the influence of Lukács11, as a 
“change in the structure of experience” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 314). So, if Erfahrung is 
mainly characterized by the fusion of individual experience and collective memory, the 
modern change in the structure of experience has to be defined by the divorce between 
public and private life and by the break-up between conscious perception and implicit 
memory. 
 As I have just argued, in “On some motifs in Baudelaire”, despite its modest title, 
Benjamin’s interest is fixed in the consequences of this devaluation of experience for art 
and poetry. He argues that an activity which was perfectly integrated with the structure 
of traditional societies (BENJAMIN: 2002-1, 143-165), has become difficult in 
modernity, because its primary source (collective memory) has lost its old weight. This 
historic condition is, according to him, responsible for the progressive replacement of the 
German traditional word to name experience, Erfahrung, with the term Erlebnis (as 
enhanced by postromantic writers) since the last decades of the nineteenth century12 . It 
is remarkable that Gadamer, in Truth and Method also notes that the use of the word 
Erlebnis was generalized in high German culture from 1870 onwards, mostly because of 
the influence of vitalist thinkers, and this is especially notable in the work of Dilthey Das 
Erlebnis und die Dichtung (1905), whose ideas are based on an essay first published in 
1877 by Dilthey about Goethe. According to Gadamer, there are two main connotations 
                                                             
11Benjamin first read History and Class Consciousness in 1924, when he was in Capri, and he appreciated 
that “beginning with political reflections, Lukács comes to statements in his theory of knowledge that are 
at least partially (…) very familiar, confirming my position” (letter from Benjamin to G. Scholem, 7 July 
1924 [BENJAMIN: 1978, 350]). 
12Following the English edition of his Selected writings (BENJAMIN: 1996-2006), many commentators 
translate Erfahrung as “long (or traditional) experience” and Erlebnis as “immediate (or isolated) 
experience” (among others, for example, MCCOLE: 1993). There is no perfect translation, but, although it 
may find some support in Benjamin’s literal expressions, the election of the adjective “immediate” to render 
Erlebnis is particularly confusing, because Erlebnis, for Benjamin, involves some kind of reflection, even 
if it is an unnoticed one (BENJAMIN: 2006, 319). 
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in this term: on one hand, the rejection of the “mechanisation” of modern experience in 
artistic creation, and, on the other, a nexus with the transcendent realm; the criticism of 
industrial society, says Gadamer, turned both terms Erlebnis and Erleben into “redeemer” 
words with a religious resonance in the first years of the twentieth century (GADAMER: 
2004, 55). So, from the very first moment, the transformation is located in an aesthetic 
domain, where Erlebnis refers to an “experiencebased art” that would be the work of 
genius and which has nothing to do with the artistic procedures before Romanticism13. 
 
 
1.2.1. The falsification of experience 
 
 As I shall show, Benjamin firmly opposes to this conception of Erlebnis 
represented by the Lebensphilosophie, which he considers as a wrong reaction to the 
poverty of experience and as the intellectual origin of what he calls “the aesthetization of 
politics” — the political barbarism14. His main allegation against Erlebnis is that it is a 
somehow counterfeit experience. 
 The interlocutor chosen by Benjamin in vitalist philosophy is not Dilthey but 
Bergson, a thinker he both admires and criticizes at the same time15. For the author of The 
creative Mind (1934), “the past preserves itself by itself, automatically”16 in an 
unconscious or implicit memory which has nothing to do with the psychological faculty 
of remembering. So, there is a radical distinction between perception (which includes 
conscious remembrances) and memory, the two elements of experience I named in 
                                                             
13Gadamer remarks that, from Ancient times to Baroque, experience is irrelevant in artistic matters, since 
“it is not the genuineness of the experience or the intensity of its expression, but the ingenious manipulation 
of fixed forms and modes of statement that makes something a work of art” (GADAMER: 2004, 62). 
14Lebensphilosophie is a label referred to the anti-positivist reaction of German philosophy in the late 
nineteenth century (mainly associated with Nietzsche). In the twentieth century, it produced the 
methodological investigation about social sciences and humanities (W. Dilthey), the vitalist thought of H. 
Bergson or the radical aesthetics of Stefan George. 
15For Benjamin, Bergson represents a conservative reaction to modernity (the rejection of the 
“mechanisation of modern experience” Gadamer referred to above), which he does not share, but he 
respects the French philosopher as a necessary thinker through which to understand Proust, whom he 
considers the main disciple of Baudelaire, the genuine founder of modern art and poetry. 
16“There exists no special faculty whose role would be to retain the past in order to pour it in the present. 
The past preserves itself by itself, automatically” (BERGSON: 2002, 153). 
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“Reflecting on experience” (1.1). Perception is always selective and action-oriented, and 
we only bring back memories from the past to conscious perception when we find it useful 
for a specific action. This conscious memory, at the service of intelligence, is what Proust 
will call mémoire voluntaire (voluntary memory) or memoire de l’intelligence, “a by-
product of Bergson’s theory”, in Benjamin’s words (BENJAMIN: 2006, 316). The rest 
of the past —which is not valuable for action— remains separated from the waking 
perception, sealed off as part of what Bergson considered mémoire pure. Access to this 
pure memory is an exceptional experience (which Bergson calls durée and Benjamin 
equals to the romantic Erlebnis) requiring a special effort always related, as Gadamer 
recalled, to the figure of the genius, and therefore distanced from common experience, 
which is no longer accepted as valid for artistic creation17 . 
 So, if one accepts Bergson’s view, we should say that the creative action of the 
genial individual is the retrieval of all the lost richness of Erfahrung. But this is exactly 
what Benjamin refuses. On the contrary, he ranks Bergson’s durée as the “quintessence 
of an Erlebnis that struts about in the borrowed garb of Erfahrung” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
336). In other words, Erlebnis would not be a regaining of Erfahrung, but a falsification 
of experience, a counterfeit experience. 
 Benjamin states, in a lapidary sentence, that the reason of this artificiality is that 
death has been excluded from durée. And he quotes an article by M. Horkheimer which 
is the source of this allegation. If one reads Horkheimer’s essay, one finds a general 
protest against Bergson’s durée as a metaphysic mask of the consolatory attempt of every 
theology to offer humankind salvation from death “by means of cant about an eternal 
reality with which we could unite ourselves” (HORKHEIMER: 1934, 164-175), in tune 
with the redeemer character of Erlebnis underlined by Gadamer. In Bergson’s case, the 
eternal reality would be the continuous movement of the élan vital, the incessant and 
indivisible change of life impulse. But the question is that, even if something like this 
existed, it could not be experienced by mortal beings, precisely because of their finitude. 
So, the experience of durée can be only a fictitious experience (although a fiction with a 
psychological consolatory effect, indeed), not a real one. But Benjamin is more interested 
in another critical remark by Horkheimer: that the hypothesis of a metaphysical 
                                                             
17It is worth emphasising that Benjamin’s exposition hardly does justice to Bergson’s theory. This is even 
more striking in Horkheimer’s criticism, which I will mention here below. 
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connection of the empirical present with an eternal past includes a negation of historic 
reality. On the basis of Benjamin’s suggestions, it is possible to understand it in this way: 
the assumption that past can be fully retrieved by means of a metaphysic (or mystic) effort 
is not compatible with historical time, because events actually occurred cannot be 
recovered as experience by a merely methodological trend, but only by living tradition. 
And tradition is excluded from durée. It is excluded, among other reasons, because 
tradition implicates death (it is death what makes necessary the transmission of the 
experience to new generations). What Erlebnis conveys is not a collective historic past, 
but only a de-historicized illusion. 
 Benjamin concludes that “the durée from which death has been eliminated”, that 
is to say, the Erlebnis, “has the bad infinity of an ornament” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 336). 
This hermetic conclusion hides, in my view, two extremely important references needed 
to capture the whole reach of Benjamin’s thought: “ornament” and “bad infinity”. I will 
develop them successively. 
 Addressing first  the question of the ornament, the word itself suggests the image 
of an illusion: in an architectonic ornament, the gaze gets loose as in a labyrinth or 
arabesque, distracted and retained in an apparently endless trajectory. But the use of the 
word “ornament” can hardly be casual. In Benjamin’s intellectual constellation, 
“ornament” points, on one hand, to the work of Adolf Loos (one of the names mentioned 
in “Experience and poverty” as an example of dignified cultural poverty), who sees 
architectural ornament as the expression of a degenerated culture and conceives cultural 
evolution as a progressive removal of ornament (LOOS: 1996, 226-227); on the other 
hand, it points to the cultural critic S. Kracauer, author of The mass ornament and 
intellectually very close to Benjamin. Kracauer used “ornament” to describe the patterns 
of movement characteristic of mass culture in the 1920s (KRACAUER: 1995, 325-327). 
Furthermore, as has sometimes been observed, “ornament” ─because of its proximity to 
“entertainment”─ could be a precedent of what later on will be termed by cultural critics 
as “spectacle” (OCKMAN: 2003, 74-91). In the same way that journalism displaces 
traditional storytelling as an instrument to learn about the life of the community, modern 
visual spectacles displace sacred rituals, and in both cases they exclude the participation 
of the reader or the viewer, who plays the role of a non-involved consumer. 
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 Regarding the reference to “bad infinity”, it is clear that it comes from Hegel’s 
schlecht Unendlichkeit, a concept he formulates concerning Shelling’s philosophical 
system in 1801. Hegel represents this concept with the image of a line running ever 
onwards (like a line of numbers). He considers this line as a “spurious” image of infinity, 
because it does not contain infinity in itself, but only a constant delay of the final moment 
(that is to say, the finitude), due to the endless progression of the series18. 
 The connection between both references can be found in the Kracauer’s analysis 
of the chorus line in the shows of the Tiller Girls, which reflect the mechanized 
movements of workers on the assembly line conveyor belt. Benjamin illustrates the 
process of adaptation to this technological second nature with two paradigms of the 
constant “sudden start” of modern life in the nineteenth century: the in-experience of the 
worker with the machine (as described by Marx), and the in-experience of the gambler 
(as described by Baudelaire)19. The comparison is relevant, because in both cases the 
timing of the activity requires a sequence of sudden starts without accumulation of 
experience. No matter how many times the game or the task is repeated, there are no 
earnings (what is gained in one round is lost in the next ones), as in Dostoyevsky’s The 
gambler, (DOSTOYEVSKY: 1996, original edition 1866): it is as if the aim of the game 
was losing or, rather, just “the process of continually starting over”. And Benjamin 
concludes that this isomorphism has been continued by the technological developments 
of the twentieth century: “What determines the rhythm of production on a conveyor belt 
is the same thing that underlies the rhythm of reception in the film” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
328). In a certain sense, all these movements are figures of the Hegelian straight line ever 
pushing forward in an infinite progression, and both conjure away the fact of death (they 
are potentially never-ending movements). It could be said that this bad or ornamental 
                                                             
18On the contrary, the “true infinity” (wahrhaft Unendlichkeit) could be represented by a circle without end 
or beginning, which is actually infinite because it is a completed totality (HEGEL: 1988). The origin of this 
Hegelian distinction is in the “Letter XII” of Spinoza, in which he defines the “false infinity” as the one 
constructed as an interminable addition of finite segments (SPINOZA: 1982, 231-235, letter dated 26-7-
1663). 
19“The jolt in the movement of a machine is like the so-called coup in a game of chance. The hand 
movement of the worker at the machine has no connection with the preceding gesture for the very reason 
that it repeats that gesture exactly. Since each operation at the machine is just as screened off from the 
preceding operation as a coup in a game of chance is from the one that preceded it, the drudgery of the 
laborer is, in its own way, a counterpart to the drudgery of the gambler. Both types of work are equally 
devoid of substance” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 330). We find the same remark in Kracauer, who observes the 
“lack of substantive meaning over and above” in the disciplined movement of modern dancing 
(KRACAUER: 1995, 67). 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
35 
 
infinite is also a perverse eternity, like a perpetual condemnation or life imprisonment. 
Some important remarks concerning the “elimination of death” or the dissimulation of 
finitude can be found in “The Storyteller”, where Benjamin says that the industrial 
revolution has changed the face of death, and “this change is identical with the one that 
has diminished the communicability of experience”. In ancient times, dying was a social 
event: it happened in a room of the house but it was a public fact integrated with the life 
of the community. Modern society is, in contrast, organized to avoid the sight of death, 
which takes place in hospitals, far from public scene, and thus rooms in houses “have 
never been touched by death”, so their inhabitants are “dry dwellers of eternity” 
(BENJAMIN: 2002-1, 151) in a space and a time without traces of the past. This 
“elimination of death”, whether in popular fantasy or in metaphysical systems, whether 
in private rooms or in factories and theatres, is a characteristic feature of Erlebnis, which 
always masks its lack of experiential reality with the bad infiniteness of a substitute and 
ornamental (but, ultimately, false) eternity. But this falsification of experience has 
powerful practical roots. I shall comment on these roots in the following section. 
 
 
1.2.2. A plea for Erlebnis 
 
 On the basis of the preceding arguments, one might conclude that Benjamin 
intellectually condemns this conception of experience as a theoretical mistake, so that the 
poverty of experience could be overcome restoring the correct concept. But it is important 
to signal that this is not the case: cultural poverty is a frame of experience, and the frames 
of experience cannot be removed by means of theoretical effort. This issue is, in my 
opinion, decisive for an understanding of Benjamin’s seemingly ambiguous position 
regarding the poverty of experience (Is he against or in favour of it?). 
 In “On some motifs in Baudelaire”, Benjamin, familiar with the nineteenth-
century literature he had at hand in the National Library of Paris, makes an effort to look 
at the decline of traditional community through the gaze of the first occupants of industrial 
cities, often tinted with a nostalgic idealization of the virtues of pre-industrial world of 
Kultur, which did not seem then as far as it will do in the twentieth century. And he also 
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describes the essential items of modern society with the dramatic images taken from the 
shocked impressions of those who watched them for the first time in the early years of 
the industrial revolution: “Fear, revulsion and horror were the emotions which the big-
city crowd aroused in those who first observed it”. This is the condition that in 
“Experience and poverty” appears as a new state of barbarism that forces men to “start 
from zero”20 . The modern city crowd is yet another symbol of the bad infinity or the false 
eternity: walking silhouettes, apparently repeated, follow each other in a series of separate 
and potentially infinite images, like pieces on the assembly line or dancers in the chorus 
line. 
 Horror, revulsion and melancholy facing the “denatured life of civilized masses” 
and “the alienating, blinding experience of the age of the large-scale industrialism” are 
the motivations which led Bergson and others philosophers of life to reject this world 
without experience and to take shelter in “a complementary experience, in the form of its 
spontaneous afterimage, as it were” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 314). This complementary 
experience is Erlebnis, which they claim to be the true experience. For Benjamin, in 
contrast, Erlebnis is not a way of rescuing the lost tradition, but the sure signal of its 
impoverishment. The role that the mystic, aesthetic or metaphysic Erlebnis plays in high 
culture is played by the ornaments and spectacles of mass culture in popular 
entertainment, including the superstitious phenomena listed by Benjamin in “Experience 
and poverty”: “astrology and the wisdom of yoga, Christian Science and chiromancy, 
vegetarianism and gnosis” (BENJAMIN: 1996-7, 732). They are attempts to defend 
oneself from the “horror” of an environment where learning from experience has become 
impossible because the series of events starts from zero at every moment, leaving no place 
for accumulation in memory. 
 In this way, Benjamin gives back Bergson’s thought the historical background 
from which it was trying to escape. Following this interpretation, it could be said that the 
radical separations between past and present or between memory and perception are not 
                                                             
20Many times, when confronted to these paragraphs by Benjamin, contemporary readers may feel that these 
expressions are poetic exaggerations of the experience of modernity, which today do not appear so shocking 
to urban people in the post-industrial cities. But it is also possible that this impression is the result of an 
increasing of the discipline routines which we have unconsciously assumed as normal, and to which we 
have got used by training. In this sense, the exaggerated expressions used by Benjamin could be the 
reminder of a specific suffering of modernization that we ─the inhabitants of the modern world, exercised 
in accepting the poverty of experience─ have forgotten, but which is not less real for that reason. 
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ontological structures, but historical effects of the dissolution of experience (Erfahrung) 
“in the strict sense of the word”. They are, indeed, the historical consequences of the 
break-up of the links between the individual experience and the collective one. This 
rupture is materialized in the divorce between the internal experience (now understood as 
the private experience of an isolated individual) and the external one. The external realm, 
in modern societies, abandons the pattern of traditional storytelling and adopts the 
discourse of information, characteristic of history, journalism, nature sciences and 
technology. The need for objectivity in the informative discourse forces it to appear as 
something independent from both the storyteller’s and the reader’s experience. This 
discourse, in Benjamin’s terms, informs us about the past, but does not transmit it: life 
lessons cannot be extracted from it. This is why Benjamin identifies the hegemony of this 
informative discourse with the atrophy of storytelling that is, ultimately, the atrophy of 
experience (Erfahrung) understood as Kultur or tradition. So, when calling attention to 
the divorce between perception and memory, Bergson, without being aware of it, 
witnesses the fact that industrial society requires systematically a conscious attention that 
is constantly orientated to action, in tune with the recognised hyperactivity of modern life. 
And this privileging of action is what blocks what Proust called “involuntary memory” 
and impoverishes experience. So, taking into account this amendment, Benjamin accepts 
Bergson’s critique of the scientific image of the world, which, rather than representing 
movement as a continuity, arrests it dividing it into single points. That is exactly what 
constitutes the snapping of the photographic camera: photography, so to speak, is a 
representation of movement wholly adapted to the nature of the mechanical rhythm which 
governs modern cities. And this is also the reason why the modern representation of 
movement as a succession of stops, materialized in movies ─photograms in motion─, is 
considered by Bergson a false movement. What Benjamin does not accept in Bergson’s 
thought is the French philosopher’s metaphysical alternative to this impoverishment of 
experience, i. e., the durée, this Erlebnis that pretends to be Erfahrung. 
 It is clear, thus, that Erlebnis is not exactly a theoretical error about the nature of 
experience, but a practical reaction to protect oneself against its impoverishment. Rather, 
it does not eliminate the poverty, but acts only as a compensation for it. This is more 
clearly expressed in what Benjamin calls the concept of Erlebnis “in the strict sense” 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 318), which he constructs by repeating the process of “re-
historization” operated with Bergson’s thought with regard to the thesis of Freud in 
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Beyond the pleasure principle (FREUD: 1990) concerning traumatic neurosis. As Freud’s 
essay was written in 1920, it sometimes refers to the “war neurosis” appeared after the 
First World War, which can be considered as the psychopathological version of the 
speechless soldiers described by Benjamin in “Experience and poverty”. Freud defines 
consciousness as a psychic defensive mechanism against potentially traumatic 
experiences. This conscious activity operates a reconstruction of experience, excluding 
from it the problematic ingredients, which become unconscious and leave traces of their 
suppression in the form of blank spaces in personal biography. The outcome of this 
reconstruction is Erlebnis, that is to say, private experience: an impoverished and, to a 
certain extent, mutilated version of the experience. But, for Benjamin, these statements 
cannot be understood as mere affirmations about the structure of the psychic system. They 
have to be historically contextualized. It is not plausible that the normal operation of 
conscious intelligence had been turned into this defensive mechanism unless we assume 
that the experience of the shock had become historically the rule of perception in the 
collective life21. So, it is required to deepen this concept of shock, which plays such an 












                                                             
21I will propose a broader development of this theme in the fourth chapter. 
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1.3. MODERN TIMES 
 
 Which are the events that Benjamin calls “shocks”? It would result in a poor 
conception, completely unsatisfactory to understand Benjamin’s reflections, if they were 
reduced to physical upsets (in traffic or in factories) or to psychic traumas. As I suggested 
above, my main hypothesis in this chapter is that, when Benjamin speaks about an 
experience for which exposure to shock has become the norm, he refers, more or less 
consciously, to the habitual modern experience of time. In this sense, I should like to 
emphasise that the aforementioned Hegelian straight line of the bad infinity is the 
privileged image of time in modern culture: each second of this time is a finite point of 
the potentially infinite line, which jumps as the second hand on the clock face in the first 
image of Chaplin’s Modern times (1936). Every second is exactly alike the previous and 
the next ones; but it is also completely different and new, because the points of the line, 
as the jumps of the second hand of the clock, are not continuous but contiguous: one is 
next to another, but they are not connected, and each one starts only when the previous 
one has finished. 
 
 There is a philosophical tradition of this image of time. In the Critique of pure 
reason, Kant remarks that, although the straight line is a good metaphor for temporality, 
it is an imperfect comparison: the parts of the line are always simultaneous (they happen 
at the same time, and this makes the solid continuity of the line), whereas the instants of 
time are successive, and one comes only when the previous one has ceased (KANT: 1998, 
180, original edition 1781). Some years before, in 1739, Hume had written: “’Tis a 
property inseparable from time, and which in a manner constitutes its essence, that each 
of its parts succeeds another, and that none of them, however contiguous, can ever be co-
existent. For the same reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 
1738, every moment must be distinct from, and posterior or antecedent to another. ’Tis 
certain then, that time, as it exists, must be compos’d of indivisible moments” (HUME: 
1896, I, 31). But he also gave a pictorial explanation of the illusion of continuity that 
Bergson will call the cinematographic illusion: “If you wheel about a burning coal with 
rapidity, it will present to the senses an image of a circle of fire; nor will there seem to be 
any interval of time betwixt its revolutions; merely because ’tis impossible for our 
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perceptions to succeed each other with the same rapidity, that motion may be 
communicated to external objects”. (HUME: 1896: I, 35). This illusion, in Benjamin’s 
terms, fills with imaginary data the blank spaces. 
 
 But, if we deactivate this illusion, each jump is a sudden start (and a sudden end), 
and there are always blank spaces between them22. These meaningless intervals turn every 
second into a possible shock, a death menace ("Three thousand six hundred times an hour, 
the second-hand / Whispers: 'Remember!'”, writes Baudelaire in The Flowers of Evil 
[1857]): every finite point of the series could be the last (and, in a certain sense, is the 
last… and the first one). And the shock can only be cushioned by the arrival of the next 
point of the series, which, simulating infinity, denies finitude for the moment and 
displaces anxiety to the next one, whose occurrence is a new temporary conjuration of 
death, a new Chockerlebnis, as happens in the “Alabama Song” from Bertolt Brecht’s 
Mahagonny (1927): 
 
Well, show me the way 
To the next whisky bar. 
Oh, don’t ask why. 
Oh don’t ask why. 
For, if we don’t find 
The next whisky bar, 
I tell you we must die (BRECHT: 2012, 14) 
 
 The operations —mentioned by Benjamin— of triggering, snapping, switching, 
pressing (today we could add “clicking”) or shooting (a film or a gun) are all of them 
allegories of these jumps of la Seconde. As Bergson would have claimed, this is a 
mechanical time or a false movement, made of stops and starts (that is how Bergson refers 
to cinema), artificially fabricated and different from the continuous time of the spirit and 
the nondivisible movement of organic life. But, for modern cities inhabitants, machines 
are the actual producers of this new kind of social time, the time of inexperience, in which 
                                                             
22This image of time is opposed to the one of the “true infinity”, i.e., the circle (the usual symbol of time in 
ancient societies) and the wheel of the year, where meteorological seasons merge with cult calendars. In 
the circle, movement is continuous and events do not come simply one after the other, but one as a 
consequence of the other: spring is born from winter, and the beginning of every turn is not a start form 
zero but the progression of a one and only process. It is not the image of a series, but the one of a totality. 
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the qualitative differences of the seasons and the sacred cults associated to them are 
abolished. Benjamin says that the activities of the industrial worker and the gambler, 
“forced to march to the beat of the second hand” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 331), are devoid of 
substance. In the same sense, it could be said that this mechanical time is empty and has 
no meaning, but precisely for this reason it can receive any content and any meaning23. 
 As I suggested in “Reflecting on experience” (1.1.), in Benjamin’s conception the 
experience of time in traditional societies takes the form of a narrative chain which 
connects past and present, and in this way experience “fills and articulates time” 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 331). When this articulation is broken or damaged, the circle of time 
loses its consistency and turns into the bad infinity of the potentially interminable straight 
line, which continuously produces empty intervals that cannot be filled by memory. Only 
if events repeat themselves cyclically like the seasons, the experience of the previous 
generations can be useful for the next ones. But this is not the case when time runs in a 
line infinitely flowing from past to future and with no path of return, where every event 
must be immediately forgotten and forever lost to let the consciousness pay all its 
attention to the next one. 
 The defensive strategy of Erlebnis —i. e., the selective and pragmatic 
reconstruction of the time-line of the past, suppressing from it the dangerous or aggressive 
ingredients of actual experience which do not fit in such anxiolytic version— is a highly 
efficient one to parry the shocks of the mechanical-linear time. If these advantages seem 
to remain unnoticed to Benjamin’s eyes, it is because, as I claimed above, the main 
objective of “On some motifs in Baudelaire” concerns this question: is art possible in 
modern society? How can art and poetry exist in the new conditions of cultural poverty 
created by the change in the structure of experience? And the first step taken by Benjamin 
to answer this question is that, leaving aside its indisputable performance to make the new 
                                                             
23In correspondence with the military image of “marching to the beat of the second hand”, Kracauer wrote 
that modern social dancing has been reduced to a mere “marking of time” and “tends to become a 
representation of rhythm as such” (KRACAUER: 1995, 66). For him, the ultimate goal of this aimless 
“system” would be to reduce human movements to the rhythm of machinery. The impossibility to perfectly 
accomplish this goal is the source of the incurable anxiety of modern people and, perhaps, the reason why 
psychoanalysis, in charge of the treatment of this anxiety and its consequences, can be, like Freud wrote in 
1937, “interminable” (FREUD: 2012, 373-405). 
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experience of time manageable, the anaesthetic product resultant of this process —
Erlebnis— is “sterilized” and worthless for poetic experience24. 
 Summarizing the conclusions reached up till now, I have shown that what 
Benjamin is thinking under the name of Poverty or experience is the process of erosion 
suffered by the traditional structures that make sense out of one’s existence in society. He 
calls Erfahrung the core of this process, that is to say, the way in which the individual 
connects his own experience with the collective memory stored by cultural transmission. 
Thus, the bonds of the shared present with the also shared past and future, constitute the 
whole meaning of experience in its traditional sense. When the emergence of large-scale 
industrialism begins to erode these links, experience is broken in two halves: on one hand, 
the public realm, so far identified with the commonplace of Kultur, acquires the form of 
an unspeakable present without past or future, giving rise to a new experience of time, 
strongly symbolised by modern machines and industrial technology. On the other hand, 
memory and imagination, having lost their ties to the collective tradition, become the 
elements of private experience, Erlebnis, the new scene where such a detached subject 
tries to rebuild the meaning of experience, continuously denied by the mechanized time 
of perception. 
 But the relevant issue is that the transmission of experience was the first function 
of art and poetry in traditional societies, which explains why they become problematic 
when such a transmission is interrupted or damaged. How could art and poetry be possible 
when experience has become a succession of shocks starting and vanishing at every 
moment? How to speak of transmission of experience if it has been suppressed from the 
ordinary perception of reality and from the ordinary communication of such reality? On 
one hand, as I have explained, Benjamin rejects ahistorical attempts to retrieve lost 
experience by metaphysical or mystical means: when the past is a historical past, we 
cannot return to it by a voluntary effort, no matter how exceptional this effort may be (in 
other words: we cannot ignore death); it only can be recollected by tradition. But, on the 
other hand, he recognizes that the transmission of tradition is broken (or, at least, seriously 
                                                             
24It must be recognized that Benjamin's intuition has been somehow corroborated through the evolution of 
the term “Erlebnis”, that has gone from having some aesthetic and religious resonances during the 
nineteenth century to become a fetish term in contemporary advertising, as when a certain good is presented 
as an unvergessliches Erlebnis (unforgettable experience). 
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damaged) by the “large-scale industrialism”, and this break-up constitutes the poverty of 
experience. So, once again, how can art and poetry be possible in modern times? 
 In the context of Benjamin’s writings on Baudelaire, this problem seems to have 
only two possible solutions. The first one, which he relates to the romantic image of the 
genius and to the Lebensphilosophie of Dilthey or Bergson, consists of conceiving the 
artistic (and philosophic) activity as a privileged (but nonetheless private) kind of 
experience which would be able to restore the links with the lost memory (now considered 
beyond historical time), and therefore a spiritual shelter from the new mechanized 
experience of time. As shown in Benjamin’s attitude regarding Bergson, he judges this 
solution as a conservative or backward response to the poverty of experience. The second 
one, which he exemplifies with Baudelaire’s poetry, is to a certain extent the opposite. 
Instead of rejecting the modern experience of time, Baudelaire submerges himself in it to 
show at the same time the destruction of the experience (Erfahrung), of which he is a 
witness, and the extreme penury of the attempts to compensate it (Erlebnis), filling his 
writings with the ambiguous feeling of desolate complicity with the modern urban crowd. 
This is, for Benjamin, the key to the fact that his work (although with some delay) finally 
reached the modern readers and became a leading model for modern lyric poetry. The 
(posthumous) universal acknowledgement of The Flowers of Evil and his poetic prose as 
peak paradigms of modern writing is the historic evidence from which Benjamin tries to 




1.3.1. Modern beauty: a general view 
 
 In formal terms, the scheme of Baudelaire’s procedure is clear: if Erlebnis is what 
sterilizes experience for poetry, the pathway to free experience from this anaesthesia is 
“the emancipation from Erlebnisse” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 318). But, as it has been shown 
above, if the protective shell of this defensive mechanism is removed, perception faces 
directly a Chockerfahrung, the nude experience of shock and of the blank spaces that ruin 
the plausibility of the selective reconstruction. 




 It could be said that the accomplished poem is the victory over such an enemy (the 
“sudden start”), but not in the sense that the poem overcomes the shock or the blank 
spaces; as I have claimed, there is not, in this context, an overcoming of the poverty of 
experience; rather, the victory means the ability of making poems with these shocks (not 
only about them): “Blank spaces hovered before him, and into these he inserted his 
poems” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 318). Baudelaire submerges himself in the mechanical 
rhythm, he dances marking the time, marching to the beat of the second hand, faces the 
“fear and revulsion” that the philosophers of life rejected but, so to speak, manages to 
sing off-beat, to inject the words of the poem in the interval between the beats, at the 
moment of anxiety unregistered by the clock and erased by the Erlebnis (the moment 
when it is not yet sure that there will be another second, another point in the line)25. This 
is why Baudelaire’s verses have often the urgency of anxiety: their rhythm is made of 
subterranean shocks that collapse words. 
  Nevertheless, the success of this experiment is never granted: it does not depend 
on a voluntary effort, but upon chance. The division of the year into days of labour and 
cult dates or days of recollection is typical of traditional societies, in whose calendars 
“spaces for recollection are left blank, as it were, in the form of holydays” (BENJAMIN: 
2006, 336). This division is lost in modern times, in which every second is exactly similar 
to the previous one and to the next one. The chance of a victory over the shocks, the 
possibility of making poems with them, depends on the discovery of what Baudelaire 
calls correspondances. In Benjamin’s analysis, these correspondances have nothing to do 
with the mystic or synesthetic interpretation that the symbolist poets made of them, but 
refer to the ruins of the ritual cult elements that, as the lost halo of the poet in the prose 
piece by Baudelaire which closes Benjamin’s essay, have fallen “in the mire of the 
macadam” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 342). These are the above mentioned “non-realistic 
elements” that the collective memory of traditional communities enclosed in its tales. 
Such elements have become implausible in modern societies and have been removed out 
of their old temples. The casual finding of one of these ruins, dispersed in the dirty streets 
of the city, is what gives the poet the opportunity of inserting a poem in the blank space 
                                                             
25Many years after, in the comic realm, the character of Charlot will practise the same “method” in Modern 
times, when, after having strictly adapted his body to the hysterical rhythm of the conveyor belt, gets a 
victory over the assembly line inserting a piece of “free time” within the iron discipline of the factory. 
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between two beats (or two seconds of the clock, two photograms of the film, two pieces 
of the conveyor belt, two dancers of the chorus line, two sterilized rooms, two faces in 
the urban crowd…). And this finding is what makes appear a holyday at the core of the 
bad infinity of labouring days or a miracle in the course of a time that has abolished 
miracles. 
 Some lines of “Experience and poverty” are repeated in “The Storyteller”. But 
there is a remarkable variation. In “Experience and poverty”, Benjamin said: “We have 
become impoverished” (BENJAMIN: 1996-7, 735), in the sense of «impoverished in 
experience». In “The Storyteller”, the sentence Arm sind wir geworden is transformed in 
sind wir an merkwürdigen Geshichten arm, “we have become poor in noteworthy stories” 
(BENJAMIN: 2002-1, 147). The noteworthy is not only the strange or the curious, but 
also the miracles and wonders that I have referred to above, which were an important 
element of traditional storytelling26 . Benjamin suggests that Baudelaire’s 
correspondances are precisely the ruins of such miracles and wonders excluded from 
nature and from society by the modern organization of time, the rags of the holidays and 
the cult dates omitted when calendars became timetables and schedules. The activity of 
perception and language during the working days is the Erlebnis, the heavy task of joining 
the instants of time trying to reconstruct with them a plausible and comforting time-line. 
But the unscheduled finding of a holyday is something that cannot be nor absolutely 
discarded neither absolutely planned (“They are days of recollection, not marked by any 
Erlebnis. They are not connected with other days, but stand out from time”, BENJAMIN, 
2006, 333). The “involuntary memory” of these secret dates, as practised by Proust, would 
be, for Benjamin, the sequel of Baudelaire’s procedure and the core of “modern beauty” 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 333) in contrast with the ancient one27. For the protagonist of Á la 
                                                             
26In the days of his investigations on the Trauerspiel, Benjamin had a great admiration for Carl Schmitt’s 
theory of sovereignty, and probably took from his works the idea that, as the information discourse has 
banished the wonderful and the marvellous for being implausible in modern communication, modern 
science has eliminated the miracle from nature and the exception from human social life: “This pattern of 
thinking (…) is based in the rejection of all “arbitrariness” and attempts to banish from the realm of the 
human mind every exception” (SCHMITT: 2005, 41, original edition 1922). 
27The allusion to this “secret dates” of history is also a favourite theme of J.L. Borges. The official dates of 
modern history are, for Borges, fabricated or simulated by governments by means of propaganda in the 
style of Cecil B. DeMille, and “have less relation with history than with journalism”. The secret side of 
history is “more modest and (…) its essential dates may be, for a long time, secret (…) by its own anomaly”. 
And art and poetry are the instruments of detection of these unnoticed dates (BORGES: 1964, 167). The 
connection with Benjamin is clearly established in JENCKES: 2007, 107. 
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recherche du temps perdu, over many years, his memories of Combray, where he had 
spent his childhood, were poor and undefined images: in Benjamin’s terms, they informed 
him about Combray, but they did not transmit to him the experience of his infancy. We 
could say that his experience of Combray was impoverished. And, although for Proust 
the rescue of the “true memory” of the past is the task of the poetic or artistic work, it 
only happens after the casual encounter with a humble madeleine, which acts as the 
‘magic object’ that assures the contact with the transcendent realm in ancient societies, 
as if poetry had recovered the ritual character of the “ceremonies and festivals” of the 
traditional community. 
 But I would like to point out that the comparison with old rituals can only be 
metaphorical: Proust’s character is, like Baudelaire himself, an enlightened citizen, a 
private individual living in a modern city, and his condition of poet or writer does not 
exclude him from his historic context. So, how can be interpreted the references to the 
“lost object” in which lies the power of the “true memory”, waiting for the unplanned 
arrival of the poet as the Sleeping Beauty waits for the kiss of the Prince?28 The question 
is important, because if the expressions “modern poet” or “modern artist” are not 
contradictory (i.e., if it is possible to be modern and, moreover, a poet), their meaning 
cannot be a return to the rituals and beliefs of the pre-modern culture. But Benjamin does 







                                                             
28When it comes to the references to the “magic object” rescued by the poet in his verses, it could be 
objected that these sentences belong to the realm of poetry: we no longer believe in the existence of “magic 
objects” with the miraculous power of interrupting historic time. Rather, we moderns are persuaded that it 
is the poet’s gaze or the aesthetic appreciation what constitutes the artistic condition. However, there is 
something important in the insistence of Benjamin in characterizing the modern artist’s work as 
“involuntary”. The modern poet and the modern painter are no longer semi-gods or genial individuals who 
could invest arbitrarily objects with the aesthetic condition. 
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1.3.2. Modern beauty: a conflict of interpretations 
 
 If, looking for more precision, one moves to The work of art in the age of its 
technological reproducibility, one finds that “ancient beauty” is, for Benjamin, associated 
with religious beliefs and ritual practices. The beauty of ancient icons is, so to speak, the 
gaze that Gods focus on them29. Benjamin, like many other authors, assumes that the 
modern conception of the artwork results from the secularization of practises that, before 
the Renaissance, only took place in the realm of religious or magic rituals. Indeed, 
Benjamin seems to underline continuity rather than signalling differences: “the earliest 
artworks originated in the service of rituals —first magical, then religious. And it is highly 
significant that the artwork's auratic mode of existence is never entirely severed from its 
ritual function” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 105). But, does this mean that the artistic value of 
a modern artwork somehow derives from the sacred value of the cult objects in ancient 
practices, which live on in the profane cult or secular worship of beauty, and “prevailed 
during three centuries”? Of course, it could be said, as Benjamin suggests, that art has its 
own sacred places (Museums and Galleries), its own rituals (the exhibitions) and its own 
magicians and priests (artists and critics). But it is at least problematic to overlook the 
substantive difference between the (magic or sacred) cult value and the (profane or 
secular) artistic value, especially taking into account that the aesthetic appreciation has 
been constructed in relationship with the great social, political, economic, technological 
and cultural revolutions which configured modern world by means of a breakup of 
traditions coming from Ancient times. These revolutions include, as a distinguishing 
mark, the separation of the civil and the religious jurisdictions. Although it could be said 
(metaphorically) that art is the religion of modern world, artworks its cult objects, and 
museums its cathedrals, we cannot forget the connection of art as a social institution with 
the project of the Enlightenment as a whole and, specifically, the separation of powers, 
which does not only refer to political powers, but also to the autonomy of the diverse 
fields of human action, including the aesthetic sphere. On the contrary, Benjamin seems 
                                                             
29“Icons—the Christ in triumph in the vault at Daphnis or the admirable Byzantine mosaics—undoubtedly 
have the effect of holding us under their gaze. We might stop there, but were we to do so we would not 
really grasp the motive that made the painter set about making this icon (…). What makes the value of the 
icon is that the god it represents is also looking at it. It is intended to please God. At this level, the artist is 
operating on the sacrificial plane—he is playing with those things, in this case images, that may arouse the 
desire of God” (LACAN: 1981, 113). 
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to suggest that art’s autonomy —which finds in Baudelaire one of its founding heroes— 
is only a “semblance” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 109), because art always has “its basis in 
cult”. But, what is the meaning of “cult” when speaking of the aesthetic value of modern 
artworks? According to Benjamin, the dependence of the artwork on religious ritual is 
“parasitic” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 106), which seems to presume that the ritual is not its 
correct place. On the contrary, in the post-modern world which Benjamin announces at 
the end of this essay, the work of art will no longer depend upon rituals, but on politics. 
Is politics then its proper cultural place? This seems to be suggested in such an essay. But 
this creates a great problem: in the ritual realm, the objects which we now consider 
artworks were not yet so, precisely because of their exclusive sacred character. In the 
utopian coming world, in contrast, they will not be artworks anymore, because in such a 
world art will disappear as an autonomous cultural sphere separated from life, dissolving 
itself in politics. So, “modern beauty” —this moment in which artworks no longer depend 
on religion but still do not depend on politics— could be, perhaps, the only “non-
parasitic” location of artworks, when they acquire the aesthetical autonomy characteristic 
of the Enlightenment project (BOURDIEU:1996, 60-68). But, of course, Benjamin does 
not say that. 
 It is very possible that Benjamin would not have shared this opinion, but I am 
quite sure of what is the “real” term of which all these expressions —correspondances, 
magic objects, halos, secret dates, cult ruins and madeleines— are metaphors: the modern 
reader, or the modern viewer. The fortunate discovery by the poet or the painter is not 
even a mere word or a simple image, but the unexpected revelation of a reader or a viewer 
able to correspond to such words or images. This reader is shaded and hidden in the 
anonymity of the crowd, he or she has no name, and this is why the possibility of reaching 
him or her is always uncertain. But, if the reader is finally met, the frightened scream the 
poet exclaims before being beaten by the crowd (BENJAMIN: 2006, 319) would have 
become the word of a language shared by this modest community. And this also means 
that the “nonrealistic elements” I have alluded to cannot be the ritual objects of a 
homogenous traditional community: because the reader or the viewer the artist looks for 
is not necessarily a member of the group sharing the same habits and beliefs, but an 
unknown and faceless passer-by, the words and images capable of detecting such a 
community have to achieve a level of universality incomparably superior to the 
acquaintance granted in the “rituals and festivals” . 
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 By contrast, reading The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility 
one might have the impression that there is no essential change in the status of artworks 
from prehistory to the nineteenth century, as if modern world —in which painting or 
poetry are no longer at the service of religion or magic— had no relevance for the 
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  In The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility, Benjamin makes 
an original approach to the theory of art, which mainly consists of his distinction between 
cult value and exhibition value, conceived as the two poles of a tension that defines the 
work of art. My aim in this chapter is to clarify as far as I can this distinction, because I 
shall use it as a theoretical frame in the following chapters, relating it to Hopper's works 
and testing it in this way. Although Benjamin’s essay is, without any doubt, the most 
published and cited of Benjamin’s works, to my mind it has rarely been noted that, in it, 
he considers this polarity as a methodology for the history of art, and therefore as the 
distinctive mark of the artworks belonging to such history, which could be called 
historical artworks. I will accept this proposal for the period corresponding to the object 
of my research, but to give more consistency to this approach, my first contribution in 
this chapter (section “2.1. Benjamin as an art historian”) will reconstruct the operation of 
this polarity in different periods of the history of art, based on the footnotes of the essay 
on reproducibility as well as on other essays, since he did not develop this project in 
detail. This is the reason why the first section is divided in two subsections (2.1.2. and 
2.1.3.), corresponding to ancient and early modern times. 
 
 But later modern times, which would be the next episode of such a history of art, 
are nearly absent from the essay on reproducibility. This interruption of art history 
(section 2.2.) has to do with the fact that, although Benjamin speaks of “artworks”, for 
him technologically reproducible images are progressively devoid of cult value and, 
therefore, they are in fact excluded from art history. Indeed, the artworks of the future, 
which according to him will be exclusively appreciated in terms of their exhibition value, 
are posthistorical works. I shall argue that Benjamin’s polarity of antinomic values is so 
well articulated that, when the opposition is resolved in favour of one of the poles, the 
meaning of both values becomes more and more confused. Some of Benjamin’s 
theoretical positions which are problematic from the standpoint I have taken in this thesis, 
will be examined in section 2.3. (“The obligatory misunderstanding”), which constitutes 
a second contribution to the interpretation of Benjamin’s writings on art. The main 
problematic question concerns art’s autonomy. Taking into account the leading role that 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
51 
 
Benjamin ascribes to the Baudelairean conception of art in “On some motifs in 
Baudelaire”, and considering that Baudelaire was, as Pierre Bourdieu has emphasised, 
one of the founding heroes of the struggle for art’s autonomy in modern European culture, 
how does this square with Benjamin’s position that art should be in the service of left 
politics? I think that Benjamin’s ideological approach leads him to overlook certain 
aspects of the opposition of cult and exhibition in modern art, and I shall develop some 
of these issues beyond Benjamin’s assumptions. I shall argue that the opposition can be 
useful to enrich the understanding of the debates on realism and on the relationship 
between form and content, which were so relevant in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, when artists claimed the autonomy of the artistic form regarding any 
content or subject.  
 
 These developments will allow me to present a third contribution, oriented to a 
wider interpretation of the impoverishment of experience through two new features, 
which I shall add to the transformation of Erfahrung in Erlebnis treated in the previous 
chapter. I will call the first one the reduction of distances (section 2.2.1.), which is to a 
certain extent terminologically marked in Benjamin’s texts by the opposition between the 
words Ferne (remoteness) and Abstand (distance). The second one, which I will call the 
loss of words (subsection 2.3.2.), is not clearly expressed by Benjamin, but only briefly 
mentioned when comparing the titles of paintings and the photo captions or filmic 
subtitles. However, I think that this observation opens the door to a very important aspect 
of the poverty of experience connected to the new relationship between words and images 
introduced by the reproduction devices and, in a way rarely noticed by Benjamin, by the 
appearance of paintings whose contents are not (in whole or in part) translatable to words. 
Bearing in mind that these are the three major issues I shall develop in this chapter, I will 
begin reviewing Benjamin’s vision of the history of western art to make clear the 
continuity of the opposition “cult/exhibition” and to draw out in the process some aspects 
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2.1. BENJAMIN AS AN ART HISTORIAN 
 
 Benjamin summarizes the originality of the approach to art contained in his essay 
in these sentences: 
 
 Art History might be seen as the working out of a tension between two polarities 
within the artwork itself, its course being determined by shifts in the balance between 
the two. These two poles are the artwork’s cult value and its exhibition value 
(BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 106). 
 
 However, the terms “cult value” and “exhibition value” appear only in the sixth 
section of the essay30 . Before this, without using the term “cult value”, Benjamin does 
speak of cult, and in connection with this he develops some key notions for what follows. 
The most important is the authenticity of the original piece, the whole history of which 
(including physical and legal changes) is attested by tradition. And he opposes this 
originality to the lack of authority of reproductions made by hand, which risk being 
considered as forgery. He refers to “the unique value of the ‘authentic’ work of art”. And 
he summarizes it in the term aura, which he refers, on one hand, to the insurmountable 
remoteness involved in the perception of the unique and permanent object; and, on the 
other hand, to the mentioned tradition that witnesses its temporal and spatial changes, 
guaranteeing its symbolic efficacy. 
 
           His account of art history begins in prehistoric times, stating that the value of the 
images used in magic rituals lies in their very presence, being only incidental their 
exhibition to human eyes, and because of this they are supposed to remain hidden from 
public view31 . Let us note that the remoteness implied in the perception of the image is 
not only a spatial distance (indeed, every spatial distance is spatially reducible): not even 
the shortening of such distance deprives these images of their symbolic remoteness, 
because such transgression is a profanation and, therefore, it does not eliminate the sacred 
character of the ritual objects. And this means, in other words, that “the work of art in 
                                                             
30Benjamin does not trouble to define such terms. He assumes that his previous descriptions (in sections I-
V of the text) are enough to understand their meaning. But I will show that this is not always easy. 
31“Artistic production begins with figures in the service of magic. What is important for these figures is that 
they are present, not that they are seen. The elk depicted by Stone Age man on the walls of his cave is an 
instrument of magic, and is exhibited to others only coincidentally; what matters is that the spirits see it. 
Cult value as such even tends to keep the artwork out of sight” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 106). I shall add that 
this opposition between cult and exhibition can still be felt when, in a church, a warning informs the visitors 
that photographs cannot be taken during the cult. 
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prehistoric times, through the exclusive emphasis placed on its cult value, became first 
and foremost an instrument of magic which only later came to be recognized as a work 
of art” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 107). This is a very important warning, because in this 
sentence, even if his words are a bit confusing (“the work of art […] came to be […] a 
work of art”), Benjamin recognises, first, that the images at the service of magic were not 
(at least for their contemporaries) works of art; and second, that, even if he does not 
always respect this terminology, in the scheme he bears in mind there is no work of art 
without a dose of exhibition value, although it produces the tension between polarities; 
therefore, the coexistence of cult value and exhibition value is the distinctive mark of the 





2.1.1.Cult and exhibition in ancient times 
 
         To the prehistorical origin of the work of art Benjamin adds a sketch of its proper 
historic origin in the footnote n. 22 of the second version (1935-1936) of the essay on 
reproducibility (usually considered as the Ur-text of the article). There, he rolls back the 
polarity cult/exhibition to what he considers “the primal phenomenon of all artistic 
activity”, the practice of mimesis (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 127). Benjamin attributes to the 
mimesis two powers intimately mixed but analytically discernible, which he considers 
the origin of the distinction between cult and exhibition values. He names the first one 
“semblance” (Schein), and the second “play” (Spiel). 
 
       “Semblance” should not be taken here as the imitation of an existing presence but as 
the act of making appear —with gestures and voice—what lacks of a sensible presence at 
all. Mimesis would have an internal and spiritual meaning, not to be confused with the 
material copy of a pre-existent external figure. This first power of the mimesis is linked 
to what romantic aestheticians call a “symbol”, that is to say, a sensible image which, by 
                                                             
32Attending to the analogy between this pair of values and the Marxist classic distinction between use value 
and exchange value, this can also mean that, when artworks quit magic and religion, they became a mix of 
artistic and economic value or, in other words, that modern artworks always are at the same time (but not 
to the same extent) commodities and aesthetical products. 
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its own internal power, evokes transcendent and supersensible realities. The mimic, in 
this exercise, so to speak, becomes what it mimes. 
 
        The second power of mimesis is different: the mime plays the object of his imitation, 
in the musical or dramatic sense of this word. Playing is, according to Benjamin, “the 
inexhaustible reservoir of all the experimenting procedures” of a technology which, in 
contrast with magic rituals, does not aim at mastering natural forces, but “aims rather at 
an interplay between nature and humanity” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 107). In the semblance, 
the symbol becomes what it represents, in the same way that the bread becomes the 
Christ’s body in Eucharist. The play does not point so far. In the semblance, the mime is 
possessed by the nature of the imitated thing. In the play, like in modern technology, there 
is a mediation, an artifice which somehow warns the viewer that what he is seeing is only 
a play. This duality of “semblance” and “play” reminds of the double function often 
attributed to art: the expressive dimension, which transmits emotions and states of mind, 
frequently related to colour in painting, and the representative dimension, that is to say, 
the representational content of the artwork (see, for example, WOLLHEIM: 1970), 
although in ancient art “expression” is not referred to the artist’s mind, but to transcendent 
forces. This could be an indication that the successful posterity of Benjamin’s distinction 




2.1.2.Cult and exhibition in early modern times 
 
       Benjamin’s references to this duality in modern times are scarce in the essay on 
reproducibility. But in the book about the Trauerspiel (1928), he signals what, in my view, 
could be another precedent of the pair “cult/exhibition”, precisely in the distinction 
between symbol and allegory. There we find the thesis that, in the cultural periods in 
which the symbol (the first power of the mimesis) is dominating in artistic activity, cult 
value prevails over exhibition value. In the history of painting, an abstraction or 
idealization of forms is typical, for example, of the paintings of the Renaissance. Human 
bodies are idealized as transfigured by the light of eternity, which shines for a moment in 
the mortal flesh, and this internal bright is precisely the aura. Eternity lies in the heart of 
finitude. Human naked bodies, beyond their individual particularities, express an instant 
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of eternity in which their imperishable essence shines in their mortal existence. They are 
symbols of a flesh saved from death by the inner light emanating from them during that 
instant, a light which does not come from any external source, and which concentrates 
the beauty of paintings like Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus. 
 
        Benjamin opposes symbol and allegory, the latter being usually defined as the 
representation of an abstract concept by means of a visual convention (and, to this extent, 
operating in terms of Spiel more than in terms of Schein). However, Benjamin’s concept 
of allegory is more complex: “Whereas in the symbol destruction is idealized and the 
transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed in the light of redemption, in allegory 
the observer is confronted with the faccies hippocratica of history as a petrified, 
primordial landscape. Everything in history that, from the very beginning, has been 
untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face, or rather in a death’s head” 
(BENJAMIN: 1996-3, 166). Allegory, and, according to Benjamin, especially the baroque 
allegory, shows the degradation of time, discovers the mortality of bodies, as it happens 
with the death’s head below the feet of Holbein’s The Ambassadors. If the symbol can be 
defined as an expression of poetry in history, allegory could be understood as the 
appearance of history in poetry, the decline of bodies from their eternal essence to their 
mortal existence. Perhaps for this reason, Holbein’s skull can only appear in his painting 
as an abnormal object violating the rules of the composition. And this procedure, 
according to Benjamin, corresponds to a “crisis of the aura” and echoes in every historic 
moment in which its decline becomes evident. So, the importance of the aura changes 
historically, and cult and exhibition values do not exclude one another. Artworks have 
always had both values: what changes historically is the proportion of their combination 
(if one of them increases, the other one decreases33). However, this coexistence will be 
interrupted, according to Benjamin, by a process beginning in late modern times and 




                                                             
33This idea has been somehow confirmed in our times: art museums contain paintings whose main 
characteristic is the aura. That is to say, there is an insurmountable remoteness in them and it could be said 
that it is precisely such a distance which grants the painting an “artistic” value. However, the relentless 
waves of tourists that, with their cameras, invade daily those museums crush the aura when reproducing 
those images in their digital devices. 
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2.2. INTERRUPTION OF ART HISTORY 
 
            Late modern times, which would constitute the next step in Benjamin’s draft of 
art history, seem to be out of reach in The work of art in the age of its technological 
reproducibility. Artists like Derain and Rilke are only mentioned as the representatives of 
a historic epoch left forever behind, while the mechanical techniques detach persons and 
things “from the domain of tradition” and photography and film, as agents of serial 
reproducibility, act like the gravediggers of the aura. Even so, as I have signalled, one 
should say that the aura or the cult value which characterizes artworks cannot be, in this 
epoch, exactly the same ritual distance operating in traditional social structures, because 
these structures are declining in modern social life. Indeed, the modern attitude regarding 
artworks is usually thematised as aesthetic distance: an essential requirement to perceive, 
for instance, the fictional depth of a perspective painting and to understand the scene 
taking place within it, or to establish with the author of a fictional story a tacit pact 
accepting the rules of the tale. Although Benjamin seems to think of aesthetical distance 
as a by-product of ritual remoteness, in the essay on Baudelaire he marks it by means of 




 2.2.1. The reduction of distances as a second feature of the poverty of experience 
 
           I propose to interpret “remoteness” as what we usually find in modern figurative 
portraits. We find it especially in the figure’s gaze, which creates an insurmountable 
interval, impossible to translate into units of objective measurement. However, it 
disappears “when the viewer steps too close to the depicted scene” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
341) and —I would add— also when she steps too far from it. It could also be said that 
the space of a painting is the implicit space of experience (Erfahrung): it creates a sense 
of depth precisely because it is not metrically expressed, for such expression would 
impede the understanding of what the painting wants to transmit. A literary notion can 
help to explain this point. The saying “Three things in human life are important: the first 
is to be kind; the second is to be kind; and the third is to be kind” is attributed to Henry 
James. I would like to suggest that this “kindness” could be understood as some sort of 
sense of respect regarding a secret which the story tells without making it explicit. I 
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daresay that the way in which the secret runs through the story, articulating it as an 
implicit enigma whose nature consists in the impossibility of being revealed, symbolizes 
the obligation of never trespassing the remoteness that creates that very peculiar mystery. 
It is never explicitly revealed What Masie knew (1897), what was the content of The 
Aspern papers (1888) or what secret the characters of A turn of screw (1898) share. In the 
same sense, people portrayed are not deprived from their mystery or their secret, but it is 
kept and transmitted without violating it, almost in a discreet way, akin to the transmission 
of tradition. 
 
            In contrast, “distance” (Abstand) is a measurable space which can be diminished 
or increased until every ambiguity disappears. For Benjamin, it has to do with 
technological reproducibility. In photography, everything seems to be on the surface, 
everything seems to be explicit. In the terms I have just proposed, it could be said that 
painting respects the remoteness as a characteristic of experience-Erfahrung and, 
therefore, aura can be perceived in it. The reduction of the distance which distinguishes 
photography from painting is not only a gradual approach to things: it changes the nature 
of the resultant image. The transformation of a measureless remoteness (Ferne) into a 
measurable distance (Abstand) implies an impoverishment of experience, a decrease of 
its aura which excludes the image of the realm of beauty (according to Benjamin, the 
beautiful has no place in technological reproduction). It belongs to the jurisdiction of 
Erlebnis. 
 
           Although Benjamin rarely develops explicitly the connection between the 
reduction of distances and the decline of the aura, it may be established without difficulty. 
It is worth recalling that the emergence of photography not only resulted in the 
democratization of the tradition of portraiture; photography was also used in medical and 
police practices, taking pictures of corpses, crime scenes or human body’s organs. This 
kind of photography implies that its objects are devoid of any sort of aura or remoteness. 
Medical or forensic photography has to suppress the distance of respect and it should 
reveal any detail which the subject would prefer to conceal, disregarding moral or 
aesthetical conventions in favour of scientific interest or in order to solve a crime. The 
‘cruelty’ of documentary photography opposes to the ‘kindness’ of figurative painting. 
Photography pursues what may escape the human eye and so, ideally, its products should 
be deprived of experience (Erfahrung). It shows us (ideally, I repeat) the aspect that things 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
58 
 
would show if we were not experiencing them. This seems to be the essence of the 
exhibition value. So, although the opposition “cult value/exhibition value” is not the 
opposition between painting and photography, it is clear that, in the late nineteenth 
century, this is one of its main expressions. And it is also clear that, in this controversy, 
Benjamin has taken sides from the beginning with photography, although understanding 
the reasons for this position is not easy. 
 
              According to him, in nineteenth-century photographs, exhibition value does not 
completely lose ties with cult value. The “last entrenchment” of cult value in photography 
is witnessed by the “cult of remembrance of dead or absent loved ones”, in which “the 
cult value of the image finds its last refuge” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 108). But once this 
last resistance is overcome, exhibition value will experiment, according to Benjamin, not 
only independence, but absolute self-sufficiency. Benjamin interprets this overcoming as 
“the liquidation of the value of tradition in the cultural heritage”, which, in the terms of 
the essay on Baudelaire, technically is tantamount to the highest possible degree of 
impoverishment of experience. In Marx’s terms, the use value of things has been replaced 
in modern times by their exchange value; in Benjamin’s terms, cult value has been 
replaced by the value of exhibition. The process that had begun with photography (“In 
photography, exhibition value begins to drive back cult value on all fronts…”) comes to 
an end with film. And for Benjamin this end is also the end of the history of art, that is to 
say, of the “tension between two polarities within the artwork itself”, whose shifts would 
determine the different periods of that history. This (revolutionary) interruption of the 
history of art involves three issues, which will be the object of the following subsections: 
the surpassing of the opposition “cult/exhibition”, the relationship between modern 
masses and avant-gardism, and the social and political function of art. 
 
 
 2.2.2 Surpassing the opposition between cult and exhibition 
 
            Before the modern era, there would have been only quantitative shifts in the 
opposition of cult and exhibition values. But, with the emergence of film 
 
(…) a quantitative shift between the two poles of the artwork has led to a qualitative 
transformation in its nature (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 107). 




I want to highlight the terms of this sentence, because, although it has rarely been noticed, 
Benjamin’s description of the change in the nature of the artwork corresponds very 
closely to the most extended version of dialectic materialism: the movement of history 
whose internal contradictions turn quantitative changes into qualitative ones (as, in the 
customary example, the quantitative increase of temperature produces the qualitative 
turning of water into steam). What I am arguing is that Benjamin seems to be thinking 
this qualitative transformation as a sublation (in the terms of the Hegelian Aufhebung) of 
the antinomy between cult and exhibition values. As a result of this, the concept of 
exhibition value that is operating from this moment on is no longer opposed to cult value: 
it has overcome the very opposition between cult and exhibition values, which has been 
resolved in favour of the latter34. And a strong indication that this is actually the case is 
the evidence (also neglected in most readings of this essay) that Benjamin is forced to 
implement a new definition of exhibition value. 
 
           According to the old definition of exhibition value, panel painting increased the 
power of presentability of the artwork compared with the fresco and the mosaic that 
preceded it, and the same happened with the portrait bust when compared with the statue 
in a temple. The reason is that a painting “can be sent here and there”. And a photograph 
can be sent here and there much more quickly and easily than a painting. But, according 
to the new definition, the change of criterion is so strong that images which Benjamin 
had first considered as examples of a minor exhibition value with regard to painting (like 
frescoes and mosaics) are now redefined, under the new principle, as examples of a 
superior presentability. The qualitatively superior exhibition value that Benjamin assigns 
to film no longer relies on the fact that it “can be sent here and there”: the new and 
absolute exhibition value depends upon the fact that the work can be seen by a large mass 
of spectators at the same time. The opposition is no longer between cult and exhibition, 
but between the individual reception (as a characteristic feature of easel painting) and the 
collective and simultaneous one. 
 
         So, this new definition not only differentiates painting from photography or film 
but, moreover, approximates film to music or architecture, and also to the artworks of the 
                                                             
34Let us remember Jameson’s warning: “to resolve this opposition either way would destroy it” 
(JAMESON:2013, 21-26). 
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ritual age. In fact, Benjamin compares the power of the film with the one of the epic 
poem. This qualitative transformation means, therefore, the advent of a new type of 
artwork which, as an inverted image of cult objects, have exclusively exhibition value. 
The birth of cinema is, for Benjamin, the closure of the cycle initiated with the appearance 
of cult images (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 124). Artworks are no longer objects of 
contemplation, but “means of entertainment”, so that “the greatly increased mass of 
participants has produced a different kind of participation” which Benjamin calls 
“reception in distraction” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 119). In contemplation, the viewer is 
“absorbed” by the painting’s scene; in the distractive reception, the image is absorbed by 





 2.2.3 The masses and avant-gardism 
 
 
        Benjamin suggests that the modern crowd loves only the artworks susceptible of a 
simultaneous reception. Indeed, he says that the crisis of painting began in the late 
eighteenth century, when paintings were for the first time collectively exhibited in salons 
and galleries. When the masses enter the museums, they cannot “organize and control 
themselves in their reception”. And only the arrival of film has given them an alternative 
to this uneasiness. In the movie theatre, the masses not only receive the film collectively 
and simultaneously, but they respond to it with a unique voice, because “individual 
reactions are predetermined by the mass audience response” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 114). 
So, it is noticeable that the masses presented by Benjamin in the essay on reproducibility 
are not the “amorphous crowd” in the street which he describes in the essay on 
Baudelaire. They rather look like an organized and controlled body. It could be said 
Benjamin is observing the crowd in the same way that, according to his words in “On 
some motifs in Baudelaire”, Marx did it in the nineteenth century: realizing that “it was 
his task to forge the amorphous masses (…) into the iron of the proletariat” (BENJAMIN: 
2006, 321). 
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        But these masses do not appreciate so much the works of those avant-gardist 
movements which Benjamin supports (Futurism, Dadaism and Surrealism). The anti-
artists delight in the destruction of cult value in their creations and stand for the 
abolishment of any contemplative distance: “Dadaists turned the artwork into a missile” 
which jolted the viewer (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 118-119). For Benjamin, the masses 
misunderstand the avant-gardist works, but they are not responsible for this mistake. The 
cause of the misreading is that artists use the traditional procedures of literature or 
painting; so, the public does not understand that the works exhibited are not strictly 
artistic. Surrealist books, says Benjamin in 1929, are “demonstrations, watchwords, 
documents, bluffs, forgeries if you will, but at any rate not literature”, as the Surrealist 
pictures are not paintings or any other “artistic dabbling” (BENJAMIN: 1999-1, 212). 
Benjamin states that Dadaism was a sort of cinema before it existed: the film also aims 
to shock the public. But if the same shocks provoked by avant-gardist performances in 
the scandalized audience produce an enthusiastic acclaim when becoming the material of 
the Chaplin’s films, it is because the first ones have still a residual artistic appearance, 
while the second ones have fully accepted technological reproducibility. 
 
            However, the affinity of the masses with technological reproducibility does not 
only rely on the fact that they feel comfortable in the realm of the simultaneous and 
distracted reception. In technological development, says Benjamin, the masses anticipate 
the rehearsal of their liberation from hardworking, suffering and burdens. Technology’s 
achievements culminate, says Benjamin, in the remote-controlled aircraft which needs 
no human crew. Thanks to it, “the individual suddenly sees his scope for play (Spielraum) 
immeasurably extended” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 124). This upcoming age of abundance 
will be the end of the poverty of experience, not because the future men will be rich in 
experience, but because they will not need experience anymore. Machines, so to speak, 
will accumulate experience and will do the hard work, just like the remote-controlled 
aircraft. Meanwhile, men and women will play like children. “The primary social 
function of art today is to rehearse that interplay” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 107-108). But, 
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 2.2.4 The social function of art 
 
                There is “a precondition for playing with natural forces”. Benjamin calls this 
precondition “the mastering of the elementary social forces” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 124) 
or the adaptation of “humanity’s whole constitution” to “the new productive forces” 
which technology has set free. The aim of revolutions “is to accelerate this adaptation”, 
because the mere development of the productive forces does not produce automatically 
new social relations. In sum, what Benjamin calls “communism” is the true gas pedal to 
speed history. This means “the enslavement of human beings to the powers of the 
apparatus” (BENJAMIN, 2002- 2,108). And this is the point where art can perform a 
social function. The avant-gardist products are not artworks, but political actions taking 
part “in the transformation of a highly contemplative attitude into revolutionary 
opposition” (BENJAMIN: 1999-1, 212- 216). Hence his affirmation that “for the first 
time in world history, technological reproducibility emancipates the work of art from its 
parasitic subservience to ritual” and “the whole social function of art is revolutionized. 
Instead of being founded on ritual, it is based on a different practice: politics” 
(BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 104-106). 
 
         To grant the acceleration of the progressive development of technology, art has to 
find an effective welding of the artistic revolt to the “constructive, dictatorial side of 
revolution”. The aversive response of the masses to the surrealist works is the evidence 
that this welding is yet insufficient (BENJAMIN:1999-1, 216). The contemporary 
function of art is “to train human beings in the apperceptions and reactions needed to deal 
with an apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding almost daily”, and the use of the 
reproducible images for mass mobilization is the “most difficult and most important task” 
of art (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 108, 120). Of course, the political enslavement of the masses 
is a characteristic of Fascism and Communism. But, for Benjamin, the substantive 
difference is that Communism uses this enslavement as the previous step to put 
technology at the service of humankind, whereas Fascism aims at putting humankind at 
the service of technology to avoid its emancipation, “granting expression to the masses 
—but on no account granting them rights” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 121). From here, 
Benjamin concludes with the idea of a confrontation between two irreconcilable 
consequences for art: either art depends on politics, or politics depends on art. In my 
view, this is —in all respects— an obscure argument because, although one could find 
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easily examples of both policies, these extreme sentences seem to be only clearly 
intelligible if we reduce in them the meaning of “art” to “propaganda”. And it is clear 
that this was not Benjamin’s position35. 
 
           What is the concrete link between exhibition value (in its new definition) and 
social progress? Why should the defence of cult value in artistic works be considered as 
a regression? And, why does the artistic policy of Fascism appear to Benjamin as “the 
consummation of the doctrine of l’art pour l’art” (which would be, so to speak, a radical 
upholding of artworks’ cult value)? I would say that his rejection of cult value and his 
opposition to art for art’s sake depend on several ideological decisions he has made at 
the point of departure of The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility36. 
                                                             
35Probably, the text in which Benjamin deals more specifically with this problem is “The author as 
producer”, from 1934. Intended as an address to the Parisian “Institute for the study of Fascism”, Benjamin 
exposes very clearly the position regarding art’s autonomy shared by his communist audience. About “the 
question of the autonomy of the poet, of his freedom to write whatever he pleases”, he says: “You are not 
disposed to grant him this autonomy. You believe that the present social situation compels him to decide in 
whose service he is to place his activity. The bourgeois writer of entertainment literature does not 
acknowledge this choice. You must prove to him that, without admitting it, he is working in the service of 
certain class interests. A more advanced type of writer does recognize this choice. His decision, made on 
the basis of class struggle, is to side with the proletariat. This puts an end to his autonomy. His activity is 
now decided by what is useful to the proletariat in the class struggle”. Benjamin does not reject this position 
but he considers it insufficient: “The tendency of a literary work can be politically correct only if it is also 
literarily correct”. And a literary work is literarily correct if it implies “progress of literary technique”. So, 
how to decide what is progress or regression in literature? This seems to be a political decision, because 
Benjamin states that it depends on “the place of the intellectual in the class struggle”. But his indications 
about the appreciation of such progress are anything but clear: he identifies literary progress with the 
dialectical surpassing of the “unfruitful antithesis of form and content” or of the “conventional distinction 
between genres, between writer and poet, between scholar and popularizer (…), between author and 
reader”, and he stands for the overthrowing of “the barrier between writing and image”, so that the writer, 
having become a photographer, is able to add to each picture “a caption that wrenches it from modish 
commerce and gives it a revolutionary use value” (BENJAMIN: 1999-7, 768-782). The internal debate of 
Benjamin about his political position as a writer seems to have been a permanent problem. His “Moscow 
Diary”, written during the weeks he stayed in Moscow in 1927, shows clearly his indecision. In the entry 
corresponding to January 9, he writes about the convenience of joining the Communist Party, and he 
considers as a major drawback that it “means completely giving up your private independency. You leave 
the responsibility for organizing your own life up to the Party, as it were”. Remaining outside the Party, he 
says, depends on “whether or not a concrete justification can be given for my future work, especially the 
scholarly work, with its formal and metaphysical basis (…) and whether, for the sake of my work, I should 
avoid certain extremes of ‘materialism’”. He also asks himself, regarding his work, “what is ‘revolutionary’ 
about its form, if indeed there is something revolutionary about it” (BENJAMIN: 1986, 66). 
36These decisions can be summarized in the following thesis: (i) Benjamin wants to build an aesthetics of 
(historical) materialism, and this means for him accepting the Marxist dogma that the historical 
development of the productive forces (the economic base) transforms the conditions of production and, 
thus, the superstructure; this development is guided towards a goal: “the creation of the conditions which 
would make it possible for capitalism to abolish itself ” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 101); (ii) as art is a part of 
the superstructure, the invention of photography, as a result of the technological development of 
reproducibility, according to the philosophy of history assumed in thesis (i), goes in the right direction 
(“photography […] emerged at the same time as socialism” BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 106 ); (iii) as photography 
implies an extraordinary increasing of exhibition value, attempts to retain the artwork’s cult value (l’art 
pour l’art) are attempts to impede or delay the political triumph of socialism. In fact, in the last section of 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
64 
 
These decisions are, so to speak, the consequences of Benjamin’s political commitment 
and the militant dimension of his essay, and probably for this reason he does not explain, 
review or discuss them, and I will not either. But I would like to stress that this 
commitment obscured another possible and in my view indispensable consideration of 
the claim for cult value in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which would complete 
the map of the western art in modernity, and which could enhance the usefulness of the 
polarity cult/exhibition beyond Benjamin’s essay. Indeed, Benjamin also spoke of “the 
obligatory misunderstanding” of l’art pour l’art, saying that “it was almost always a flag 
under which sailed a cargo that could not be declared because it still lacked a name” 
(BENJAMIN: 1999-1, 212). So, I would like to discover the cargo that I think is sailing 




















                                                             
the essay, the polarity “cult value/exhibition value” becomes the polarity “fascism/communism”. As I 
signalled in the Introduction, I shall not follow these assumptions, among other reasons to preserve the 
coherence of my approach, which is focused on the impoverishment of experience, a question that, 
shockingly, central as it is in Benjamin’s reflections on art in the essay on Baudelaire, seems to have entirely 
disappeared from the one on reproducibility. 
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2.3. THE “OBLIGATORY MISUNDERSTANDING” 
 
         
          Benjamin’s negative comments on art for art’s sake is surprising in an admirer of 
Baudelaire37. It is certain that, around 1848, the poet had taken a violent stand against 
“pure art”, calling it a “puerile Utopia” (BOURDIEU: 1966, 58). But it is not less clear 
that, in his essays on modern painting, he refused any social justification of art, supplying 
a perfectly structured theory of art for art’s sake, which he embraced himself after the 
revolutionary years38. Reading the last lines of The work of art in the age of its 
technological reproducibility, where Benjamin identifies “the consummation of l’art 
pour l’art” with the aestheticizing of politics, by which humankind’s annihilation 
becomes “a supreme aesthetic pleasure” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 122), one should say that 
he shares the criticism of art for art’s sake that, in the nineteenth century, both bourgeois 
critics and the upholders of social art addressed to Baudelaire and his peers. That is to 
say, the allegation that, by putting life at the service of art, they violated the most sacred 
moral laws, like the immature and fatuous Dorian Gray. This was, in fact, the 
denunciation of “republicans, democrats and socialists” against Baudelaire, condemning 
“the ‘egoistical’ art of the supporters of ‘art for art’s sake’” and demanding that art and 
literature fulfilled a social or political function (BOURDIEU: 1996, 73). Benjamin 
correctly defines art for art’s sake as “an idea of ‘pure art” which rejects (…) any social 
function” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 106). But, is it sure that the rejection of a social function 
of art means, for a poet like Baudelaire, such egoistical aestheticism or such immoral 
submission of life to art’s requirements? Defending the autonomy of aesthetic values is 
the same as defending an immoral aestheticism? 
 
          Benjamin does not only interpret artistic movements that try to retain the artwork’s 
cult value as reactionary trends set against historical progress as represented by 
photography, but he also affirms that the stressing of the elements of colour in painting 
                                                             
37Commissioned by M. Horkheimer to write “a materialist article” on Baudelaire, Benjamin exposes his 
distancing from Baudelaire’s positions in his essay “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” 
(BENJAMIN: 2006-3). 
38“When Hugo writes to him that he ‘never said Art for Art’s sake, but Art for Progress sake’, Baudelaire 
redoubles his contempt for the political priesthood of the romantic magus. After the militant period of 1848, 
he joins Flaubert in a disenchantment leading to a rejection of any connection with the social world and to 
an undifferentiated condemnation of all those who sacrifice to the cult of good causes, like George Sand, 
his bête noire” (BOURDIEU: 1996, 80-81). 
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associated with Impressionism —in a time when colour photography was not 
generalized— was a reaction to photography (BENJAMIN:1999-8, 6). This refers to a 
historic moment characterized by the professional rivalry between both arts. In a few 
years, photography deprived painting of a great amount of its exhibition value and, 
therefore, of its main social function: portraiture and interior decoration, especially 
attached to landscapes (BENJAMIN:1999-5, 520). 
 
 
              2.3.1. Reinterpreting the poverty of experience 
 
         But the painter’s complaint regarding photography is not always an expression of 
the mentioned rivalry, but also a protest against the loss of autonomy which it implies. 
Benjamin states that “Photography greatly extends the sphere of commodity exchange, 
from mid-century onward, by flooding the market with countless images of figures, 
landscapes, and events which had previously been available either not at all or only as 
pictures for individual customers” (BENJAMIN: 1999-8, 6). But this flooding of 
photographic images means, for the artistic painter, an excessive dependence upon the 
market demands: “When the means employed by painters are taken up by fashion and by 
big department stores, they immediately lose their significance”, said Matisse 
(MATISSE: 1978,100). This “significance” alluded to by Matisse is, in Benjamin’s 
terms, painting’s cult value. When Matisse says that the painting should offer “what 
photography cannot give”39 or, in other words, what the camera cannot capture, he does 
not point to external objects (which can be perfectly photographed), but to emotions, 
sensations or impressions of the subject, that is to say, the personal involvement in 
experience that the prevalence of the informative discourse and mechanical reproduction 
have suppressed from representation. 
 
        All those terms refer to what I called before (in 1.1.) the first element of experience 
(the perception of an individual thing); but, in aesthetic terms, this element is not 
appreciated in its objective dimension, as a direct intuition of an external object (this 
function would have been assumed by the camera), but only as an affection of the subject 
— namely, an experience— that photography, not because of its mechanical nature, but 
                                                             
39“Today, thanks to photography, one can make such lovely reproductions, even in colour, that the duty of 
the artist, the painter, is to provide more: what photography cannot give” (MATISSE: 1978, 140). 
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due to their main social uses, usually excludes. These emotions are, undoubtedly, the part 
of the experience which cannot be reduced to exhibition value. So, could it be said that 
they concentrate the cult value of the image? 
 
         In fact, these sensations will only acquire cult value if they manage to reunite the 
“community of feelings” invoked by modern artworks. And the power to reunite this 
community corresponds to what I called the second element of experience, the one related 
to memory and imagination and, through them, to language. I propose a reinterpretation 
of the poverty of experience by means of the connection between experience and 
language which I referred to as an essential issue in Benjamin’s writings since his essay 
on the tasks of the coming philosophy. I have mentioned the implicit character of the 
apprenticeship involved in the transmission of experience, and the fact that “life lessons” 
can be obtained from it, denote that the words and the stories (the “telling”) which 
transmit the experience are narrowly interconnected with practices (the “showing”), as 
happens in handcraft training40. When Benjamin calls the aura of an object of perception 
(which he identifies with “experience”) the constellation of associations which, coming 
from the “long practice” (Erfahrung), “cluster around” such object (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
337), it implies that this constellation is not only made of images, but also of words 
(“Words, too, can have an aura of their own”, BENJAMIN: 2006, 354). Words are 
implicit in things, and things are implicit in words41. The experienced man is one who 
always can tell what he is perceiving, who knows the precise word to name every 
concrete thing; and to know the name of the thing, in the realm of practice, means to 
know its use. Words help to structure the practice’s apprenticeship, and practice helps to 
fill the worlds with meaning. This interweaving is inherited from the coexistence of 
gestures and words in the ancient mimesis, and it is expressed in the combination of cult 
and exhibition factors in the works of art —even if these factors are antithetic. 
 
         So, to make possible the community of feelings, sensations cannot break radically 
with the tradition shared by the viewers. The titles of classical paintings are often as 
                                                             
40Although he does not seem to call attention to this, everything Benjamin says about the ritual value of 
images has to do with the fact that such images are the “showing” dimension of myths and stories, which 
are in turn the “telling” dimension of the ritual objects. 
41The reason why both a traditional handmade farm tool and a Louis XVI chest of drawers have aura, but 
the disposable cups and plastic spoons lack of it, is also that the former tells a story (the story of the long 
practice stored in it), whereas the latter, being single use instruments, cannot do so. 
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variable as their contemplation; many times they do not come directly from the painter, 
but from a long tradition established by their different viewers (their owners, the 
museums’ curators, the critics or the public in general). So, the title takes part in the 
transmission of an experience in which words and images implicitly interpenetrate one 
another. The title is an indication of the secret transmitted by the canvas —without 
profanation or explication of its remoteness—, a secret which creates in the viewer’s 
mind a wide range of possible interpretations. And the historical variations of the titles 
show that they are not exactly denotative designations, but rather connotative expressions 
of a figurative language. In many cases, the exhibition value of an image refers to its 
translatability to the words of the common language. In impressionist paintings, things 
exploded indeed in coloured points, but, through this impression, the collective world 
was still recognizable, although the rules of the perspective began to lose their previous 
power. The titles of the paintings still referred to figurative elements which helped the 
viewer to interpret the canvas (“Mont SainteVictoire”, “Water lilies”, “Starry Night”, 
etc.), even if their representation was highly surprising. Certainly, this is the moment in 
which the painting’s titles began to become quite unusual: Monet names his famous 
painting from 1872 Impression, sunrise [Fig.4], not “Dawning in Le Havre”. 
 
 [Fig.4] Claude Monet, Impression sunrise, 48 x 63cm, Marmottan Monet Museum, Paris 
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          The word “impression” does not refer, as in the other cases cited, to the contents 
represented in the painting, but to the impressionist form of the representation (which 
concentrates its cult value): it invokes Ferne (in fact, it is necessary to take some distance 
from the painting to avoid that the explosion of colours sweeps along the figurative 
scene). But, thanks to their helping handholds, the explosions of colours do not leave the 
viewer as speechless as the soldiers of World War in the middle of explosions and torrents 
of unknown forces. Monet’s title is not only Impression, but it is also sunrise, allowing 
the viewer to tell what he is seeing. 
 
        And this is a way of recognizing that, no matter how valuable the painting is from 
the standpoint of cult value (what is alluded to by the word “impression”), it is not 
absolutely deprived of exhibition value (represented by the word “sunrise): Monet’s 
painting is, to a certain extent, “realist”. Fredric Jameson, an author often very close to 
Benjamin’s spirit, has argued that realism, in literature, is a consequence of the tension 
between the two poles of language which Henry James called “telling” and “showing”: 
“You tell, you recite the events/ you show them happening in the present of the novelistic 
scene”. There are novelists fonder of telling and novelists with a major inclination to 
showing (like James himself, whose scenes are sometimes quite filmic), but there is no 
realist novel without both kinds of language. Jameson calls these poles “antinomic”, in 
the sense that their conflict cannot be solved. If the tension was decided in favour of one 
pole or of the other, the result would be the breakdown of realism, because “to resolve 
this opposition either way would destroy it” (JAMESON:2013, 21-26). I think that the 
same thing happens with the antinomy between cult value and exhibition value, which is 









 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
70 
 
2.3.2 Art’s autonomy and the opposition of form and content in the artwork as an 
expression of the tension between cult and exhibition values: the question of 
realism. 
 
            Impressionist pictures were shocking to their first viewers precisely because what 
they showed had enough exhibition value to be recognized by the spectators. Manet’s 
Olympia [Fig.3] seems to respect the same formal rules of composition as The Venus of 
Urbino, but it applies them to a content that the majority of its viewers found degraded 
This means that the conceptual pair “cult/exhibition” is also expressed in the pair 
“form/contents”. 
 
[Fig.3] Edouard Manet, Olympia, 1863, 130.5 x 190 cm, Orsay museum, Paris 
 
          And something similar happens in the realm of poetry. Certainly, Baudelaire wrote 
in his verses words that had never been before in a poet’s tongue, but he did it with the 
most exquisite respect to the strict rules of metric and versification transmitted by 
tradition. Indeed, what his first readers found scandalous in the poems of The Flowers of 
Evil were their contents (so to speak, their exhibition value or what was shown in them), 
not their form (which concerns rather cult value). The same kind of astonishment was 
produced by Flaubert, who put the highest resources of French literary tradition (the cult 
value of narrative art) at the service of stories, facts and characters whose exhibition was 
perceived as morally inadequate as a literary subject. Baudelaire’s poems shocked and 
scandalized his contemporaries, but the shock was not their goal. The poet tries to detain 
the shock with his poem, like the swordsman detains the fencing blow with his body. In 
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“On some motifs in Baudelaire”, the crowd appears as an element, like air or water, the 
element in which the poet lives and through which he experiences the city. Of course, 
Baudelaire feels “fear, horror and revulsion” with regard to the crowd, he battles it, but 
he does it “with the impotent rage of someone fighting the rain or the wind” 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 343), that is to say, always from inside (“the masses were anything 
but external to him”), because he also feels the “attraction and allure” of the crowd 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 322). And Benjamin signals that this makes a difference with the 
points of view on the masses elected by other writers: Poe watches the crowd from the 
window of a public coffee house, Hoffmann from the corner window of his house 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 321). Baudelaire is in the crowd, and looks into it for the love of the 
woman who makes her way past and, of course, for the attention of his reader (“Hypocrite 
reader —my fellow creature— my brother!”). The possibility of finding a “fellow-
creature” into the serial line of faces in the crowd is as uncertain as the one of finding the 
lost halo in the asphalt; but it is a possibility because the masses “do not stand for classes 
or any sort of collective; rather, they are nothing but the amorphous crowd of passers-by, 
the people in the street” (BENJAMIN, 2006, 321, italics added). 
 
           In the Baudelairean poetics, the shock is a means to achieve the aim of the poem 
(so to speak, the vanishing aura). The shock is an unpleasant and not intended effect of 
which the poet takes advantage to reach his reader. This is the form taken in modern times 
by the combination of the collective and the individual experience. And, although with 
some delay, his language was fully accepted by his descendants as the common language 
of modern poetry, and the community of readers he was looking for finally recognized 
itself successfully in his writings, because he gave “the weight of experience 
(Erfahrung)” to its inexperience (Erlebnis) (BENJAMIN: 2006, 343). And he made this 
from the assumptions of art for art’s sake. Baudelaire, Flaubert or Manet are trying to 
defend the independence of the form of the artwork (i.e., its cult value) from its contents, 
but these contents are still (at least partially) representational. And this is precisely what 
constitutes the reason of the scandal perceived by the viewers: they experience the 
inadequacy between form (cult value) and contents (exhibition value). The tension 
between both values is here stressed, but it is also evident that, therefore, these works 
preserve what I previously called the distinctive mark of the artwork, which precisely 
consists of this coexistence. 
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         The stress on the tension comes from the artists’ defence of the independence of the 
expressive factor with respect to the representational one, which is underlined with the 
formula ‘art for art’s sake’. But although this defence displays a popular image of such 
artists as socially dangerous people, the stigma of moral extravaganza attached to them 
might be the signal of a socially regressive resistance to the institutionalization of artistic 
freedom (which is indissolubly linked to civil liberties), even if this resistance comes 
from allegedly progressive sectors42 . This is the reason why they can be considered as 
heroes in the struggle for art’s autonomy. As Bourdieu says 
 
The upholders of art for art’s sake (…) engaged in a labour that is located at the 
antipodes of a production subservient to the powerful or to the market (…) It is they 
who, making a break with the dominants over the principle of the existence of the 
artist as artist, institute it as a rule of operation of the field in the process of formation 
(…) If, in this collective enterprise (…), one had to choose a sort of founding hero, 
a nomothète (…), one could only think of Baudelaire (BOURDIEU: 1996, 62). 
 
 
           These words underline that the main signification of the autonomy which the 
painter claims this way is referred to a specifically aesthetic sphere of value and 
judgement, different from the spheres of market, morals or politics. But autonomy from 
politics, as an artistic position, is also a major political issue43 . 
 
          Benjamin adds that “by the time Impressionism yields to Cubism, painting has 
created for itself a broader domain into which, for the time being, photography cannot 
follow” (BENJAMIN: 1999-8, 6). When he speaks of the claim for a “pure art” as a 
symptom of resistance to the industrial technology of reproduction, he says that this 
attitude does not only leave aside any social function of art, but also any representational 
content of it (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 106). His literary example is Mallarme’s poetry, but 
I shall argue that this also happens in abstract painting. Some avant-gardist painters reject 
the mechanically produced images and move towards abstraction, exclusively 
emphasizing the cult value in the artwork. Probably, if Benjamin had not adopted this 
                                                             
42“The defenders of the art for art’s sake (…) assert the autonomy of the artist by opposing ‘social art’ and 
the ‘literary bohemia’ just as much as they oppose a bourgeois art which is subordinated (…) to the norms 
of the bourgeois clientele” (BOURDIEU: 1996, 342). 
43In the essay on reproducibility, Benjamin rejects such autonomy: “insofar as the age of technological 
reproducibility separated art from its basis in cult, all semblance of art’s autonomy disappeared forever” 
(Benjamin: 2002-2, 109). To my view, this opinion is linked to the commonplace of the Marxist materialism 
accepted by Benjamin in this essay: the autonomy of the superstructure can only be an ideological illusion, 
given the prevalence of the economic base. 
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position against art’s autonomy, he could have taken advantage of the duality of cult and 
exhibition value to construct a better understanding of the rise of abstraction. Painting 
things somehow detached from the recognizable objects of the everyday perception is 
also an effort to avoid that the Erlebnis represented by photography in the illustrated 
magazines and anywhere else substitutes for the subjective experience, a struggle to 




            2.3.2 The loss of words as a third feature of the poverty of experience 
 
            A proof of the intimate character of the link between cult and exhibition values is 
that, when the interweaving of both values disappear, also the words of experience (the 
words “with aura”) vanish, and they need to be replaced by another kind of language. 
The poverty of experience also refers to the perplexity of someone who, like the soldiers 
of the First World War, finds himself among things which he cannot name (the “force 
field of destructive torrents and explosions”, BENJAMIN: 1996-7, 732), or whose names 
mean nothing to him. It happens as if, after having lived during centuries in an implicit 
but narrow agreement, words and images began to separate from each other. 
 
            Benjamin signals that “prehistoric art made use of certain fixed notations in the 
service of magical practice”. This can be compared “from a material point of view” with 
what happens in cinema. Even if the viewer adopts the same psychological attitude in 
front of the screen as when listening to a tale or a melody, he cannot really remember all 
the previous photograms when he watches the actual one (indeed, he has not consciously 
seen such photograms), and he cannot anticipate the next one, in contrast with what 
happens, for example, in traditional music: “in a film, perception conditioned by shock 
was established as a formal principle” (BENJAMIN:2006, 328). For this reason, as 
Benjamin says, explicit and imperative directives are again necessary “where the 
meaning of each single picture appears to be prescribed by the sequence of all preceding 
ones” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 109). In other words, directives become necessary when the 
images do not come from experience, but from the dissecting activity of the mechanic 
                                                             
44I will show in the next chapters the possibilities of this approach to account for what I would call the cult 
side of avant-gardism. 
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vision. And the sign of this need is the appearance of signposts under the pictures of the 
illustrated magazines: the image is substituted for the place photographed in it, like a 
prefabricated or ready-made experience; but, as every industrial object, it needs a verbal 
explicit directive to indicate which is the experience ‘bottled’ this way. Erlebnis is the 
proper name of this impoverished experience, which is actually in-experience. 
 
            Words have to be added to images because images, somehow, have run away from 
words45: they say nothing to the one who sees them. Words are not implicit in the images, 
by contrast with what occurred when images transmitted a living experience, and 
therefore they have to be inserted as “explicit and imperative directives” to learn their 
meaning: “For the first time, captions have become obligatory”. When the publication of 
a photograph becomes the “standard evidence for historical occurrences” 
(BENJAMIN:2002-2, 109), these images appear to the reader as shocks (in the 
Benjaminian sense): he experiences photographs as real facts that, like the crime scenes 
which policemen observe when arriving in the scenery of a murder, cannot be 
immediately explained by words. The newspaper’s reader “feels challenged by them” 
and he needs protection against this astonishing appearance. The caption is that 
protection, it says explicitly what has to be seen in the picture, leaving no margin for 
what Benjamin calls the “free-floating contemplation” which would be accurate in front 
of an artwork. Without such a footer, photographs are as deserted as the mentioned crime 
scenes. The imperative captions of the illustrated newspapers and the advertisements 
written in the subway walls or flashing in the street’s neon are the instruction manual of 
the visual Erlebnis. They are not the words of experience, they do not tell the collective 
story, but they fill the blanks produced by the lack of experience and of stories. 
 
          Of captions Benjamin says that “it is clear that they have an altogether different 
character than the title of a painting” (BENJAMIN:2002-2, 109). In contrast with the title 
of a painting, the photo caption is needed when the image informs us visually about a 
fact, but it does not transmit us any experience, so it cannot suggest the adequate words 
to name it. It could be said that, when images replace things, captions replace titles. The 
                                                             
45Another sequence of the above cited film by Chaplin, Modern Times, shows the character of Charlot in a 
music hall where he unwillingly loses the words of the song he has to sing, which were written in his cuffs. 
His partner in the story, seeing his despair in the scenery, shouts to him: “Never mind the words! Sing!”. 
But the viewer does not listen to these words (it is an almost silent film), but he reads them in the intertitle. 
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photo caption appears like something exterior and strange to the image, imposing from 
outside a univocal decoding system, as an order. Captions are always denotative 
prescriptions not only associated with journalism and film, but especially with the 
spheres of fashion and market commodities and to the one of the political slogans. 
 
           The modern visual scope is, according to Benjamin, deprived of experience and 
its roots do not lie in tradition. This is an impoverishment of experience, responsible for 
the fact that experience, in modernity, has become a sequence of shocks which merges 
itself with the anti-narrative sequence of the mechanical time of the clock. And this 
impoverishment is what the soldiers described in “Experience and poverty” feel when 
they cannot tell the things they have seen; or, could it be said, when the first element of 
experience (sensation) is separated from the second (memory and imagination). But, as 
Benjamin himself suggests, this poverty does not occur without providing a defensive 
strategy to control the shocks and, therefore, to hide or to dissimulate its nakedness to the 
eyes of those who suffer it. This is what Benjamin calls “the protective shell” of the 
Erlebnis, which suppresses the unlikely and virtually traumatic events. This defensive 
strategy is an integral part of the poverty of experience: it does not alleviate the 
scarceness; it only avoids that poverty can be painfully experienced as such. And that is 
the function of the images whose main value is their exhibition power (as well 
photographs as pseudoromantic landscapes). But, as Benjamin says, this protective shell 
eliminates the aura and is sterile if seen as material for the artistic work. The painter’s 
eye, so to speak, cannot be a protective one. Indeed, impressionist paintings produced a 
shock in the public when they were exhibited for the first time: figures disintegrated in 
an explosion of colours and abstract forms. But this does not mean that impressionist 
paintings were not “realistic”: this explosion was actually happening in the urban 
Erfahrung; things were really exploding in separate fragments or “impressions” at the 
rhythm of the shocks. The impoverishment of experience (that is to say, the technological 
fragmentation of experience) is responsible for the fact that these emotions, that in 
traditional culture were integrated in storytelling, had lost an important part of their 
narrative charge, becoming naked sensations that the protective shell of Erlebnis makes 
insensible. The task of the painter, as described in “On some motifs in Baudelaire”, is to 
make sensible this insensibility. 
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         But, in Benjamin’s view, the radical bifurcation of cult and exhibition values marks 
the beginning of a period coming after art history, the post-historical condition of the 
work of art. The “approaching war” which he previews in 1933 (BENJAMIN: 1966-7, 
735) will be, for him, the global confrontation of cult value (Fiat ars, pereat mundus) 
and exhibition value (Fiat mundus, pereat ars) in the European battlefields. Regarding 
art, he expected that the result of such conflict will be the final closure of the long “age 
of auratic perception that is now [in 1936] coming to an end” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 105, 
127). All we can say is that reality did not fulfil in any manner what Benjamin had 
imagined. Among many other consequences, this meant that aura, even damaged, torn 
and plunged deeper into the macadam than in Baudelaire’s times, somehow outlived this 
massive crisis in Europe as well as in the geopolitical locations anticipated by Benjamin 
as the post-historical sites of the non-auratic perception of the work of art. One of these 
sites was the Soviet Union. The other, the United States of America, due to the advanced 
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 This Part introduces the situation of American visual arts in the early twentieth 
century, in Hopper’s formative years as a painter, and develops an analysis of his mature 
works, specifically focusing on House by the railroad (1925) [Fig.15], usually considered 
as a major example of it. I shall apply the theoretical frame developed in the previous Part 
to the objective of drawing the historical conditions of American art in general and of 
Hopper’s work in particular. In the third chapter (“The image of America”), moving from 
the European view of America which is implicit in Benjamin’s writings to the actual 
discussions of American artists and critics in the period. I propose a twofold consideration 
of the debate on visual arts in the United States: in historical terms, it is the conflict 
between those artists linked to modernist and avant-gardist trends, and those others who 
searched for inspiration in American themes, trying to construct an artistic approach to 
modern life rarely intended in art schools and academic institutions. But, in the terms of 
Benjamin’s analysis, as I shall argue, this conflict could be seen as an expression of the 
internal tension between cult and exhibition in the modern artwork. Putting it in broader 
terms, both approaches belong to the general debate about the weight of technology and 
tradition in modern art, including discussions concerning the artistic use of technology 
and the technological use of art. 
 
 The impact of this general debate can be found in Hopper’s painting to the extent 
that it is embodied in the dynamic tension which dominates House by the railroad 
[Fig.15] whose two main elements contain, respectively, the symbolic meaning of 
tradition and technology, as I shall argue in chapter 4 (“A house by the railroad”). After a 
review of some of the main critical statements on this painting, I shall introduce the 
impoverishment of experience in terms of the reduction of distances produced by the 
railway. But my point will be to elaborate a new interpretative hypothesis about how this 
objective transformation is reflected in a structural change of the subjective perception of 
space and time, and on Hopper’s unconscious registering of such changes artistically. One 
of the remarkable results of this procedure is the fact that, instead of representing a 
landscape absolutely deprived of mystery by the technological intervention, House by the 
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railroad [Fig.15] shows the image of an uncanny building with a dark and menacing aura. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE IMAGE OF AMERICA 
 
 
 My aim in this chapter is, on one hand, to establish the link between the previous 
Part about Benjamin and the analysis of Hopper’s painting that will constitute the object 
of the rest of my dissertation, and, on the other hand, to make a first test of the theoretical 
frame I have designed to describe the situation of visual arts in America in the early 
twentieth century. In the first section (“The many faces of Americanism”) I shall argue 
that this standpoint conflicts with the situation of American artists, who were involved in 
a long and complex debate about American cultural identity and the construction of a 
distinctive American art. And in this debate the terms ‘art’ and ‘life’ (and the relationship 
between them) were also a constant object of dispute. In the second section (“A landscape 
of controversy”) I shall consider this debate through Benjamin’s opposition of cult and 
exhibition values in the heart of the work of art, which to my view enriches the 
signification of the confrontation between ‘realism’ and ‘abstraction’ (“An excursus on 
the representational impoverishment in the abstract artwork”). Finally, in the last section 
(“Hopper’s place”) I will signal some of the peculiarities shown by Hopper’s position in 
this landscape of controversy, stressing dissimilarities with painters who were apparently 
close to his aesthetic, such as John Sloan, heir of the Ashcan School in the decade of 1930. 
This is all groundwork for the interpretation of House by the railroad [Fig.15], the object 
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3.1.THE MANY FACES OF AMERICANISM 
 
 Like Benjamin himself, many European thinkers and artists shared a vision of 
America as the naïve and primitive territory where the future of art will be constructed. 
But, what are the ingredients of a European image of America? And what role did this 
image play in the perception that local artists had of the artistic problems they faced? 
Many passages in Benjamin’s writings express a positive attitude towards America in 
cultural matters, today often described as “Americanism”46 . For example, Mickey Mouse 
features in the last pages of “Experience and Poverty” or these lines from One-way-street: 
 
Today the most real, the mercantile gaze into the heart of things is the advertisement. 
It abolishes the space where contemplation moved and all but hits us between the 
eyes with things as a car, growing to gigantic proportions, careens at us out of a film 
screen (…) in face or the huge images across the walls of the houses, where toothpaste 
and cosmetics lie handy for giants, sentimentality is restored to health and liberated 
in American style, just as people whom nothing moves or touches any longer are 
taught to cry again by films (BENJAMIN: 1996-5, 473) 
 
 This Americanism implies two elements. The first one is an old and stereotyped 
image of America as a “mythical” and virginal land (ignoring or disregarding the presence 
of Native Americans in the epic tale of the conquest). This America was neither modern 
nor ancient, but primal. It represented the elemental, the wild and the primitive. In a 
pejorative sense, the definition of the primitive is linked to the idea of the barbaric or the 
uneducated. However, primitive can also have a positive sense: that of the innocent or the 
unsophisticated, which has been present in literary tradition as a typical note of the 
American character. In the same way that their romantic predecessors had travelled to the 
north of Africa to experience an exotic otherness, artists like Duchamp or Picabia felt 
America as a country which was not under the burden of its history. Europeans usually 
compared the two different cultures, so that, as Corn states, “America’s wild and primitive 
modernity served as rhetorical foil to Europe's tradition bound character (…). The New 
                                                             
46The search for the specific qualities of American art became a commonplace among artists and critics in 
the United States during the nineteenth century, so the question of “Americanness” in art was frequently 
discussed (McCOUBREY: 2000; NOVAK: 2007; TUITE-DOCHERTY: 2010). Besides its broad nationalist 
meaning, the term “Americanism” applied to art emerged probably in the twentieth century, in the first 
generation of American modernists, who no longer related Americanness to the iconography of the wild 
natural landscape of America, but to the products of industrialization and the problems posed by their 
representation (CAHILL-BARR: 1936; GELDZAHLER: 1965). Virgil Barker used the word in two articles 
in 1934 and 1936, “Americanism in painting” and “The search for Americanism”, where he relies on the 
idea that Americanism was a European dream before becoming actuality in America (BARKER: 1934, 51). 
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World had all the headstrong energies of youth, Europe the mellowness of age” (CORN: 
1999, 53). But these youthfulness and innocence have also a negative meaning: cultural 
underdevelopment. This was the reason for the trip around Europe which became 
mandatory as a culmination of the apprenticeship for those Americans who wanted to be 
considered as artists. Edward Hopper travelled to Europe in 1906, 1907 and 1908, 
encouraged by Robert Henri, although this European tour lost its relevance during the 
first decades of the twentieth century (HOBBS:1987, 25). 
 
American artists faced, in the New York of the early twentieth century, the same 
problem that, according to Benjamin, Baudelaire tried to solve in nineteenth-century’s 
Paris: how to create art under the sway of the poverty of experience. American artists 
could not search for the lost memory in their past in the same way as European artists did, 
because in America this European past implied dependence. But the poverty of experience 
is not only a negative feature, but an opportunity to set culture free from European 
colonialism. American artists did not have an institutionalized visual art in the national 
cultural tradition; on the contrary, they were trying to construct it. The artistic realm of 
the country during the first half of the twentieth century was characterized by a constant 
effort and a relentless dispute about the means to reach this goal, only achieved by the 
time when the United States became a global dominant power, after the Second World 
War. But the lack of a strong cultural tradition positions American artists in the middle of 
what is generally considered as the very core of modernity: industry, business, finances, 
advertising, mass culture, that is to say, the main features of the impoverishment of 
experience. 
 
 And this observation leads us to the second element of the European image of 
America: the fascination with industrial development, which is also present in Benjamin’s 
texts. In the first decades of the twentieth century it was not unusual for Europeans to 
understand America as a politically and industrially developed but culturally 
underdeveloped country when compared to Europe, a sort of technological paradise 
which lacked tradition. As Wanda Corn puts it: “Europe was the seat of humanism, 
America of efficiency and industry (...) Europe had great artists, America great engineers. 
Europe had palaces and cathedrals; America had skyscrapers” (CORN: 1999, 55). 
Benjamin exposes his utopian idea of a post-art world with examples taken not only from 
the avant-garde context, but also from the cultural industry of the United States (films, 
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comics and cartoons) and, as it has been noted before, he appreciates these seemingly 
childish expressions of mass culture as the symptoms of a technology that develops the 
productive forces in the direction of a progressive liberation. Miracles, in technology and 
in nature, have become possible again. 
 
 So, if one puts together both elements of the European image of America — ultra-
primitivism and ultra-technologization— , it can be said that this mythical vision is not 
far removed from the mix of “nature and technology, primitivism and comfort” that 
Benjamin perceives in Mickey Mouse’s adventures, as if the two extreme ages of the 
artwork, the magical and the technological one, could reunite in a new world capable of 
making compatible the comforts of civilization and the exoticism of the terra incognita, 
which for Kracauer, by contrast, excluded one another (KRACAUER: 1995, 65-66). 
 
 This same spirit can be found behind the statements on art made by Duchamp in 
America47: he saw in that innocent barbarism (or barbaric innocence) the realization of 
an avant-gardist utopia where art and life merge. Rather than struggling to create its own 
culture, America, according to Duchamp, would have to accept its own lack of education 
and to think of itself as a society which had overcome culture and art in the elitist, 
decadent and old European sense. This is close to what Benjamin calls, in the final lines 
of “Experience and poverty”, outliving culture. Americans were not the ones who had to 
travel to Europe (or to go French) to educate themselves; rather, Europeans had to travel 
to America to become absolutely modern. 
 
 However, the idea of America surpassing of art, quite attractive for European 
immigrant artists, was not so appealing for American artists. For American painters, the 
emancipation from European cultural tutelage did not only mean a rupture with European 
tradition, but also with the European image of America, still impregnated with colonialist 
prejudices. Indeed, the positive Americanism of French artists, like the one shared with 
Benjamin, could be less innocent than it seems. Wanda Corn suggests this issue when she 
calls attention on the “double agenda” proposed by Apollinaire in 1916: “modernizing to 
stay nationally competitive”, that is to say, “grafting elements of American style 
modernity onto French tradition and self-images” to assure “the survival of their own art 
                                                             
47“If only America would realize that the art of Europe is finished —dead— and that America is the country 
of the art of the future” (New York Tribune, September, 12, 1915). 
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traditions, now threatened by shifts in global power” (CORN: 1999, 103-105). For this 
reason, the cultural and artistic independence from Europe requires questioning both the 
ultraprimitivistic and the ultra-technologized images of America. 
 
 And this task in turn implies relativizing the idea that there is no cultural tradition 
in America apart from popular religion and mass culture. In this sense, it represents a 
decisive step the series of writings produced by Lewis Mumford after 1926, the year he 
published The Origins of the American Mind. In this and subsequent writings, Mumford 
constructed a canon of intellectual founders of modern American high culture: Whitman, 
Melville, Emerson, Thoreau and Eakins, among others. He also established a new kind of 
link between Europe and America, preserving the maternal connexion and, at the same 
time, surpassing the relationship of dependence. One of the most interesting points of 
Mumford’s position is that he identifies “American” with “modern” to the extent that he 
locates the breakup with the old world in Europe, where “fossilized” medieval culture 
was replaced by a new abstract culture “deliberately indifferent to man’s proper interests”. 
It was Europe, according to Mumford, that produced that culture and, by doing so, 
“already had one foot in America”. That is to say, America would be the name of the 
accomplishment of that new order, and the American man would be the “naked 
European”, unable to continue with his tradition and therefore forced to create an 
unexpected future. Mumford understands the emerging American culture as a way of 
rehumanizing the world. Taking Melville’s suggestion (“we are the pioneers of the 
world”) as a starting point, America’s past is assumed as broader than the European one 
because of the cultural variety brought by massive immigration. He also emphasises the 
connection between science and technology to redirect culture towards “humankind 
interests” (MUMFORD:1926, 30). In this project, rather than trying to overtake tradition 
through technology, technology extends the limits of a tradition which would be no longer 
merely European, but generically human. So, America does not mean only primitivism, 
because it has a high culture tradition; and because of it, America does not mean only 
technology: it announces a deeper kind of humanism. This reconstruction of American 
cultural roots, even if it refers especially to literary tradition, will be significant in 
discussions of American visual arts in the twentieth century. And this remark becomes 
more important if we take into account that Duchamp’s and Picabia’s version of avant-
gardism was not the only artistic trend to arrive in the United States from Europe in the 
interwar period: also cubist and abstract painting were attentively received. And a time 
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will come when, in America, abstraction will be interpreted as one of the possible symbols 
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3.2.A LANDSCAPE OF CONTROVERSY 
  
 After having offered a general view of the discussion about artistic American 
identity in the first decades of the twentieth century, I shall now look closely at the artistic 
transformation conducted by American artists, underlining the opposition of the 
movements led, respectively, by Alfred Stieglitz and his circle, and Robert Henri and the 
Ashcan school. My main contribution to the understanding of this discussion will be its 
interpretation by means of the polarity of cult and exhibition values (subsections 3.2.1. 
and 3.2.3.), to which I shall add a reference to the trends to abstraction which will be so 
relevant in American art after the Second World War, also interpreted under this 
theoretical standpoint as an impoverishment of the artwork’s exhibition value (subsection 
3.2.2.). 
 
 To enter the landscape of these American discussions, I will take as a starting point 
the description that Edward Hopper makes of such a landscape. In 1927, he wrote —in 
quite aggressive terms— about what he called “the horde of camp-followers, publicity-
seekers and imitators who attach themselves to all movements in art” (HOPPER: 1927, 
177). He was referring to some of the artists who followed the path of the avantgarde, 
which had reached America through the Armory Show and the so-called “first circle” of 
the photographer Alfred Stieglitz in the 291 Gallery in New York (“Little Galleries of the 
Photo-Secession”). However, Hopper himself recognised that it was the first time in this 
period that there was an opportunity for autochthonous artists to interact with the 
incentives coming from elsewhere (OTTINGER: 2012, 46). Hopper opposes these 
“imitators”, who were unable to emancipate themselves artistically from Europe, to those 
artists who were attempting to create a national American art. He identifies the last ones 
with the movement led by the Ashcan School, which he defined as the first movement 
truly important for the development of a national artistic consciousness in his country 
(OTTINGER: 2012, 46), a movement both original and intelligent enough to create an 
American “tang of the soil” able to be independent from its “French mother” (HOPPER: 
1927, 177). 
 
 Leaving aside the ‘historical justice’ of these declarations, the distribution of the 
scenery suggested in them reflects a real polarization in American visual arts in the 1920s. 
This polarization was represented by the rivalry between the leaders of the two groups in 
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which it was embodied: Alfred Stieglitz (1864-1946) and Robert Henri (1865-1929). To 
put it in broad terms, these two men had different origins, personalities, education and 
artistic profiles: Stieglitz was an intellectual and an aesthete, highly influenced by the 
European avant-garde and disdainful of the approval of the general public (BOCHNER: 
2005); Henri rejected the notion of art for art’s sake (HOMER: 1988) and, although he is 
often considered as an artistic nationalist, his Americanism, inherited from Whitman, 
includes a strong ingredient of universality, which will also be present in Hopper48. From 
1910, when the groups led by each of them presented separated exhibitions, it was clear 
that Stieglitz considered Henri and his pupils “conventional if not retarded”, while for 
Henri the art shown in Stieglitz’s 291 Gallery was “faddish and undemocratic” (ROSE: 
1967, 40)49. However, both shared a rejection of academic painting and both identified 
this rejection with the need for an American autochthonous art. But each of them 
understood this need in radically opposed senses. In the language of their times, this 
opposition positioned Henri and his disciples as realists, because for them life was a 
higher value than art, while the group of artists led by Stieglitz considered art as the 
highest value and their works were often accused of abstraction. Here we find an echo of 
the debate on art’s autonomy I have referred to in the previous chapter. 
 
 These two movements have been studied by the art historians of the period whose 
works I will quote and discuss along these pages50. Nevertheless, I shall argue that the 
conflict in question is not only the result of personal preferences or alternative schools, 
but expresses, in the specific conditions of the American context in the early twentieth 
century, the conflict between artwork’s cult value and exhibition value. This analytic 
frame becomes especially useful if it is reduced to the background which is, after all, the 
                                                             
48“Always we would try to tie down the great to our little nationalism; whereas every great artist is a man 
who has freed himself from his family, his nation, his race. Every man who has shown the world the way 
to beauty, to true culture, has been a rebel, a “universal” without patriotism, without home, who has found 
his people everywhere, a man whom all the world recognizes, accepts, whether he speaks through music, 
painting, words or form” (HENRI: 2007, 144). On the influence of Whitman on Henri, which this last 
transmitted to Sloan, see BOHAN: 2012. 
49“For his followers, Stieglitz was a mythic crusader against the vulgarity of ‘commercial America’, the 
paterfamilias of American Modernism battling ‘Babbitry’. Conversely, his critics deemed him either a P.T. 
Barnum figure, or a false prophet, at the head of an exclusive and affluent artistic cabal” (HARAN: 2007, 
336). 
50Without claiming to be exhaustive: CAHILL, and BARR: 1934, ROSS, N. and CATEFORIS: 1997, 
CORN: (1999), DOSS: 2002, FOSTER: 2004, GELDZAHLER: 1965, GREENBERG:1993, HASKELL: 
1999, ROSE, B: 1968, TUITE and DOCHERTY: 2010, ZURIER: 1996 and 2006. 
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only one strictly developed by Benjamin, that is to say, the transformations of the image’s 
technologies and the attempts of art to give a response to them. 
 
 
 3.2.1 From the cult value standpoint 
 
 Let us begin the analysis with the group led by Stieglitz, the main advocate of 
European modernism in America, and also the main defender of a modernist America. 
 
 As I have just said, both Stieglitz and Henri rejected academic painting. But 
Stieglitz, closer to the European scene, understood this fight as a rebellion against the 
Western pictorial tradition. Nobody knew exactly what the visual meaning of a genuinely 
American art could be; but, to the extent that it had to include a rupture with Europe, for 
Stieglitz’s circle, the way in which avant-gardist painters were trying to break with the 
mainstream of their own tradition could act, at least, as an inspiration for American 
painters to do the job they were supposed to do. Avant-gardism was, as a minimum, a path 
to an authentically American art. 
 
 In this path, cubist and abstract painters seemed to obey an intellectual or spiritual 
motivation that, in a certain sense, opposed the ‘materialistic’ face of Americanism51; one 
can remember the strong defence of the spirit in the writings of Klee, Mondrian, 
Kandinsky or Malévich. Stieglitz knew very well this pictorial spiritualism, because he 
had published excerpts from Kandinsky’s text Concerning the spiritual in Art in his 
photographic journal Camera Work, in 1912, and he had purchased Kandinsky’s 
Improvisation 27 (Garden of Love II) in the 1913 Armory Show. Of cubist paintings, 
Sartre said in 1940 that the forms we grasp in them “are certainly not the forms of a rug, 
a table or anything else that we ordinarily grasp in the word”; they have matter, depth, 
density, so they are things; but they are the kind of things “that I have never seen nor will 
ever see” (SARTRE: 2001, 295); and, could it be added, that the camera will never 
                                                             
51This aspect of the circle has been analyzed by K. Wilson in “The Intimate Gallery and the Equivalents: 
Spirituality in the 1920s Work of Stieglitz”: “Stieglitz's spiritual beliefs carried with them an explicitly 
modern air: they were tinged with anxieties about the loss of human reality in a postwar age of extreme 
mechanization, and they were infused with an incongruous market sensibility” (WILSON, K.: 2003, 764). 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
88 
 
capture. This domain where the mechanical reproduction of images cannot follow is what 
the Stieglitz’s circle points to with the words “art” or “beauty”. 
 
 Stieglitz was a supporter of art for art’s sake, and he insisted on quality (on the 
artistic quality of artworks), that is to say, on cult value. But one should not forget that he 
was a photographer (for example, the photographs he took of Duchamp’s Fountain can 
be counted among the few remaining traces of the original object). Photography, for him, 
had not the nature of an aura reducer or an Erlebnis-maker, as it is described by Benjamin. 
What Stieglitz appreciates in photography is not what Benjamin considers its main 
achievement, i.e., its exhibition value. Bringing it to the terms I am proposing, it could be 
said that, in a direction exactly opposite to Benjamin, he understood “photography as art” 
(which Benjamin thought of as the subject of an unfruitful debate, BENJAMIN:1999-5, 
520). As Rose attests, Stieglitz “conceived of photography as an increasingly abstract 
medium, in which images are divorced from any other than formal meaning” (ROSE: 
1967, 41). It is clearly so [Fig.5], but, where does this project come from? 
 
 Despite his interest in a distinctive American art, in his early writings Stieglitz 
openly recognises his link with the English tradition founded by P.H. Emerson, 
naturalistic or pictorial photography52. Emerson, who was himself interested in Stieglitz’s 
work, was the favourite authority he invoked to fight “one of the most universally popular 
mistakes that have to do with photography”, its assumed mechanical nature: “A great 
paradox… is the assumption that because photography is not ‘hand-work’, as the public 
say –therefore is not an art language. This is a fallacy born of thoughtlessness (…) we 
find there is very much ‘hand-work’ and head-work in it”53. 
 
                                                             
52In an article called “A Plea for photography in America”, published in 1892, he complains about American 
photography when compared to the work of the “English fellows”: “What we lack is that taste and sense 
for composition and for tone (…), when we go through an exhibition of American photographs, we are 
struck by the conventionality of the subjects chosen (…) the same unfortunate attempts at illustrating 
popular poetry”. And he declares that the “exquisite atmosphere effects” (the aura?) which lack in American 
photography make the difference between a photograph and a picture, that is to say, “a photograph of artistic 
value” (STEGLITZ: 1983, 179, 181). 
53These are the words of Emerson in Naturalistic photography, quoted by Stieglitz in his essay for Scribner’s 
Magazine “Pictorial Photography”, in 1899 (STIEGLITZ: 1983, 186). 





            [Fig.5] Alfred Stieglitz, The hand of Man, 1902 Gelatine silver print, 34.4x27  
             cm, The Art Institute of Chicago. 
 
 
 Stieglitz attributes this mistake to the popularization of the hand-camera and the 
industrialization of the process (“Don’t believe you became an artist in the instant you 
received a gift Kodak on Xmas morning”, STIEGLITZ: 1983, 190), to the extent that, 
when the public is informed about “the plastic nature of the photographic process”, the 
need for the photographer to “be quite as familiar with the laws of composition as is the 
landscape or portrait painter” and the complexity of the printing processes, the result is 
so far “from the stiff, characterless countenance of the average professional work” that 
the reaction use to be saying: “but this is not photography!”. On the contrary, Stieglitz, 
who distrusted terms as “art-photography” or “pictorial photography”, thought that 
photography was really such, and “that which the world is accustomed to regard as 
pictorial photography is not the real photography, but an ignorant imposition” 
(STIEGLITZ: 1983, 189). In other words, his efforts were dedicated to endowing 
photography with the same cult value that can be found in paintings. Far from dispelling 
the aura, his photographs try to restore it to the places and the people in his portraits. 
Stieglitz fought against, so to speak, the technological reproducibility of images in its 
very birthplace. His was a claim for recognition of photography “not as the handmaiden 
of art, but as a distinctive medium of individual expression” in which the style was as 
perceptible “as it is that of Rembrandt or Reynolds” (STIEGLITZ: 1983, 190, 187). 
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Obviously, this conception of photography was influenced by painting54, but, in turn, in 
the case of Stieglitz, it influenced the painters close to his Gallery. 
 
 After having closed it in 1917, in 1925 Stieglitz, leaving aside European 
modernism, reopened his gallery renaming it as Intimate Gallery (in 1929, he renamed it 
again as An American Place). It was made clear then that, along with artists such as 
O’Keeffe, Dove, Hartley, Marin, Demuth and Paul Strand, among others, his project was 
to define the elements of an American high visual culture, trying to achieve an American 
subjective emotion which could represent a distinctive visual style. “[Georgia O’Keeffe] 
is American. So is Marin. So am I (…) Haven’t we any of our own courage in matters 
‘aesthetic’?” (STIEGLITZ: 1983, 212). Stieglitz did not want to renounce to high culture 
or to leave aside tradition to go beyond Europe; he wanted to elaborate a new high cultural 
tradition. The spiritual features of this culture should avoid reduction of American to 
popular cultural icons linked to the economic growth and the development of marketing. 
For this reason, in visual terms, these artists felt forced to break any connection with the 
procedures of mechanical reproducibility of images which dominated the market realm55 . 
Despite their strong anti-puritanism, for them, the only way to search for cult value was 
to maintain an aesthetic ‘religiousness’ or spirituality which was also a form of affinity 
with what I have called “the cult side” of European avant-gardist movements. In a letter 
to Heinrich Kühn, in 1912, he writes: “Now I find that contemporary art consists of the 
abstract (without subject) like Picasso etc. and the photographic. The so-called 
photographic art, whether attempted with camera or with brush” (STIEGLITZ: 1983, 
194). 
 
 The artists of Stieglitz’s circle never looked for the acquiescence of the public: 
their art was addressed to informed critics and private individuals with an advanced 
aesthetic taste. But this does not mean that they were not interested in social progress. 
Rose says that they considered social progress not as a task of arts, but as a condition for 
artistic creation and aesthetical appreciation: “Social progress, they thought, would issue 
                                                             
54In collaboration with the amateur photographer J. Keiley, Stieglitz improved a glycerine-developed 
platinum printing process that proved to be among the most painterly photographic methods ever devised 
(METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART: 1978, 24). 
55“They repeatedly described the camera as an extension of Stieglitz's own body, and his photographs as an 
extension of his spirit. As a result, they claimed that Stieglitz had achieved a profound physical and spiritual 
union both with his machinery and with the subjects he photographed” (BRENNAN: 1997, 156). 
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from sensual liberation (…). The question of whether the repressive, inhibiting anti-visual 
of the Puritan legacy had permanently crippled the American ability to have an aesthetic 
experience was asked more than once” (ROSE: 1967, 50). But some remarks should be 
added to the questions of “social progress” and of the defence of the visual. 
 
 Regarding social progress, Stieglitz did not simply expect that social progress 
helped in the appreciation of his works. He understood the “Photo-secession” as a sort of 
cultural revolution: “In all phases of human activity, the tendency of the masses has been 
invariably towards ultra-conservatism. Progress has been accomplished only by reason of 
the fanatical enthusiasm of the revolutionist, whose extreme teaching has saved the mass 
from utter inertia”. So, he understood the “secession” as “a protest against the reactionary 
spirit of the masses” (STIEGLITZ: 1983, 190). And, regarding the question of visuality, 
one could ask: if the Puritan legacy is ‘anti-visual’, why these artists opposed the images 
of popular culture, which, like the “toothpaste and cosmetics for giants in the walls of the 
houses” mentioned by Benjamin, were, one should say, exceedingly visual? Of course, 
they did not demand a higher exhibition value. Indeed, the constant allegation that their 
images were not realistic refers to the low exhibition value of their works; but, for them, 
it did not mean that they were not interested in reality. When these artists discarded the 
image of the city as a series of successive stills seen from the earthbound perspective of 
a pedestrian who observes the buildings from a single vantage point, they also made it for 
realistic reasons. As Corn writes: “For them, the new city demanded an approach and 
style as disjunctive and shrill as the urban environment itself ” (CORN: 1999, 175)56 . 
 
 But the point is that the reality they were looking for was not the external reality 
of the industrialized public realm, but the interior reality of affections. And affections are 
on the side of cult value, which is the centre of the aesthetic experience. When Stieglitz 
claimed “the right of the picture to speak for itself, without being subjected to total 
exhaustion through verbalization” (ROSE: 1967, 41), he was taking a stand in defence of 
the autonomy of the artwork’s form in the sense I have developed in the previous chapter. 
Because, as I have argued, the translatability of the image into words is a mark of its 
exhibition value. So, Stieglitz’s claim is not only the visual, but the specific kind of visual 
that separates art from the merely representational images. 
                                                             
56In 1902, Stieglitz declared that the Flatiron Building was to America “what the Parthenon was to Greece” 
(STIEGLITZ: 1946, 189). 




 However, neither the cubo-futurist painters nor expressionist ones, neither 
photographers nor watercolourists of Stieglitz’s circle dared to completely abandon 
figuration. Certainly, as I have indicated, the main charge against them was that their 
works were undemocratic, elitist and subjected to foreign (i.e., not American) 
conventions. Indeed, they did not create an internationally recognizable American art as 
such: they mainly focused on New York (“the city of the future”, according to Picabia 
[PICABIA: 1913, 11]), and more specifically on Manhattan and its skyscrapers, which 
was the most appealing place for Europeans. But, as Corn concludes: “they did not so 
much create a new iconography as refined as the one invented by the generation of 1890-
1910” (CORN: 1999, 175), the cubo-futurist one. For this reason, they were often 




 3.2.2 An excursus on the representational impoverishment in the abstract artwork 
 
 Looking at the legacy of this movement, it could be said that its relative failure (in 
the search of a strictly American art) was not due to its excessive detachment from the 
representational pole of the artwork, quite the opposite: it did not go far enough. If cubism 
and abstract art can be seen as the struggle of painting to grant for itself a specific domain 
different from photography and film, it implies a meaning of the autonomy of art slightly 
different from the signification I have alluded to in chapter 2. Now, autonomy is not only 
referred to the cult value which is specific to art, but to the cult value which is specific to 
painting, and this second sense of the autonomy of painting was later decisive in the 
emergence of abstract expressionism, as it is shown in the work of critics like Clement 
Greenberg. But this development implies an aspect of the impoverishment of experience 
different and somehow opposite to the one foreseen by Benjamin. 
 
 So, this is one of these occasions in which the distinction of cult and exhibition 
values can provide a service beyond Benjamin’s standpoint, showing us another meaning 
of the claim for cult value that is also related to the loss of words as a feature of the 
poverty of experience. Although it implies a slight displacement in time regarding the 
opposition between Stieglitz’s and Henri’s positions, I find indispensable its development 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
93 
 
to complete the map of artistic options in which Hopper’s artistic project acquires its 
whole meaning. When asked about abstract expressionism, Hopper reluctantly 
recognized it as a real influence for Europe, somehow reverting the aesthetical dominance 
of France over America, which had lasted “more than thirty years”57. But he judged it as 
a “skilful invention of the intellect” or a “stimulating arrangement of color, form and 
design” which tried to replace “the essential element of imagination” or “the pristine 
imaginative conception” (MORSE: 1959). How should these statements be interpreted? 
 
 If painting has to fix its specificity with regard to other arts, and literature is one 
of these other arts, this struggle implies its autonomy with respect to verbal language. 
Paradoxically, the time in which painting begins to define itself as a language, is also the 
time in which it separates more strictly from language. And this is emphasised by the fact 
that the images shown in abstract painting are radically untranslatable to the words of 
experience. I have referred to this circumstance as the third feature of the poverty of 
experience (the loss of words). 
 
 In front of a completely abstract painting not only the viewer, but also the painter 
has no words to describe what is on the canvas. Now, it does mean that the artist is as 
mute as the soldiers described by Benjamin in the middle of explosions and torrents of 
unknown forces. This is perhaps the reason why, by the beginning of abstract painting, 
titles like “Composition VII” [Wassily Kandinsky, 1913], “Composition II in Red, Blue 
and Yellow” [Piet Mondrian, 1929], “White on white” [Kazimir Malevich, 1918] or even 
“Without title” became ubiquitous, which doubtless appeared a strange innovation to 
contemporary viewers. Mallarmé said in 1891 that “To name an object is to suppress 
threequarters of the enjoyment of the poem” (MALLARME: 2003, 700). This contributes 
to accentuate the visual shock produced by the image of a non-recognizable thing, 
offering an empty verbal indication which does not allow such stupefaction to be 
overcome. It assures the occurrence of a “true experience” (Erfahrung), which, in 
Benjamin’s terms, cannot appear but as a shock, precisely the shock that the reproducible 
Erlebnis tries to dodge. The struggle of the new painters of the twentieth century is 
                                                             
57Hopper says to John Morse that “The domination of France in the plastic arts has been almost complete 
for the last thirty years or more in this country”. Then, Morse asks Hopper: “We, in effect, are influencing 
France. Do you find that to be true today?”, and he answers: “I think it is so, but I am not quite sure” 
(MORSE:1959). 
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intended to break the protective shell of Erlebnis, which means to escape at the same time 
from mechanical images and from verbal translation of affections. 
 
The painters who are trying to settle in this domain inaccessible to reproducibility 
do not only need to reject mechanical images, which have absorbed any representational 
content, but also the captions which reduce any visual ambiguity and turns every image 
into a univocal and objective evidence. The abstract title of the abstract painting gives the 
work a mark of distinction, distancing it from the realm of commodities, by which the 
painter affirms his authority as an author. But, as long as the painter cannot give a title 
which transmits to the viewer the implicit experience of the painting’s contents, his strict 
designations are also a symptom of the poverty of such experience. For sure, nobody can 
deny that the artist has painted his experience. He cannot put his experience into words 
for the same reason that he cannot paint figurative or recognizable (verbally translatable) 
objects. So, his experience is a private one, what is the very Benjaminian definition of 
Erlebnis. He can say he has painted a sensation or an emotion of what he has seen, but 
the public exhibition of his painting will reveal that the viewers feels the same poverty of 
experience before the painting and its deceiving title: not only they cannot recognize a 
nameable or familiar object in the canvas; they are also incapable to name or to recognize 
the emotion which they are supposed to be seeing. How could it be expressed the 
representational impoverishment of modern painting better than saying that it depicts 
things whose names we ignore, things for which we have no words? Returning to Monet’s 
example used in chapter 2, the impression, divorced from the sunrise, is now an 
expression which shows something than nobody can tell; and the title is a phrase telling 
something in which nothing is shown. This is, perhaps, what Paul Klee —another of the 
heroes of dignified poverty in Benjamin’s “Experience and Poverty”— wanted to express 
in his famous declaration that “the people are missing”58, that is to say, that there is no 
common language (not even a visual one) shared by the painter and the public. 
 
 In the first decades of the twentieth century, it was common among some critics 
and artists to treat Cubism and abstract painting as parts of a new visual language. 
Although it at first awakened popular aversion, the argument went, people would come 
to understand the rules and accept them. But this never happened. And this failure of 
                                                             
58“This last force is lacking for want of a people that carries us”, he wrote in 1924 (KLEE: 1980, 33). 
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reconciliation between words and images (a metaphor of the rupture between cult and 
exhibition values) is another symptom of the poverty of experience as a “loss of words”. 
The existence of a visual code of abstract (or cubist) forms which would express the 
emotions and the states of mind, a spiritual painting opposed to the mechanical procedures 
of the reproducible images which reflect the external world, has been refuted as an 
ingenuous illusion. And, in the absence of such a code, the artist could only preserve his 
aspiration to create a new language invoking his exceptional authority —that is, his 
genius— to impose a private visual lexicon upon viewers (and this authoritarianism was 
not far away from the attitude of some avant-gardist artists). Not only the cruelty of 
documentary photography, but also the severity of abstract painting could represent the 
opposite to the kindness of figurative art. Despite its critical acclaim, the aversion, the 
indifference or the incomprehension of the general public was always an essential feature 
of avant-gardism, a sort of guarantee of authenticity (“one requirement was paramount: 
to outrage the public”, BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 119). 
 
 In the absence of this language and this community, it can be said —and this is 
probably what motivates Benjamin’s admiration for Klee— that, at least, the painter has 
made visible and has “dignified” this poverty in terms of experience, the Erfahrung which 
the Erlebnis tried to suppress from perception. Indeed, the naked or unnameable images 
of abstract expressionism are in tune with the ideal of the Mumford’s canon in this sense: 
the humanity they reflect, because of its nakedness, cannot be American but in the sense 
that it aims at being generically human. 
 
 So, Hopper’s statements quoted in the beginning of this subsection must be taken 
as a proof of his attachment to what I called the “distinctive” conception of the historical 
artwork, which cannot be completely deprived neither of cult value nor of exhibition 
value, even if they are as antinomic as the “telling” and the “showing” of literary realism. 
Was this reaction of Hopper a consequence of the teachings of Robert Henri? 
 
 
 3.2.3 From the exhibition value standpoint 
 
 As I have done in the case of Stieglitz’s circle, I will analyse in this subsection the 
American discussion from the standpoint of Robert Henri and the Ashcan school, to which 
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later, in the decade of 1930, will be added a third polemic instance: the regionalist 
movement of the American scene. 
 
  The anti-academicism of Robert Henri was, in a certain sense, more immediate 
and ingenuous than Stieglitz’s revolt: for Henri, the formula “academic painting” 
designed only American academic painting. And, as Rose points out, “in America, the 
academies were hardly more than organizations that held annual exhibitions” (ROSE: 
1967, 11-12). His rebellion was not against Western tradition, but against “the sheer 
mechanical process” practised in the art schools of his time. But this also means that 
Henri’s heroes were not European artists like Monet, Duchamp or Picasso, but American 
painters (whom Stieglitz would have considered representatives of an outdated notion of 
art) like Winslow Homer and, especially, Thomas Eakins, who was forced to resign from 
Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts for removing a loincloth on a male model in a class 
with female students. Although the historical significance of this anecdote has been 
perhaps overrated, it stood as a symbol of the anti-academic spirit. 
 
 Let us put this argument in terms of the debate I am describing. As is usual in art 
history, when the meaning of beauty and fine arts is felt by young artists to be 
monopolized by academic conventions —“the corruption of reactionary and official art”, 
in Hopper’s words (OTTINGER: 2012, 27)—, the main claim of the rebel painters cannot 
be beauty or art, but what Henri called life, even if painting directly from life could mean 
a collision with the interests of art and beauty. Criticizing abstract painting, Hopper said 
that “The term ‘life’ as used in art is something not to be held in contempt, for it implies 
all of existence, and the province of art is to react to it and not to shun it” (MORSE: 1959). 
But, what is the meaning of ‘life’ in this use of the opposition between art and life? The 
claim to ignore conventions, although primarily referred to academic rules, also included 
eventually the conventions of French modernism and avant-gardism: notwithstanding the 
anti-conventional character that modernism had in Europe, it was perceived by American 
artists whose pictorial past was not the one of the European painters as a foreign 
convention, without roots in local traditions. What is usually called the realism of the 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
97 
 
movement led by Henri (the Eight or the Ashcan School59) is this desire of making 
pictures from American life. 
 
 
 It is notable, when considering the focus on ‘life’ in these movements, that Eakins 
was also a photographer, and this practice was not for him separated from his artistic 
work. But unlike Stieglitz he was not exactly an artistic photographer, rather his interest 
in photography was a scientific one, in the mode of Renaissance artists who were 
interested in the science of their times so as to improve their artworks. As a follower of 
Edward Muybridge’s experiments, Eakins was interested in capturing, by means of 
photography, the movement of the human body —that is to say, its life—, and considered 
this study as a part of the knowledge of anatomy required for the craft of painting, which 
is clearly connected with the episode of the loincloth. Henri said: “Eakins was a deep 
student of life and with a great love he studied humanity frankly. He was not afraid of 
what this study revealed to him” (HENRI: 2007, 90). His conception of photography, 
therefore, unlike the Stieglitz’s, does match with Benjamin’s view: the camera removes 
the veil of respect which covered human body and deprives it of aura; photography is able 
to reproduce life without aesthetic or moral consideration and thereby reduces physical 
and cultural distances. 
 
 But painting from life also meant that Eakins looked for inspiration in American 
themes, and he counselled his students not to waste their time travelling to Europe. “If 
America is to produce great painters and if young art students wish to assume a place in 
the history of the art of their country, their first desire should be to remain in America, to 
peer deeper into the heart of American life” (GOODRICH: 1974, 271). But, which are 
the themes of American life that the painter should be interested in? From the time of 
Eakins to the time of Henri, American life underwent a radical transformation. As Hobbs 
informs us, from 1890 to the First World War, nearly sixteen million people, mainly 
European, entered the United States and settled in the industrial cities (HOBBS: 1987, 
89). The reality these artists aimed to paint was now characterized by industrial 
expansion, and the growth of cities as manufacturing centres attracted thousands of 
                                                             
59Rebecca Zurier, Snyder and Mecklenburg give a broad interpretation of the group formed by Robert Henri, 
William Glackens, George Bellows, George Luks, Everett Shinn and John Sloan in the book “Metropolitan 
lives” (ZURIER: 2006). 
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immigrants. So, the movement that painters had to capture was no longer the one of living 
animals or human bodies, but that of the urban crowd of industrial cities. However, there 
were few precedents for these subjects in American art. There was still some persistence 
of the romanticism of the Hudson River School, modernised by trips to France and the 
influence of Impressionism, which had been until that time the most modern movement 
from Europe. This combination of American Idealism and French Impressionism (along 
with other European influences) appeared as an aesthetic defence against the 
transformation of experience derived from the industrialization of the city. Such 
transformation was often understood as dehumanized or at least as an environment where 
humanity was under threat and displaced by something inhuman or even anti-human, 
usually represented by technology. Where humanity has lost its privilege because of the 
development of technology, beauty cannot be found (let us remember Benjamin’s 
statement that the beautiful has no place in technological reproduction). And this was the 
main motivation for many American painters taking shelter in domestic interiors and 
introspective paintings in the same way that John Singer Sargent did, using seventeenth-
century’s portraits, such as the ones Van Dyck painted, as inspiration for their works. For 
this reason, in order to paint a city life which had been rarely represented before, resorting 
to spontaneity and breaking academic rules were constantly invoked in Henri’s teaching. 
The problem was how to introduce in the artwork some representational contents until 
then excluded from artistic exhibition. 
 
 A recent and modest support for this task of painting from (urban-industrial) life 
did exist, not in the academy, but in newspapers: “In the decade between 1890 and 1900, 
before newspapers had adapted the photograph to the requirements of daily publications, 
artists-reporters, following the footsteps of Homer, who had sketched civil war battles, 
functioned as photographers do today, rushing to fires, strikes, murders, mine disasters 
and other sensational events” (ROSE: 1967, 16). The frenetic rhythm of the modern city 
was indeed the reason for the emergence of the new career of newspaper illustrator, and 
this became a professional opportunity for most of the artists linked to the Ashcan School. 
Because of their previous experience as illustrators in Philadelphia, many of them worked 
for different newspapers and magazines in New York. Their job consisted of sketching in 
situ any sort of event —from daily life to crime scenes— and then developing it in a more 
detailed way at their office desk. 
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 In other words, they were photographers avant la lettre, and the elaboration of the 
sketches in the newspapers’ headquarters was the equivalent to the photographic process 
of development and retouching of photographs. The drawings made by illustrators, just 
because they were made “for the purpose of establishing evidence”, had to present the 
same scientific neutrality as Eakins’ shots of human movement, neutralizing the distance 
of respect to the subject depicted. In the same sense that, according to Benjamin, the 
rhetoric of journalistic objectivity excludes the subjective experience of the storyteller, 
the artists who worked as graphic reporters were forced to remove the veil of prudery that 
prevented academic art from painting these themes because they were not included in the 
repertory of ‘beauty’. Newspapers were not made to show beauty, but to show life: 
“Because of their newspaper experience, [Ashcan artists] were able to capture what the 
camera could record in a split second snap of the shutter, they became expert as well at 
depicting figures in motion and the psychological nuances of gesture” (ROSE: 1967, 16). 
But the fact that they were photographers without a camera does not only mean that their 
pictures had an exchange value (the city had also become a marketable subject), but also 
that, from the visual point of view, the main feature of their works was exhibition value. 
 
 The critical allegation of ‘ugliness’ was often addressed to the Ashcan School. 
Indeed, the pejorative sense of the term “Ashcan” referred to the sordid nature of their 
pictorial motifs: alleys, trams, bridges, night clubs, movie theatres, stores and restaurants 
(RYALL: 2013,162): these were the themes which academic painting threw in the ashcan 
of ugliness. Some critics called the members of the School the “Apostles of ugliness” or 
“the revolutionary black gang” (DOSS: 2002, 35). But, what does “ugliness” mean in this 
context60? The maladjustment of the new urban experience and traditional aesthetic 
representation is what is expressed by the Benjaminian concept of the “decay of the aura”. 
Benjamin defines this decay as the fall of a veil. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and 
Engels used this metaphor to describe a world where all that is sacred is being profaned 
by “egoistical calculation” (MARX-ENGELS: 1848, 16). The demystification of social 
life, the disenchantment of the world or the decline of transcendence —symptoms of the 
impoverishment of experience— would be then the cause of that ugliness. 
                                                             
60Henri often complained about the idea that there are “ugly” subjects for painting: “’Why do you paint 
ugly and not beautiful things?’ The questioner rarely hesitates in his judgment of what is beautiful and what 
is ugly (…) Beauty he thinks is a settled fact. His conception also is that beauty rests in the subject, not in 
the expression. He should, therefore, pay high for Rembrandt’s portrait of a gentleman, and turn with 
disgust from a beggar by Rembrandt” (HENRI: 2007, 136). 




 However, ugliness is an aesthetic category: it does not refer to reality itself but to 
its representation. This representation, linked to the new technological media 
(newspapers, photography and cinema), is perceived as ugly since those new media create 
a naked urban image that lacks aura. So, what contemporary critics of the Eight called 
ugliness (“Is it fine art”, one critic asked, “to exhibit our stores?”, ROSE: 1967, 25) is not 
the condition of some subjects represented by these painters, but the status of a kind of 
image deprived of cult value or of artistic quality and sterilised for poetry, becoming non-
aesthetic or anaesthetic. 
 
By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. 
And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular 
situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These two processes lead to a tremendous 
shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of 
mankind (BENJAMIN, 2002-2, 103-104). 
 
 The “unique existence” is what traditional painting aims to express. Photography 
is “a device for giving events the character of a shock, detaching them from the contexts 
of experience” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 351); it fragments the totality of the “unique 
existence” of human beings and reproduces it in the context of the viewer, which is 
foreign to such experience, like a single photographic frame extracted from the series of 
the shots of the living movement taken by Muybridge or Eakins. 
 
 Obviously, the proto-photographic drawings of newspaper illustrators were not 
considered as art by Henri. Newspaper illustration and political cartooning counted 
among the popular sources of the effort to make pictures from life, but they were not at 
all its final result. Because of their professional training in rapid execution and 
spontaneous style, very far from the parameters of those artists around Stieglitz's circle, 
the Ashcan painters felt able to solve the question posed by the city as an aesthetic 
problem: how could something that had not, until then, been considered worth of being 
the subject of a painting be represented? How to capture those settings that were devoid 
of an aura? Artists looked for new pictorial solutions to this dilemma, looking for 
inspiration in both popular and historical sources. Although their work shared the same 
worries that were present in newspapers, entertainment pamphlets and documentary 
photographs, they aimed at finding new artistic ways to represent those subjects and 
different ways of thinking about them. In their paintings, the Ashcan School artists tried 
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to interpret and visualize the social dynamics which was constantly transforming New 
York city, and this approach produced a need for creating images which did not yet exist, 
to picture the new urban phenomena. With some exceptions, they usually captured 
specific moments, sites or seasonal activities which were every so often included in the 
title of the painting. This procedure leads to a way of understanding the city brick by 
brick, event by event, as in the different acts of a stage play or the different episodes of a 
drama whose argument is partially unknown to the viewer. 
 
                         
           [Fig.6]. Robert Henri, Sylvester – Smiling,1914, 61 x 50.8 cm., Private Collection. 
 
 Henri’s students wandered the streets in search of subjects, and he encouraged 
them to translate their sketches into paintings61 . For him, sketches played a similar role 
to the Eakins’ photographs. But, in this translation, what was mainly exhibition value 
should be enriched, acquiring a cult value when becoming painting. According to the 
objective of capturing immediate life, in his class Henri defended the spontaneous 
pictorial technique, and encouraged his students to work quickly: “Work with great speed 
(…) Finish as quickly as you can. There is no virtue in delaying23 (…) Do it all in one 
sitting if you can. In one minute if you can (….) The most vital things in the look of a 
face or of a landscape endure only for a moment” (HENRI: 2007, 24). “He even forbade 
                                                             
61“The sketch hunter has delightful days of drifting about among people, in and out of the city, going 
anywhere, everywhere, stopping as long as he likes—no need to reach any point, moving in any direction 
following the call of interests. He moves through life as he finds it, not passing negligently the things he 
loves, but stopping to know them, and to note them (…) Like any hunter he hits or misses (…). Those who 
are not hunters do not see these things” (HENRI: 2007, 13-14). 
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the use of small brushes in the class because they fostered an emphasis on delicate detail” 
(HASKELL: 1999, 66); the usage of thick paintbrushes emphasised flux in urban traffic 
(ZURIER: 2006, 173). Zurier also recalls that memory and a quick perception of reality 
were essential skills for the accomplishment of the newspaper illustrations (ZURIER: 
2006,122). But, for Henri, memory is not only a professional skill of the visual reporter, 
but it also plays an important role in artistic painting, and this methodological indication 
will leave a deep trace in Hopper’s conception of painting: after the first impression 
(related to what I called “the first element” of experience), to which the painter must 
remain always faithful, “work should be done from memory” (which belongs to the 
“second element” of experience). “The memory is of that vital movement. During that 
moment there is a correlation of the factors of that look. This correlation does not 
continue. New arrangements, greater or less, replace them as mood changes. The special 
order has to be retained in memory—that special look, and that order which was its 
expression. Memory must hold it” (HENRI: 2007, 24). 
 
 But, what is the ingredient added by these brushes, the element which transmutes 
sketches into artworks or, in Benjamin terms, adds cult value to exhibition value? What 
transforms the quasi-photographs in art is painting, which, in Henri’s words, adds 
humanity to the dehumanized life of the city. “Because we are saturated with life”, he 
wrote, “because we are human, our strongest motive is life, humanity; and the stronger 
the motive back of a line, the stronger, and therefore the more beautiful, the line will be” 
(HENRI: 2007, 110). What “the Eight” or the Ashcan School wanted to highlight was the 
possibility of finding beauty, life and humanity precisely in those subjects which both 
academicism and ultra-modernism eliminated from their focus: “Henri's position made it 
possible for the artist to reject academic practice and official taste without embracing the 
modern attitude or any of its implications. It offered a third choice to American artists 
who were repelled by Post-impressionism as they were by Neoclassicism” (ROSE:1967, 
39). The claim for humanity in these paintings is what separates them from newspaper 
illustrations, even if newspapers were an occasional training for it. Henri’s pupils were 
trying to humanize the industrial city life, not merely to illustrate it [Fig.6]. 
 
 The finished painting is, for Henri, “a complete statement of just what you feel 
most important to say about the subject” (HENRI: 2007, 171). So, we come back to the 
impressions, affections or emotions which become the domain of art when technology 
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appropriates the sphere of objectivity. These feelings seem to concentrate the cult value 
of artworks. But, if stressing these emotions had driven the artists of the Stieglitz’s group 
to approach to abstraction, the artists in Henri’s orbit thought, as Hopper put it, that “the 
inner life of a human being is a vast and varied realm and does not concern itself alone 
with stimulating arrangements of color, form, and design” (MORSE: 1959), that is to say, 
it retains also an exhibition value. The word humanity seems to suggest that the artistic 
quality of these images is founded on a moral or social intention, often underlined by 
Henri’s defence of democratization of art. But, like Haskell and Rose underline, Ashcan 
school painters were much more interested in the agitation of streets, parks, beaches and 
night scenes, in the immediacy and intensity of the movement, than in social, ethnical or 
economical inequalities (HASKELL: 1999, 62): “their works carried no didactic social 
message other than a feeling for humanity in all of its possible conditions” (ROSE: 1967, 
16). So, returning to my argument, I would say that Henri’s approach could be called a 
visual democratization more than a social or political issue. The American realism 
democratises images in the sense that makes pictorially viable some contents which 
previously were not, like photography made possible the exhibition of things that until 
them were veiled or forbidden to the eye. But the main idea behind the Ashcan School 
movement should not be understood as a social approach. The claim for humanity 
underpins an aesthetic rather than a social intention, rooted in the rejection of the elegant 
subjects of high society and of faddish modernism. 
 
 Now, if we accept that the intention of the Ashcan School is a modernization of 
painting that brings it closer to real life, what is the pictorial strategy used to achieve this? 
They allude to the very vitality of the impulse to paint the urban industrial life and to the 
confidence in spontaneity; they defend the cause of democracy in art to search humanity 
among the restless urban hustle, in the very core of this “ugliness” that has been made 
visible, in this reality without aura whose space and time are the result of mechanical 
reproduction. But allowing free spontaneity to face the task of painting beyond all kind 
of prejudices is not enough to produce a pictorial style. Like experience, painting is also 
a matter of tradition. So, these artists had to resort to some painting procedures drawn 
from a pre-impressionist tradition. In order to turn the industrial city exhibition value into 
something pictorially acceptable and therefore into something human and beautiful, that 
is to say, in cult value, they turned their subjects, as Renner says, into picturesque scenes 
(RENNER:1991, 30). In order to establish a link —which until that moment had not 
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existed in American painting— between art and the modern city represented by New 
York, they searched for beauty in a picturesque way. They looked for high contrast and 
irregularity of forms, relying on the humanizing usage of anecdotes that they had learnt 
from illustration. And they naturalized the urban landscape, which allowed them to 
remain in tune with the traditional rules of landscape painting. This is why Zurier states 
that this resort to the picturesque must be understood here as an “aesthetics of 
accommodation” which tries to naturalize what could be considered as strange and to turn 
it into an object of visual pleasure, to domesticate the urban chaos and to control its 
novelty subjecting it to a pictorial code which was already in use in the last decades of 
the eighteenth century (ZURIER: 2006, 163). Doubtless, through this technique, the 
Ashcan School artists created, for the very first time, images where the urban traffic influx 
and crowds were present, a subject that had been left aside in American painting until 
then (HASKELL: 1999, 161-173). But it could hardly be said that, acting this way, they 
created a new —and American— pictorial language recognised by a “community of 
feelings”. 
 
 And this is perhaps one of the reasons why, in the 1930s, the social regionalism of 
the “American Scene” movement somehow took up the baton from the aesthetic 
nationalism of the Ashcan School. The label “American Scene” points to the title of a 
renowned travel book by Henry James. It could be a signal that the explicit vocation of 
this group belongs to the realm of “showing” and, in this sense, to the exhibition value of 
the artwork. Anyway, the works of Benton, Wood, Curry, Bohrod and Burchfield, who 
were the main artists of the movement, were not only in a clear opposition to modernist 
trends, but shared a reaction to the social transformation which followed the Great 
Depression in America. John Dewey, in an article entitled “United States, incorporated”, 
called this transformation “the dominant corporateness”: he focused on the growing 
importance of corporations in economic life: 
 
We may then say that the United States has steadily moved from an earlier pioneer 
individualism to a condition of dominating corporateness. The influence business 
corporations exercise in determining present industrial and economic activities is 
both a cause and a symbol of the tendency to combination in all phases of life. 
Associations tightly or loosely organized more and more define the opportunities, 
the choices and the actions of individuals (DEWEY: 1931, 37). 
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 So, Eakins’ claim to concentrate on American themes acquired a new meaning, 
and so did the definition of an autochthonous American painting. The objective was no 
longer to pay attention to industrial city life, but to preserve the traditional American types 
(the farmer or the small trader), whose virtues —expressing the spirit of the age of 
pioneers— were supposed to define American cultural identity; an identity which was 
now being threatened by the centralization of federal government and the large 
corporations with their executives and bureaucrats. This nostalgic interest in rural 
American folk heroes as symbols of the true American identity gained a large audience, 
partially because it appealed to popular taste and partially because it was widely 
disseminated throughout the country by mural painters such as Mitchell Siporin, 
Boardman Robinson, George Biddle and Anton Refrieger, “commissioned to decorate 
local banks, railway stations and public buildings like post offices, as part of the public 
works programs inaugurated by the New Deal to employ those artists out of work because 
of the Depression, something that would be continued by the Federal Art Project and the 
WPA” (ROSE: 1967, 125). 
 
 In this decade, Hopper was often included in the American scene group by critics 
—including the influent Lloyd Goodrich, former director of the Whitney Museum and an 
attentive follower of Hopper’s career. He profoundly rejected such a description: 
 
The thing that makes me so mad is the American Scene business. I never tried to do 
the American Scene as Benton and Curry and the Midwestern painters did. I think 
the American Scene painters caricatured America. I always wanted to do myself. 
The French painters did not talk about the ‘French Scene’ or the English painters 
about the ‘English Scene’ (…) The American quality is in a painter ─he does not 
have to strive for it (SCHMIED: 1995, 8). 
 
 Probably, Hopper’s allusion to caricature is related to the confusion, often present 
in Benton and Curry, of folk tradition and popular culture, what sometimes drove them to 
add Chaplin or Disney characters to the list of American traditional figures. And, also in 
this case, Hopper is probably right when he discards this local or nostalgic effort of the 
American Scene as the path for constructing an American art. 
 
 But here again, I shall argue the advantages of the theoretical framework I am 
proposing, relying on Benjamin’s opposition of cult and exhibition values, to reinterpret 
this period of art history in the United States and to establish the link between modern 
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painting and poverty of experience. The interesting point is the parallelism between the 
posterity of the movements of the American Scene or the Ashcan School and the 
movement represented by the Stieglitz’s circle. As I have signalled, the main allegation 
against Dove, Hartley, Marin, Demuth, Strand or O’Keeffe was their approach to 
abstraction or, in other words, their deviation from the exhibition value of paintings; a 
deviation that, as I have also suggested, is a form of poverty of experience. But, over time, 
it will not be the reduction of this inclination to abstraction but, on the contrary, its radical 
accentuation what will lead the abstract expressionists to success where their predecessors 
did not accomplish an original visual language. 
 
 Something similar seems to happen to realist American painters in the territory of 
“showing”. In this case, the main reproach addressed to realist painters was their 
excessive insistence in exhibition value and the corresponding deficit of cult value, i.e., 
of artistic quality in their paintings, because of the proximity of their images to the ones 
of mass culture. And it is curious to observe that, in the 1960s, pop art painters of the 
United States attain international acknowledgement as American artists precisely by 
intensifying this approach to mass culture, that is to say, increasing the exhibitive factor 
to the extent of making some critics doubtful about the cult value of their works. 
Something that, again, could be considered as a form of acceptance of the impoverishment 
of experience in modern images. 
 
 Those who took part in the debate about American artistic identity were interested 
in defining cultural contents as essentially American (contrasting them with those which 
would be essentially European). But, while this debate was at its peak, diverse and even 
opposed and contradictory cultural subjects were considered as essentially American: 
such varied styles as the anti-academicism of Eakins, the urban picturesque works of the 
Ashcan School, the Americanism of the European avant-gardists immigrated after the 
First World War, the regionalism of the “American scene”, the works of the Stieglitz’s 
group, the abstract expressionism and, of course, Hopper’s paintings, were labelled as 
“American art”. But perhaps this enormous variety in the definition of cultural identity is 
not such a strange issue if one recalls that, as Knutsson states from an anthropological 
point of view, cultural identity can never be defined only in terms of given cultural 
contents: it is constructed fundamentally through antagonisms which rely on the 
interactions between different groups fighting over a certain territory or resource, and 
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every so often a radical change of content is necessary in order to preserve the antagonism 
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3.3. HOPPER’S PLACE 
 
 The above brief description of American artistic panorama attempts to achieve a 
better understanding of Hopper’s place in the scheme of the visual debate in America. 
The interpretation merely drafted in this section will be fully developed in the following 
chapters. 
 
 Although, listening to Hopper’s words, one should say that he is clearly aligned 
with the aesthetic position of the Ashcan school, Hopper’s paintings somehow question 
this impression. Of course, he remains faithful to the rule of finding beauty hidden in the 
ugliness of the accelerated urbanisation-industrialization process. For this reason, he is in 
direct rivalry with the social uses of photography, to which he is also close in his job as 
an illustrator. As I have also recalled, in the 1930s, the polarity represented in the United 
States by Stieglitz and Henri is replaced by the antagonism between the tendencies to 
abstraction (whose main figure is Stuart Davis) and the regionalism of the “American 
scene”62 
 
 In his article for Reality, Hopper distinguishes two different interpretations of the 
term modern: one, quite restricted, defines artists as “modern” if they cultivate the 
“technical innovations of the period” they belong to; the other sense, broader and essential 
to Hopper, refers to the “truth” that the artwork implies, no matter the historic period in 
which it was made, and this “truth” turns the modernity of those paintings into something 
that cannot be ever outdated63. In other words, he opposes the American scene because 
he retains a classical (universalistic) conception of art, but he also discards abstraction 
because he trusts in the possibility of a universal art not absolutely divorced from the 
“essential element of imagination”, that is to say, exhibition value. So, in the system of 
coordinates of American visual arts in the early twentieth century, the natural drive of 
Hopper’s painting would have been to continue Henri’s way, something represented in 
those days by the artistic work of John Sloan. 
                                                             
62Davis declared that he also painted the American scene, although he condemned provincialism: “I use, as 
a great many others do, some methods of modern French painting which I consider to have universal 
validity” (ROSE: 1967, 76). 
63“In its most limited sense, modern in art would seem to concern itself only with the technical innovations 
of the period. In its larger, and to me irrevocable, sense, it is the art of all time of definite personalities that 
remain forever modern by the fundamental truth that is in them” (MORSE: 1959). 




 But, even if Hopper’s theoretical position is this, the evidence shows that his 
paintings differ substantially from Sloan’s. Hopper seems to be aesthetically close to the 
painters from the Ashcan School, but neither his methods nor the resulting work can 
plausibly be included into that movement; his paintings look for poetic features in the 
new context of the industrial city, but his technique differs from the one Sloan or Henri 
defend. If the main goal of the Ashcan School members was to naturalize the strange and 
turn it into something visually appealing or worth of being aesthetically captured in a 
painting, it could be said that Hopper seems to turn the natural into something strange. 
Hopper practises an aesthetics of the unacommodation: his characters seem to be 
constantly on the move, in transitory spaces, not comfortable at all; and the technique he 
uses has nothing to do with the picturesque. 
 
 Hobbs, who has called out multiple differences between Hopper and the Ashcan 
School, observes that, in Manhattan Bridge Loop (1928) [Fig.7], the urban landscape 
lacks any remarkable or peculiar element, as if the “anti-heroic” qualities of the lonely 
passer-by, shrunk in comparison with the concrete blocks, were being stressed. 
 
  
[Fig. 7] Edward Hopper, Manhattan Bridge Loop, 1928,  88.9 cm × 152.4 cm, Addison Gallery 
of American  Art, Andover, MA. 
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Moreover, Hobbs compares Sloan's painting A window on the street (1912) [Fig.8] with 









 In both paintings, the viewer is turned into some sort of voyeur of a moment in 
the private life of the character. However, whereas Sloan’s painting is somehow enriched 
with the anecdotal elements and with the tradition of art history (it has some sort of 
connection with Rossetti’s or Burden’s paintings, where every so often women lean on 
windows), Hopper’s scene is deprived of these resemblances and background, turning the 
naked figure into some kind of emblem of the heart renting aridity of urban life (HOBBS: 
1987, 33). Rose says that “Hopper saw only the doomed yearning of lonely figures in 
cold offices and desolate hotel rooms” (ROSE: 1967, 81). 
 





[Fig. 8] John Sloan, A Window on the street, 1912, 66 x 81.28 cm.,  Bowdoin college Museum 
of art. 
  
 In The City (1927) [Fig. 9], we find a building somehow located halfway between 
Manhattan’s Germania and the one in House by the Railroad [Fig.15]; seemingly outdated 
when compared with its context, the windows of the house are empty and dark (with the 
exception of one of them, which has a colourful awning). In the square below, human 
figures seem to be walking, but their profile is blurred and their bodies seem to be moving 
with difficulty, leaning in the direction of movement, as if the wind was pushing them, 
suggesting, according to Renner, a certain degree of anxiety that contrasts with the 
apparent serenity of the painting (RENNER: 1987, 48; WELLS: 2008, 74). 
 
 





[Fig.9] Edward Hopper, The City, 1927, 93.98 x 69.85 cm University of Arizona Museum 
of Art 
  
 In these comments, the commonplace on Hopper’s paintings appears summarized: 
voyeurism, aridity of urban life, desolation, loneliness, anxiety. These topics will be 
presented in relation to Hopper’s critical reviews in the following pages, as evidence of 
something whose foundations are, however, very far from being clear. And, as I have 
already suggested, this is the main reason why I have resorted to the notion of poverty of 
experience developed in the first Part, looking for some means to read this kind of 
material. The source of all these psychological readings seems to rely on some features 
that come apparent if one briefly compares how Hopper and Sloan capture the city. In 
both cases, many of the paintings from their formative years share the dark palette and 
the tonalist influence of their teachers, as we can see if we put together Queensborough 
Bridge [ Fig.17], a Hopper’s oil dated in 1913, and The City from Greenwich Village 
(Sloan, 1922). But even through a superficial comparison, the enormous differences are 

















[Fig.10] John Sloan, Six O'clock, Winter, 1912, 66.36 x 81.28 cm, Philips Collection, 
Washington, DC, US;  [Fig.11] Edward Hopper, Railroad Train, 1908,61.6 cm × 73.66 cm  
Addison Gallery of American Art, Andover MA 
  
 When juxtaposing Six O’Clock, Winter (Sloan, 1912 [Fig.10]) with an early work 
of Hopper such as Railroad Train, dated in 1908 [Fig.11], it is clear that something has 
changed: from the work by Sloan to the one by Hopper one might say that experience has 
been impoverished. In Hopper's painting, humanity seems to have disappeared, and with 
it any trace of anecdote (the seemingly cheerful small talk between the pedestrians, those 
travellers waiting at the platform or the tenacity of the workers holding a big box in 
Sloan's oil), only the slope and the smoke of the train engine are visible, along with its 
opaque and impregnable wagon’s windows. Sloan’s houses are almost always inhabited 
and they suggest liveliness and encounters, anecdotes, activities and life scenes (the 
women walking on the pavement in Street, Lilacs, Noon Sun [1918], the comfortable 
house in Our red Cottage, Gloucester [1916], the family scene portrayed in Sally and 
Paul, Reds and Greens [1914-1918]), while Hopper’s houses are often empty or devoid 
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of any activity, as suspended in time and space. But, as Henri wrote, “It may be that what 
we take for absence of humanity is the very presence of it” (HENRI: 2007, 95). 
 
 When comparing a painting of Sloan such as Sunset, West-Twenty third Street 
(1906, [Fig.12]) with City Roofs (Hopper, 1932, [Fig.13]) or Roofs of Washington Square 
(Hopper, 1926, [Fig.14]), not only a difference in the palette it is visible, but also the 
anecdote which would justify the scene (the female character standing on the roof hanging 
out the clothes) has disappeared, and the variety and irregularity of details has been 
replaced by the homogeneity and serial repetition of skyscrapers’ windows, chimneys and 
skylights, without any trace of human presence. Whereas in the paintings of the Ashcan 
school there is always something remarkable, picturesque or interesting, the striking 
element in Hopper’s paintings is that there is nothing striking in and of itself; everything 
seems to be monotonous and lacks novelty. It is worth mentioning that Hopper himself 
once said, when talking about Office at Night (1940, [Fig.30]): “I hope it will not tell any 
obvious anecdote, for none is intended”64 
 
 
          [Fig.12] John Sloan, Sunset, West-Twenty third Street , 1906, 61.91 x 92.1 cm, Joslyn 
          Art Museum, Omaha Nebraska 
 
                                                             
64The statement is attached to the letter of August, 25,1948 to Norman A. Geske, director of Walker Art 
Center, which had acquired the painting the same year (WAGSTAFF: 2004, 18). 




[Fig.13] Edward Hopper, City Roofs, 1932, 73.7 × 91.4 cm,  Whitney Museum of American 
Art , New York; [Fig.14] Edward Hopper, Roofs in Washington Square, 1926, 33.34 × 49.37 
cm, Carnegie Museum, Pittsburgh 
 
 
&     &     & 
  
 
As a preliminary conclusion, it could be said that Hopper’s concerns as a painter 
seem to be finally far removed from the discussion of Americanness. Of course, he does 
not share the avant-gardist program of a surpassing of art. But his previously quoted 
statement about the American scene that “the American quality is in a painter” is 
ambiguous. On one hand, it means that he finds absurd trying to be American in painting, 
like Benton or Curry; on the other hand, the sentence seems to assume that the American 
quality of the painter is directly expressed in his paintings. However, whilst it is a matter 
of fact whether the painter is or is not American, it remains problematic how to decide 
whether his painting is or not. To deepen this question: the universalist nationalism 
proposed by Mumford turns out to be paradoxical; if Americanness is an expression of 
naked humanity, it would mean that this cultural identity consists of giving up any 
national identity. And this paradox is present in Stieglitz’s Americanism (“Of course by 
American I mean something much more comprehensive than is usually understood –if 
anything is usually understood at all! –Of course the world must be considered as a whole 
in the final analysis”, STIEGLITZ: 1983, 212) as it is in Henri’s patriotism (“My love of 
mankind is individual, not national, and always I find the race expressed in the individual. 
And so I am ‘patriotic’ only about what I admire, and my devotion to humanity burns up 
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as brightly for Europe as for America”, HENRI: 2007, 141). Perhaps this is the reason 
why Hopper concluded that “the question of the value of nationality in art is perhaps 
unsolvable” (MORSE: 1959). 
  
As for the controversy between cult and exhibition factors in American art, as I 
have stated, Ashcan School paintings escape from the rivalry with photography because, 
rather than merely showing, they also tell a story (even a formal story in their picturesque 
contrasts), an anecdote or some sort of aesthetically attractive irregularity which would 
somehow contain a dose of cult value, an ability to move the viewer. On the contrary, 
Hopper’s frugality of details, the nakedness of his paintings, and the fact that he seems to 
be showing the poverty of experience of modern life, would suggest a lack of cult value. 
However, he does not simply eliminate the anecdote or the story as he replaces contrast 
and irregularity by serial monotony: he makes the viewer feel their absence. The narrative 
ingredient does not exactly disappear but turns itself into something disturbing or unreal. 
 
 I have called Hopper’s position classic only in the sense of his attachment to what 
has been described in previous pages as the problem of modern beauty: if the 
approximation between Benjamin’s polarity (cult/exhibition) and the dualism of Henry 
James (telling/showing) which Jameson proposes as a definition of realism is acceptable, 
as I have suggested above, it could be said that Hopper keeps on besing realist because 
he refuses to resolve the polarity in favour of cult value, as it happens to a certain extent 
in abstract painting. But it is clear that he also refuses a kind of painting which would 
have only exhibition value: art is an experience of the aura. But aura cannot be 
experienced in the modern world but as what is disappearing from the image because of 
the reduction of distances —the transformation of Ferne in Abstand. With the help or the 
Benjaminian instruments profiled in Part I, the next chapter will examine a particular 
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CHAPTER 4. A HOUSE BY THE RAILROAD 
 
 
 Although I will also refer to other Hopper’s paintings, this chapter focuses on a 
single work, House by the railroad, 1925, [Fig.15], a painting often taken as marking 
Hopper’s artistic maturity. In the first section (4.1., “House by the railroad”), after a brief 
and preliminary description, I will show how the formal opposition which dominates this 
composition has been considered as a symbol of an opposition in the contents, leading to 
interpretations of the painting as a nostalgic view of outdated rural America marginalised 
by the consequences of the technological revolution, what I find to be an unsatisfactory 
reading. So, I shall return to the visual analysis to deepen the mentioned formal opposition 
and in its rich metaphorical meaning, taking one of its outstanding formal features (the 
impression of the instability of the house) as the driving force of my argument. 
 
 
 As a first step to an alternative approach, I shall examine a further development 
of the second feature of the poverty of experience I referred to in chapter 2 to redefine the 
cultural coordinates in which this painting (and many other works by the artist) can be 
understood. In the second section (4.2., “The house in the window”), I shall propose an 
interpretative hypothesis to account for the tension between the house and the railroad 
and also for the particular impression awakened in most viewers by this house. This 
analysis will be important for the chapters that follow this one, in which I shall extend my 
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4.1. HOUSE BY THE RAILROAD 
 
 The building that stands out in the composition is quite asymmetric and relatively 
narrow. The tower and the porch, along with the high and long windows, echoes the style 
of Second Empire architecture, very popular in the late Victorian era, also called 
“Mansard-Style”. Indeed, Helen Appleton Read defined in 1933 this roof as one of 
Hopper's key elements. Hopper himself commented on the “hideous beauty” of 
“pseudoGothic, French Mansard, Colonial, mongrel or what-not” houses, with their “eye-
searing color or delicate harmonies of faded paint, shouldering one another along 
interminable streets” (HEMINGWAY, A.:1992, 383). 
 
 
[Fig.15] Edward Hopper, House by the Railroad, 1925, 73.7 x 61 cm , Museum of Modern Art, 
New York 
 
 It could be said that the house follows the European tradition that Hopper had 
already captured in his early French works. It stands alone, on the other side of a railroad 
that longitudinally cuts through the lower side of the painting. The blue tonality of the 
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house seems to be in tune with the colour of the sky, in the same way that the usage of 
red tones, visible on the chimney, echo the colour of the slope and the railroad on the 
foreground. Whereas one of the facades, rather than merely illuminated, seems to emanate 
its own light, shadows dominate the tower, the terrace and the porch, whose entrance 
remains also hidden because of the presence of the railroad. The long windows of the 
house, whether they are open or closed, do not allow the viewer to distinguish the interior 
of the building, turning into something impossible to determine —except through mere 




  4.1.1 A dominant interpretation 
 
 As a starting point, let us review some of the main critical contributions to the 
interpretation of the painting. 
 
 Based on her deep knowledge of Hopper’s corpus, Gail Levin has described 
House by the Railroad [Fig.15] as the first painting where the artistic maturity of Hopper 
is made completely visible (LEVIN: 1980,48). From a strictly biographical standpoint, it 
was certainly the first painting by the artist acquired by MoMa in 193065. Throughout this 
decade, the increasing relevance of Hopper as an artist allowed him to leave aside his 
work as an illustrator, of which he had never been very fond. Shortly after, in 1933, MoMa 
organized a monographic exhibition. At this juncture, then, Hopper became a 
“professional” artist. But this is only a biographical circumstance, external to the painting 
itself. So, where does the artistic importance of this work in Hopper’s career lay? The 
“maturity” has to be noticed in the painting itself, in its formal approach and in the subject, 
which somehow must be singularly significant in order to represent the artistic self- 
affirmation of the painter. What is more, if we assume the inaugural nature of this 
painting, the interpretation of its meaning should be taken as the starting point or as a 
miniature prototype towards a general interpretation of Hopper's work. 
                                                             
65Shortly after the museum’s founding in 1929, the controversial MoMa’s exhibition “Paintings by 
Nineteen Living Americans” showed six Hopper paintings, including House by the railroad, which was 
donated to MoMa at the show’s conclusion by Stephen C. Clark; it was the first oil to enter the museum’s 
permanent collection (BARTER, 2007,139). 







 [Fig.16] Edward Hopper, American Landscape, 1920, 31.1 x 18.4 cm, Philadelphia Museum  
             of Art. 
 
 There is, in Hopper’s visual approach to this theme, an invitation to think from the 
very beginning the relation of the house and the railroad as an oppositional one: the 
horizontality of the railroad opposes to the verticality of the house. Most critical 
interpretations are inclined to give the spatial opposition social significance): a conflict 
between an innocent past and modern life and its complexities. Levin suggests that this 
conflict is made visible in Hopper’s works after 1920. She considers the engraving dated 
that year, American Landscape [Fig.16], as the direct predecessor of House by the 
Railroad (LEVIN: 1980, 40). Indeed, in this engraving we can see some cows going 
through the railroad and a house standing on the other side, as it happens in the 1925 oil 
paint. However, the details of the engraving (the anecdote of the cows) distract the viewer 
from the starkness of the solitary house that in House by the railroad, according to Levin, 
not only represents America’s simpler past, but also America’s rootless society (LEVIN: 
1980, 39- 40). Hobbs, who also compares this painting with the same engraving, 
understands American landscape as an image of an interrupted landscape, thinking of the 
small farms on the other side as out of sync with the new technology (HOBBS: 1987, 56). 
 
 According to Strand, one of the main reasons for the popularity of the painting is 
its representation of the house as a “rebellious” element against the railroad. The house, 
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Strand says personifying it, seems to turn its back to the viewer, and it defines, in the 
simplest terms, an attitude of resistance, declining established hierarchies, but also it 
surrenders, in a dignified way —majestic and insubordinate at the same time—, to what 
is inevitable (STRAND: 2008, 43). 
 
 This seems to be a possible starting point for the dominant and widely spread 
social interpretation of House by the railroad [Fig.15], as an example of which I will take 
the reading of Hobbs, who also promotes a social reading of Queensborough bridge [Fig. 
17] to which I will refer below. He suggests that the issue in many mature artworks of 
Hopper during the decade of 1930 is the opposition of industrial and agrarian points of 
view at a moment when battles between farmers and railway companies were at their 
peak. (HOBBS: 1987, 109). In Cape Cod Evening, painted in 1939, Hobbs claims that 
both the house and its inhabitants seem to be the victims of progress, understanding the 
painting as expressive of the situation that the rural areas of America were undergoing. 
The end of the agrarian age would turn those farmers into emblems of an anachronistic 
way of life (HOBBS: 1987, 110). Wells also signals that Hopper's railroad tracks could 
be understood as a temporal journey from the cultural-historical past into the present, as 
if alluding to America’s transition from their earlier agrarian times that were coming to 
an end, leaving space for the urban industrial dominance (WELLS: 2008, 154). 
 
 But, no matter how Hopper himself felt concerned about this debate, I do not think 
all those visual contrasts are enough to support this kind of social reading. This reading 
suggests a homesick interpretation of the artist’s intentions in favour of the rural past and 
against the industrialization procedures. But Hopper remained faithful to Henri’s 
principles and he was not interested in social commentary but in an artistic expression of 
the changing circumstances of the modern world. Hopper’s oeuvre cannot, therefore, be 
explained either as a critique against or as a celebration of progress. Indeed, this social 
interpretation of Hopper’s works is a continuation of the allegation of ugliness or lack of 
artistic character directed first against the Ashcan school paintings and, after, against 
Hopper himself from the sphere of abstract expressionism66, as if his insistence on 
figurative painting could only be ethically (not aesthetically) justified as social realism. 
                                                             
66“In December 1946, Greenberg stated that a new artistic category should be invented for Hopper’s 
achievements. According to him, his means were epigonal, paltry and impersonal; but his sense of 
composition offered an insight into the state of American life not found in literature. Hopper was simply a 





 4.1.2 Back to the painting 
 
 So, I must return now to the painting and its formal features, in search of a more 
plausible approach. 
 
 In Hopper’s work there seems to be something like a visual pattern which is 
recognisable in House by the railroad [Fig.15]: a house seen from a low angle with the 
entrance and the site made invisible by a visual obstacle which introduces movement in 
the canvas. One of the first examples of this pattern is Le Pont Royal (1909) [Fig.18], 
where a house of the same style appears, and the vision of its location is obstructed by the 














[Fig.18] Edward Hopper, Le Pont Royal, 1909, 61 cm × 73.8 cm, Whitney Museum of American 
Art, New York 
 
 Both painted the same year, Bridge over the Seine and Le Pavillon de Flore depict 
a similar house by the river, in the last case with some buildings obscuring the ground 
floor. In the engraving American Landscape (1920), the whole first storey of the house is 
                                                             
bad painter, Greenberg concluded, but if he were a better one, he probably would not be such a great artist” 
(KRANZFELDER: 1998,177). 
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hidden behind the slope under the railroad —a slope that, by the way, had already 
appeared in Railroad train (1908). Also, in The railroad (1922) there are several houses 
by the railroad, and a slope which only permits a view of the rooves. The same happens 
in New York, New Haven and Hartford (1931), although in this case there are not the 
sloped terrain or the railroads what hides the entrance of the house, but some trees. The 
same visual pattern, without the railroad, returns in From Williamsburg bridge (1928) 
[Fig.19], but in this painting the bridge that hides the basis of the houses is decreasing. 
And houses with an invisible ground are shown, by means of the low angle, in The 
bootleggers (1925), where the “same” building from House by the railroad [Fig.15] 
appears, in Lighthouse Hill (1927) or in Corn Hill (1930) [Fig.20]; the same effect, with 
a high angle, is obtained in The city (1927) [Fig.9], in Lighthouse and buildings (1927) 





[Fig.19] Edward Hopper From Williamsburg Bridge, 1928,74.6 cm × 111.1 cm,  Metropolitan 
Museum of art. 
 




[Fig.20] Edward Hopper, Corn Hill, 1930, 72.39 x 107.95 cm , McNay Art Institute,San Antonio 
  
 This pattern is characterised by the systematic appearance of an oblique line, 
which introduces movement in the scene (present in most of Hopper’s works). Trying to 
clarify the use of the word movement in visual arts, Rudolph Arnheim shared in 1954 the 
position of Kandinsky about the terminological misunderstandings associated to this 
term, and proposed to replace it with the expressions “directed tension” or “visual 
dynamics”: “Oblique orientation is probably the most elementary and effective means of 
obtaining directed tension. Obliqueness is perceived spontaneously as a dynamic 
straining toward or away from the basic spatial framework of the vertical and 
horizontal”67. Moreover, when this oblique line is a railroad, the continuous sequence of 
the ties invites the viewer to visually follow the tracks in the direction of the tension 
outwards the canvas. 
 
 House by the railroad [Fig.15], as I just signalled, is horizontally divided in its 
lower part by the railroad, although that horizontality is rather at an angle, creating some 
sort of diagonal which emphasizes the feeling of deepness. The house itself also seems to 
lean slightly, although the vertical lines, as Kranzfelder signals, are parallel to the 
                                                             
67After exposing a lot of examples from classical paintings, and having mentioned the train rails as a case 
of such dynamic tension, Arnheim adds: “Similar dynamic effects are obtained by photographers when they 
tilt the camera or change the angle of the original negative in order to add an element of heightened life or 
excitement. The cubists and expressionists gave violent action to their subjects by building Eiffel Towers, 
churches, trees, or human figures out of piles of oblique units” (ARNHEIM: 1974, 424-428). 
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painting’s margins (KRANZFELDER: 1998, 86-87). As in many of Hopper’s paintings, 
it is suggested the presence of an imaginary internal viewer68, and in this case the point 
of view of this implied beholder is quite unusual: the scene is observed from the same 
height of the slope, so it is seen from a low angle. The impression that the house lies 
behind an assumed horizon lends it an eerie look. Hopper does not eliminate the laws of 
perspective, but he alters them, creating discomfort and even vertigo. Gillies claims that 
in House by the railroad [Fig.15] there is a two-point perspective: on one hand, the 
horizon line, which in this case would be the basis of the house, or the railroad tracks, and 
which would help the viewer to orient oneself. The foreground wedge, on the other hand, 
indicates a rising conformation of earth between this line of sight and the horizon line. 
However, there is no convergence between them, and depending on the vanishing point 
chosen, the horizon line would be on the top of the first story’s windows or on its basis. 
Gillies also points out —and this is in my view a relevant observation— that this painting 
exemplifies what he calls “an abuse of parallel perspective” in Hopper, “for all the 
apparent horizontals would lead to a vanishing point that remains outside of the canvas”. 
The top line of the foreground wedge becomes a line of convergence, and the line of the 
railroad ties becomes an illusionary parallel, stabilizing the painting and creating the 
effect of two-point perspective. Thus, the external viewer is confronted with a choice of 
horizon lines and a choice of spaces: whether the picture plane is parallel or oblique 
requires a decision, because “the convergence of horizontals suggests an oblique plane, 
but the sharp-edged focus and the pronounced base conflict with this choice” (GILLIES: 
1972, 407). This visual instability is what produces the feeling that the tower of the house 
is leaning to the right, a feeling which increases if we look at the section of the painting 
featuring the railroad. If we look again the whole picture, the rising of the slope running 
to the left in the painting somehow compensates this inclination, suggesting the illusion 
that this rising diagonal is the real basis of the house. The instability of the building in 
House by the railroad [Fig.15] could be a mere effect of this tension and of the fluctuation 
between the two possible perspectives observed by Gillies. The effects of signification 
that this instability produces in the spectator will be the guiding thread of my main 
argument in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                             
68I will further develop this issue in chapter 6. 
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 4.1.3. The dynamic tension between the house and the railroad 
 
 The kind of conflictive relationship represented by the house and the railroad was 
not always present in Hopper’s works. In a painting such as Valley of the Seine, made in 
1908, the enormous engineering work of the bridge, and the train with its white vapour, 
seem to harmoniously coexist with the small town at their feet. In other works, the role 
of the railroad is played by a road or a bridge which marks the dynamic contrast between 
the stability of the houses and the “movement” element that opposes it; so, the conflictive 
relationship appears, as it happens in Burly Cobb’s house (1933); but, in contrast to House 
by the Railroad [Fig.15], the houses or the visible architectural elements are 
contextualized: it is made clear that the houses represented belong to rural architecture, 
and, therefore, they are located appropriately. In Railroad Sunset (1929) [Fig.21], the 
“empty” building which stands facing the twilight is a Railroad Switch Tower, and 
therefore it is also in its rightful place by the railroad. Something similar happens in 
paintings such as Le Pont Royal, painted fifteen years before House by the Railroad 
[Fig.15], or The City [Fig.9], where urban buildings are also located in their context (Paris 




[Fig.21] Edward Hopper, Railroad Sunset, 1929, 74.5 cm × 122.2 cm, Whitney Museum of 
American Art, New York 
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There are other examples in Hopper's oeuvre during the decade of 1930 where buildings 
seem to be isolated or decontextualized, such as Ryders House (1933), South Truro 
Church (1930), or Corn Hill (1930) —although, in this last one, houses are grouped 
together. However, in these paintings there is no trace of the industrial communication 
technology to contrast with the traditional, rural or natural element. It might be argued 
that House by the railroad [Fig.15] reunites three different elements that define the 
painting. First, the element of tradition, represented by the house; secondly, the 
interpolation of the technological element; and, thirdly, the isolation of the house, 
producing decontextualization. The conflict between the house and the railroad —which 
is not always made clear in Hopper’s oeuvre, but here is visualized in a very explicit 
way— is, therefore, rich in symbolic significations: the dynamic tension between the 
technological and traditional elements is the visual support for other metaphorical 
meanings; it can be related to the conflict between tradition and technology, between 
Europe and America, and between past and present. Let us see this closer. 
 
 Train scenes (engines, railways and the interior of train coaches) are not rare in 
Hopper's oeuvre (Railroad train, 1908 [Fig.11] Freight Car at Truro, 1931, D. & R G 
Locomotive, Locomotive and Freight car, 1925 are some examples). Hopper was 
intrigued by trains, railroads and train stations (The El Station, 1908, Dawn in 
Pennsylvania, 1942), and they often seem to carry a symbolic significance, be it a sense 
of change, continuity, mobility, or the rootlessness of modern life. It could be said that 
both the house and the railroad share the same space but not the same time. Because of 
its imperial architecture, the house seems to be outdated in relation to the moment in 
which it is being represented. The railroad, which may be considered responsible for the 
isolation of the house, points to the future, to the modern world. The house, on the 
contrary, is a symbol of the past (the seventeenth century, when François Mansart 
employed extensively in France the type of roof named after him, and the Paris of 
Napoleon III, who commissioned Haussmann to redesign central Paris in this style). And 
this temporal difference suggests another one. The past and the present that the Second 
Empire house and the railroad respectively symbolize, indicate not only a quantitative 
difference (past comes before present) but also a qualitative one between two 
heterogeneous temporalities which point to different geographies. The house is a qualified 
and differentiated space, with an architectonical and social meaning, whereas the railway 
belongs to a homogeneous, indifferent and unqualified space, a quantitative reality. When 
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shortening distances, the train seems to reduce differences, whereas the house seems to 
underline them. But let us note that those industrial constructions whose main function is 
that of communicating, connecting and shortening distances, create however an effect of 
decontextualization, distance and separation. The railroad interrupts the spatial continuity 
between the houses and its surroundings, which acts in the painting as a suggestion for 
the temporal comparison between past and present. 
 
 Whatever the context the house may have ever had in the American territory, its 
origin is doubtless European. So, it could be said that it is not Hopper who has uprooted 
the house from its context, but somehow the house has lost its original meaning in the 
same way the European tradition has lost it when introduced in the modern world, whose 
technological dimension has been turned into a privileged symbol of America. The 
tension between past and present, suggested by the contradictory juxtaposition of the 
majestic house and the monotonous railway, is also a tension between Europe and 
America, between tradition and modernity, to the extent that the meaning of America 
seems to absorb all the processes of industrialization and the increase of speed as 
something characteristic. As if moving the house from European to American territory 
was part of the process of the loss of context, as if America was some sort of perfect 
example or prototype of the modern world, a land without context or a scenery whose 
context consists precisely in the lack of context. 
 
 As in many other Hopper’s paintings, in House by the railroad [Fig.15] there is a 
complex relationship between closeness and distance. What I am arguing is that closeness 
and distance are metaphorical and not only physical: the house is far from us, in a past 
that we cannot bring back no matter how close we come to it. And the railways are close 
not only in visual terms: they are immediate to our modern experience, as constitutive 
elements of our perceptual landscape, and they will always be, no matter how far we try 
to escape from them. But, in another sense, railways are what will take us far away when 
we board the train, not only physically speaking but also visually, when we follow their 
route in Hopper’s painting. And the house that stands outlined against the threatening 
landscape without defined clouds or clears is right in front of us, as something 
immediately captured by our look that keeps our eyes fixed on it, while the railway goes 
across the picture and gets lost into the infinite out of the painting. 
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 4.1.4. Railroads and reduction of distances 
 
 But it is clear that, after the considerations made in the first Part, railways can be 
interpreted as an agent of the second feature of the poverty of experience, the reduction 
of distances I spoke of in 2.2.1. This interpretation, also charged with social and cultural 
significations, relies on the Benjaminian theme of the decline of the aura. I conceive of 
this further development as a way to move forward a critical hypothesis susceptible of 
being tested in the analysis of House by the railroad [Fig.15]. I will show that this 
interpretation is fruitful, first, to enrich the significance of the conflict between the house 
and the railroad; and, second, to shed light on the very particular aspect of the building. 
 
 But, why should we accept that the decline of the aura means a reduction of 
distance? And, how is it directly implied in the social meaning of the railway? Indeed, 
Benjamin defines aura in terms of remoteness. Aura characterizes the perception of an 
insurmountable distance, “however close it may be” the object of such perception. He 
attributes this remoteness to the fact that the object in question belongs to the domain of 
tradition: “the aura attaching to the object of a perception corresponds precisely to the 
experience [Erfahrung] which, in the case of an object of use, inscribes itself as long 
practice” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 337). So, we could say that aura is the signal or the richness 
of experience provided by cultural tradition. In this sense, it is clear that spatial distance 
is the material support of a symbolic or cultural one, which is actually insurmountable. 
The naming of the “object of use” as a sediment of experience in which the aura is also 
perceived indicates that, in traditional societies, even the common devices of everyday 
life —and a house is, so to speak, the main of these devices— are, in a certain sense, 
sacred objects affected by the symbolic remoteness which, in modern times, will be 
secularized as aesthetic distance. In an extensive sense, it could be said that every object 
(including natural beings) is loaded with tradition and, therefore, participates in the aura 
 
 So, the decline of the aura in modern societies, as another name for the 
impoverishment of experience, has to be also expressible as a reduction of distances. As 
usual in Benjamin’s thought, this reduction is articulated by technological innovations 
coming from the industrial revolution. And this way we come from the house to the 
railroad. Indeed, the shortening of distances produced by modern technology has two 
complementary dimensions. The first one refers to the industrial transportation devices, 
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especially trains and automobiles in Benjamin’s times. Railroads are not only a mere 
element of modernization and industrialization, but one of the foundational planks of the 
national construction of the United States. Railways are part of the development of 
national identity. In the epic tale of that national construction, which movies have often 
made visible, trains are an essential element for the unification of territory. They bring 
closer elements that, in the vast land of the United States, are socially, culturally, 
climatologically and even linguistically heterogeneous. They shorten distances between 
faraway places and connect regions that had been until then isolated or barely accessible. 
At the same time that it unifies territory, the railway also creates a standardization of time 
which makes uniform the different time zones it passes through, guaranteeing temporal 
equivalences that allow us to calculate the length of the trip and the departure and arrival 
times. The revolution in transportation which took place in the late nineteenth century and 
the first decades of the twentieth century contributed to the dissolution of the mystique of 
faraway places, since for the first time everyone could reach them easily. It could be said 
that those faraway places could only keep their mystery halo as long as only a few people 
had seen them with their own eyes, while for the rest the sense of these places were 
confined to more or less romantic stories or visual evocations. The significant growth of 
long-distance trips brought new travellers closer to places which otherwise they would 
have never even dreamt of visiting. Sigfried Kracauer expressed this effect in his essay 
on “Travel and dance”: “The more the world shrinks thanks to automobiles (…) and 
airplanes, the more the concept of the exotic in turn also becomes relativized. This 
relativizing of the exotic goes hand in hand with its banishment from reality (…) As a 
result of the comforts of civilization, only a minute part of the globe's surface remains 
terra incognita today”. But it does not mean that modern travellers have an experience of 
the far places they can visit: “strictly speaking, the travel that is so a la mode actually no 
longer enables people to savour the sensation of foreign places: one hotel is like the next, 
and the nature in the background is familiar to readers of illustrated magazines” 
(KRACAUER: 1995, 65-66). 
 
 It cannot be said more clearly that the experience of these foreign places has been 
replaced by an image of them. And this image comes from the second dimension of the 
shortening of distances, that is to say, the mechanical procedures of reproduction of 
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images69. The idea that photography extinguishes the aura of the object, liquidating its 
uniqueness, is a well-known topic in the Benjamin literature. But, in Benjamin’s terms 
mechanical images are deprived of cult value (they show the object, but they do not tell 
its story). This way, the shortening of spatial distances implies the decline of the aura 
because it is associated with mechanical and mass reproduction of images of foreign 
places. These images —not the places depicted in them— are what modern man sees, not 
only when he is travelling to foreign places, but also when he moves into the city: the 
infinitely reproduced images occupy the vision and replace experience. As stated by 
another tireless reader of Bergson: “the photograph is not a figuration of what one sees, 
it is what modern man sees. It is dangerous not simply because it is figurative, but because 
it claims to reign over vision” (DELEUZE: 2003, 11). It could be said that they are “false” 
(they are not the real places depicted, they do not transmit the experience of those places), 
but it does not eliminate the fact that these images are the very objects constituting the 
fabricated space in which the modern city dweller lives. If, as above suggested, in a 
certain sense every object in traditional societies has an aura, also in a certain sense, every 
object in the modern ones is deprived of aura, i.e., of tradition. 
 
 The modern private experience is not only that of the single individual, but also 
that of the anonymity of the passengers of the public means of transportation (buses, 
railroads and trams), like the ones depicted in Hopper’s Chair car (1965); one of them is 
reading, but reading, in many Hopper’s scenes, is a defensive reaction of those who find 
themselves for the first time, with the arrival of this new means of transportation, in 
“situations where they had to look at one another for long minutes or even hours without 
speaking to one another”, as says Simmel in a quote recalled by Benjamin (BENJAMIN: 
2006, 341). And modern external experience is now, for example, that of the landscape 
seen from a train window, like the bridge appearing in Hopper’s Compartment C, Car 
293 (1938) while the woman in her seat leaves through a magazine: images in the window 
follow one another as illustrations in the pages of a magazine. 
                                                             
69G. Freund has signalled the historic coincidence of both phenomena: “The network of railroads around 
the world covered over 618,000 miles by 1880. Also in 1880, a newspaper carried the first photograph 
reproduced by purely mechanical means, a process that was to revolutionize the way events were seen and 
transmitted […] The introduction of newspaper photography was a phenomenon of immense importance, 
one that changed the outlook of the masses. Before the first press picture, the ordinary man could visualize 
only those events that took place near him, on his street or in his village. Photography opened a window, as 
it were. The faces of public personalities became familiar and things that happened all over were his to 
share. As the reader’s outlook expanded, the world began to shrink” (FREUND: 1980, 103). 




 The mechanical production of movement, which characterizes industrial times, 
has given birth to different transport media which turn the old remoteness into a 
measurable distance potentially susceptible to be traversed by anyone. In this way, a new 
experience of space, which we could name “abstract”, appears: the one that is incarnated 
by the new railroad plans and their schedules (one of these schedules is what the woman 
in Hotel Room [1931, Fig.48] holds in her hands). In them, travels are presented as mere 
geometrical lines without a figurative link with “real” (perceptual) space, and the places 
are signalled as dots with the names of the train stations, illustrating the fact that, as 
Kracauer said, “travel has been reduced to a pure experience of space” (KRACAUER: 
1995, 66). 
 
 Referring to Hopper's Gas [Fig.22], Mark Strand remarks: 
 
With the exception of the tamarack, Hopper’s trees are generic. They look theway 
trees do when we drive by them at fifty or sixty miles an hour. And yet his woods 
have a peculiar and forceful identity. Compared to the woods that precede them in 
American painting, they are sombre and uninviting. The wilderness of Cole, Church, 
and Bierstadt was panoramic, open and available. It overwhelmed but did not 
threaten. Its enhancements were inspirational, not fearful. It was a vast theatre in 
which the moment of creation was enacted again and again. For Hopper, the 
wilderness is nature’s dark side, heavy and brooding. In Gas the shadowy woods 
seem poised, ready to absorb the viewer as well as whoever happens to be travelling 









[Fig.22] Edward Hopper, Gas, 1940, 66.7 x 102.2 cm, Museum of Modern Art, New York 
 
 
 Indeed, although Strand does not develop this statement, such generic and 
“threatening” nature can be found, for example, in House at dusk (1935) [Fig.33], 
Compartment C, Car C 293 (1938), Cape Cod Evening (1939), August in the city (1945) 
[Fig.36], Seven A.M (1948) [Fig.70], Cape Cod Morning (1950)[Fig.35], Sunlight on 
brownstones (1956), Western Motel (1957)[Fig.67], or Second Story Sunlight (1960). 
 
 Unfortunately, Strand limits his observation to Hopper’s woods, what impedes 
him from noticing that, in Hopper’s works, this kind of generification, as I shall argue, 
affects not only the natural environment, but also buildings (as happens in House by the 
railroad [Fig.15]) or even people. Despite his incidental comparison of the generic trees 
with the perspective of the driver, neither Strand makes a clear connection between the 
technological intervention of landscape and the uninviting look of Hopper’s nature, nor 
he notices that the driver sees the trees through the window of his car (and windows are 
not minor ingredients in Hopper’s work). I will explain the relevance of this observation 
in the next section. 
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4.2.THE HOUSE IN THE WINDOW 
 
 Having highlighted these points, I will face in this section the construction of my 
interpretative hypothesis about House by the railroad [Fig.15]. Expressed in simple 
terms, my assumption is not that Hopper has painted the house from the railroad (it is 
known that Hopper painted always in the studio and from memory, although he used to 
make some sketches in situ), but that he has tried to paint the house as it could be seen 
through the window of a moving train and, therefore, that the virtual viewer who observes 
the building inside Hopper’s oil is moving. Besides giving my reasons for this 
interpretation, I will argue that this simple assumption acquires a deeper meaning when 
located in the context of the impoverishment of experience implied in the reduction of 
distances produced by the railroad 
 
 Besides the previous visual analysis, I would like to begin underlining that if, as I 
have argued in chapter 2, figurative representations not only point to a resemblance 
regarding perceptual experience, but also translatability to words: in realist art the title of 
the painting should be taken as an important indication. It is clear in this case that, 
whatever had happened to the house to have become so unstable, it must be related to the 
fact that the building is by the railroad. The title is, indeed, an indication in the sense that 
the interpretation should not be focused either on the house or on the railroad, but on the 
relation between them. 
 
 And the point I am making is that, although it has been rarely observed, one of the 
most evident peculiarities of Hopper’s oil is that, in it, the house is watched from the 
railroad. That is to say, the railroad is the internal standpoint chosen from which to present 
the house. All the critical reviews of this painting focus on the house, perhaps because it 
is assumed that there is nothing remarkable to say about the railroad. The painting makes 
visible the most essential parts of this simple structure: rails and ties. Seen from a moving 
train, parallel rails create a sensation of visual (and virtually infinite) continuity, but the 
perpendicular ties break from time to time —from space to space— this continuity (and 
these interruptions are not less virtually infinite). So, the resultant visual experience of 
the space is that of constant continuity and constant fragmentation: except for the curves, 
parallel lines seem to remain still, but perpendicular ties jump out of view one after the 
other all the time, creating, with a systematic frequency, little visual shocks. It is just as 
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evident that railroads, described this way, are another figure of the Hegelian bad infinity 
alluded to by Benjamin, which I previously defined as a line running ever onwards 
(corresponding to the rails), producing a constant delay of the final moment of its finitude 
(represented by the ties). Kracauer said that the modern patterns of movement are at the 
same time the aesthetic reflection of industrial work discipline and a way of sinking into 
a state of relaxation and indifference that compensates for the uneasy effects of such 
tension (KRACAUER: 1995, 325-327). This explains that this apparently trivial 
movement can be a relaxing spectacle, a distraction from the downtime of a railway 
journey. 
 
 I also stated that the Hegelian straight line of the bad infinity is the privileged 
image of time in modern culture: every second of the clock, every jolt of the industrial 
machine, every coup of a game, every photogram of a film, every piece on the conveyor 
belt, every dancer on the chorus line, every hotel room, every face in the urban crowd, is 
exactly like the previous and the next ones; but it is also completely different and new, 
because each one starts only when the previous one has finished. Continuity is, as in the 
case of the visual experience of rails and ties in movement, an optical illusion produced 
by the speed. And this also illustrates the basic feature of the poverty of experience: in 
modern times, learning from experience has become impossible because the series of 
events starts from zero at every moment, leaving no place for accumulation in memory. 
And this means that the sudden start is the actual rhythm of the modern experience of 
time. The meaningless intervals between the ties turn out every second in a possible 
shock, an occasion for derailment. 
 
 As Benjamin recalls, Freud defines the function of the conscious mind as a 
protection against external stimuli which might produce a shock. The source of 
Benjamin’s concept of shock is not only Freud, but also Simmel. In The metropolis and 
mental life (SIMMEL:1976), Simmel speaks about the “intellectualization of perception” 
needed to face the overabundance of visual and aural stimuli in an industrialized 
environment, where perception becomes sudden and discontinuous. In order to process 
this overload of speedy information, the level of consciousness must be increased to 
anticipate mentally a possible shock, being prepared for it before it occurs (KOEPNIK: 
1999, 144-145). We have seen that Benjamin’s concept of shock could also include 
“everyday shocks” like, for example, the impacts produced by the sensationalistic 
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headlines of newspapers or the unexpected appearance of an image in a car window. This 
tireless activity of intellectualized perception constitutes private experience as a defence 
against the blank spaces which menace with potential failure the continuity of thought, 
assigning a precise point in time to every event in consciousness, even “at the cost of the 
integrity of the incident’s contents” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 319). The failure of this activity 
leads to trauma: an event which cannot be integrated in consciousness. It must be 
suppressed to construct a consistent narrative. But, in doing so, an empty space appears 
in one’s personal experience. The experience is impoverished due to the practical need of 
surviving what cannot be experienced (the trauma). According to Benjamin’s reading of 
Freud, the dangerous components of the external incident are kept in an unconscious 
compound of lasting impressions which have never been consciously and explicitly lived 
and have never been turned into Erlebnis. Meanwhile, in the conscious mind, events 
vanish leaving no trace. 
 
 In many of Hopper’s works, apparently trivial images are, indeed, treated with 
extreme attention. But this also happens to the car driver, who is forced to practise this 
intellectualized perception. The driver must be very aware of what goes through the 
window and then fix it quickly to detect any signal of danger, although in most cases it 
will be an irrelevant element which has to be discarded; and it will be immediately 
forgotten in order to leave space for the next one. This constantly renewed attention 
awakens a new type of visual acuity which has a paradoxical character: the continuous 
presentation of novelties is linked to a certain degree of monotony and even to a feeling 
of boredom. But the repetition of what has been already seen involves pleasure or 
relaxation: every avoided surprise, every discarded danger, every missed shock, creates a 
feeling of relief, because remoteness (Ferne) is reduced to a measurable distance 
(Abstand). Benjamin says that “in the protective eye, there is no daydreaming surrender 
to distance and faraway things. The protective eye may bring with it something like 
pleasure in the degradation of such distance” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 341), that is, in the 
disintegration of the aura. If the attention of the viewer is stimulated by the constant 
appearance of “novelties”, boredom happens because the space observed is merely a 
distraction (especially if the viewer is in the back seat of the car). In this sense, it is an 
unattended space, insignificant and at the same time specially remarked due to the act of 
driving (when talking about cars) or to the speed of the passing images through a train 
window. 




 Needless to say here that these sort of spaces are found in many of Hopper’s 
“exterior” paintings, especially in those cases where railroads or highways appear: House 
by the railroad [Fig.15], Railroad sunset [Fig.21], Early Sunday morning [Fig,42], or Gas 
[Fig.22]. These are some of the most significant examples where both the landscape and 
the architecture portrayed are seen as something general and not deeply detailed. In the 
same way, Hopper’s interiors (hotels, apartments, cafeterias) are every so often the 
representation of the urban materialization of unnoticed and ephemeral space, not worthy 
of detailed attention. This is the “distracted attention” of the traveller on the move 
between origin and final destination, because those are spaces without a clear origin or 
destiny. 
 
 So, not only can one imagine the traveller absent-mindedly observing the moving 
rails, but the passenger in the train carriage trying to reconstruct a visual continuity and a 
consistent time-line from the fragments of space seen in the window-pane. Railways give 
way to a landscape characterized by the poverty of details, since the specific features are 
lost due to the fact that the speed of the transport media is higher than the speed of 
walking, and therefore than the possibilities of a clear visual perception, which can only 
be recovered once the vehicle stops. In Hopper's paintings, houses, streets or the general 
landscape are “impoverished”, leaving only a brief and schematic image, in tune with the 
ghostly house by the railroad. Those are images seen through a glass window, and “it is 
no coincidence that glass is such a hard, smooth material to which nothing can be fixed. 
A cold and sober material into the bargain. Objects made of glass have no ‘aura’. Glass 
is, in general, the enemy of secrets” (BENJAMIN: 1999, 733-734). 
 
 This is not a merely quantitative phenomenon, derived from the speed of 
movement and therefore from the rapidity of the images passing by, which do not allow 
the viewer to construct a whole story from all those fragments, which could be considered 
almost as flashes. There is also a qualitative element: mechanical movement is made of 
“jumps” (like the movement of the second hand in an analogue watch), discontinuous 
moments and shocks. It is a movement based on mechanical momentums (the rocking of 
the train which travellers experience especially when they try to move between different 
cars). This mechanical rhythm, besides increasing attention, modifies perception when 
compared to the one of animal-drawn transport, according to Bergson’s distinction 
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between the continuity of the movement derived from living beings and the discontinuity 
of mechanical movement. The traveller is not really aware of the distance or the 
approaching of objects that pass by, but they appear suddenly as surprises (as unexpected 
images) in “the process of continually starting all over again” [BENJAMIN: 2006, 331). 
And this requires an especial type of visual attention, which prevents us from fixing our 
gaze on a determinate object because the next image appears before the previous one has 
been completely perceived, and it is essential (for the driver of a car, for example) to stay 
alert to such surprises. Hopper’s look as an artist is like this, since it is especially aware 
of those brief images that strike the viewer´s eyes when they try to fix them. Let us hear 
the testimony of a fictionalised railway passenger in 1918: 
 
I glimpsed in the window-pane, above a little black copse, serrated clouds of downy 
softness in a shade of immutable pink, dead and as seemingly indelible now as the 
pink inseparable from feathers in a wing or a pastel dyed by the fancy of the painter. 
But in this shade I sensed neither inertia nor fancy, but necessity and life. Soon great 
reserves of light built up behind it. They brightened further, spreading a blush across 
the sky; and I stared at it through the glass, straining to see it better, as the colour of 
it seemed to be privy to the profoundest secrets of nature. Then the train turned away 
from it, the railway changed direction, the dawn scene framed in the window turned 
into a village by night, its roofs blue with moonlight, the wash-house smeared with 
the opal glow of darkness, under a sky still bristling with stars, and I was saddened 
by the loss of my strip of pink sky, when I caught sight of it again, no reddening, in 
the window on the other side, from which it disappeared at another bend in the line. 
And I dodged from one window to the other, trying to reassemble the offset 
intermittent fragments of my lovely, changeable morning, so as to see it for once as 
a single lasting picture (PROUST: 2003, 233). 
 
 What Proust describes this way perfectly summarizes the modern experience of 
time and space I have been describing. The train rails act like the surgeon described by 
Benjamin: “he greatly diminishes the distance from the patient by penetrating the 
patient’s body” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 115); in the same way, railways do not “respect” 
the natural shape of the landscape or the cultural articulations of the communities 
established on it; they fragment, cut off, separate with the power of the technological 
means of industrial construction. The train’s car window is the visual experience 
corresponding to this fragmentation: as Proust says, the window is the frame where these 
broken fragments appear: landscapes, houses or villages are violently torn away from 
their places, deprived of their remoteness and brought to an immediate proximity to the 
passenger, only separated from the jumping, decontextualized and disconnected images 
by the glass of the pane. From this sudden discontinuity of images and this succession of 
landscapes without a meaningful sequence, the passenger has to implement the process 
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of intellectualized attention which characterizes Erlebnis. Film editing will provide, later 
on, the very paradigm of what Benjamin calls Erlebnis, which actually is a selective 
montage of an experience (Erfahrung) made of shocks. And this is, avant la lettre, the 
task undertaken by Proust’s character moving in an “oblique perspective” from a window 
to the other one, “trying to reassemble the offset intermittent fragments” with the purpose 
of constructing with them “a single lasting picture”. 
 
 Obviously, Proust gives in this way a superior example of mastery in the protective 
defence of private experience against external shocks which could become traumatic. But 
this activity is only understandable if, historically, the production of shocks —blank 
spaces that break the continuousness of time— has become the rule in the external or 
public realm. This is the only possible explanation of the fact that the isolation of the 
perceptions that the conscious mind cannot control, and their relocation in a temporal 
sequence, had become the “peak achievement of intelligence” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 319). 
This operation reconstructs the integrity of experience in order to avoid the traumatic risk, 
in the same way that the city pedestrians have to look around quickly to be aware of traffic 
signals at the cost of disregarding some parts of their surrounding background. Hence, 
normal experience in modern society is the experience of shocks (Chockerlebnis), the 
fragmentation of space and time, but not in the sense that the subject goes through this 
experience or experiments with the shocks, but rather in the sense that he himself 
elaborates, reconstructs and controls them to prevent collapse. Only if this control is 
successful, as happens in Proust’s description, a real or possible trauma can become a 
spectacle which one can watch like a movie, without being a part of it or menaced by it. 
For instance: the non-relation and mutual indifference of those who walk or travel 
together and merged in the city crowd becomes manageable only by means of this attitude 
of Chockerlebnis. If this protective mechanism stops working, the passer-by will 
experience a sudden start, a face to face encounter with another passer-by whom he has 
nothing to say, because they have no relation or common past, and he will have to confront 
this shock without the help of previous experience. In other words, Chockerlebnis is the 
defensive strategy to avoid Chockerfahrung, the chaotic encounter with an impoverished 
experience that, having become independent from collective memory, is full of blank 
spaces which produce “fear, revulsion and horror” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 327) or anxiety. 
But also “love at last sight”, as Benjamin suggests about Baudelaire poem “To a passer-
by”. 




 Thus, if there is a failure of shock defence (that is to say, a breakdown of Erlebnis 
and, therefore, a real experience of shock, Chockerfahrug), the effect, says Benjamin, 
would be “a sudden start”. But that means that the sudden start is the actual rhythm of 
modern time. Therefore, the obligation of starting from zero is not a particular situation 
occurring in the first decades of the twentieth century, an extreme consequence of world 
war and the financial crash (although these facts make it come apparent dramatically), 
but the normal condition of industrial civilization. Technology, if not the cause of this 
new “barbarian” rhythm of social life, is the way in which citizens learn their new 
environment: “technology has subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of 
training” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 328). Benjamin mentions a lot of examples of this rhythm 
concerning the innovations appeared since the mid-nineteenth century, examples that 
“have one thing in common: a single abrupt movement of the hand triggers a process of 
many steps”; from striking a match to picking up the phone, all the “countless movements 
of switching, inserting, pressing, and the like” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 328). 
 
 But it could be possible to add to these examples the in-experience of the train’s 
passenger. Most railway passengers associate the visual experience of the “continuous 
discontinuity” of rails and ties with the train’s rattle, that is to say, the movement (and the 
sound) that reveals to them that the floor under their feet is not smooth and immobile. 
The bodily sensation of a slight loss of balance which has to be compensated for at every 
instant would be, if the passenger keeps eyes closed, the only evidence of a displacement 
in the space. When the passenger opens the eyes and looks out the car’s window, the 
visual experience of the landscape will reproduce the one of the railway: continuous 
movement continuously fragmented, in which images follow one after another jumping 
out of view at every moment like the railroad ties. 
 
  I am arguing then, for the hypothesis, that the standpoint chosen by Hopper from 
which to paint the house suggests that the house is painted as seen from the window of a 
moving train Something like this has been suggested by Kranzfelder, though apparently 
only in a metaphorical sense, because, obviously, the rails in the painting discount it 
explicitly70 . But it is also evident that an explicit indication could not be given at all: in 
                                                             
70“The image has the character of a snapshot taken from a moving train, except the rails themselves are 
visible in the picture. We have the impression of frozen motion, yet within the frame, within the actual 
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no case would it be possible to paint a sudden, instant and ephemeral image appearing in 
the windowpane of a train carriage (only instant photography could produce something 
like this). What I am suggesting is not that the house is painted from a train, but that it is 
painted as it might be seen in this way or, in other words, that it is painted as if it was an 
instant photograph taken through the train window. 
 
 Perhaps it would be better to say that Hopper is painting the house as if his canvas 
was a camera, but only by immediately adding that precisely it is not and it cannot be. 
Photography, in the ideal sense often assumed by Benjamin, destroys the aura 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 338). Painting, in contrast, retains it. A photograph of the house 
would have been, in this sense, merely Erlebnis, image without remoteness. The painting 
of the house, however, is one of a house which has lost its aura, has been uprooted and 
has become a two-dimensional image transitorily attached to the glass of a window. So, 
also the painting should depict a house without aura. Or maybe not exactly. I wrote before 
that “aura or remoteness cannot be experienced in the modern world but as what is 
disappearing from the image”. Photography would show a house without aura. Painting 
(at least Hopper’s painting) shows the lack of aura of the house, which is not the same 
thing. Hopper is not painting a house, but the perception of a house. And, as I have argued, 
aura is not a property of objects but of the perception of such objects. And the same can 




 4.2.1. A dark aura 
  
So, we come to the last, and in a certain sense the main question posed by House 
by the railroad: what is the reason for the impression of a sinister character in the building 
represented in the painting? A key point to this question is, I shall argue, that the house 
(as it happens to other objects in Hopper’s work) is on the other side, separated from the 
foreground by a metaphorical barrier that seems to exclude it from reality, giving it the 
kind of unapproachability that Benjamin attributes to the aura. And this seems to be a 
leitmotiv in Hopper’s work. But, why is this a dark aura or a menacing remoteness? 
                                                             
image, there is no movement at all. It is as if we were standing on a camera dolly during the making of a 
film, watching the landscape roll past us” (KRANZFELDER: 1998, 82). 




 I have mentioned uncanniness because, in the case of this painting, the vast 
majority of commentators experiment more than a simple instability: “Set in broad 
daylight”, says Margaret Iversen, “it is none the less the darkest painting of a house I 
know” (IVERSEN: 2003, 412). Others underline its dreamlike or spectral presence, as if 
it was part of a ghost town (RENNER: 1987, 72). Wells signals that Hopper seems to strip 
the house from any recognizable attribute: there is not an entrance path, no garden or trees 
or neighbourhood, there are no signs that the house might be inhabited (WELLS: 2008, 
110). Kranzfelder underlines that the house seems to be literally levitating over the 
viewer, separated from any known reference (KRANZFELDER: 1998, 87), as if the 
environment, in Schmied’s words, would have “removed itself from our grasp” 
(SCHMIED: 1995, 94- 100). 
 
 Perhaps it could be thought that these remarks are a retrospective consequence of 
the fact that the picture was Hitchcock’s model for the frightening Bates’ house in his 
1960 Psycho, somehow creating a successful filmic cliché for horror movies. But, as early 
as in 1931, Guy Pene du Bois suggested that Hopper’s houses were “haunted”; and, 
probably thinking of this painting, he called Hopper’s Mansard houses “still as death and 
as forbidding as their stark surroundings”. For Brace, too, all of Hopper's houses are 
haunted, and he asserted the strangeness and mysteriousness of their presence 
(HEMINGWAY, A.:1992, 393). 
 
 I have already signalled different formal elements which can contribute to this 
impression. The murky, almost threatening, undefined sky, the high contrast between light 
and shadows, the absence of any signs of human beings, the low angle, etc. The feeling 
of an unbalanced composition derived from the crosswise lines of the railroad hiding the 
entrance of the house suggests that the house itself is wrongly settled or in a state of decay. 
However, do all those elements justify the eerie feeling of strangeness? A French Mansard 
roof house is not an unusual figure in the American territory. Indeed, a local legend of 
Haverstraw (a village situated about an hour’s drive from New York) affirms that Hopper 
was seen in 1924, with a portable easel, painting from the train station the house with 
mansard roof which still stands there in the Route 9W, 18 Conger Avenue built in 1885, 
really very similar to the building of House by the railroad [Fig.15]. Jo Hopper denied 
such a direct inspiration and argued that, as usual in Hopper’s works, the house is not the 
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picture of a particular building, but an artistic reconstruction based on numerous houses 
mixed in memory; in any case, the anecdote suggests that it was a rather familiar vision. 
 
 The strangeness has to be, therefore, a consequence of Hopper’s treatment of this 
image. Doubtless, the viewer may well assume that the installation of the railway has 
isolated the house from its surroundings, dispossessing it of its solemn and monumental 
beauty, and has transformed it in an outdated or marginal object (as happened, by the way, 
to the Bates Motel when the new highway was built), not very suitable for habitation; and 
one can even imagine that the arrival of the railway has provoked the departure of its 
inhabitants, condemning the house to ruin. But the result of this isolation would be a 
house in state of decay which will awake compassionate or nostalgic feelings in the 
viewer. However, as I have just signalled, this is not the case in the testimony of most of 
the art historians: they do not experience the house with compassion or nostalgia, they 
find it “dark”, “dead”, “haunted” “hostile”, as part of an evil, menacing or malign 
landscape which is not only excluded from its familiar context, but excluded from reality. 
A supplementary explanation is needed to justify this disturbed feeling. 
 
 If the house in Hopper’s painting were to be simply considered as representative 
of “traditional societies”, and the railroad as the technological instrument which reduces 
its unapproachability, how should we explain the ghostly condition of the building, which, 
according to this reduction, should have lost all its remoteness? Symbolic or cultural 
remoteness is often aesthetically underlined in modern artworks under the category of the 
sublime, as in the landscapes of the Hudson River school, but Hopper's paintings no 
longer fit into this category since, as I have insistently repeated, vision is blocked by the 
presence of the railways. The railroad track, made to shorten distances, deprives the house 
of its context and, somehow, keeps its aura as something unachievable. It extends across 
the painting something that obscures what remains on the other side, as if the house was 
not actually there. 
 
 It could be said that the building in House by the railroad [Fig.15] has been 
subjected to a process of isolation like the one described by Freud in Beyond the pleasure 
principle, existing to control dangerous stimuli, and therefore it appears in the middle of 
nowhere and produces the sensation of haunting. The familiar house becomes strange or 
spectral when it is deprived of its surrounding, as if the artist was “giving events the 
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character of a shock, detaching them from the contexts of experience”, in Benjamin’s 
words. The visual instability of the house is reinforced by its lack of spatial definition: 
there is absolutely nothing which could give the viewer a clue as t where the house is 
located. 
 
 The building shown in the cited Le Pont Royal [Fig.18] seems to be limited by the 
wall and the bridge, and the horizontality that dominates the painting gives a certain air 
of protection to the entire composition. However, in House by the Railroad [Fig.15], the 
feeling of an irregular horizontality makes the house fragile, illogical and disconnected 
from the landscape that surrounds it. Not only does the painted building lack context, but 
there is no other natural element, not even clouds in the sky, to help fix any particular 
moment of the day. The very idea of “meaning”, in the visual realm, is related to the 
possibility of locating every element of a composition in the sequence it is supposed to 
belong to, so that its coherence or incongruity may be considered. If the house may have 
had any context at any point, it is now completely lost and, if anything, it somehow seems 
to shine in its splendid isolation, as in other Hopper paintings such as High Noon (1949) 
or South Carolina Morning (1955). 
 
 The railroad is, in this case, the element that creates the rupture in the sequence 
and eliminates all meaning, the barrier that blocks the viewer from creating some sort of 
visual or narrative continuity between the building and its surroundings. Following 
Iversen’s discussion of the painting, it could be said that there is an uncanny quality to 
Hopper's paintings, the feeling that something familiar has been turned into something 
strange, according to Freud’s definition of the uncanny (IVERSEN: 2003, 417). Wells 
also thinks that, if the house represents the past, it seems to state itself as a long lost 
memory suddenly recovered, as a place everyone has known and lost which suddenly 
reappears from the point of view of a child standing close to the rusty railway (WELLS: 
2008, 77). It would suggest a psychoanalytic interpretation of the house, so to speak 
emerging from Hopper’s childhood unconscious memories, as a figure of the Freudian 
“return of the repressed”, so strongly invoked by Hal Foster (FOSTER: 1996). 
 
 But maybe Hopper’s uncanniness could be seen differently. I would add that, in 
the same way that Freud defined the uncanny as a familiar element turned into the strange 
by repression, it seems that in many of Hopper’s paintings some elements of the past 
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(either natural or artificial ones) become uncanny not because of unconscious repression, 
but because of modernization and industrialization, which turns them into something 
strange, depriving them of the context which would give them a meaning. The house, as 
an anachronism, seems to be doomed by modern industry and transport, but at the same 
time it stands, perhaps in a much less explicit way. If, at first sight, the house, in its stony 
strength, seems to be the fixed element of the painting, and the railway, on the contrary, 
the one that introduces the feeling of movement in the solid scene, a further observation 
could suggest that Hopper’s painting represents the immediate aftermath of the passing 
train, which somehow seems to drag the house with it and, at the same time, leaves behind 
the trembling building. Of course, the physical building is not trembling after the train 
leaves. But the image of the building does trembles in the train’s window. And, of course, 
the house is not there (in the window). As I have repeated, the house is separated from 
the imaginary internal viewer through the railway —and railways were every so often at 
that time surrounded by warnings against crossing— as a barrier: the frontier of modernity 
itself, the transformation of time and space and, therefore, the transformation of 
sensibility. Once this frontier has been crossed, there is no turning back. Or, it would be 
better to say, there is no turning back except where there is a failure of the alluded self-
defensive mechanism of Erlebnis; in such a case, the past —which has not disappeared— 
returns as uncanny, the lost aura of tradition and beauty comes back turned into a dark 
halo or a menacing shadow. That is what I was arguing when I suggested, at the end of 
the previous subsection, that painting, in contrast with what Stieglitz would have called 
professional or commercial photography, does not show a house without aura, but the 
lack of aura of the house. 
 
  In Hopper’s mature works where this tension between traditional (or natural) 
elements and technological devices appears, the element altered by the uncanniness is 
never the modern or technological one, but precisely the traditional or natural one, as it 
follows from my previous quotation of Mark Strand. This natural but obscure element 
seems to be always on the other side of the railroads and roads or at its edge, as happens 
in Gas (1940)[Fig.22] , in August in the City (1945)[Fig.36] , or even in the mountains 
seen through the window in Western Motel (1957)[Fig.67], which once more stand in the 
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other side of the road71. This is the reason why I cannot share Hobbs’ suggestion to include 
Queensborough bridge [Fig.17] in the examples of paintings somehow related to House 
by the railroad [Fig.15](HOBBS: 1987, 111). 
 
 In Queensborough bridge [Fig.17],  it is the bridge what appears as a menacing 
and strange or sombre element. And this is precisely what distinguishes this painting from 
House by the railroad [Fig.15]. First, from a merely formal point of view, it could be said 
that this painting does not belong to Hopper’s mature style: the palette is too dark and too 
dependent on tonalism. But the important point is that the technological element is what 
in this case has been turned into something strange, whereas the traditional one (the 
wooden house) is not represented as uncanny, but as defenceless. There are numerous 
examples where nature in Hopper’s canvases is turned into something uncanny or eerie, 
precisely because of its generic and blurry features, nearly indistinct, with colour inclining 
to black, forming a dark and sometimes heavy and compact mass. 
 
 
[Fig.17] Edward Hopper, Queensborough Bridge, 1913, 152.4 x 88.9 cm, Whitney Museum of 
American Art, New York 
                                                             
71And, although there is not an explicit barrier as the one made by roads or railways, the same sort of 
“strangeness” is made visible in paintings such as Stairway (1919) [Fig.58], Cape Cod Evening (1939), in 
Cape Cod Morning (1950) [Fig.35] or in House at Dusk (1935) [Fig.33]. 
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 So, it could be said that House by the railroad [Fig.15] is, expressed in these terms, 
a failure of the protective activity of distracted attention: Chockerfahrung. The activity of 
recomposing visual reality, which is operating in the tireless visual attitude of Proust’s 
passenger, cannot insert the image of the house in a consistent totality: therefore, the 
house appears as a traumatic shock or as the evil image whose uncanny aura emerges 
unexpectedly, not only as a sudden start, but even as a sudden stop, the “non-realistic 
element” that interrupts the railway's continuous line. In the polarity of exhibition value 
and cult value, the house doubtlessly corresponds to cult value: it concentrates the aura, 
the traditional element, and it should tell a story (that is to say, belongs to the territory of 
the “telling”), while the railroad is the agent of the showing activity, what deprives the 
house of its aura and exhibits it in its extreme nakedness. But, paradoxically, Hopper’s 
exhibition value, when showing the house, displays not only a house without aura, but 
the dissolution of the traditional veil turned into a dark and uncanny remoteness. 
 
 




 Summarizing, I would say that the hypothesis that the house is painted as if seen 
from the window of a moving train is a clearer explanation of the instability of the 
building than the ones habitually given in the Hopper literature and, furthermore, of the 
ambiguity of the perspective and the rivalry of vanishing points (something unavoidable 
if the eye is moving). It is not the house, but the viewer, who is actually unstable, subjected 
to changes of direction of the railway and to the bending of its trajectory, and constantly 
affected by the slighter or stronger loss of balance caused by the rattling of the train’s 
wheels. And this is what makes the viewer constantly shift between parallel and oblique 
perspective, like Proust’s character passing from one window to the other. It would also 
explain why the movement blocks the viewer from being fully aware of those details 
which constituted, in other time, the “personality” of the house —which is another way 
of obeying Henri’s lessons about not descending to detail and focusing on movement. It 
is not the image of a real house but the result of the generification produced halfway of 
instant undetailed vision and memory. The instant vision corresponds to the first element 
of experience, which in the modern world is technologically mediated, and the generic 
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corresponds in it to the disqualified character of the mechanical space and time; memory, 
as imagination, correspond to the second element of experience, which in this case 
describes a very different kind of abstraction: the one that characterises Hopper’s creative 
process. So, the insistence of Hopper in the role of memory in his paintings refers to what 
Proust would call the involuntary memory more than to the so-called photographic 
memory. Together with homogeneous space and measurable time, there is a “lost time” 
or a “lost space” which, although unattainable —they are beyond the barrier that the 
railway represents—, is a part of modern experience. 
 
 It could be said that this lost time is poetically recovered by the painting, but not 
as a private property that the individual would incorporate to his conscious biography. 
Modern poetry is also “touched by death” —therefore the dark aura of the house by the 
railroad. Modernity means poverty of experience; poetry means the experience of this 
poverty. The richness of experience is retrieved by poetry in the only way that it can be 
experienced in modernity: as “something irretrievably lost” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 333). 
The house comes from another time inserted in historic time, that is to say, in the railroad, 
without being a part of it or an event of the chronological series, without having its place 
in the timeline. But this other time does not fight against ordinary or historic time in a 
battle with a final winner: both times are not horses running the same race, they are 
counted by non-commensurable clocks that, in some odd way, are coupled to one another. 
As happens with the opposition of the house and the railroad, the necessary relation of art 
with this other time does not compensate for its loss, does not integrate it in the 
chronological series, but makes it present as not disposable. It is neither the bad eternity 
of the conveyor belt nor the true infinity of the season’s circle: it is a line made of shocks 
in which, from time to time, hazardous circles may appear in the blank spaces between 
shots, as turbulences in a flowing stream, where experience becomes again possible. 
These exceptional moments are not an alternative to the straight line of modern time, they 
are not spaces where the artist or the viewer could take shelter from the modern crowd. 
They do not constitute a richness which could be accumulated to fight the poverty of 
experience or a spectacle which could be enjoyed or consumed, but they are what makes 
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PART III: NIGHTHAWKS AND PAINTING IN THE 




My main subject in this Part is one of the most celebrated of Hopper’s works, 
Nighthawks. [Fig.23] I shall dedicate the fifth chapter to reflect on the affinity of this 
painting with the realm of photographic and filmic images, and to discuss in such a 
context the presumed influence of film noir on Hopper’s works. Towards the end I shall 
suggest another approach to the relationship between Nighthawks and cinema, and, in 
chapter 6, based exclusively on the painting, I shall develop this approach as an extension 
of the interpretative hypothesis set out in chapter 4 regarding House by the railroad 
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CHAPTER 5. NIGHTHAWKS: THE SEQUELS 
 
 
 Nighthawks (1942, [Fig.23]) has been buried by the series of reproductions which 
have transformed it in a commonplace of contemporary visual culture. I shall analyse the 
peculiar relation of the painting with reproduction in the first section (5.1. “Nighthawks 
and technological reproducibility”). One of the key objectives of this chapter will be to 
clarify the nature of the affinity of this painting with the realm of the photographic and 
filmic images, as an introduction to a process affecting Hopper’s work as a whole. This 
affinity underpins the widely held view that cinema, specifically film noir, influenced 
Hopper’s painting. In section 5.2. (“Hopper and film noir: telling and showing”), I will 
explore the literary and scenographic sources of this film genre, questioning the basis of 
this assumed influence. Anyway, since the affinities between Hopper’s painting and 
cinema are indisputable, another kind of explanation for this commonplace is needed. I 
shall develop my alternative explanation in section 5.3. (“Why paint reproducibility?”), 
focused on two issues: on one hand, the confusion of form and contents in which the 
iconic recurrence of the scene is partly based; and, on the other hand, the reason why 
Hopper is close to the technological revolution in visual culture associated with 
photography and film (5.3.1. “An inner cinema”). Finally, I shall argue what I find to be 
the reasons for the apparent need for filling up the narrative void of Nighthawks with ever 
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5.1.NIGHTHAWKS AND TECHNOLOGICAL REPRODUCIBILITY 
 
 Nighthawks [Fig,23] is, doubtless, one of the Hopper’s most famous works. The 
Art Institute of Chicago acquired the canvas months after the artist finished it in 1942. 
From the outset, it became a popular picture and was openly and positively accepted by 
the critics and the public in general. Hopper himself considered it one of his best 
paintings. Shortly after purchase, the painting was shown in numerous art exhibitions and 
state fairs of the time, to the point that, as early as in 1953, it required conservation and 
restoration work (BARTER: 2007-1, 204). In the following decades, and until nowadays, 
it has been relentlessly reproduced or imitated in popular culture: in advertisements, 
photographs and films. 
 
 
               
 [Fig.23] Edward Hopper, Nighthawks, 1942, 84.1x 152.4 cm, Art institute of Chicago 
 
 Of course, many other paintings have suffered this process of photographic 
reproduction during the twentieth century, as the work of art entered what Benjamin calls 
“the age of its technological reproducibility”. But the way in which Nighthawks [Fig.23] 
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has become an iconic subject of contemporary visual culture is a different kind of case. It 
is therefore worthwhile describing this difference. As the mechanical means of visual 
reproducibility reached technological consistency, many paintings considered as 
especially significant for the history of art were subject to constant reproduction. This 
happened, for example, with Da Vinci’s La Gioconda, Velazquez’s Las Meninas or 
Vermeer’s The Girl with a pearl earring. In these cases, Benjamin’s general formula of 
the impact of technological reproduction on art applies: works like the above mentioned 
are not initially conceived for massive reproduction, so, when they suffer this process, it 
threatens “the authority of the object, the weight it derives from tradition” or, in other 
words, its aura, increasing its exhibition value and diminishing its cult value 
(BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 102-106). Unlike the original painting, the reproduced image can 
reach the viewers in their own time and place, detaching contents from the tradition which 
they belong to, and subjecting them to situations that the original could never attain. That 
is to say, photographic reproduction menaces the artistic authority of these works, 
revoking a part of their ritual power, and adds to them something that they did not have 
originally: an overdose of reproducibility. Nonetheless, although reproductions increase 
the familiarity of the public with these works, their artistic authority and, therefore, their 
cult value cannot disappear completely, because the aesthetic appreciation of the original 
work as a paradigmatic representation of a period of the history of art is, ultimately, the 
reason for its persistent reproduction. 
 
 But Nighthawks [Fig.23] has not received such an overdose of exhibition value 
because of the artistic authority of Hopper as a painter, nor because of its signification in 
the history of art. On the contrary, it has been easily absorbed by photography and film 
as something already photographic or filmic, giving the impression that these replicas are 
not the reproduction of a work not initially conceived for it, but “the reproduction of a 
work designed for reproducibility” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 106), and therefore prompting 
the notion of an influence of photography and film on Hopper’s painting. 
 
 Nighthawks has been frequently quoted in cinematography. Examples include: 
Profondo Rosso (1975), where Dario Argento tried to reproduce the diner in the painting; 
another recreation of the diner appears in Pennies from Heaven (Herbert Ross, 1981), one 
of the few examples that cannot be categorised as a thriller, where the space is used as the 
meeting point of a couple during the Depression years; in The end of violence (1997), 
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Wenders used the diner as part of a film set; in Hard Candy (Slade, 2005), the protagonist 
couple meet in a place called “Nighthawks diner”, and the female character shows up 
wearing a T-shirt with the painting of Hopper painting on it; the painting is present as an 
indirect inspiration for the scenography of other films such as Days of glory (Malick, 
1978), Blade Runner (Scott, 1982), Paris, Texas (Wenders, 1984) or The Neon Bible 
(Davies, 1995), not to mention Hitchcock’s films, in which there are numerous 
Hopperesque quotations. And the painting has been used in TV shows such as the 
animated sitcom The Simpsons (Homer vs. The Eighteenth Amendment: 1997) and the 
C.S.I. 2006 promotional season posters. But this remarkable reproducibility, far from 
absolutely depriving Hopper’s Nighthawks of it of its aura, has transformed it into a 
peculiar cult image, in a sense not reducible to the one in which Benjamin uses this term. 
It seems that, while the significant paintings mentioned above as an example have lost a 
part of their original aura because of their technological reproductions, there are other 
paintings that, like Nighthawks, have acquired a sort of cult value (which they did not 
have originally) precisely because of their reproducibility. 
 
 Doubtless, the history of every artwork also includes the history of its reception. 
But let us note that the quotations and contextual reinterpretations of Nighthawks [Fig.23] 
are not exactly receptions in the sense of the word commonly accepted in art-historical 
hermeneutics. The chain of receptions always refers to the original, and to “a tradition 
which has passed the object down as the same, identical thing to the present day” 
(BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 103). That is not the case with these reproductions; the continued 
actualizations rely on the impact already produced by the reproductions. Do all these 
visual quotations risk burying the work that Hopper, before triggering the chain of 
receptions, considered “one of the best things I have ever painted” (BARTER: 2007-1, 
196)? “I seem to have come nearer to saying what I want to say in my work, this past 
winter, than I ever have before”72, he wrote in 1942. But, what did Hopper want to say in 
Nighthawks? The meaning of Hopper's painting is always taken for granted. 
 
 The approximation between painting and technologically reproduced images 
reminds us of the formation of some modern painters as illustrators for magazines, 
newspapers and the advertising industry, associated with the urban development of the 
                                                             
72Letter from Hopper to D.C. Rich, on May 13, 1942; D.C Rich Papers, Art Institute of Chicago Institutional 
Archives (BARTER: 2007, 196). 
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big cities in the early twentieth century, something that I referred to in chapter 3. This 
approximation was experimentally accentuated, with artistically subversive purposes, by 
some avant-gardist movements. And this extreme closeness of painting and technological 
reproduction found an explicit status in Pop art from the decade of 1960 onwards. I speak 
about “explicit status” because, in the case of Pop, it is clear that many of the filmic and 
photographic images chosen by the artists were already presences on colour TV and in 
the newsreels of the decade of 1950 in the United States; and Pop artists were affected by 
them as viewers before they used them. Is this also the case of Hopper? It could be said 
that the recognition by the public of the visual icons used by Warhol and other Pop artists 
aided the massive diffusion of their works, but, is the recognition of a commonplace also 
the cause of the long-term visual success of Nighthawks? 
 
 The affirmative answer to both questions seems to be, at least, one of the main 
assumptions of critical readings of this canvas, usually understood as a “cinematographic” 
scene strongly related to film noir, evoking the mysterious atmosphere of Hollywood 
Bmovies from the 1940s using scenarios with high contrasts of light and shadow and 
unusual angles, elements which contribute to creating the air of danger that characterizes 
such films73. So, it has become typical to consider Nighthawks as evidence of the 
influence of film ─and specifically of film noir─ on Hopper's paintings. But, what is the 
basis for establishing this influence once we separate the painting from all those 











                                                             
73Levin, among others, claims that “the setting of Conference at Night, with its strong theatrical light, was 
probably inspired by the movies, particularly the urban melodramas now known as film noir.” (LEVIN: 
1980, 63). 
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5.2. HOPPER AND FILM NOIR: TELLING AND SHOWING 
 
 To support this influence, critics highlight two main reasons. The first one is 
biographical: as Hopper himself stated, he was fascinated by the movies of his time, and 
during a certain period he went to the cinema more than once a week (LEVIN: 1980, 57). 
He considered a film such as The savage eye (Joseph Strick, Ben Maddow, Sidney Meyer, 
1960) ─which contains a sequence of a man with a hat and a woman casually together in 
a diner’s counter─ a true reflection on the American society of his days (LEVIN: 1980, 
58). However, this biographical aspect refers to a purely external connection. In some of 
his works, theatres or film houses are turned into the main subject of the canvas (among 
others, Two on the aisle [1927], The Circle theater [1936, Fig.72], Sheridan Theatre 
[1937], New York Movie [1939][Fig.69], Girlie show [1941][Fig.61], First row orchestra 
[1951], Intermission [1963] [Fig.54] or Two comedians [1965]). Nevertheless, Hopper 
never refers to his passion towards films as an influence or inspiration for his paintings, 
but as mere entertainment: when he was unable to paint, he went to the movies (LEVIN: 
1980, 58). When talking about movies, he does not mention noir films or gangster movies 
which were released at his time —although he might have seen them, of course. So, this 
argument seems too weak to support an explicit influence. 
 
                                           
  [Fig.24] The savage eye (Strick, Maddow and Meyer, 1960) 
 
 Much more relevant is the second reason, regarding aesthetic resemblances 
between the ambience that noir films create and Hopper's paintings, Nighthawks [Fig.23] 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
156 
 
being one of the most frequently mentioned as linked to this film genre (RYALL: 2013, 
167). As film historians and theorists claim, contrary to what happens with other 
cinematographic genres, “film noir” was neither a category accepted by the film industry 
nor by the broad audience of the moment. It is a label coined by the French critic and 
filmmaker Nino Frank, who, acting as a curator avant la lettre, used the term in the 
summer of 1946, when five recent American films arrived in Paris: Murder, my sweet 
(Edward Dmytryk), Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder), Laura (Otto Preminger), The 
woman in the window (Fritz Lang) and The Maltese Falcon (John Huston), this last being 
frequently considered as the first film of the noir genre. In these five films, Frank and 
other film critics found contents and formal elements which differentiated them from 
other Hollywood productions of the pre-war period. 
 
 From the side of “telling”, that is to say, concerning the literary inspiration of film 
contents, these five films were screen adaptations of so-called “hard-boiled” American 
crime novels. The Parisian screenwriter Marcel Duhamel had started translating these 
stories into French in 1945, and he created a new collection of books as part of the 
Gallimard publishing house called “série noire” (hence the name of the film genre), which 
achieved great success not only in the commercial sense, but also among philosophers, 
artists and intellectuals74. This common literary source would explain the narrative and 
thematic similarities found in those five films. 
 
 From the side of “showing”, or film scenography, there is a wide consensus about 
its main source: the mise-en-scène of French poetic realism and —especially— German 
expressionism of the previous decades (KRUPTNICK: 1991, 15). It is generally admitted 
that film-directors and cinematographers visually translated the contents of detective and 
police stories with the assistance of this inspiration. I shall analyse these two aspects 





                                                             
74Sartre confessed, in his autobiography, that he read the “Série Noire” more readily than he did 
Wittgenstein (SARTRE: 1964, 76). And the issue of the number 1000 of the collection was celebrated with 
an article by Gilles Deleuze (DELEUZE: 2002, 114-119). 
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 5.2.1. The criminal plot 
 
 Concerning the literary ingredient, it has been said that Nighthawks [Fig.23] 
“mirrors Hopper’s cognizance of the 1930’s film themes and subject matter, especially 
the gangster theme” (DOSS: 1983, 21). And Hopper’s painting has been presumed to 
echo the feeling of global anxiety which seems to be a part of the atmosphere of film noir, 
introducing characters, visual elements and even sets from hard-boiled modern novels 
(BARTER: 2007-1, 209). 
 
 It is remarkable that, in most cases, the connection between noir films and 
Hopper’s paintings is mediated by the assumption that the plot of detective novels and 
thrillers of these years contain social criticism, or even a countercultural perspective 
(RYALL: 2013, 160), which opposes the hopefulness of the “American dream” and the 
(ideologically distorted) optimistic view of industrial society offered by Hollywood’s 
superproductions and comedies in the 1940’s (CHOPRA-GANT: 2006, 4). According to 
Warren Susman, the “most important contribution of a major subgenre of detective and 
gangster movies in the forties, film noir”, was “to reduce the optimistic American vision 
to dust” (SUSMAN: 1989, 29), that is to say, it was a denial of the conformism of 
“official” American culture (WARSHOW: 1970, 136). Krutnick defines the noir city as 
“a realm in which all that seemed solid melts into the shadows, and where the traumas 
and disjunctions experienced by individuals hint at a broader crisis of cultural self-
configuration engendered by urban America” (KRUTNICK: 1991, 91). In this view, film 
noir was the cultural manifestation of the “sombre underside that contrasts markedly with 
the allegedly optimistic public face of the period” (DIMENDBERG: 2004, 8): 
 
It is the underlying mood of pessimism which undercuts any attempted happy 
endings and prevents the films from being the typical Hollywood escapist fare many 
were originally intended to be. More than lighting or photography, it is this 
sensibility which makes the black film black for us (PORFIRIO: 1996, 80). 
 
 If one accepts the validity of this interpretation of film noir (something that is not 
unconditionally necessary75), the assumed connection between thrillers and Hopper — 
                                                             
75It is not completely clear that the “hard-boiled” fictions which supplied the narrative contents of 
Hollywood B-movies contained an (even implicit) social criticism (it would be difficult to find a crisis of 
self- configuration in the movies cited as the origin of the label “film noir”, whose stories find always a 
happy or, at least, heroic resolution). Police and detective stories have always been favoured in the popular 
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“probably the most cited of all American painters in relation to film noir” (RYALL: 2013, 
165)— will immediately lead one to see Hopper’s scenes under this “mood of 
pessimism”, as if his paintings reflected the “bareness and lack of fulfilment” of the 
American dream (ROSE: 1967, 214) and the “dysfunctional relationships” of the 
disenchanted citizens (LYONS AND WEINBERG: 1995, xii). What I am arguing instead 
is that the thesis of an influence of film noir on Hopper’s works could be, at least partially, 
another attempt to endow these works with social meaning. Although these assumptions 
are widely held and rarely questioned in the critical essays on Hopper, can we really 
postulate that the themes of film noir have an actual presence in Hopper's paintings? Is 
there any visible threat in any of his works? Is there any sign of violence or crime in his 
characters, who often are merely waiting? 
 
 When John Updike reviewed the catalogue of the exhibition Edward Hopper and 
the American Imagination, he signalled that only five out of all the short tales included in 
the book were specifically about Hopper, while the rest of them were included under the 
presumption of being Hopperesque. However, whereas in these stories we might find “the 
bottom end of the social scale” —from murders to violence and bums—, Updike remarks 
that none of these elements are to be found in Hopper's scenes. His scenes may be stark 
and austere, but they are free from any social or economic content (UPDIKE: 2005, 180). 
I think Updike is right: there is nothing in Hopper’s paintings —and there is nothing 
specifically in Nighthawks [Fig.23]— which could suggest violence, slums or criminal 
underworld and the midst of assaults and murders. At most, it could be said that the urban 
landscape of Nighthawks [Fig.23] —the naked street and the empty windows of the shops 
                                                             
culture, in spite of their simplicity and the repetition of the plotlines. According to Benjamin, the historic 
process of modernisation implies the discredit of the shared narratives that in traditional societies gave a 
full and transcendent meaning to the everyday life, linked to the normative character of religious beliefs. In 
modern times it is not impossible to have traditional and transcendent beliefs, but those beliefs are turned 
into private ones, and they must respect the others’ private beliefs and, therefore, accept a pluralism of life’s 
projects which cannot be reduced to a unique and common plotline. This is responsible for a certain “thirst 
for meaning” and for the feeling of homesickness and nostalgia of the lost community. So, a very attractive 
way of quenching that thirst consists of imagining —only as a fiction or as entertainment—, behind all 
those partially unsatisfactory impersonal relationships of a society regulated by the rule of law, an invisible 
and powerful collusion of “dark forces” which allows the citizen to “re-enchant” the city adding the missing 
supplement of sense. This is the reason why this “confabulation” should take the form of a mystery that is 
hard to unravel, of an uncanny plot, because only when the collusion seems to have an evil nature its secrecy 
seems justified. In this sense, the noir plot could be described as an adequate “entertainment” for modern 
citizens more than as a social critique of the ideological daydreams of capitalism (something similar was 
suggested by Umberto Eco in 1976, see ECO: 2001). This excursus does not affect the assumed “influence” 
of film noir on Hopper’s paintings, but I hope it could help to clarify what Hopper wanted to say when he 
confessed that movies were for him —like for most of the viewers— just “entertainment”. And 
entertainment is not a minor issue. 
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around the diner— is “stark and austere”, poor in experience or “deserted” like a crime 
scene (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 108). But this could be said of any corner of the modern city, 
where unknown people gather in anonymity, surrounded by what Benjamin called the 
experience of shocks: “isn’t every square inch of our cities a crime scene? Every passer-
by a culprit?” (BENJAMIN: 1999-5, 527). The painting does not provide enough 
evidence to presume a particular “dangerous event” of the kind one could find in detective 
mysteries, but only the generic insecurity associated with the rhythm of the modern city. 
 
 
[Fig.25] Walker Evans, South Street, New York, 1956, Gelatin silver print 16.2 x 25.1cm, Private 
Collection. 
 
 However, Nighthawks [Fig.23] is persistently linked with the noir city: the 
assumption that something dangerous may happen outside the diner —that is to say, 
something that does not happen in the painting’s contents— has found an immediate 
feeling of empathy among the critics as well as on the general public. One would say that, 
facing the absence of these contents of violence and danger in Nighthawks [Fig.23], some 
critics have interpreted this absence as a proof of their implicit presence. Gordon Theisen 
has described the painting as a “desolate, alien, denatured, perverse, desperate” 
masterpiece (THEISEN: 2006, 232) which portrays a city close to the one depicted by 
Herbert Asbury in Gangs of New York (1927). In this book, Manhattan is seen as a city in 
which “its impoverished, congested and disease-ridden slums might have been all too 
successful experiment in breeding homicidal thugs, who by and large ran the city from 
their filthy hovels, nickel whiskey joints, rigged casinos and bordellos masquerading (but 
barely) as dance halls, from the years preceding the Civil War through the early decades 
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of the twentieth century”. Obviously, these contents are not present in Hopper’s painting, 
but Theisen’s hypothesis is that their absence suggests a repression of them, which makes 
it possible for the artist to glimpse the city “from the other side of a claustrophobic urban 
nightmare of vice and violence” (THEISEN: 2006, 59). So, this chaotic nightmare (the 
“Bside” of the American dream) would be unconsciously present in Hopper’s work only 
by its suppression, a suppression that Theisen finds somehow “visible” in the painting. 
Undoubtedly, this appears an abuse of interpretation, but the obstinate insistence on 





 5.2.2. Night Shadows 
 
 If we discard a direct connection between the contents of the crime novels and 
Hopper’s art, the only remaining support for the relation with film noir is the scenography. 
This relationship is often based on unspecific and vague impressions, as also occurs in 
the link between Hopper and photography76 . 
 Nighthawks [Fig.23], Levin suggests, is an “essentially dramatic [scene], 
capturing the sinister aspect of a disquieting urban night” (LEVIN: 1980, 160). Rather 
than focusing on formal elements, the hypothesis seems to depend on “the somber mood 
evoked by the lighting effect” (DOSS: 198 3, 21), that is to say, on the shadows in contrast 
to the artificial lighting and the usage of odd angles that awake a sentiment of strangeness 
in the scene (WARKEL: 2008, 23). This could be a strong foundation for the “influence” 
I have been considering, because there was, in Hopper’s immediate artistic context, 
something like a tradition of interweaving American realism with expressionism 
(HIRSCH: 1981, 82-83) to depict the image of the city, as can be seen in the works of 
John Sloan, George Bellows, Franz Kline, Reginald Marsh or Martin Lewis 
(HIRSCH:1981, 82-83). But there is a chronological difficulty that stops us from openly 
                                                             
76There could be some parallelism with photographers such as Walker Evans or John Guttmann. There are, 
indeed, some aesthetic resemblances (if we compare the photo shown in the text —Walker Evans, South 
Street, New York, 1956— with Early Sunday Morning, or the series of Evans’ photographs of Victorian 
houses), such as the clarity in the composition or the impact of the main elements represented in the 
photography. However, rather than influence, one should talk about affinities (BOZAL: 2012, 14), and, 
once again, Hopper's artwork does not suggest to the social charge that especially Walker Evans photos do. 
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talking about a direct influence of film noir on Hopper's paintings: many of the recurring 
elements in Hopper’s works —the deserted streets, the apartment views, train railroads, 
hotel rooms, gas stations and so on— are already present in Hopper’s work as early as in 
the 1920s. Limited to black and white by its own technique, the engraving Night Shadows 
(1921) [Fig.26] seems to suggest something uncanny or mysterious, and it could be 




     [Fig.26] Edward Hopper, Night Shadows, 1921, 17.6 x 20.7cm, etching, Museum of Modern Art 
 
 The bird’s eye perspective may be related to the influence of French impressionist 
painters, who used this method to celebrate modern urban cities. But Hopper seems to 
use this angle of vision to underline the isolation of the lonely figure walking through an 
empty street. It has been claimed that this engraving somehow anticipates some of the 
visual elements of film noir. Hobbs notes that “the print foreshadows (…) many scenes 
from 1940-1950 film noir” (HOBBS: 1987,56). Erika Doss similarly concludes that 
Hopper “parallels or anticipates the stylistic development of film noir in the early 1940’s” 
(DOSS: 1983, 21). That is to say that the development of Hopper’s subjects is either 
simultaneous to or precedes film noir, but is not subsequent to it. In sum, “foreseeing”, 
“anticipating” or “foreshadowing” film noir is contradictory with “being influenced by 
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film noir”. In other words, most of the aesthetic and formal elements used by Hopper in 
his paintings, and that every so often have been considered as betraying the influence of 
film noir, were already in his works even before he achieved his artistic maturity. In 
addition, let us remember that, with the exception of The Maltese Falcon (1941), the other 
four films abovementioned in the origins of the label “film noir” are from 1944, two years 
after Nighthawks [Fig.23]. 
 
 There are many reasons to argue that the influence happened in the opposite 
direction77. That is to say, that Hopper influenced film noir, and indeed in some cases this 
influence is documented. In Force of Evil (Polonsky, 1948), Polonsky asked his director 
of photography to achieve “the Hopper effect” in the film, showing him some 
reproductions of Hopper’s paintings (RYALL: 2013, 46). This same influence may also 
be presumed in films such as Scarlet street (Lang, 1945) or Asphalt Jungle (Huston, 
1950), Some came running (Minelli, 1958) or His girl Friday (Hawks, 1940) —in these 
two last examples, the influence would come from Office at night (1940) [Fig.30]. A scene 
which recalls the situation of the characters of Nighthawks can be seen in Dial 1119 
(Mayer, 1950, [Fig.27]). 
 
                                                    
                                                     [Fig. 27] Dial 1119 (Mayer, 1950) 
 
                                                             
77Something similar could be affirmed in the case of photography. Hopper did not get along with the camera 
(“I once got a little camera to use for details of architecture and so forth, but the photo was always so 
different from the perspective the eye gives, I gave it up” [O’DOHERTY: 1965, 77]); but his influence on 
photographers is undeniable. Leaving aside Walker Evans, whose first exhibition in the MOMA coincided 
with the first Hopper’s retrospective, his stylistic mark is clearly visible in artists like Diane Airbus (1923- 
1971), Joel Meyerowitz (1938), William Eggleston (1939), Gregory Crewdson (1962) or Gabriele Croppi 
(1974). 
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 The influence is also obvious in Psycho (Hitchcock, 1960), where, as I recalled 
before, the Bates’ mansion was inspired by House by the railroad (1925) [Fig.15], and 
the influence of South Truro Church (1930) may also be present in the 1963 Hitchcock 
film The Birds (NAUGRETTE: 1995, 56). The whole scenography of Rear window 
(Hitchcock, 1954) makes us think of Hopper’s Night Windows (1928) [Fig.39]. And, as I 
have stated before, a list of films arguably inspired by Hopper’s paintings continues 
through the second half of the twentieth century until today. 
 
 About this question of the “influence”, Naugrette has proposed an especially 
interesting hypothesis, because it brings together the two sources of film noir. According 
to his view, Hopper’s images would have been used as a mediation between novels and 
films: the atmosphere created by Hopper would have helped filmmakers (without 
Hopper’s acquaintance) to construct the iconography they needed to transform the “hard-
boiled” novels of the 1920s and 1930s, by which they were inspired, into the movies of 
the 1940s and 1950s (NAUGRETTE: 1995, 56). This assumption has reached a great 
success in critical literature. For example, the characters in Nighthawks’ [Fig.23] have 
been linked to The glass key (HAMMETT: 1931), in which Hammett describes “a hawk-
nosed, long-chinned pale man, a predatory animal of forty or so” who sits near “a softly 
fleshed red-haired girl with eyes set apart” (BARTER: 2007-1, 208). This is in tune with 
Higashi’s claim that the autochthonous sources of the scenography of film noir (American 
realist painting) have been often underestimated in favour of German expressionism 
(HIGASHI: 2007, 354). And Christopher states that Hopper, among other painters of his 
generation, made a “seminal contribution (...) to the visual underpinnings of the film noir: 
its intensely luminous detail, jagged perspectives, vertiginous heights, hallucinatory 
geometry, and bold compositional methods” (CHRISTOPHER: 2006, 15). So, the 
hypothesis would be that in the beginning writers influenced Hopper, and after Hopper 
influenced filmmakers. 
 
 But this hypothesis presents two serious gaps rarely noticed by its supporters (not 
because of negligence, but because, as it is usual to do, they assume the affinity between 
Hopper’s painting and crime fiction instead of examining it). The first one is that there is 
no evidence of the influence of crime novels on Hopper (and at first sight the genre does 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
164 
 
not fit in his confessed literary preferences)78. So, how did these fictions catch Hopper’s 
attention? I shall discuss this in the next subsection (5.2.3., “The end of the naïve poetry”). 
The second is the difficulty, to which I will refer in 5.2.4. (“A circular argument?”), to 
explain how filmmakers could perceive in Hopper’s paintings (which, to our knowledge, 
have not relation with crime fiction) the adequate iconography they needed. I shall argue 
below that, when trying to fill these gaps a new approach appears that allows us to explain 




 5.2.3. The end of naïve poetry 
 
 Regarding the first gap (the influence of literary fiction on Hopper), I would like 
to highlight that, although Hopper never spoke a word about hard-boiled stories, he 
confessed his admiration for Hemingway. In his letter addressed to the director of 
Scribner’s Magazine in 1927, Hopper wrote: 
 
 I want to compliment you for printing Ernest Hemingway “The Killers” in March’s 
Scribner. It is refreshing to come upon such an honest piece of work in an American 
magazine, after wading through the vast sea of sugar-coated mush that makes up the 
most of our fiction. Of all the concessions to popular prejudices, the side stepping of 
truth, and of the ingenious mechanism of the trick ending there is no taint in this 
story (BARTER: 2007-1, 208). 
 
 The words used by Hopper in his letter (“honest piece”, “truth”), and his critical 
references to prejudices, mush and trick ending are not very precise, but they 
unequivocally draw attention to the realism of Hemingway, opposed to the illusionism of 
“the most of our fiction”. The typical Hemingway’s sentence is acknowledged because, 
in it, the not-said is more important than the explicitly said. Like Hopper’s works, it shows 
much more than it tells; or, in Benjamin’s terms, the weight of exhibition value exceeds 
the one of cult value (an imbalance that —as a loss of words— is a feature of the poverty 
of experience). 
 
                                                             
785Naugrette himself suggests that also in this case the influence could have been the other way round: he 
considers A couple of writers [CHANDLER: 1951] as a pastiche of different paintings by Hopper, which 
goes in the opposite direction of his assumption. 
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 But, how should we understand Hopper’s appreciation? It seems to be on the same 
wavelength as Henri’s invitation (which Hopper himself explicitly shared) to “remove 
the loincloth” of prudery and convention and not to ignore “life”. And it also points in the 
same direction that Benjamin’s observations about the modern aim to “peeling away” the 
object’s shell (which is also made of words and tales) and to destroy its aura 
(BENJAMIN, 2002-1, 519). Surely, it does not mean that writers or painters of other 
periods were alien to reality or farther from it than the modern ones. The truth is that it 
was reality itself what changed with technological and social revolutions. And this change 
operated a disruption in the balance of “showing” and “telling” which articulated the 
frames of the experience. This is what produces in young artists the impression that old 
manners are not realistic and that a readjustment is needed. In Hopper’s words, “the 
province of art is to react to it and not to shun it”, and he finds in Hemingway’s prose 
such a reaction. 
 
 So, it is not casual that this disruption of experience is felt as an impoverishment 
of “telling” (the cult value associated with tradition) or as a complementary increase of 
“showing”. When tradition becomes outdated, the “non-realistic” elements, which I 
previously described as characteristic of traditional storytelling, lose their credibility, 
because such credibility relied on the authority of tradition. The mixing of everyday life 
events and miracles and wonders becomes implausible in modern societies. Or rather, 
historical transformations make appear as non-realistic narrative and representational 
structures those which before such transformations were experienced as plausible. 
Therefore, the feeling of the new realists that, putting it in Schiller’s terms, “the age of 
the naïve poetry” has come to an end. Benjamin calls attention to “the listener’s naive 
relationship to the storyteller” in traditional narrative, and he suggests that “the art of 
storytelling is reaching its end because epics is dying out (…) The first true storyteller is, 
and will continue to be, the teller of fairy tales” (BENJAMIN; 2002-1, 140). But the 
modern reader can find this naivety obsolete and “sugar-coated”, and he can experience 
marvels as a “side-stepping of truth”. And when storytelling decays, in absence of the 
words of traditional experience, things appear shown in stark nakedness. The ‘cruelty’ of 
the exhibition contrasts with the ‘kindness’ of storytelling. 
 
 Hopper’s allusion to the “trick ending” is very interesting, because it points to the 
“ingenious mechanism” that, in traditional popular tales, resolves the plot. And what most 
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critics signal as a keynote issue in Hopper’s pictures is, precisely, that the plot is 
unresolved (as it happens in “The Killers”) or, perhaps, irresolvable79. But I should argue 
that this is also a distinctive trait of American literary realism. In the novels of Francis 
Scott Fitzgerald, the characters and actions rarely find a final revelation. The social goals 
of the main characters of The beautiful and the damned —he desires to become a writer, 
she wants to be an actress— are sustained all through the book, but they blur over the 
years, as the glamour of the jazz age vanishes. In the pages of The Great Gatsby, many 
assumptions about the past of the protagonist are made, but the origin of his fortune is 
never revealed, and the facts of his biography remain unknown, except that he knew Daisy 
Buchanan in his youth; the mystery is not resolved, but definitely lost, by his death. What 
I am arguing is that, when Hopper shows his admiration for “The Killers”, the point is for 
him the prose (a formal feature, if I may term it thus), not the criminal underworld 
appearing in its contents. Hopper was not interested in gangster plots, but in realism in 
art. 
 
 Of course, Hemingway was not a crime fiction’s writer, but if authors like Dashiell 
Hammett and Raymond Chandler were considered as the fathers of the specifically 
American detective fiction, substantially different from the English mystery narrative, 
this is due to the harsh and unemotional style of their stories. Hammett or Chandler were, 
so to speak, the popular version of the direct style prose of the writers of the so-called 
“second American Renaissance” of the twentieth century, which included authors like 
John Dos Pasos, F. Scott Fitzgerald, William Faulkner or Ernest Hemingway. So, the 
autochthonous literary source of the language of the “hard-boiled” fictions is the use of 
realistic and naturalistic techniques distinctive of these writers of the “lost generation”. 




 5.2.4. A circular argument? 
 
 Let us consider now the second gap of Naugrette’s hypothesis (how filmmakers 
could perceive in Hopper’s paintings the adequate iconography they needed?). The fact 
                                                             
79I shall develop in detail this subject in chapter 7. 
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that they did it seems to be hard to deny. Hemingway’s “The Killers” takes place mainly 
in a diner (Henry’s Diner): 
 
Outside it was getting dark. The streetlight came on outside the window. The two 
men at the counter read the menu. From the other end of the counter Nick Adams 
watched them (Hemingway, E:1991, 172). 
 
 At the beginning of Hemingway’s text, it is five o’clock, and there is still sunlight 
in the street. But there are not many visual indications to imagine the space, aside from 
the fact that all diners are quite similar. When Robert Siodmak turned the story into a 
movie, in 1946, it is already dark in the diner’s scene, and the streetlights are switched 
on. Besides the marked contrast of light and shadows, the angle of vision and the urban 
landscape are not very different from the ones in Nighthawks [Fig.23]. 
 
 
[Fig.28] The Killers (Siodmak, 1946) and Nighthawks details (Hopper, 1942) 




 Some other similarities can be found in the attitudes and postures of the characters, 
in the objects on the counter, in the stools and the bar equipment, not alluded to in 
Hemingway’s short story [Fig. 28]. Not to mention that there is a gas station outside the 
diner which might remind us of Hopper’s Gas [Fig. 29]. 
  
               [Fig. 29] The Killers (Siodmak, 1946) , Nighthawks (Hopper, 1942) and Gas (Hopper, 1940) 
 
 
 Of course, it can always be said that these resemblances are a mere coincidence, 
because Hopper’s picture and Siodmak’s movie belong to the same decade and the same 
country. But it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that, in the same way that 
Hemingway might have inspired Hopper for Nigthwaks, Hopper might have inspired 
Siodmak for his film about Hemingway’s story. As I signalled above, what Hopper 
emphasises in Hemingway’s fiction is its literary form, which appears as realistic because 
of the predominance of exhibition value on cult value —but this raises the question: why 
the increase of the exhibition factor in an artwork should be perceived as realistic? 
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 Nevertheless, the fact is that such form appears linked to a determined content (the 
plot of Hemingway’s short story). On the other hand, when the filmmaker has to translate 
this story into images, he does not only count on the contents of the plot, but also with the 
linguistic style of the dialogues of the script. But why, when it comes to choosing a 
scenography, he looks at Hopperesque models? Where lies the filmic affinity of Hopper’s 
painting? 
 
 Naugrette’s answer consists of assuming a previous influence of filmmakers on 
Hopper. He describes Hopper’s painting as cinematographic in broad terms: he refers to 
Hopper’s use of high angle (The city [1927][Fig.9], House at dusk [1935][Fig.33], Office 
at night [1940][Fig.30] New York Movie [1943][Fig.69]), low angle (House by the 
railroad [1925][Fig.15], Lighthouse hill [1927], Pennsylvania coaltown [1947][Fig.31]) 
or zoom (Chop Suey, [1929][Fig.32], Room in New York [1930][Fig.41], Hotel Room 
[1931][Fig.48]), and he suggests that Hopper transforms the viewers into moviegoers 
travelling from the darkness of the stall section to the lighted screen where the action is 
going to take place (NAUGRETTE: 1995, 60). 
 
 








[Fig.31] Edward Hopper, Pennsylvania coaltown, 1947,71.12x 101.6 cm, Butler Institute of 
American Art, Ohio 
 
                            
                  [Fig.32] Edward Hopper, Chop suey, 1929, 81.3 x 96.5, Private Collection 
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 Although the argument is clearly circular (Hopper influenced filmmakers, but 
filmmakers influenced Hopper), it has, to my view, an important advantage compared 
with the one of most of the previously cited critics: Naugrette is not speaking of the 
influence of film noir on Hopper’s paintings, but of the influence of film technique in 
general on Hopper’s work. Even so, how should we interpret such suggestions? Do they 
mean that Hopper is copying from film techniques? Stating that Hopper frames reality 
according to the procedures of cinema, Naugrette concludes that Hopper “not only paints 
America, he paints a series of American clichés” because he “appropriates the clichés, the 
stories and the procedures of cinema for his art (…), aiming for the role of the 
projectionist of the American scene” (NAUGRETTE: 1995, 57-61). I sympathise with 
the idea of an internal presence of film techniques in Hopper’s work, but I cannot agree 
with the kind of direct appropriation of such techniques or of a projection of clichés that 
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5.3.WHY PAINT REPRODUCIBILITY? 
 
 In the first section of this chapter I left some questions unanswered: where does 
the affinity of Nighthawks [Fig.23] with technological reproducibility lie? Why do 
viewers recognize it over and over again as some form of “dèjá vû”, as if there were not 
an original painting but only reproductions, as if it had only exhibition value? Now I shall 
answer that the main reason for it is not in the painting itself, but in what is represented 
in it. Let us note that what is reproduced in all the “quotations” of Nighthawks [Fig.23] I 
alluded to is not an actual place located in New York’s Greenwich village: what is being 
quoted is a scene that during the second half of the twentieth century became an iconic 
and autonomous subject separated from its physical space. Hopper himself claims that 
the painting could have been inspired through the walks around that neighbourhood, but 
he rejects any coincidence with a concrete place80. The reason is the same as in the case 
of House by the railroad [Fig.15]: the method of the artist consists of a process of 
abstraction and simplification based on previous direct observations and sketches, which 
is finished in the studio, just as the “draughters-reporters” of the Ashcan School sketched 
the newspapers illustrations in the streets and then finished them at the office desk. 
Explained this way, it does not seem to be an especially original procedure: it could be 
said that many artists have worked this way: some painters in the seventeenth century, 
like P.J. Saenredam, painted cathedrals which were somehow the result of an exercise of 
the same kind of abstraction. But there is an important difference in the case of 
Nighthawks [Fig.23] and other Hopper’s paintings. The difference is that, beyond the 
process of abstraction developed by the artist, the object depicted is in itself the result of 
abstraction. The process of abstraction not only takes place in Hopper’s mind, but in the 
public realm. The kind of diner chosen by Hopper is an abstract or generic space (“the 
American diner”). There is not an original diner that other commercial premises imitate 
or reproduce: every diner is like the other, there is not a first one, but a large series of 
reproductions. 
 
 In other words, what Hopper paints is not an original, but a reproduction (the 
reproduction of an ideal architectural matrix originally made to be infinitely reproduced). 
                                                             
80Some have tried to locate Hopper's diner in an actual place, and it has been suggested that it might have 
been in Mulry Square, where Seventh Avenue South, Greenwich Avenue and West 11th Street meet (MOSS: 
2010). 
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It could be said that also Gothic cathedrals repeat a scheme, but before industrial 
construction it does not mean the same thing. Each Gothic cathedral has its own 
personality, linked to its architectural and local history. Diners, on the contrary, are 
characterized by not having any personality and being indifferent to their surroundings81 . 
Because of this, everyone recognizes them as “already seen”: this is the key to the affinity 
of Nighthawks [Fig.23] with reproducibility. It has not to do only with the form of the 
painting, but mainly with its contents. And, as I argued in chapter 2, the contents of a 
painting are related to its exhibition value. But the point I am making is that, although the 
high dose of exhibition value of Nighthawks [Fig.23] makes it a realist picture, it cannot 
be reduced to such value. Hopper’s work is not a reproduction, although what he paints 
it is, and although he paints it underlining its reproducibility. 
 
 Among other modern industrially constructed spaces, the diner is an architectural 
incarnation of Erlebnis: it “sterilizes” experience. The big glass window is a defensive 
tool against an Erfahrung which has become dangerous because of the lack of a collective 
narrative. The physical isolation or the “sealed” space does not only mean psychic 
loneliness in a negative aspect; it also means aseptic protection from the unqualified risk 
of the shocks: this indeterminate danger of the city, and not a particular criminal event or 
gangster plot, is the dark aura floating over the diner. When describing Nighthawks, Wells 
states the following: 
 
Hence the Phillies 5-cent cigar sign above the window, echoing the popular 
shibboleth that ‘what this country truly needs is a really good five cent cigar’82. At 
a mystic level, where dreams payout, Nighthawks serves that need. Its vivid tableau 
represents a small but profound important victory: a holding action against the void 
(WELLS: 2008, 214). 
 
                                                             
81Indeed, diners themselves represent the culmination of the serialization of a rootless space that can be 
located anywhere. This is made evident in the definition given by the American Diner Museum as 
“prefabricated structures built at an assembly site and transported to a permanent location for installation 
to serve prepared food”. The idea of a place in which food could be served to anyone at any time was put 
into practice by Walter Scott in 1872 (although his business was rather what today could be considered as 
a food truck). However, diners did not acquire their characteristic decoration until the 1920s and 1930s, 
when they adopted “the streamlined look of Art Deco” that switched in the 1950s to new materials such as 
Formica or stainless steel, and neon lights were used as luminous signs in all of the more than 6000 that 
dotted the country following the same pattern (SISSON: 2017; BLAKEMORE: 2017, HURLEY: 1997). 
82Theisen informs us that the “5 cents cigar” is made possible because they were rolled by machine rather 
than by hand, “an innovation that came about in the 1930s, when cigar interests were trying to regain market 
share from cigarettes, which had been rolled by machine since de mid 1880’s” (THEISEN:2006, 72). 
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 I do not think that Nighthawks [Fig.23] “serves that need” of defeating emptiness. 
I would say rather that diners of the kind represented in the painting serve it (the victory 
over the void is not a negligible aspiration). Awareness of this confusion of the painting 




 5.3.1. An inner cinema 
 
 Nevertheless, is Hopper’s methodological abstraction of the same kind as the 
industrial scheme infinitely reproduced in diners throughout the American urban 
landscape? Does he paint, as Naugrette says, “a series of American clichés”? 
 
 Not only as a moviegoer, but also as a film poster designer83, Hopper was widely 
aware of the visual clichés or stereotypes of his times and of the urban mythologies that 
were part of the new framing of experience (the lonely man, the woman waiting, the 
empty house, and so on). And this awareness underlies his paintings and his realism. This 
realism does not capture a copy of reality, but it must be understood as the painting of a 
reproduction. He paints the image of a reality which has previously been turned into an 
image, the kind of image which has somehow replaced, in American iconography, the 
reality corresponding to traditional experience. And this replacement has taken place in 
the dawning of an age which, as it has been suggested above, will transform exhibition 
itself into a new kind of cult value. This has, doubtless, contributed to the influence of 
Hopper's scenes in films and has provided many of his paintings with a high coefficient 
of reproducibility. But it has also undermined the visibility of some of his works 
(especially Nighthawks [Fig.23]), due to its overexposure. Because the diner represented 
in the painting belongs to the realm of reproducibility, often the painting is overlooked as 
if it was some kind of a reproduction exclusively defined by exhibition value. But the fact 
                                                             
83Hopper “began a series of movie posters for U.S Printing & Litho Co. (...) In range of plot and theme, the 
silent films Hopper was paid to watch and promote resemble the magazine commissions. Both aim at the 
expectation and interest of the popular audience: Dance of Mammon, Mendel Beilis under Arrest, The 
Master Criminal, She of the Wolf's Brood, The Lunatics, Petrof the Vassal, The Horrors of War, Whom the 
Gods Destroy, Chasing a Million, and The Gape of Death. Most were produced by Eclair (...) Eclair had a 
studio factory in Fort Lee, New Jersey, from 1911 until March 1914, when fire destroyed it (No copies of 
the films for which Hopper made posters appear to have survived). When war broke out in August 1914, 
film production ceased and Hopper lost a good client” (LEVIN: 2007, 94-95). 
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that Hopper was aware of visual clichés does not mean that he, as an artist, accepted 
them84. 
 
[Hopper] complained of the rules laid down for making the posters, rules like those 
for illustration meant to assure acceptance by a broad American public: ‘say the 
movie was about Napoleonic wars. I’d do the soldiers in French uniforms of that 
period. They make me redo them and put them in khaki uniforms and campaign hats 
like American soldiers’. Catering to the stereotypes of a mass market would never 
be his forte (LEVIN: 2007, 95). 
 
 Of course, Hopper strives to paint the poverty of an experience full of visual 
stereotypes. He cannot reduce painting to photography or cinema, because the visual 
experience of such reduction is precisely what he wants to paint (not to reproduce). But 
one cannot paint something which belongs to the sphere of reproducibility in the same 
way that one can paint from nature. It seems to be obvious that Hopper does not resign 
himself to repeat the visual clichés of his time (one could even say that some of these 
stereotypes are his own creation). Rather, he uses them as the starting point of his work. 
In a certain sense, Hopper’s work is to cinema what the works of the Ashcan School were 
to photography. Hopper’s painting is not just visual knowledge of reality, but visual 
knowledge of previous visual knowledge, of a reality already transformed into some sort 
of savage cinema by new mechanical media85 . 
 
 The features that seem to link Hopper’s paintings with film noir (the horizontality 
of his paintings, the absence of impasto or visible brushstrokes in his oils and the uncanny 
atmosphere that some critics specifically refer to this genre) point to a technical and 
internal connection (rather than a biographical or external one) between painting and 
cinema. And this kind of connection cannot be explained in terms of influence but as a 
way of accounting for a visual reality produced by technological media, corresponding 
with the physical reality of a city erected by industrial machinery. Hopper does not reject 
the new visual reality, the new space created by films and photography in the form of 
stereotypes. He does not try to go back in time to classic painting looking for shelter from 
those mechanical procedures, but “to react to it and not to shun it”. He turns this filmic 
experience of reality into painting, which incurred some resistance, because painting was 
not considered appropriated to represent reproducible items, associated with ugliness. 
                                                             
841“I was a rotten illustrator -or mediocre anyway”, confessed Hopper (GOODRICH: 1978, 21). 
85I will explain in a greater depth this point in the next chapter. 
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Hopper himself was aware of this ugliness when he returned from Paris: “It seemed 
awfully crude and raw when I got back. It took me ten years to get over Europe” (LEVIN: 
1980, 26). 
 
 Indeed, not only the “travelling effect” of Hoppers horizontals seems to emulate 
movement, as it happens in Nighthawks, but it is also certain that Hopper’s paintings 
seem to be framed as if applying filmic methods. Beyond any doubt, the most important 
of all the frames is, in Hopper, the window (and the most important of all windows is, 
probably, the one of Nighthawks). Concerning windows seen from the street (the only 
ones I will consider for the moment), Hopper painted them in many ways: seen from far 
(From Williamsburg bridge [1928][Fig.19], House at dusk [1935][ Fig.33]) or at close 
range (Apartment houses [1923][Fig.34] Room in New York [1932])[Fig.41], with human 
presence (Cape Cod Morning [1950]) [Fig.35] or without it (August in the city 
[1945][Fig.36]), storefronts (Early Sunday Morning [1926][Fig.42], Drug Store 
[1927][Fig.37], Seven A.M. [1947])[Fig70] or offices (New York Office [1962] [Fig.38],), 
opened (Night windows [1928][Fig.39]) or closed (Rooms for tourists [1945]). In 
Nighthawks [Fig.23], the painting itself works as a movie theatre rather than as stage 
design. Hopper drags us through the scene, as if we were looking through a camera 
travelling over imaginary rails from the shadows of the dark street to the bright light of 
the diner, visible because of the glass window. Hopper’s windows are screens. But the 
relevant point is the way in which Hopper developed a cinematographic technique, 











        [Fig.33] Edward Hopper,  House at dusk, 1935, 127 x 92.71 cm, Virginia Museum 
                  of Fine Arts, Richmond 
 
  
       












[Fig. 35] Edward Hopper, Cape Cod Morning, 1950, 86.7 x 102.3 cm, Smithsonian American Art  
            Museum 
 
 




[Fig.36]  Edward Hopper August in the city, 1945, 58.4x76.2 cm, Norton Museum of Art, Florida 
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 [Fig.38] Edward Hopper, New York Office , 1962, 101.6 x 139.7, Montgomery Museum of  Fine Arts 
 
                            
 [Fig. 39] Edward Hopper, Night windows, 1928, Museum of Modern Art, New York 
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 When in chapter 4 I advanced the hypothesis that the building in House by the 
railroad [Fig.15] is painted “as if it was an instant photograph taken through the train 
window”, and when I said that Hopper was painting the house “as if his canvas was a 
camera”, I also said: “but only by immediately adding that precisely it is not and it cannot 
be” (section 4.2). In other words, the emphasis of my hypothesis is, as I shall argue in the 
next chapter, in the as if, that is to say, in the metaphorical presence of an internal camera 
or an inner cinema (not a direct external influence) in Hopper’s painting. 
 
 But, what is the importance of painting the scene? What adds painting to the 
sphere of reproducibility? If painting “maintains the distance” that photography or film 
tend to abolish, it could be said that, suspending the denouement, Hopper, like 
Hemingway in “The killers”, “keeps the secret” just when it is about to become evident 
that there is no secret at all: remoteness only appears in the moment it is about to disappear 
and to be turned into mere distance. It is not just a matter of giving some sort of implicit 
remoteness (through the painting) to what is characterised by simple distance (films and 
photography), as if the aim was adding an aura to what, by its own definition, lacks it. 
The question is, once again, how to paint (and, therefore, how to turn into experience) 




 5.3.2. Reasons for re-contextualization 
 
 In The work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility, Benjamin 
differentiates two types of relation between artworks and reproduction: “to photograph a 
painting is one kind of reproduction, but to photograph an action performed in a film 
studio is another” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 110). In the first case, what is reproduced (for 
example, Rembrandt’s The Night Watch) is a work of art, but the photograph of 
Rembrandt’s work is not a work of art86 . In the second case, what is reproduced (for 
example, the final dialogue of Rick and Lisa in Michael Curtiz’s Casablanca) is not a 
work of art, but only a single scene from a longer script, and the filmic reproduction of 
                                                             
86It may be well the case that an artistic photograph of Rembrandt’s painting is considered as a work of art, 
but what Benjamin means is that a photograph of a painting is not a work of art simply because it reproduces 
a work of art. 
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such performance is not a work of art either, but only a little piece that in the final work 
of art —the finished film— can even be discarded during editing. But there is a third case 
not considered by Benjamin but essential to Hopper’s painting: “to paint something which 
has become technologically reproducible”. Here, what is painted is not a work of art, but 
the painting can be such a work. Under which conditions? 
 
 As it has been noted, Erlebnis implies a certain “reconstruction of experience” 
(like the one made by Proust’s character through train windows), based on pragmatic 
motivations, which I have compared with the filmic editing process: the isolation of the 
perceptions that the conscious mind can control, and its relocation in a consistent temporal 
sequence by giving up the integrity of experience in order to avoid a traumatic risk. That 
is to say, Erlebnis is like a selective montage of the Erfahrung made of shocks. When 
Hopper paints this Erlebnis (not only the diner, but also the way in which it is perceived), 
the painting of Erlebnis is not itself Erlebnis, but Erfahrung: he makes visible the 
incongruences set apart in the pragmatic reconstruction (so to speak, he shows some of 
the frames discarded by the editor). In the syntactic dimension of the painting, these 
incongruences relate to the vagueness of the horizon line, the instability of volumes and 
the uncertainty regarding the viewer’s position87. In the semantic dimension, they refer 
to the dissolution of the storyline in frozen frames without resolution of the tension, and 
to the impenetrability of the meaning of the scene. The painting is not Erlebnis (it could 
not be, because Erlebnis is aesthetically sterilised). The painting is Erfahrung, but not 
Erfahrung without Erlebnis (which might be a definition of the objectives of abstract 
painting), but Erfahrung of Erlebnis. That is why it contains a high dose of exhibition 
value, but not only exhibition value. 
 
 I previously asked (in 5.2.4.) why an increase of the exhibition factor in an artwork 
should be perceived as realistic by the artists and writers of Hopper’s generation. The 
answer to this question is that realism, in art, does not mean faithfulness to a self-
subsistent external reality, but a certain artistic approach to reality that is somehow in the 
spirit of the times, and that in this case consists of the augmenting of exhibition value, or 
rather of a decrease of the “telling” dimension of realism due to the decay of traditional 
shared narratives not only in the artwork, but in the social perception of reality in general. 
                                                             
87I will discuss these aspects, also appearing in Nighthawks as in House by the railroad, in the next chapter. 
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Hence the impression that reality has become harsher or devoid of emotion, “poor in 
noteworthy stories”, as Benjamin said. But this impoverishment of the plotline, the 
absence of an ending —because the old narrative closing procedures are now felt as non-
realistic, as a “trick ending”—, is a feature of the modern experience of space and time, 
and it is an attribute of the realistic approach to it. When Hopper’s paintings are said to 
be “frames taken out of a sequence”, it means that what is shown in them is separated 
from a storyline and a denouement which could be told. Events, at least narratively 
relevant events, seem to be excluded. Something might have happened before the scene 
we are watching in Nighthawks [Fig.23]; something could happen in the next instant. But 
at this moment nothing is happening in the diner. The characters are waiting. When the 
time comes, they will leave the diner without saying goodbye to each other and get lost 
in the night, every one of them to a destiny which remains unknown to us. But in the 
minute chosen by Hopper, the time has not yet come, the argument is suspended. 
 
 The repeated efforts of Hopper’s interpreters to fill the painting with stories are 
attempts to correct the incongruences alluded to above and to ease the tension (or, as we 
might also say, to ease the pain of the poverty of experience), as are the never-ending 
“recontextualizations”. Most of them are directed to eliminating the uneasiness resolving 
the uncertainty. Theisen, for example, fills the painting with all kinds of contextual 
readings throughout the decades of the twentieth century: in 1900, the couple of 
Nighthawks would be marginal and damned; in 1925, they would be two “charged-up 
hipsters”; in 1933, Bonnie and Clyde; in 1975, they would be proposing group sex to the 
waiter, and so on (THEISEN: 2006, 122). Hobbs, for his part, insinuates a possible 
relationship of the painting with the feeling of loneliness in American society after the 
years of the Great Depression. But, leaving aside the fact that 1942 is quite a distance 
from 1929, what could suggest, in the painting, economic crisis? Hobbs also argues that 
Nighthawks was painted at a time when “young people were sent off to the armed services 
and the entire country was caught up in the war effort”, and invokes a link with the 
pessimism derived from the bombing of Pearl Harbor. He recognizes, however, that, even 
if “the fact of the war causes one to wonder exactly who the Nighthawks really are”, the 
characters “do not seem to be (…) military personnel” (HOBBS: 1987, 131). So, why 
should we think that the rest of the inhabitants of the city have quietly gone to bed after 
hearing war news and the characters in the diner are the last patriots left to reflect on 
them? I previously called Theisen’s interpretations of Nighthawks “abusive”, yet they are 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
184 
 
not more audacious (just more concrete) than the assumption that the characters are 
doomed by the pessimism produced by the fall of the American dream, the Great 
Depression, the loneliness of modern city or the Pearl Harbor bombing. 
 
 The painting seems to be especially amenable to all these readings, in the same 
way that it appears particularly appropriate for filmic quotations and for reproduction in 
advertisements, popular culture and gadgets. But the point is that, whereas the viewer 
fights to reconstruct the storyline trying to reconstruct the horizon line to stabilize the 
self, Hopper does not permit this correction. We already know the reason: Erlebnis, 
although it calms the tension for a while, sterilizes experience for artistic purposes. If, as 
I have just said, Erlebnis is the montage of Erfahrung, painting dismounts Erlebnis —so 
the incongruences appear— to make of it a genuine Erfahrung. To paint the Erlebnis 
means to make the experience of the in-experience, to make in-experience (the poverty 
of experience) accessible to experience. For this reason, the various readings hung on 
Nighthawks do not have longevity. And this answers another remaining question: what I 
called the obstinate insistence on finding in Hopper’s Nighthawks [Fig.23] what 
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CHAPTER 6. NIGHTHAWKS: THE PAINTING 
 
 In the previous chapter I discussed the affinity of Hopper’s painting with 
reproducibility in general terms, and particularly the affinity between Nighthawks 
[Fig.23] and the long series of its reproductions and appropriations, which have had 
important effects on its interpretation I aimed to unfetter the picture from those 
appropriations and to reformulate its relationship with reproducibility. Now, in this 
chapter I will focus on the painting itself, and my main objective is to expand upon the 
previous suggestion of a sort of (metaphorical) “inner cinema” immanent in Hopper’s 
paintings. I will comment first (in section 6.1. “The scene”) on Nighthawks’ characters, 
on Hopper’s use of light and his spatial technique. In the course of these comments, 
several questions will arise, leading to a discussion of Richard Wollheim’s influential 
distinction of the internal and the external spectator of a painting (6.1.3., “Wollheimian 
interlude”). I will show how this distinction can help to make Benjamin’s metaphorical 
language more plausible, especially regarding the —often underestimated— Benjamin’s 
definition of the aura in terms of gaze (6.2., “Spectators and expectations”), which I 
consider essential for the analysis of the painting. As a result of this discussion, I shall 
propose an extended reformulation of the hypothesis presented in chapter 4 to achieve a 
deeper understanding of Hopper’s work, which will provide the answers to the questions 



















 I shall begin with a description of Nighthawks [Fig.23] because, as I have 
signalled, constant reproductions and remakes of it have made the painting almost 
invisible. First I will focus on the figures appearing in the painting. 
 
 
 6.1.1. Actors without aura 
 
 The waiter, dressed in a white uniform, leans down, his head slightly up. His half 
opened mouth could suggest that he is about to start small talk with the two clients seated 
at the bar. However, the web of gestures and glances puts this suggestion aside: neither 
the man nor the woman, seated side by side with their arms leaning upon the counter, look 
at him. The woman's gaze seems to be fixed in the sandwich she is holding on her right 
hand, as in hesitation, perhaps lost in her own thoughts, unaware of things around her. 
Something similar happens with the figure of the man whose facial features, according to 
Jo Hopper’s diary’s notes, inspired the name of the painting because of his prominent 
nose (BARTER: 2007-1, 197-206). His gaze seems to be lost in the distance; he, too, is 
immersed in his own thoughts or maybe just letting time go by. Looking closely at the 
painting, we conclude that the waiter is not looking at the clients. His face seems to be 
illuminated by a beam of light coming out of nowhere, and his eyes are perhaps focused 
somewhere outside the glass window of the diner. It is a gaze immersed in some sort of 
professional ennui, the gaze of someone whose main occupation is that of waiting. 
 
 All we can say about the fourth character, with his back to us, is that he is wearing, 
like the other man in the painting, a fedora-type man’s hat, still popular in the United 
States of the 1940s, as it can be seen in films and advertisements of the period. He is 
seated at the other side of the bar counter, and he could be looking at its surface, or merely 
focused on his drink, ignoring both the waiter and the other two clients. The empty glass 
close to this figure indicates that there might have been someone else seated to his right, 
someone who has recently left the diner and whose absence allows us to have an entire 
panoramic view of the waiter and the couple. The scene seems to have been meticulously 
constructed so that the characters’ gazes do not meet one another at any point and, at the 
same time, none of them attempts to make eye contact with the viewer. It could be said 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
187 
 
that the painting is designed to avoid a hypothetical exchange of glances which could be 
an emerging gesture or even evoke a word, something that could create a link, though 
precarious, which could break the silence that dominates the composition and the 
indifference that every one of the figures seems to feel towards the rest. It would be too 
risky to infer that the woman and the man who are on the same side of the bar counter are 
a couple. The feeling that the woman’s left hand is about to touch the man’s right hand is 
quickly refuted because of the cigarette he is holding, which excludes any attempt of 
connection. 
 
 It has become customary, in the case of Nighthawks, [Fig.23] to look for Hopper’s 
inspiration in some of the French impressionist paintings representing cafes. The same 
paradoxical relation between closeness and distance that I have noticed in House by the 
railroad [Fig.15] can be found in such paintings. In these spaces, characters seem to 
achieve some sort of physical proximity without intimacy or any previous acquaintance 
between them. Barter suggests a comparison with Manet’s At the Cafe (1878) [Fig.40], 
where it is not clear what kind of link the different characters who appear in the scene 
share (BARTER: 2007-1, 198). The man leans slightly towards the woman behind him 
and opens his mouth as if to speak. Even so, is he talking to her or to an unseen figure? 
She, on the other hand, does not look at him, her hand rests upon a chair, as if to push it 
away, whereas the woman on her left is clearly separated from them. This ambiguity of 
being together in the same space, though separated, is also present in Hopper’s painting: 
the members of the hypothetical couple of Nighthawks [Fig.23] do not look at each other, 
although their hands almost meet in the bar counter. It could be understood as an 
indifferent closeness, as in Degas’ L’Absinthe (1876), or a purely accidental one, as in the 

















[Fig.40] Edouard Manet, At the cafe, 1878, 78 × 84 cm., Oskar Reinhart Foundation, Winterthur, 
Switzerland 
  
These similarities, however, also seem to highlight differences. In the French paintings, 
the ambiguity of closeness and distance relies almost always on the hustle and bustle that 
derives from the crowding and jostling of people in a limited space. The hubbub of the 
Parisian Foule which obsessed Baudelaire (“his Paris is invariably overpopulated”, 
BENJAMIN: 2006, 322) is linked to the social emergence of the masses, which was the 
subject of a great number of thinkers since the late nineteenth century88 and, according to 
Benjamin, also the privileged laboratory where modern poetry was distilled. But that 
crowd seems to be missing in Hopper’s paintings. Rather than piling up the figures in his 
paintings, Hopper seems to treat them in a more conventional way, giving them, as Barter 
says, space to breath (BARTER: 2007-1, 198), maybe because he is more interested in 
assuring the general visibility of the space and its components, as can be observed in some 
of his late works, where human figures disappear. This is what seems to emphasize the 
feeling of loneliness and empty space that is usually pinned to Hopper’s scenes, when 
compared to the overcrowding and confusion that dominated Impressionist paintings, and 
                                                             
88Among others, Le Bon [Psychologie des foules, 1895], Freud [Massenpsychologie und Ich Analysis, 
1921], Ortega [La rebellion de las masas, 1929], Reich [Massenpsychologie des faschismus, 1933], Canneti 
[Mass und Macht, 1960]) and, of course, Benjamin himself. 
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this is still true of an early Hopper work like Soir Bleu (1914), where the atmosphere of 
Parisian cafes is still present and characters show links between them. Nevertheless, even 
if formal or compositional motivations can be adduced to explain this procedure, a first 
question arises: if Hopper’s characters —at least the ones in Nighthawks [Fig.23]— 
belong to the urban realm of “the modern masses”, why is the crowd almost always absent 
from his oils? 
 
 This individualization of the characters has been related to the Hopper’s so-called 
“voyeurism”, an idea probably derived from his use of perspective: the painter usually 
allows us to observe the characters he depicts without them noticing they are being 
watched (REISS: 1973, 84, NOCHLIN: 1981, 138). In Nighthawks [Fig.23], we have a 
wider perspective and more visual information than the characters do. We are aware, at 
least partially, of the exterior of the diner, we have a panoramic view of the scene that the 
characters are incapable of noticing, and we can see what they all have behind their backs. 
More importantly, we have the feeling (enhanced by the transparency of the windows) 
that, as in many other Hopper windows, such as Night Windows (1928)[Fig.39] or Room 
in New York (1932)89[Fig.41], the characters have been caught unawares at some moment 
of their daily routine, as if they were subjected to some sort of surveillance90. 
 
 Relying on the lack of a visible entrance to or exit from the Nighthawks’ diner, 
and on “the ugly ochre door with a tiny square window in it”, Theisen explains this feeling 
of surveillance comparing the scene with a prison cell, playing with the idea that “New 
York may be said to function as a kind of prison” (THEISEN:2006, 58, 72). However, I 







                                                             
89Although examples multiply: Apartment Houses (1923), August in the city (1945) Cape Cod Morning 
(1950) Office in a Small city (1953), New York office (1962), etc. 
90I will discuss Hopper’s voyeurism in detail in chapter 8. 




[Fig.41] Edward Hopper, Room in New York, 1932, 73.66 x 93.02cm, Sheldon Memorial Art 
Gallery and Sculpture Garden, Lincoln, NE 
 
 The figures indeed seem to be locked in the space they occupy, perfectly isolated 
even when in company. However, the interpretation of this condition in the sense of police 
or political surveillance is even more forced that the supposition of a criminal plot, which 
I have discarded in the previous chapter. Especially because in Hopper’s paintings, 
although certainly there is no accumulation of figures and the characters are distinctive 
enough to be differentiated, except for a small number of portraits, there is no actual 
individualization: Hopper’s characters are types —even stereotypes—, they do not 
represent actual people. This ambiguity awakens a second question: who —or what— are 
they? 
 
 In fact, Nighthawks’ readings which point to the subordination of the characters to 
the space they inhabit refer to a circumstance which has been insistently underlined by 
critics, and has not to do with “power” but, again, with scenography. This mise-en-scène 
element —the exhibition dimension of a theatre play, its “showing” aspect— is as clear 
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in Hopper’s images as the feeling that the characters are located in a decor in order to be 
observed. There is a certain visual resemblance between the buildings in the background 
of the painting and the ones that we might find in other oils: Early Sunday morning 
[Fig.42], painted more than a decade earlier, in 1930. We discover there the same kind of 
architecture, the same colour palette and almost the same frugality when it comes  to the 
details of the store windows, which do not reveal what kind of business do they host91. It 
is assumed that Early Sunday morning [Fig.42] was inspired by Jo Mielziner’s stage 




[Fig..42] Edward Hopper, Early Sunday Morning, 1930, Whitney Museum of American Art, 




                                                             
91In both paintings there is only one element which reveals more detail: in Early Sunday Morning is the 
characteristic barber pole; in Nighthawks, it is the partially lighted cash register inside one of the buildings 
(WELLS: 2008, 172). 
92“On February 14, 1929, Hopper and his wife saw Elmer Rice's Street Scene (…) Hopper's Early Sunday 
Morning of 1930 is the quintessential street scene. The buildings are viewed at an angle from above as if 
seen from a building across the way. In fact, the Hopper’s saw Mielziner's Street Scene set from the second 
balcony, and it is this experience that may have suggested the slightly elevated vantage point found in Early 
Sunday Morning” (LEVIN: 1980, 57-58). 
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So, we could say that those buildings play the role of a theatre set, which would explain 
the vagueness. Warkel claims that Hopper’s most intriguing works are his interiors, 
“composed like stage sets with appropriate stage lighting” (WARKEL: 2008, 29). It might 
be argued then, with Wells, that Hopper acts like some sort of theatre scenographer: his 
compositions are often proscenium-like, the light is directed (and so are shadows) and 
characters depicted frequently seem to be posing (WELLS: 2008, 215). 
 
 However, there is a strong drawback to this hypothesis. Benjamin notes that “the 
aura surrounding Macbeth on the stage cannot be divorced from the aura which, for the 
living spectators, surrounds the actor who plays him” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 112). That 
is to say, the aura of the theatre actor is linked to the role he plays in the story and, 
therefore, to the character’s involvement in the plot. On the contrary, Hopper’s characters 
seem to have no aura because they do not play a concrete role, and this is the reason why 
we cannot decide who they are. The storyline is, to the players, as tradition is to social 
agents, and the poverty of experience is to modern individuals as the poverty of argument 
to the players. The “frozen” moment captured by Hopper is not a relevant scene belonging 
to a plot, but a trivial instant without a special signification. And this is emphasized by 
the fact that the characters’ visible or imagined gazes are empty or lost. Over and over 
again, in articles and monographs written about Hopper, critics insist on terms such as 
loneliness, alienation, despair or sadness as the typical states of mind of Hopper’s 
characters. But much as one wants to get closer to the figures, their faces reveal boredom, 
or, in general terms, are distracted, haunted or indifferent, appropriate to the spaces they 
inhabit, which are not particularly oppressive but anodyne or transitory, without mystery 
or secret. I agree with Updike’s observation that, if we were to understand Hopper’s 
scenes as theatre sets, his paintings could only depict the first scene the viewer sees when 
the curtain goes up and nobody knows the storyline in which the characters are going to 
be immersed (UPDIKE: 2005, 184). They are, like Pirandello’s actors, “characters in 
search of an author”. So, this hypothesis that Hopper’s characters must be considered as 
if they were actors is not consistent enough to answer the question about their identity, 
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 6.1.2. Light and Space 
 
 I will focus now on light and space, because, as in many other paintings, the 
figures represented might not be the central issue. Perhaps we should take seriously the 
Hopper’s incidental statement that he was not interested in drawing people “grimacing 
and posturing” (as it was common during his work as an illustrator): “maybe I am not 
very human. What I wanted to do was to paint sunlight in the side of a house” (LEVIN: 
1980, 139). And light and space constitute the elementary structure for any exhibition. 
 
 The powerful artificial light is the only source visible in the scene. It has been 
defined sometimes as “dehumanizing”, because of the cold tones used by Hopper. Indeed, 
this coldness affects the whole atmosphere of the painting. The light not only illuminates 
the building's interior, but also spills over into the street and onto the buildings in the 
background of the composition93. And, as in many other Hopper’s paintings, the main 
feature of this light is its excessive intensity. As the artist George Segal once claimed, one 
needs sunglasses to enter Hopper’s paintings (SCHMIED: 1995, 100). This seems to 
enhance the idea that that the characters are under the spotlight, in a theatre where the 
diner window would be like the “fourth wall” of a stage. 
 
 Hopper divides the surface of the canvas into differentiated zones of colour and 
value, outlining the diner to separate the fluorescent light from the shadows. But the 
excess of light has an ambiguous effect on objects and human figures. On one hand, it 
shapes them with contour lines and hard edges, creating volume and solidity; on the other 
hand, far from bringing out the details of things and faces, as Gillies rightly suggests, the 
overexposure “burns” them and hides their features (GILLIES: 1972, 405), as can be 
clearly seen in a painting like Chop Suey (1929) [Fig.43]. Profiled by the cold light, like 
the bright and frosty milk glass of Suspicion (Hitchcock, 1941), the objects in the counter 
of Nighthawks’ diner seem to confirm Benjamin’s observation that “warmth is ebbing 
from things: the objects of daily use gently but insistently repel us” (BENJAMIN:1996-
5, 453). 
                                                             
93Archibald J. Motley Jr, a Chicagoan who painted scenes of the city's speakeasies, was interested in the 
qualities of light, especially night-time and artificial light. He declared Hopper's painting “the best example 
I have seen of (artificial interior) lighting”, and it inspired his 1943 painting Nightlife (BARTER: 2007-1, 
203- 204). 





                                            
 
[Fig.43] Edward Hopper, Chop suey (detail), 1929  
 
 All of them come from industrial construction or mass production: they are not 
transmitted by the authority of tradition; human cultural experience is not accumulated in 
them. They inform us about their functions (by means of the instruction manual attached 
to them, often reduced today to a set of photographic images), but they do not transmit us 
any experience: they are poor in experience. Benjamin would say that they have no aura 
as a result of how they have been produced. The frugality of details that we can see inside 
the diner is also noteworthy: walls are naked, and with the exception of the empty glass 
on the right side of the man with his back to us, there are few elements of tableware 
anywhere to be seen. So, if there are not especially relevant things to be seen, this raises 
a third question: if nothing shown is important, why this excess of light? 
 
 In depicting the huge window, the other main feature of Hopper’s spatial technique 
is revealed. The directionality of the painting, dominated by horizontality, suggests the 
movement of urban dynamics. As Theisen notes, we can find it in the window, in the bar 
counter, in the sequence and repetition of the stools, in the pavement, in the row of 
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windows of the same shape and size in the buildings on the background, and in the 
architecture of the diner itself (THEISEN: 2006, 73). It is as if it propelled our glance 
across the surface, preventing us from entering inner depths. 
 
 If we accept that there are two procedures to produce the illusion of three 
dimensionality in a painting, recession in depth by colour and value graduation, and the 
linear relationships of forms, we could say that Hopper mainly uses this latter. So, his 
works rarely rely on the graduation of light and shadows, and both rival in the surface of 
the canvas a bit like the same colours echo inside and outside the diner. This contributes 
to giving Nighthawks [Fig.23] the air of what could be called a “total frontality”: the 
farthest zones, instead of fading away by the distance, are focused with the same accuracy 
as the nearest ones, as if the viewer’s focus was at the same time everywhere and, as 
Lawson said about this use of perspective, “seeing clearly what he is not looking at” 
(GILLIES: 1972, 406). But, although the space is constructed following linear perspective 
to suggest depth, as I have remarked in the case of House by the railroad [Fig.15], the 
horizon line is not clear. The diner is like an odd isosceles trapezoid that marks the 
vanishing point outside the composition. But the street and the buildings in the 
background claim another vanishing point which does not accord with the one implied by 
the diner, so it is difficult to locate a fixed point of view for the beholder. This instability 
of the ground awakens two possible associations (which are not mutually exclusive): (i) 
that the viewer is to imagine spectatorship in motion; and (ii), that the viewer cannot 
perceive the space shown in the painting as an extension of her own perceptual space. 




 6.1.3. Wollheimian interlude 
 
 In order to clarify all the above observations about the viewer of Nighthawks 
[Fig.23], I will resort to the way in which Richard Wollheim presents, in his book Painting 
as an art, the distinction between “the spectator of the picture” and “the spectator in the 
picture” (WOLLHEIM: 1987, 101-185). Although I am aware of the distance between 
Wollheim’s theoretical and methodological framework and Benjamin’s, which I am using 
in my dissertation, I suggest that a fruitful parallelism between them on some issues that 
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are crucial for my argument can be experimentally developed: on the question of mimesis, 
from which derives the polarity “cult/exhibition”, and the implicit character of aura’s 
remoteness, which I discussed in chapter 2. What is the interest of reformulating 
Benjamin’s notions in terms of Wollheim’s internal spectatorship? As I shall argue, this 
reformulation is a key tool to make more plausible the hermetic and metaphoric 
definitions of aura in terms of gaze, and therefore a basis for further development of my 
suggestion about the presence of an imaginary “inner cinema” in Hopper’s works. 
 
 For the purposes of this parallelism, I will leave aside many of the complexities 
of Wollheim’s argument, and I will retain from it just the issues that can be useful in the 
analysis of Nighthawks [Fig.23]. For the moment, I will summarize these issues by saying 
that, although is an ingenuous assumption that the real spectator can literally “enter” a 
painted representation, in a certain kind of paintings the spectator of the picture is allowed 
to enter the represented scene imaginatively: the spectator is able to imagine himself “as 
if ” inside the picture. For this to be possible, the painter has to have constructed a place 
for an internal (but unrepresented) spectator near the viewpoint from which the scene is 
painted. 
 
 For me, the important point in this position is the expression as if. This expression 
leads us to what Kant called das Reich des als ob, the realm of the “as if”. The function 
of Wollheim’s implicit spectator, not represented but immanent in the represented scene, 
is to allow the external spectator to play at being inside the picture, just as an actor plays 
a role in the stage. It is, to my view, very relevant that Wollheim calls the internal spectator 
the protagonist of the picture. This designation could suggest a literary comparison. The 
thesis of the internal spectator is, in other words, constructed through an analogy with the 
protagonist of literary fiction. Indeed, the role that Wollheim assigns to the internal 
spectator (“he can see everything that the picture represents and he can see it as the picture 
represents it […] He is, I shall say, a total spectator” [WOLLHEIM: 1987, 102]) reminds 
us of the function of the omniscient narrator in literature. The protagonist or the narrator 
of a modern novel is, so to speak, the device that allows the reader to experience the 
events of the plot as if in the fiction and to perceive action from within the plot. To achieve 
this objective, the reader should operate a narrative identification with the protagonist: 
imagining himself or herself as if the protagonist. It could be said: the reader plays the 
role of the protagonist. This reminds us of what Hopper called “the essential element of 
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imagination”, whose importance in the structure of the experience I have underlined in 
chapter 1. 
 
  The indication that this identification has to be an imaginary one is central in the 
argument, because if this requirement is not fulfilled mimesis fails94 . If failure can be 
excluded, and if there is effectively a place for the spectator in the picture, the spectator 
of the picture will have “distinctive access to the contents of the picture” (WOLLHEIM: 
1987, 129). For Wollheim, this means, on one hand, access “from within” the space 
represented in the picture, playing the part of the internal spectator who watches the 
scene; this is the representational dimension, corresponding to the “showing” or the 
exhibition value. And, on the other hand, it means access to the “mind” of the internal 
spectator, being, so to speak, “possessed” by the repertoire of affections of the internal 
spectator; this is the expressive dimension, corresponding to the “telling” side of the scene 
or to its cult value. And, as with exhibition and cult values, when the side of “telling” 
gains importance, the side of “showing” loses it95. 
 
 So, it is assumed that the painter represents in the picture the gaze of the internal 
spectator (what he can see): not only the contents of such a gaze, but also the emotional 
colouration of the internal spectator’s affections concerning what he is looking at. The 
possibility of this imaginary identification involves an interweaving of both dimensions 
(the emotional identification helps to complete the representational one, and vice versa). 
And this double contribution seems to be in tune with what I have been calling “realism”. 
When the external spectator can even attempt an imaginary access to the implicit internal 
space of the picture, we could say that it is a “realist” picture, not an “illusionist” one. 
 
 In the case of painting, in chapter 2 I have associated aura with the remoteness 
implicit in the gaze of the person represented in a traditional portrait, which implies a 
mystery or a secret that the painting transmits (as an experience) but does not betray it (as 
information). And I have interpreted this remoteness as the cause that makes the 
                                                             
94I am not referring to the cases —mentioned by Wollheim— in which the imaginary identification is 
attempted but not achieved (because the painter did not locate successfully an internal spectator in his 
work), but to those in which the identification cannot be even attempted. 
95“In some cases, the affective contribution that identification with an internal spectator makes to pictorial 
comprehension will be much greater, in other cases it will be comparatively less (…) where the affective 
contribution is greater (…) we should adopt a more relaxed attitude towards the precise location of the 
internal spectator” (WOLLHEIM: 1987, 183). 
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represented space irreducible to the explicit dimensions of the space of the representation. 
Now, Wollheim also insists on the implicit condition of the internal spectator. Both spaces, 
explicit and implicit, cannot be confused, but there is a possibility of gaining access from 
the first to the second. To the extent that the external spectator never loses the sense of 
reality (and of its difference with fiction), this access does not mean an explicit revelation 
of the “secret” that the scene conceals (this revelation would mean the “inauthentic” 
confusion of the spectator of the picture with the spectator in the picture, or in any case 
an ingenuous illusion): it could be said that the internal spectator transmits the secret to 
the external one —this is the core of the “distinctive access”—, but what is transmitted is 
an experience and, therefore, probably nothing that could be translated into explicit 
information. So, the picture itself keeps the secret or, in other words, retains its aura. 
 
 Now, I suggest that all the difficulties in entering the space of Nighthawks [Fig.23] 
(the unstable position of the beholder, the insecurity about the standpoint and the horizon 
line, the lack of spatial continuity, etc.) should be interpreted as the difficulties of the 
spectator of Nighthawks [Fig.23] to identify with the spectator in Nighthawks. Wollheim 
indicates that, in some cases, “the external spectator (…) can allow the internal spectator 
to drift”. This is especially important in Manet’s paintings, whose “internal spectator is 
essentially a mobile spectator. He must be free to prowl through the represented space 
(…) and therefore there could not be one point of view exclusively associated with him” 
(WOLLHEIM: 1987, 161). In other words, different perspectives on the contents of the 
picture, which would be “really” successive, are “imaginarily” represented as if they were 
simultaneous, and this is characteristic of the spatial (modern) representation of time, as 
I have argued referreing to Hume and Kant words. The external spectator’s acceptance of 
Manet’s works is, so to speak, subordinated to the possibility of looking at the picture 
through the wandering internal spectator’s eyes. According to Wollheim, if such internal 
spectator cannot be explicitly represented it is precisely because the picture’s point of 
view could not support his presence, given “the indefinitely many viewing points through 
which he would pass on his wanderings through the represented space”. In fact, Wollheim 
says that, if he was actually represented, his presence would give “the impression of being 
totally arbitrary”. This is what happens, I suppose, with the arbitrary customer appearing 
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in the mirror of Un bar aux Folies Berger (1882)96[Fig.44]. Manet’s indiscreet revelation 
of the figure which should have remained unrepresented happens precisely because, like 
the defocused faces of the King and the Queen in the mirror of Las Meninas, he is the 
privileged spectator (FOUCAULT: 2002, 3-18). But, is there an internal spectator in 
Nighthawks? Is there, in general, a privileged spectator in Hopper’s paintings? 
 
 
[Fig.44.] Edouard Manet Un bar aux Folies Berger, 1882, 96x130cm, Courtauld Gallery, London 
 
 Discussing Wollheim’s theory, Wilder has called attention to some paintings by 
Vermeer —an author often admired for the “photographic quality” of his images. In these 
works, even if the viewpoint from which the scene is painted is conceivable as a spatial 
continuation of the room in which the figure is placed, an obstacle appears —sometimes 
a “fortification” of objects—, so that when “attempting to identify with this point of view, 
we” —the spectator of the picture— “are faced with barriers that allow us to experience 
a poignant and necessary absence”. In his view, these barriers do not exclude “the 
spectator standing before the painting, but a presence now potentially internal to the 
scene”, that is to say, the spectator in the painting (WILDER: 2011, 600-611). I have also 
mentioned in chapter 4 the presence, in some Hopper’s works, of visual barriers that seem 
                                                             
96A lot of critical literature has been written on this painting and its circumstances: see ROSS, N.: 1982, 
CARRIER: 1990, FASCINA: 1994, CLARK: 2003, HOUSE: 2004, FLAM: 2005, and especially 12 views 
on Manet’s Bar (COLLINS: 1996). 
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to block the access of the viewer to the subject of the painting, like the tracks of House 
by the railroad [Fig.15]. I suggested then that, in these cases, what lies on the other side 
of the barrier acquires the condition of the “uncanny”. 
 
 In Nighthawks [Fig.23] there is a barrier or an obstacle. Not only does the distant 
standpoint from which the scene is framed, separate it from the (internal) beholder with 
a long section of pavement: the window here is the main barrier to entering the diner. 
Wollheim invites us to imagine Manet’s internal spectator “who tries, tries hard, tries 
importunately, and fails, to gain the attention of the figure who is represented as there in 
the space”. When this expectation is disappointed, Wollheim continues, we can 
experience “some of the tedium, some of the frustration, some of the sense of rejection, 
that must attend any attempt to establish contact with the represented figure” 
(WOLLHEIM: 1987, 160). 
 
 My suggestion is that the failure of the implicit viewer’s attempts to gain the 
attention of the figure, just as the visual obstacle which blocks the access of the viewer to 
the subject of the painting may not be a casual but a structural feature in modern painting. 
And this structural disappointment has to do with the displacement, in the work of art, 
from the ritual to the exhibition value, this considered as a feature of “realism”, to which 
I referred in the previous chapter (5.2.4. and 5.3.2.), as a result of the loss of authority of 
traditional narratives. 
 
 Balance between fiction and reality acquires a peculiar signification in modern 
art. It has become customary to accept that modern painting differs from what I previously 
called (in Schiller’s words) “the age of naïve poetry” precisely because of its rejection of 
a certain ingenuity. In other words, what once was faced in paintings as realistic, that is 
to say, the appearance of the scenes shown as views of an immediate reality directly 
captured by the artist, has become, in modern times, suspicious of illusionism and 
retouching, in the same sense of the “side-stepping of truth” that Hopper found 
unacceptable compared with the outspokenness of Hemingway’s style. In French 
painting, Manet has been often considered as a privileged paradigm of what Clement 
Greenberg called “frankness” towards the spectator which is typical of modern art 
(GREENBERG: 1993, 86). This frankness has a wide range of meanings: in one of its 
extremes (the one to which Greenberg refers), the question is the formal fact that modern 
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painters openly emphasised the flat surfaces on which they were painting, and in this way 
they highlighted the autonomy of the painted surface (something that Hopper himself 
discreetly practised in his early years, when his French influence was stronger, for 
example, in the expressive brushwork of Railway Train, from 1908). At the other extreme, 
the question is the content of the paintings. In his essay on Manet, Bataille —the thinker 
whom Benjamin confided his manuscripts when he was forced to leave Paris in 1940— 
saw in Olympia [Fig.3] an attempt to break “with the lies that the eloquence had created” 
in the mainstream of the tradition, not only with the illusion of depth (BATAILLE: 1955, 
63). Bataille underlines Manet’s “indifference” in The execution of the Emperor 
Maximilian (1869), accomplished with the same coldness as if he was painting a flower 
or a fish. This exclusion of sentimentalism can be also related productively to Hopper’s 
rejection of “popular prejudices” and “sugar-coated mush” in his appreciation of 
Hemingway’s straightforwardness. And this straightforwardness is, in turn, related to 
Manet’s frankness towards the beholder: Bataille speaks of Manet’s disdain for the 
sentiments convenus and the “multiple conventions” of the preceding period. And Bataille 
gives this gesture the weight of a transgression or even of a “crime”. 
 
 But, somewhere in between these two extremes, the disenchantment of painting 
operated by Manet involves a change in the kind of look that the spectator must address 
to the canvas: Bataille emphasizes that the painter removes Olympia from Olympus and 
returns her to the world of prosaic beings (“au monde des êtres prosaïques”, BATAILLE: 
1955, 63). Manet’s figure is not exactly a Goddess; she is also Victorine Meurent, his 
model. So, his frankness is also expressed in the fact that his characters are no longer to 
be seen only as if they were heroes or goddesses; they can also be seen as if they were 
models posing in the painter’s studio. The painted scene keeps on being fiction, but it is 
also a fiction that reveals itself as such, not wanting to “deceive” the viewer. As we have 
seen, Un bar aux Folies Bergère (1882)[Fig.44] contains a self-declaration of its fictional 
condition in the strange disappearance of the customer reflected in the mirror, who would 
be expected to be in front of the waitress, in the foreground of the picture. Paradoxically, 
this implicit confession that uncovers the painter’s artifice —which a scandalized 
spectator could experience as an extreme optical error—, precisely because it turns off 
the excess of illusion characteristic of the age of the naïve poetry, now is somehow felt as 
an ingredient of artistic realism. Removing Olympia from Olympus is, to a certain extent, 
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depriving her of the aura of divinity still present in Titian’s Venus. And this is in tune with 
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6.2. SPECTATORS AND EXPECTATIONS 
 
 
 Returning to my Benjaminian trajectory, in this section I shall develop an approach 
to the modern gaze to support my suggestion of a structural disappointment of 
expectations as a feature of such a gaze. I shall argue that modern gaze is characterised 
by a photographic or filmic way of seeing, one Benjamin calls “the protective eye”. The 
camera is a symbol (or an allegory) of this gaze, and to my view this is the reason why 
Benjamin states that photography is linked to a general crisis in the structures of 
perception, and also the key of his metaphorical references to a “culture of glass”. As 
streets are filled with the serial spaces of industrial construction, the gaze of the passer-
by is filled with stereotyped images, which are the perceptive strategy that corresponds 
with that new reality. To prepare a final interpretation of Nighthawks [Fig.23], I shall 
distinguish two kinds of protective eye: the camera-like gaze as an embodiment of the 
defensive Erlebnis (subsection 6.2.1.), and the gaze of those who have been trained by 
the dynamics of the city in a new way of being watched without returning the gaze, as if 
they were film actors or photographic models. 
 
 
 6.2.1. A gaze without eyes 
 
 According to Benjamin, inherent to human gaze, no matter what one is looking at, 
there is the expectation that “it will be returned by that on which it is bestowed. Where 
this expectation is met, there is an experience of the aura in all its fullness” (BENJAMIN: 
2006, 338). The expression “no matter what one  is looking at” is quite strange, because 
Benjamin’s sentence makes us think of human relations. But, he continues, an object —
not a person— can also be invested “with the ability to look back at us”. Obviously, he is 
speaking metaphorically, but as he does not make it clear, the reader is introduced in a 
quasi-magical environment. Indeed, his first example of this inhuman aura are ritual 
objects and images. But also the traditional objects of use have aura, the aura of tradition, 
the authority of the experience of many generations through the years, which looks at us 
from such object. But this can also occur, I shall add, in the case of a painting, as when 
we expect a returning gaze from Manet’s waitress. 
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 Anyway, considering the problem from the standpoint of modern societies, it 
could be said that every industrially produced object lacks “eyes” with which to look at 
us. And there is one of these objects in which this inability to look back is especially 
relevant, because it appears often named —and perceived— as an “eye”: the photographic 
or filmic camera. The first men who looked at the camera in the nineteenth century 
confronted it, unavoidably, with the expectation of the return of their gazes by the 
mechanical eye. But the camera never looks back at us (hence the impression that it 
“sucks” or “swallows” our gaze): it registers our look without experiencing it (the words 
“sensibility” or “impression”, when applied to technology, lose their subjective meaning 
and describe only mechanical processes). This fact, says Benjamin, had to be felt as 
“inhuman” or “deadly” by the first ones to be exposed to it. The “inhuman” is the way in 
which, as I suggested above, the camera reduces or eliminates the moral and the 
aesthetical remoteness in which the aura consists. 
 
 This “inhumanity” of the camera is widely explained by Benjamin in the essay on 
reproducibility with the metaphor I have already mentioned, which approaches the action 
of the painter to the one of the magician, and the action of the cameraman to the one of 
the surgeon (BENJAMIN: 2002, 115). The painter, says Benjamin, maintains “the natural 
distance” with the model whose aura is trying to translate to the canvas, and even when 
he approaches to observe a detail, the distance is maintained “by virtue of his authority”. 
His picture is intended to symbolize the spiritual unity of the model in the portrait’s gaze. 
In contrast, the cameraman “greatly diminishes the distance” because he does not look at 
the model (he “abstains from facing him man to man”): like the surgeon, he penetrates 
him, fragments his image in different shots as in a post-mortem dissection, and after that 
he assembles these pieces to construct of a new reality which, as the bad infinity, is made 
of finite frames whose aspect of continuity is, like the one of Hume’s burning coal, the 
illusion produced by a motion which goes faster than human eyes. 
 
 After stating that “photography is decisively implicated in the phenomenon of a 
‘decline of the aura’” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 338), Benjamin frequently speaks as if the lack 
of aura was the main feature of certain kind of objects: those which the camera has 
captured, turning them into reproducible images. But, despite the hypnotical power of 
Benjamin’s prose, the idea that the camera “absorbs” or “destroys” the aura of paintings, 
landscapes or human faces is only a very appealing metaphor, constantly repeated in the 
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studies on Benjamin, but it cannot be taken literally. Let us say that, if the reproducible 
images can “reign over vision”, as suggested by Deleuze’s (See chapter 4, 4.1.4.), and if 
they can replace the visual Erfahrung with the optical Erlebnis, it is because the camera 
does not affect objects, but rather the way these objects are perceived or, in other words, 
the camera affects the modern gaze. Benjamin himself says that “The crisis of artistic 
reproduction that emerges in this way can be seen as an integral part of a crisis in 
perception itself ” (BENJAMIN:2006, 338). When speaking about the modern individual 
who moves through the traffic, Benjamin mentioned the “technological training” needed 
to successfully survive this new environment. I would say that, in the visual realm, a gaze 
can lose its remoteness, its depth, by means of technological training: the training of the 
camera-like inquiry which produces the self-protective eye can only be acquired by a 
widespread adoption of a photographic way of seeing which does not “profane” 
remoteness as the transgression of a ritual, it simply becomes blind to the phenomenon of 
the aura. 
 
 And this is the profound reason for the affirmation that the “objects made of glass 
have no aura”. Certainly, in this context Benjamin refers to buildings, but he adds that the 
architects of these buildings “have created rooms in which it is hard to leave traces” 
(BENJAMIN: 1996-7, 734), as seems to happen in the diner in Nighthawks’, completely 
wrapped in a glass. 
 
 Let us say that, if diners are —among many other modern spaces— the urban 
incarnation of Erlebnis, the inhuman eye of the camera is its appropriate visual reception, 
that is to say, the right way to visually perceive the new mechanical reality of the 
industrially produced and reproduced space and time. One cannot look at a technological 
reproduction in the same way one looks at something natural or original. There is, as 
Benjamin says, a change in the frame and the conditions of experience. So, the visual 
equivalent of the abstract “schemes” or “concepts” underlying the serial spaces like the 
diners, is the cliché or the stereotype. What is, then, a stereotype or a cliché? It is an image 
specially charged with exhibition value. That is to say, an image that, as Marx stated in 
1858 talking about money, has the same status than the electric spark97: it does not 
                                                             
97“It circulated not because it was worn, but it was worn to a symbol because it continued to circulate (…) 
it never appears as exchange value in a state of rest or even a commodity in a state of rest. The reality which 
in this process the exchange value of commodities assumes, and which is expressed by gold in circulation, 
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circulate because of its value, but it is valued precisely because it circulates, because of 
its potential reproducibility. 
 
 Benjamin says that glass is the worst enemy of secrets, but the secret is exactly 
what is retained in the eyes of the character portrayed by the painter to which I referred 
above. I would say that the meaning of this reference to “glass culture” is not completely 
intelligible if we do not assume its metaphorical charge: the protective shell of the 
Erlebnis, so often alluded by Benjamin, can be imagined as if made of glass because its 
vision can be imagined as if safeguarded by the glass of the camera’s lens, as an allegory 
of the photographic way of seeing. In this context Benjamin cites those lines from 
Brecht’s poem: 
 
The man who hasn't signed anything, 
who left no picture, 
Who was not there, who said nothing: 
How can they catch him? 
Erase the traces. (BRECHT: 1987, 31)98 
 
 
 But, although he associates these words with “the detective novel”, they can be 
perfectly applied to the cameraman: in the ideal self-image of photography, he has not 
signed anything, he is deprived of the authority of the painter, he was not there, he said 
nothing, all the work is done by the camera, he has not experienced anything, he is nobody 
(how can they catch him?). In the same sense that the surgeon’s hands —protected by 
“glass” gloves— , his eyes leave no traces when penetrating things with the camera. 
Benjamin compares the protective eye with the gaze of a wild animal, always vigilant of 
its immediate surroundings, searching at the same time for the signals of a possible prey 
and ones of a possible predator; so acts the eye of the city passer-by, who tries to avoid 
risks and to grasp opportunities, and also the one of the factory worker on the conveyor 
belt. 
  
                                                             
is merely the reality of an electric spark. Although it is real gold, it functions merely as apparent gold, and 
in this function therefore a token of itself can be substituted for it” (MARX: 2010, 349). 
98Benjamin quotes Brecht’s poem to enforce this idea of a glass-culture. But it is noticeable that, while he 
celebrates the arrival of such culture without secrets, Brecht’s poem is not, on the contrary, so enthusiast: 
he tells the story of a man who, after entering the city, does not recognize neither his friends when they 
knock at the door nor his parents when he meets them in the street, a man who disowns his words and dies 
without a gravestone. In Brecht’s poem there is no sign of the attitude of celebration of this traceless 
biography which seems evident in Benjamin’s comment. 
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 6.2.2. Eyes without a gaze 
 
 Barter suggests a comparison between the gaze of the waitress in Manet’s Un bar 
aux Folies Bergère and the gaze of the waiter in Nighthawks (BARTER, 2007-1, 198). 
The comparison is opportune given Hopper’s interest in nineteenth-century French 
painting (in 1962 he affirmed: “I think I’m still an Impressionist”, LEVIN: 1980, 2699). 
It is also plausible because, in both cases, we find blank stares or empty eyes. However, 
in my view, although both characters have the same position, there is a substantial 
difference between them: Hopper’s waiter is watching, even if one cannot say what is he 
looking at; Manet’s waitress, on the contrary, is being watched by the client in front of 
her, but she is not looking at him. 
 
 In Hopper’s works, we can find a “waiting-and-searching” eye in the women of 
East side interior (1920) [Fig.45], Tables for ladies (1930) or Cape Cod Morning (1950) 
[Fig.35] and in the men of Two on the aisle (1927), Hotel by a Railroad (1952) [Fig.53], 
Office in a small city (1953[Fig.71]) or Sunlight in a cafeteria (1958) [Fig.46]. The 
waiter’s gaze in Nighthawks [Fig.23] also belongs to this kind of “protective eye”. It is 
also the gaze of the traveller looking through a train’s window and attempting to 
reconstruct a totality out of the fleeting images in such a frame, avoiding the “shocks” 
that fragment the landscape. 
 
  
                                                             
99The affirmation is more important than it might appear. Although Hopper often uses Romantic, Goethian 
or expressionist metaphors to define his conception of art, the indelible mark of Impressionism appears in 
his intention to stay true to the visual impression: “I am a realist, and I react to natural phenomena” (KUH: 
2000, 139). Benjamin’s comparison of the painter and the magician refers to the long tradition of symbolism 
in art, in which the act of painting is thought as expression of the spiritual unity of the model. Hopper seems 
to be very far from this tradition. Even if he uses sometimes this traditional language, he neither behaves 
with his models with the authority of the magician nor do his human figures suggest spiritual unity (on the 
contrary, it is usually assumed that they express alienation). 
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 [Fig.46] Edward Hopper, Sunlight in a cafeteria, 1958, 102.1x153.7cm, Yale University Art 
Gallery 
  
 But this is not the gaze of the waitress in Manet’s Un bar aux Folies Bergère. 
[Fig.44]. Among others, Wollheim has noticed that in Manet’s painting we often find 
“figures who, at the moment at which we see them, are turned upon themselves by some 
powerful troubling thought: they are figures who are temporarily preoccupied, figures 
who have retained and cherish, who cosset a secret, to which their thoughts are now 
reverted. A moment later and the mood may dissipate, but, until it does, they are absent 
from the world” (WOLLHEIM: 1987, 141). This awareness of being watched without 
returning the gaze is also present in many of Hopper’s works, predominantly in female 
characters; it is the case of the women appearing in Automat (1927)[Fig.47], Hotel room 
(1931)[Fig.48], Room in New York (1940)[Fig.41], Girlie Show (1941)[Fig.61], Summer 
evening (1947)[Fig.62], Hotel Window (1955), Sunlight in cafeteria (1958)[Fig.46], New 
York Office (1962)[Fig.38] or Intermission (1963)[Fig.54], but also of the men in Sunday 
(1926)[Fig.63] or Hotel Lobby (1943)[Fig.65]. And this is also the case in the “couple” 
in Nighthawks [Fig.23]. 




[Fig. 47] Edward Hopper, Automat, 1927, 71.4x91.4cm, Des Moines Art Center, Des Moines 
 
 
[Fig.48] Edward Hopper, Hotel Room, 1931, 152.4x165.7cm, Museo Nacional Thyssen-
Bornemisza, Madrid 
  




 I have signalled that Benjamin reminds us that the first men who looked at a 
camera did not meet their expectations of a returning of the gaze. But in the same way 
that the eyes of the city dwellers were trained to look at the world as if they were looking 
at a photograph or a film, they also learnt to be watched by others as if they were being 
filmed or photographed by a mechanical device. This apprenticeship is the reason for the 
advent of a new kind of cultural eye which is, to some extent, the complementary of the 
protective eye. An eye appearing completely unprotected —deprived of remoteness and, 
therefore, without depth and without gaze— which represents the inverted image of ritual 
situations. If the experience of the aura is the one of a gaze received beyond our 
expectations (because it comes from an object without human eyes), the experience of its 
decline occurs if the expectation is not met when we look at a human being. Benjamin 
gives many examples from Baudelaire’s verses in which human eyes appear to have lost 
their ability to look. Even when these eyes look at us, they do it with “mirror-like 
blankness”, showing only “the more complete viewer’s absence” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
340), as happens in the second group of Hopper’s paintings I have just mentioned, and 
specifically in the gazes of the man and the woman together by the counter in Nighthawks 
[Fig.23]. This experience of empty eyes makes us think of the dynamics of the city crowd, 
the relations of spatial proximity without community, like the anonymity of the 
passengers of the public means of transportation (buses, railroads and trams), who found 
themselves for the first time, in the nineteenth century, in “situations where they had to 
look at one another for long minutes or even hours without speaking to one another”, as 
Simmel notes in a quotation cited by Benjamin (BENJAMIN: 2006, 341). And a masterly 
illustration of the situations alluded to by Simmel can be found in Walker Evans’ subway 
portraits, where the blank look in the faces of passengers strongly reminds the attitude of 
the clients of Nighthawks’ diner [Figs. 49-50]. 
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[Figs. 49-50] Walker Evans, 1941, Subway portraits, Gelatine Silver Prints, 17,6 x 19,1 cm., MoMa 
Collection.     
 
  But there is a charm in these eyes which know nothing of remoteness — 
Baudelaire has “yielded to the spell of eyes-without-a-gaze”, says Benjamin. It is not 
exactly the charm of beauty, although its “dullness” could be one of beauty’s adornments 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 340), as in the impression of indolence, lethargy, laziness or 
indifference in female figures of beauty in the tradition of painting. However, in this case 
the spell “detaches itself from Eros” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 339). And this is also the strange 
beauty we find in the empty eyes of so many of Hopper’s figures. The appeal of this body 
without an owner, or these eyes without a gaze, constitutes the properly modern 













 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
213 
 
6.4.  AN EXTENDED HYPOTHESIS ON NIGHTHAWKS 
 
 
 The argument so far enables an answer to the question about the lack of aura of 
Hopper’s models or actors: this lack would not be possible if they were theatre actors, but 
only if they are film actors. Barter says that, rather than people caught in the middle of an 
action, Nighthawks’ characters are like actors in a film set, who are waiting for the take 
to start (BARTER: 2007-1, 198). I profoundly agree with this observation, but to me it 
acquires a deeper meaning if we add Benjamin’s remark that in the film studio, “the aura 
that envelops the actor vanishes, and with it the aura of the figure he portrays” 
(BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 112). In the shooting process, the actor is still not the character of 
his role; the role and the character will be constructed, if ever, during the process of 
editing. Like the inhuman eye which looks at him, the actor is, for the moment, no-one. 
His personality is absent from his body just as the viewer is absent from the “mirror-like” 
eyes. He does not look at the camera —it would break the spell of the fiction—, he does 
not oppose a gaze which would create an unapproachable gap. On the contrary, the camera 
can shorten the distance to him as necessary, as the forensic photographer does with the 
corpse, in successive shots which are not the successive chapters of the story that will be 
seen on the screen, and whose final location in the finished film, if they are not discarded, 
could be separated by many other images in the timeline. By this apathy, “glances may 
be all the more compelling, the more complete the viewer’s absence that is overcome in 
them” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 340). 
 
 
The stage actor identifies himself with a role. The film actor very often is denied this 
opportunity. His performance is by no means a unified whole, but is assembled from 
many individual performances (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 112). 
 
 
 In other words, the uncertainty about the identity of Hopper’s characters is not a 
subjective impression of the viewer: they actually do not know yet who they are, which 
role will they play in the story or what the development of the plot will be. 
 
 Furthermore, the affinity between Hopper’s scenes and cinema —not only the 
sudden image in the window of a moving car, but rather the separated frame of a film 
roll— could also help us to understand the lack of continuity of the space of the painting 
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with regard to the perceptual place of the viewer. In a theatre, the stage is located in the 
same space as the viewer, and this makes it very important to have a good seat from which 
to watch the action. And, although the spectators are not involved in the play, they occupy 
the same room, and interaction is always possible (for example, through applause or 
barracking, or if an unexpected accident happens in the hall). In a cinema, on the contrary, 
the space of the screen and the space where the viewers are seated are not continuous or 
congruent, not even in terms of scale. The screen (an island of light in the dark room 
where the audience seats) is equally visible for all the viewers, everything is on the surface 
and the standpoint loses relevance: the light does not come from above, as in the theatre, 
but from inside the screen, in the same way that the light, in Nighthawks [Fig.23], comes 
from inside the diner. The screen operates here as the fourth wall. Every detail can be 
brought to the foreground by means of the close-up. And this shortening of distances 
avoids the relevance of a “privileged spectator”. Benjamin refers to this circumstance 
when he says that modern times have abolished “correct distancing” and that it is no 
longer possible to take a standpoint by means of perspective and prospects: “Now things 
press too closely on human society” (BENJAMIN:1996-5, 476). 
 
 Moreover, this could also supply an answer to the first question I posed before: 
‘why the crowd is almost always absent from Hopper’s oils, if his characters are so often 
representatives of this modern crowd?’. When the film actor “stands before the 
apparatus”, says Benjamin, “he knows that in the end he is confronting the masses. It is 
they who will control him. Those who are not visible, not present while he executes his 
performance, are precisely the ones who will control it. This invisibility heightens the 
authority of their control” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 113). According to Benjamin, the crowd 
was never represented in Baudelaire’s work because he was always inside it, so he could 
not reach the distance necessary to watch it from outside. In the same way, it could be 
said that the crowd, rarely present in Hopper’s paintings, is implicitly included in them. 
His characters, seemingly lonely and isolated, are like actors in a film set under the 
watchful eye of the crowd, which is not literally present in the studio but it is implicitly 
felt as the destiny of the shooting process, when the images were confronted with the 
darkness of the cinema’s seating area. And let us notice that, although the street of the 
Nighthawks’ diner seems to be illuminated when watched from outside —almost as in the 
“day for night” cinematographic technique—, for the figures inside it, bathed in the 
powerful artificial light, it will appear to be in the dead of night. 




 The painting offers a general shot of the diner, but the building cannot be ‘entered’ 
by an imaginary mobile spectator. This last is strongly underlined by the glass window, 
which allows us to watch the whole scene, but prevents us from “touching” the interior 
(glass surfaces, as Benjamin says, exclude footprints), and even more by the fact that we 
cannot distinguish any entrance, as if it was a “sealed space” withdrawn from its 
surroundings, as we have also observed in House by the railroad [Fig.15]. The space 
displayed on the screen is, for the viewer, impenetrable: this viewer cannot interact at all 
with those actors who are not present, and can only see —in a privileged sense—, but 
cannot “touch” the movie, which is absolutely separated off, just as the scene of 
Nighthawks is isolated from the viewer by the huge glass window. An interesting factor 
in this isolation has been noted by Wells: the glass window also implies a sense of absence 
of speech or sound. Even if there was anything which could produce any sound, like a 
jukebox, the window would make it inaudible (WELLS: 2008, 213). I shall add that 
silence —one of the elements that differentiates Hopper's art from other American realist 
painters— is exactly what is required in a film set during a take: the place where the action 
happens becomes impenetrable and subjected to silence while the camera is filming. In 
the same way that events in Hopper’s paintings seem to be on standby, so does the diner. 
It becomes an “island of light” in the middle of a dark and empty street. It immediately 
attracts our attention and focuses it on what is happening inside, and at the same time it 
shadows the rest of the elements outside the building, as occurs in a film set while the 
camera is filming. 
 
 So, I am suggesting a substantive extension of the hypothesis presented in chapter 
4, deepening the idea that the modern gaze is the object of Hopper’s painting. 
Reformulating it in the terms that I have just borrowed from Wollheim, I would say that, 
if there is an internal spectator in Hopper’s Nighthawks [Fig.23], such a spectator is 
imagined as a metaphorical camera, that is to say, as a protective eye or a gaze without 
eyes. I am aware that it is a radical hypothesis, and that it exposes itself to some critical 
objections. Why not say, for example, that the scene in Nighthawks [Fig.23] is the 
“fixation” of a brief view seen from a moving car across the street? This would explain a 
part of its mystery: the driver has a momentary global perspective of the diner and its 
occupants, but is unable to know what will happen after that. In this case, the image does 
remain suspended or frozen for a moment before the driver’s eyes. In other words, it is 
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impossible to know what the next film frame will be, because in the next moment the 
scene will have vanished from the car window. What is gained with the hypothesis just 
advanced? In the case of my interpretation of House by the railroad [Fig.15], I underlined 
that I was not suggesting that the building is painted from a train, but that it is painted as 
it might be seen through the train window. Now —to qualify the radicalness of my 
choice—, I have to emphasise that, although for the sake of argument I sometimes put it 
in such terms, I am not arguing that Hopper paints a photographic or filmic reproduction 
of a diner, but that he paints the diner as it is observed by the protective eye whose 
privileged allegory is the camera. Retaining this imaginative or metaphorical sense is my 
way of remaining in the realm of the “as if ” and the reason for the formulation of my 
approach in Wollheimian terms (as if Hopper’s internal spectator was the camera). 
Furthermore, my aim is not to reduce Hopper’s painting to a camera-like vision of the 
city, but, on the contrary, to argue that the fact of painting (not reproducing) this 
“inhuman” gaze makes it accessible to experience and, therefore, in a certain sense it 
humanizes such vision. Certainly, I cannot present evidence to support this interpretation, 
beyond the fact that it is able to exclude the social or psychological readings I have 
criticized above, and that it provides “distinctive access” to the painting. 
 
  For example, it allows to explain more adequately the uncanniness of what, in 
Hopper’s paintings, is located beyond the barriers (in Nighthawks, beyond the glass 
window): the position of the spectator in the painting is excluded (or challenged), not in 
the sense that there is no internal spectator at all, but because the internal spectator is the 
inhuman gaze of the camera: nobody (“The man who hasn't signed anything, who left no 
picture, who was not there, who said nothing”) is looking. Or, in other words, anybody 
— not a privileged spectator, but anybody who is able to peer through the camera’s 
viewfinder “window”— can look. And this does not only affect those who watch, but also 
those who are watched. Included in my hypothesis is that it is possible to gain a better 
understanding of Hopper’s painting if we imagine the characters of the scene as if they 
were film actors in the studio during a shooting session. 
 
 If so, this would impede them from returning the gaze to the internal spectator 
(that is to say, to the camera): as I said before, this would break the spell of the fiction. 
The camera can wander around the diner, shooting from any angle as a “total spectator”; 
it can zoom in and out on the characters, and the seeming spatial incongruences will not 
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be the effect of the different perspectives, but of the different takes in the filming process. 
However, the mechanical gaze cannot go beyond the glass of the window —i.e., through 
the glass of the lens—, which is the protective shell of Erlebnis. The glass is the worst 
enemy of secrets and crusher of aura. The camera’s eye does not expect a returning gaze 
—it avoids such return. But the point is that we (the external spectator) do. And the fact 
that our expectation is disappointed (giving place to the tedium, the frustration and the 
sense of rejection mentioned by Wollheim) is what provokes the fanciful projection of 
possible plots or denouements of the scene (which would count, so to speak, as a returning 
of the gaze of the characters). All of them are, so to speak, the attempts of the spectator 
to attract the attention —the gaze— of the characters in the glass cell. And all of them fall 
apart one after the other as we study the painting. The reason is that, for Hopper, such a 
happy end would be a “trick ending”. The camera’s eye shows us a scene without aura. 
The painter’s eye, when painting this “inhuman” gaze, shows us the lack of aura of the 
scene. The difference between both operations could seem a small variance, but it 
contains the secret of Hopper’s painting. The protective eye of the camera-like gaze 
surrounds the diner in a glass cell; but I argued in chapter 2 (2.3.2.) that the painter’s eye 
cannot be a protective one. Painting breaks the protective shell of the diner provoking the 
sombre mood emanating from Hopper’s scene. 
 
 Whatever is the case in Manet’s paintings, in the case of Hopper’s internal 
spectator, the fact that the characters do not return the gaze to the camera does not mean 
that they do not pay attention to it. On the contrary, the empty eyes and the lost or 
distracted gaze are precisely the way in which the actors show their attentive awareness 
of its presence, in the same sense that the distracted glances or the simulated reading are 
a protective response to the urban public spaces shared with strangers, typical of passers-
by in the city streets, passengers of collective transports and casual clients of hotels or 
diners. The gaze of those who look as if they were nobody, and the one of those who are 
watched as if nobody was watching them, are the two halves of technologically 
reproduced images and also of the urban modern experience: “the characteristics of the 
film lie not only in the manner in which man presents himself to mechanical equipment 
but also in the manner in which, by means of this apparatus, man can represent his 
environment” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 114). Hopper’s painting is realistic, but not because 
it depicts an immediate reality, but because such immediate reality is no longer accessible 
but through the reproductive mechanism. When people get used to representing their 
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environment by means of this apparatus and photography becomes “the standard 
evidence” for real facts, “because of the thoroughgoing permeation of reality with 
mechanical equipment (…) The equipmentfree aspect of reality here has become the 
height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of 
technology” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 112). That is the reason why Hopper needs an “inner 
cinema” to paint “realistically” reproducible reality. 
 
 The empty gazes here are not only a feature of film actors, but also a trait of urban 
anonymity. And, as Benjamin speaks about a charm of these empty eyes, also it must also 
be underlined that the anonymity of urban life cannot be thought only in negative terms 
linked to anxiety or alienation, or perhaps it would better to say that alienation may not 
be such an evil thing. Anonymity in a big modern city has a lot of advantages. First of all, 
the opportunity to be a stranger in spite of physical closeness, without the need to reveal 
anything to each other, without sharing the same experience. Notwithstanding my 
previous comments, I agree with Theisen when, reflecting on Nighthawks [Fig.23], he 
writes: “Anonymity itself becomes a kind of sanctuary. We no longer worry about 
retaining the sense of personal identity, the connections, the ties that a mechanized all too 
mobile society undermines. In fact, we discover a dizzying freedom upon letting it all go. 
Just as we have no idea who the man with his back to us is, no one has any idea who we 
are, what we may or may not be capable of, as we sit there at the counter, sipping our 
coffee. We might be anyone” (THEISEN: 2006, 44-48). 
 
 This is perhaps a keynote in the development of American individualism, which 
includes the opportunity of becoming anybody and “starting from zero” at any time. As 
Richard Sennett says, modern democracy demands that citizens learn to live with 
strangers and as strangers. He recalls Simmel’s statement that “the urbanite is a stranger”. 
And he focuses on New York by 1900, “the complex world of immigrants on the Lower 
East Side squeezing hard south against Wall Street, north against the bourgeois, WASP 
residential neighbourhood around Washington Square”, where Hopper lived most of the 
time. 
 
 Evoking Simmel’s writings, Sennett adds that “in crowded streets and squares, the 
freedom of strangeness, the freedom of alterity, played itself out. In public, the urbanite 
dons an impassive mask, acts cool and indifferent to others in the street”; and he also 
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notes that some American disciples of Simmel depict the city “as a mosaic of different 
roles in different places”, which he associates with Baudelaire’s flâneur (SENNET: 2008, 
114-117). The charm that Benjamin links to the “eyes without a gaze”, which I previously 
described as the properly modern experience of the aura, is perhaps the aesthetic side of 
this political and ethical freedom. Like the signatories of Hobbes social contract (evoked 
by Mumford’s and Melville’s identification of “Americans” with the members of a naked 
humanity), the characters in Nighthawks have nothing in common, that is to say, nothing 
─the nothingness that Baudelaire experiences in his poem Le gout du néant, the emptiness 
of modern time─ is precisely what they have in common: the experience of their 
inexperience, the experience of nothingness. 
 
 However, as I said concerning the impoverishment of Erfahrung, the vanishing of 
the aura cannot be thought of as a punctual event or a historic fact that happened at a 
given moment. Concluding his portrait of Baudelaire, Benjamin says that the poet has 
“named the price for which the sensation of modernity could be had: the disintegration of 
the aura in the Chockerlebnis” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 343). But this conclusion should not 
be interpreted, I suggest, as meaning that Baudelaire disintegrated aura to write his verses, 
as Nero set Rome on fire in order to play his lyre. From the point of view that I have 
adopted in this thesis, what Benjamin calls “the sensation of modernity” is the perceptual 
incarnation of the new cultural conditions created by technological and political 
revolutions. And if the question is the possibility of art in modernity, my answer would 
be that aura or remoteness cannot be experienced in the modern world but in the moment 
of its vanishing or, in other words, as what is disappearing from the image. Modern eyes 
can only perceive the aura in its decline, and remoteness when it is ready to fade. In The 
work of art in the age of its technological reproducibility, Benjamin suggests that, in a 
coming future, this decline or this fading could no longer be perceived, and that it will be 
the signal of the extinction of modernity and of the absolute impossibility of the modern 
artwork. But, for the time being, I would not say that Baudelaire was the last poet who 
saw the aura (at the cost of its collapse), but one of the first who discovered the way to 
fairly experience it in a time precisely characterized by its vanishing. Everything that, in 
the legend of his life, makes him appear as a hero or as a martyr, has become, thanks to 
him (if not only him), the professional ethos of a not particularly heroic standardized job, 
the job of the artist (BOURDIEU:1996, 270-274). This experience of the vanishing of the 
aura is not only, as Benjamin says, the law of Baudelaire’s poetry (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
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343). It is the law of modern poetry. To sum up, the disintegration of the aura does not 
mean its complete elimination or a radical abolition of remoteness, but a poetic experience 
of its vanishing, of its presence in the form of elopement, perhaps its uniquely suitable 
appearance, at least for the inhabitants of modernity. 
 
 
&         &         & 
 
 
 My extended hypothesis about Nighthawks’ gives an account of its cultual 
impoverishment or, in other words, of the predominance of the exhibition value in it. But, 
according to my understanding of Hopper’s realism, it should also have a certain dose of 
cult value, which would derive from the fact that he paints reproducibility. Besides what 
it does show, what does it tell? Of course, there is no explicit revelation, but, is there a 
secret? If, as I am advocating, the dimension of “telling” relates to what Wollheim calls 
the repertoire of affections of the internal spectator, what are in this case such affections? 
Most commentators argue that Hopper’s paintings have an intense emotional charge, but 
are unable to describe these emotions in any detail. If this specificity is difficult to provide 
it is because what I have called Hopper’s internal spectator is frustrated by the absence of 
an essential thing that Wollheim requires from him: “The spectator in the picture”, says 
Wollheim, “need not to be a particular person (…) But (…) what he must be is a person. 
He must be a perceiving, thinking, feeling, acting, creature. What he cannot be is a mere 
disembodied eye” (WOLLHEIM: 1987, 130). The lens of the camera, which is the only 
kind of imagined spectatorship available in Nighthawks is exactly that: a disembodied 
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PART IV: HOPPER’S TIMES 
 
  
My aim in this last Part, consisting of two chapters, is to explore the consequences 
of the hypothesis of the camera as an internal spectator in Hopper’s paintings. As I have 
suggested, this involves a reconsideration of the widely discussed question of the affective 
mood underlying such paintings. Throughout these two chapters, I shall focus on two 
different paintings: Morning sun, [Fig.51] painted in 1952, and Sunday [Fig. 63], painted 
in 1926, during an early stage of artistic maturity. The temporal gap of almost three 
decades between the two paintings will help me to show the continuity in Hopper’s style 
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CHAPTER 7. THE FADING OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 In treatments of the emotional charge of Morning sun [Fig.51] , but also of other 
Hopper paintings where more than one figure is depicted, the most frequent term invoked 
is, doubtless, loneliness. I will show in the first section (7.1. “Critical readings of Morning 
sun”) that comments on emotional bleakness, isolation and sadness are the norm. 
However, Hopper himself opposes this reading, which he considers as an unnecessary 
psychological “addition” by the viewer to something that he insistently describes as the 
effect of light on a surface (the surface of a wall, but also the skin of a body, where light 
turns into value and colour). And Hopper himself said that this might mean that, as a 
painter, he was not very human —which is probably not solely an ironic comment. “Not 
very human”, in a certain sense, might describe the places resulting from the technological 
fragmentation of space. In 7.2 (“On news items”), I shall discuss the perceptive 
management of those spaces, which requires a relevant fragmentation of experience, 
exemplarily achieved by new means of expression: journalism, photography or film. 
These means share the attempt to eliminate the presence of an involved participant (the 
internal spectator or the storyteller) in favour of the cold objectivity of the machine. This 
is connected with the experience of space and with the blockage of narration in Hopper’s 
works (7.3., “Perception and narration in Hopper”). I will call the kind of space 
represented in Hopper’s canvases, which I began to highlight in the fourth Chapter, the 
space of any-place-whatever, defined by the dynamics of the no longer… not yet…, that 
is to say, transience and temporariness. And these same dynamics dominate the 
experience of time corresponding to such temporariness: the any-instant-whatever 
strongly associated with the filmic image. This context implies a challenge for modern 
art, especially if it aims to preserve a commitment to realism. On one hand, art cannot 
simply reject the new experience, seeking shelter in an outdated image of the world. On 
the other, painting or literature cannot be reduced to journalism, film or photography (i.e., 
means of reproduction of the new reality). Translated into the question of the affective 
element of painting, this challenge is expressed in the fact that, when the traditional 
narratives lose their social significance, the emotional charge associated with them also 
tends to disappear. So, which feelings are to be associated with the new experience of 
space? This is the background against which I shall explore the possibility of another kind 
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of reading of Morning sun [Fig.51], returning to the hypothesis tested in chapters 4 and 6 
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[Fig.51] Edward Hopper, Morning Sun, 1952, 101.98x 71.5, Columbus Museum of Art, Columbus, 
OH, US 
 
 Morning sun [Fig.51] is the next to last example of one of the most common 
subjects in Hopper's oeuvre: women standing or sitting by a window (A woman in the sun 


















[Fig.52] Edward Hopper, A woman in the sun, 1961, 101.9x152.9cm, Whitney Museum of 
American Art, New York 
  
In the centre of Hopper’s composition, we can see a woman wearing a short pink slip 
sitting on a bed, her hands around her bare legs, pulled up to her chest, with her red hair 
tucked back on her head in a bun. Renner defines her heavily made-up face as almost 
rigid or as an expressionless mask (RENNER: 1991, 59). She sits on the bed, facing the 
window. Her visible right eye appears sightless, which prevents us from adopting the 
common assumption that she is looking out of the window. The woman is bathed by the 
sun —or according to Strand, sculpted by it (STRAND: 2008, 68)—, and the cold light 
seems to wash out the colour intensity of the dress, whose tones also seem to be cooled 
down by the sunlight covering the pale skin of the woman. Wells signals that shadow has 
been overstated by Hopper, especially in the shoulder as well as in the underside of the 
chin (WELLS: 2008, 95). Although, as Souter writes, “the woman is less important that 
the light that strikes her” (SOUTER: 2012, 234), it is usually assumed that the figure is 
included to capture a mood or suggest a psychological effect. So, we come again to the 
question of the repertoire of affections associated with the represented figure. In this case, 
like in almost every Hopper’s painting, the main feeling mentioned by the critics is 
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 7.1.1.The loneliness thing 
 
 Although what Hopper said about it is that “the loneliness thing is overdone” (O’ 
DOHERTY: 1964, 72), it is commonly accepted as the main subject of his paintings. 
Linda Nochlin suggests that “emotional or existential bleakness” is always “proposed by 
the single figures” in Hopper’s paintings, as in Morning sun [Fig.51]. As I have stated 
above, this argument can also be found in essays about paintings such as Nighthawks 
[Fig.23], where multiple figures appear. What these paintings bring to light is the absence 
of an exchange between the characters (as happens in Sunlight in a Cafeteria [Fig.46] or 
Sunlight on Brownstones, 1956). And loneliness is often inferred from this absence. In 
fact, Nochlin adds that not even “the presence of the couple offers an alternative (…) On 
the contrary, the very proximity of man and woman seems to suggest even greater 
isolation, a more unbridgeable gap or lack of communication” (NOCHLIN: 1981, 138). 
Even when there are reasons to think that there is a close social or affective proximity 
between the figures (as in Hotel by a Railroad, 1952 [Fig.53], Excursion into Philosophy, 
1959 or Summer in the city, 1950), it is suggested that it has been interrupted (Wells 
argues that, in Hotel by a railroad [Fig.53], the man who looks through the window is 
actually considering suicide, WELLS: 2008, 95). 
 
[Fig.53] Edward Hopper, Hotel by a railroad, 1952, 101.9 x 79.37, Hirshorn museum and 
sculpture garden, Smithsonian museum 
 




 Theraux described the “melancholic loneliness” of Hopper's paintings as an 
“almost unbearable sadness, as if joy's highest refinement was born on a needlepoint of 
pain” (THERAUX, apud ENGEL: 1990, 211). Fryd, from a psychoanalytical point of 
view, understands Hopper’s figures as victims of a traumatic loss, suggesting that 
Hopper's empty rooms could represent “the womb in which the subject (...) is returned to 
the body of the mother” (FRYD: 2003, 61), as if they were memories from intrauterine 
life before birth. Schmied suggests that the woman in Morning sun [Fig.51] seems to be 
looking, as if hypnotized, her gaze “musingly out the window as if wondering whether 
this might be the first day in a new life” (SCHMIED:1995, 74). In this line of 
transcendental readings of Morning sun [Fig.51], Wells doubts whether the light that 
bathes the woman reveals a feeling of hope or despair, and, in this last option, he states 
that the “hardly gratuitous” green tone of the external window frame could symbolize a 
private traffic light indicating to the figure that is time to leave (WELLS: 2008, 95), 
without really giving any explanation as to where this assumption comes from and why 
should the woman should  be full of hope or deep in despair (since she does not look 
especially happy or sad to be bathed by the light). And Reiss, referring in general to 
Hopper’s figures, finds them immersed in “desolate moments of silence (...) in their 
lonely, almost catatonic stillness” (REISS: 1973, 85). 
 
 But, are all these interpretations justified in Hopper’s paintings? As I signalled 
before, I should not say that they are wrong, but I do think they are unsatisfactory. For 
example, why does the mere fact of facing a single figure seems to be enough to suggest 
“emotional bleakness”? Must every single figure without company be emotionally 
disconsolate? Are there no easier ways (or at least not desperate ones) of being alone 
(especially when it comes to Hopper, who was a reader of those thinkers who, as Emerson 
or Thoreau, had strong conceptions of individual autonomy and considered that a certain 
degree of isolation was a virtue rather than privation)? To what extent can one talk about 
a feeling of loneliness, or even about the expectations of the figure in Morning sun 
[Fig.51]? Contrary to what happens with the woman in Cape Cod Morning (1950) 
[Fig.35], the one in Morning Sun [Fig.51] does not seem to be expectant; she does not 
lean towards the sun. So, what is this assumption based on? Why should it be supposed, 
without hesitation, that since the woman’s gaze is —so to speak— far away, as Wells 
states, she has nowhere to go, no liaison to keep, and “she is profoundly alone” (WELLS: 
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2008, 95)? Could it not be stated that the female figure is instead “profoundly happy” in 
her privacy? 
 
 One can assume, for example, that the female figure in Automat [Fig.47]is waiting 
in vain for a date that will never be accomplished; in tune with this, in those paintings of 
Hopper where women look through windows or stand in the doorstep of a house, it could 
be said that they are waiting for their lover or for a family member to arrive, but this 
assumption is no more plausible than the one that they are merely at a moment of rest, a 
trivial break from their jobs or their daily routine, trying to  entertain themselves. There 
is nothing in those paintings that could make the viewer choose the sentimental 
interpretation better than the trivial one, for, as I stated before, Hopper suppressed 
anecdote, which, among his peers linked to the Ashcan School, constituted the main 
subject of the painting. Everything seems to indicate that the loneliness of the figures is, 
like Hopper used to say, added by the viewers. 
 
 Perhaps because of this difficult connection of Hopper’s figures to an inner feeling 
of loneliness, other authors, such as A. Muñoz Molina, suppose that the internal mood 
should be interpreted as solitude (MUÑOZ MOLINA:1998, 49). That is to say, their lack 
of company could be explained by the fact that they have been caught in an introspective 
or even a meditative moment100. James Peacock suggests that the woman in Morning sun 
[Fig.51] is “seemingly transfixed (…) by profound metaphysical thought” (PEACOCK: 
2006, 82). According to this interpretation, Hopper’s figures would be remote but 
intimately engaged, as suggested by O’Doherty, focused but apparently indifferent; 
passive but internally active (O’DOHERTY: 2004, 89). And this would explain why the 
figures are, as Warkel remarks, devoid of any sort of interaction and communication with 
what is around them (WARKEL: 2008, 11). 
 
 This is a rather suggestive proposal, but it also seems to be refuted by Hopper’s 
paintings. In tune with what happens with the emotional reading of the woman’s attitude 
in Automat [Fig.47] this transcendental interpretation clashes with the fact that, rather 
than  retired into their own intimacy, Hopper’s figures seem to be either completely 
absorbed by the activity that occupies them (as in Girl at a Sewing Machine, 1921, and 
                                                             
100Talking about Hopper’s representation of figures reading in his canvases, O’Doherty signals that, in this 
activity “loneliness is not an issue” (O DOHERTY: 2004, 89). 
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in The Barber Shop, 1931, among others), or completely distracted, merely letting time 
pass by. Would it not be a misinterpretation to claim that the main figures in Hopper’s 
People in the sun (1960) or Intermission (1963) [Fig.54] are in a deep state of private 
reflexion? Could they not be compared to Bartleby, the Melville’s scrivener, who seems 
to lack an inner self101? Focusing on facial expression —Warkel claims that Hopper’s 
figures never smile or frown (WARKEL: 2008, 11)—, one has to bear in mind that they 
seem to lack personal and well-defined features, and most seem even interchangeable, 
blurry102. 
                   
 
[Fig,54] Edward Hopper, Intermission, 1963, 101.6x152.4, San Francisco Museum of Modern Art 
 
 
 The same difficulty has also prompted the idea that the loneliness of Hopper’s 
figures is not a psychological but a philosophical one. In my previous quotation from 
Nochlin’s article, she speaks of “emotional or existential bleakness” in Hopper’s works 
where a single figure appears. When the figure’s desolation is understood as metaphysical 
                                                             
101“For me, no other painter created such a vision of us all as Bartlebys in a world so starkly real that we 
are moved to cry out for our own sake, like Melville: ‘Ah, Humanity!’” (REISS: 1973, 84). It could be 
imagined as if, each time the anecdotal element that Hopper himself tried to expunge from his canvases is 
intended as an explanation of the composition, the figure answers: “I would prefer not to”. 
102Kranzfelder claims that facial features are of little relevance in Hopper's oeuvre (KRANZFELDER:  
1995, 129). 
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rather than emotional, it does not refer to personal loneliness but to the absence of 
meaning existentialism describes. Moving to another Hopper’s work, Nochlin states: 
 
Seen through a window, from outside looking in, the couple in Room in New York 
suggests Camus's image of the Absurd: a talking figure seen through the glass door 
of a telephone booth, so that the movements of his mouth and his gestures appear 
meaningless. Yet Hopper's figures can never even talk: they are enclosed in their own 
poses, spaces, and, presumably, inner reverie (NOCHLIN: 1981, 138-139). 
 
 As Camus is commonly labelled a “philosopher of the Absurd”, Hopper should be 
interpreted as the painter of existential lack of meaning, which would explain the 
strangeness of his scenes and the desolation of the characters he portrays. The original 
text to which Nochlin alludes is this: 
 
The air of derisory intelligence, those nuances in the absurd of a man talking on the 
telephone are, if I do not hear what he is saying, a fascinating spectacle -but after all 
they teach us only our bias of looking without understanding.   
 
 The observation, as I shall argue below, is highly relevant to approach Hopper’s 
paintings. But the point is that this quotation was not written by Camus. It comes from a 
text written in 1954 by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (MERLEAU-PONTY: 1964, 311-313), 
who, although integrated with the Existentialist movement, was not a philosopher of the 
Absurd at all. In this article, Merleau-Ponty does not try to illustrate the existential 
nonsense but, on the contrary, he remarks the “dreamlike lucidity” or the “stupefying 
emotion” created when images are separated from their context of signification. I will 
return to this important remark in 7.2. But, before this, let us consider another emotional 
signification that critical literature relates to Hopper’s oils. 
 
 
 7.1.2. Isolation, voyeurism 
 
 Some critical comments give the isolation and loneliness of Hopper’s female 
figures a more intentional meaning, Although the woman portrayed in Morning sun 
[Fig.51] seems to be self-absorbed and unaware of being observed, Schmied interprets 
Hopper’s usage of light as something blinding, “almost as designed for an inquisition” 
(SCHMIED: 1995, 103). It is generally assumed that the isolation of Hopper’s figures is 
emphasised by the geometric reflections of light. The emptiness of the wall in Morning 
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sun [Fig.51] is only interrupted by a sharp patch of illumination coming from a window 
which has no visible curtains. Light casts a geometric form, as it happens in many 
Hopper’s interiors (Girl at Sewing machine, 1921; The Barber Shop, 1931, Room in 
Brooklyn, 1932; Office at night, 1940 [Fig.30]; Conference at night, 1949 [Fig.55]; 
Summer in the city, 1950; Rooms by the sea, 1951; Hotel by a railroad, 1952 [Fig. 53], 
etc.). Rectangle, parallelogram, rhomboid or trapezoid, the cause is usually a window 
(sometimes a door). As Wagstaff has argued, “these abstract forms of light are 
compositional figures themselves, a carefully positioned painted presence in 
bedchambers, offices, lobbies and sitting rooms, sharing occupancy of a room with 
painted human characters” (WAGSTAFF: 2004, 26). 
 
 
[Fig.55] Edward Hopper, Conference at night, 1949, 70.4x101.6cm, Wichita Art Museum 
 
  Light, in Hopper, seems to fix the figures into the space they occupy. “Windows 
and the shape of light from windows tend to lock the static figures into place, repeating 
interior configurations rather than offering alternatives to them” (NOCHLIN: 1981, 138). 
Indeed, in many paintings (Girl at a sewing machine, 1921, Eleven A.M, 1926, [Fig.74] 
Hotel Room, 1931[Fig.48] Room in Brooklyn, 1932, Morning in a city [Fig. 1], 1944, 
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Summer in the city, 1950, Hotel by a railroad, 1952 [Fig.53], South Carolina Morning, 
1955, Excursion into philosophy, 1959, Sunlight in a Cafeteria, 1958 [Fig.46] among 
others), Hopper confines his figures in those geometric shapes (the rectangles, or 
trapeziums of light). But, if we assume that light, that has no warmth, enhances the 
isolation of the figures, why should it be deduced from it that, although they may have 
hopes and expectations, they are, in Schmied’s words, destined to remain alone 
(SCHMIED: 1995, 100-105)? The figure is either partially or in its entirety framed by the 
reflection of the light on the wall or the floor, although often is slightly displaced with 
respect to the frame created by the shaping of light due to the window, which contributes 
to the already notable impression of imbalance or movement. But, should we conclude 
from this shaping that the represented figures are in despair because of such a 
confinement? 
 
 Among others, Yves Bonnefoy has stressed the relevance of one of the remaining 
drawings made by Hopper for Morning sun[Fig.56]. He says that it is “a spectral analysis 
of sorts of our presence in the world” (BONNEFOY: 1995, 157). 
 
 
[Fig.56] Edward Hopper, Study for Morning Sun, 1952. Fabricated chalk and graphite pencil 
on paper, 12 30.6 × 48.1 cm. Whitney Museum of American Art, New York 
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 This compositional draft is a clear example of how Hopper worked: projecting his 
paintings like an engineer or an architect trying to assure every detail of the composition 
before the building is actually constructed. But regarding the meaning of the light, 
Hopper’s abovementioned response to Katharine Kuh about his 1960 painting Second 
Story Sunlight remains valid: “any psychologic idea will have to be supplied by the 
viewer” (KUH: 2000, 139). 
 
 Hopper’s declaration refers exclusively to an external viewer, the only one who 
could be held responsible for an interpretation that, because it depends on the state of 
mind in which the spectator looks at the painting, could be thought to be arbitrary. But, 
could it be possible to consider an affective attitude coming from an internal beholder 
who shares the represented space in which the figure rests? It is not clear if Kranfleder’s 
statement that “the viewer of Hopper's scenes is always displaced from the scene, and 
somehow turned into some kind of observer against his will” (KRANZFELDER: 1995, 
37) refers to an internal or to an external spectator, but it suggests a more specific meaning 
of the figure’s confinement. Especially in those paintings where a woman is represented 
alone in a room, Schmied argues that the absence of a partner makes the figure vulnerable 
and “marked by disappointment” (SCHMIED: 1995, 75), in need of protection, 
defenceless; a feeling that, according to Renner, is emphasised by the exposed legs and 
arms of the figure in Morning sun [Fig.51] (RENNER: 1991, 57). In the cited article, but 
now, specifically referring to the pictures of a woman alone in a room, like Morning sun 
[Fig.51], Nochlin continues: 
 
No opening vistas offer release here. It is perhaps to Ingres's women enclosed in the 
harem, existing for the visual delight of the viewer-possessor, women whose 
confinement in an interior adds to the fantasy the pleasure afforded by the image of 
naked, feminine vulnerability, that one might look for precedent here, except that 
Hopper's is a puritan's harem (…) An atmosphere of hushed eroticism intersects with 
the imagery of isolation, with the nude or semi-nude figures viewed from the 
distanced vantage point of the voyeur rather than being identified with the act of 
viewing themselves (NOCHLIN: 1981, 138) 
 
 The subject of a half-naked woman on a bed is a visual commonplace in the 
tradition of painting, where the female nude (or semi-nude) figure has had many different 
readings, not only erotic ones (although eroticism has generally been linked to all of 
them). The social and historical reasons for it are evident, but the precedent of Ingres’ 
harem, as Nochlin implicitly recognizes, is not entirely applicable to Hopper’s painting, 
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because of what she calls Hopper’s “puritanism”. But, what does Puritanism mean here 
(it is difficult to think of a “puritan harem”!)? 
 
 Ingres’ harems refer to the exotic orientalism of western nineteenth-century 
culture, and they are associated with luxury, warm atmospheres and exuberance: in 
Benjamin’s terms, they are endowed with aura —they include a lot of veils—, Ferne (the 
remoteness of the Middle East) and story-telling (many tales —perhaps a thousand and 
one— are floating in the air). The harem’s eroticism, therefore, belongs to the realm of 
tradition and of what I have been calling “implicit knowledge”; in this case, the implicit 
image of the male fantasy linked to this orientalist exuberance in foreign places. Benjamin 
describes this eroticism as “the rapture of a man whose every fibre is suffused with eros” 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 324). Nothing of this atmosphere can be found in Hopper’s scenes. 
No matter how much sunlight they include, they are radically cooled by the colour palette 
and the poverty of details. This is, perhaps, the reason why Nochlin speaks of Puritanism. 
But if Puritanism means an attempt to hide the nakedness, the opposite seems to be the 
point in this type among Hopper’s paintings, a type in which —especially in A woman in 
the sun [Fig.52]—nudity is stark and almost cruel (although not obscene). This starkness 
is not only related to the cool tones used to paint the skin or to the exposure of the body, 
but to the indolence of the figures and, above all, to their distracted eyes, as it is shown 
in the right eye of Morning sun’s figure [Fig.51]103. Benjamin carefully distinguishes 
eroticism from the charm of those “eyes that could be said to have lost the ability to look”, 
adding, as I have signalled, that this kind of gaze detaches sexus from eros (BENJAMIN: 
2006, 339). The words used by Proust to describe Albertine’s paleness seem appropriate 
for the woman represented in Morning sun [Fig.51]: “She resembled the kind of fiery yet 
pale Parisian woman who is not used to fresh air and has been affected by living among 
the masses, possibly in an atmosphere of vice —the kind you can recognize by her gaze, 
which seems unsteady if there is no rouge on her cheeks” (and the woman in Morning 
sun [Fig.51] seems to have rouge on her cheeks). 
 
 So, resorting once more to the hypothesis discussed in the previous Part, in my 
view this detachment from eros is not the consequence of Puritanism, but of the cooling 
of the scene when the role of a human internal spectator is replaced by the camera.  In 
                                                             
103But also in the emptiness of the eyes of the female figures in Nighthawks, Automat or New York Office, 
even if they are fully dressed. 
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other words, it is an effect of the reduction of distances, the transformation of Ferne into 
Abstand, that diminishes the aura still appreciable in Ingres’ Little Bather or Inside a 
harem (1828) and increases the exhibition value of the scene of Morning sun [Fig.51]. I 
think this intensification is behind the comments on “voyeurism” and “exhibitionism” in 
Hopper’s works. In sum, the reduction of the distance and the corresponding increase of 
exhibition value do not point to a puritanical attitude but, on the contrary, “they reveal the 
stigmata which life in a metropolis inflicts upon love”, turning the implicit charm of 
eroticism into the explicit appeal of sex. The erotic pleasure of the Sultan’s ecstasy has 
been replaced here by the sexual shock “which only a city dweller experiences” 




















                                                             
104Bringing together the Freudian and the Marxist concepts of fetishism, Benjamin found in the 
commodification process of modern societies the clue to this transformation: sex and money make 
everything explicit (which has little to do with the harem’s atmosphere). The prostitutes appearing in 
Baudelaire’s writings represent, for him, the turning of the body into a sexual commodity. But, what is the 
relationship of these commodities with the visual sphere? This is, to my view, the right context in which to 
consider the question of Hopper’s alleged voyeurism. I shall discuss this theme in more detail in chapter 8 
(“The city on display”). 
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7.2.  ON NEWS ITEMS 
 
 In this section I shall begin my search for an alternative reading of Morning sun 
[Fig.51], not linked to the topics of loneliness or confinement discussed above. On the 
contrary, I will associate the problems of identifying emotions in Hopper’s paintings with 
a crisis of perception that, as Benjamin suggests, is also a crisis of art. As it is clear from 
the cognitive approach, emotions are not blind drives, but an integral part of cultural 
structures which also include narrative frames in which images acquire meaning. When 
these structures change, new forms of representation appear that raise unexpected issues 
for artistic traditions. This happens with the emergence of journalism, photography or 
film, which respond to social and cultural transformations creating practices and 
languages which exclude or problematize some essential configurations of literature or 
painting. 
 
 Merleau-Ponty’s statement cited above, which Nochlin wrongly attributes to 
Camus, belongs to an essay called “On news items” (that is to say, that section that the 
French daily press calls faits divers, assorted facts), the kind of events not integrated in 
any particular narrative, which call the attention of the reader precisely because he 
perceives them as sensational or exceptional: “The news item (…) strikes us because it is 
a life’s invasion of those who were unaware of it” (MERLEAU-PONTY: 1964, 313). 
Benjamin signals that events are turned into something private (Erlebnis) when the 
possibility to integrate them into the experience decreases. And “newspapers constitute 
one of many indications of such a decrease” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 315).  It is not, 
according to him, a side effect, but the main purpose of journalism, “to isolate events from 
the realm in which they could affect the experience of the reader” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
315-316). The journalist (at least the accident and crime reporter) shows us a scene that, 
like the one of Morning sun [Fig.51], is entirely external to the lives of the readers of the 
news items, who cannot integrate those faits divers in a meaningful context. Of course, it 
could be said that this estrangement produces “existential bleakness”, but it is interesting 
to “re-historicize” (using Benjamin’s words) this impression of lack of sense associated 
with Hopper’s figures to check to what extent it points to an issue completely different 
from either psychological or metaphysical loneliness. 
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 The same thing expressed, in the realm of words, by the fragmentation of the 
narratives in the journalistic discourse, turning experience into a series of “shocks”, is 
expressed, in the realm of images, by the process of visual fragmentation characteristic 
of photography and cinema. Let us go back once more to the difference between 
continuity and contiguity which I mentioned when discussing the images of time. I said 
then that, as the Hegelian “true infinity”, the visual continuity of a spatial line results from 
the fact that the points which compose it are simultaneous. According to Bergson, the 
same thing happens when we listen to a melody: even if the sounds are successive, to 
perceive them as an indivisible tune it is necessary to keep them all in mind at the same 
time, to capture them in one another as a whole, creating a qualitative and progressive 
totality (i. e., a duration) that differs in nature from the quantitative succession of the notes 
(BERGSON: 1910, 100-101, original edition 1889). This mutual interpenetration also 
characterizes the craftsmanship of the storytelling. The parts of the story come not only 
one after the other, but they are in a relation of reciprocal implication, as the parts of an 
organism. Like music or poetry, painting is an imaginative representation of this organic 
totality of experience. Of course, the strokes of the brush are successive, but it should not 
be said that they are merely contiguous. It is not certain that each one begins only when 
the previous one is finished: the painter is able to return to the previous one and to amend 
its intensity or its longitude, because it is always produced and observed as a part of the 
synthetic whole. 
 
 This is not true when it comes to the technological procedures used to tell a story, 
for example, in a film. The movie frames are actually successive and contiguous, as are 
the different shots. The continuity of the narration is an illusion produced by technological 
methods after the shooting, during the editing process. Throughout my argument, I have 
stressed that the Benjaminian concept of Erlebnis can not only be illustrated, but actually 
clarified by the filmic procedure of montage. Unlike the organic totality of life, the final 
result of montage is an illusion: an illusion of continuity and an illusion of totality. On the 
contrary, the organic totality is something given by nature. 
 
 In the realm of words, the discursive fragmentation attested by Merleau-Ponty is 
the way in which language corresponds to the dissolution of collective narratives as a 
consequence of the urban fragmentation of space and time. The generalization of 
journalistic procedures produced a crisis of the novel, but it also gave rise to new 
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novelistic forms able to respond to the challenge of the fragmentation of experience. 
Whereas the main examples of the novelistic narration supplied by Merleau-Ponty come 
from the nineteenth century, we can appreciate these new novelistic forms in works like 
the cited Manhattan Transfer (John Dos Passos, 1925), The Great Gatsby (F.S. Fitzegarld, 
1925) or Berlin Alexanderplatz (Alfred Döblin, 1931).We could not say that these works 
are journalistic: indeed, in a certain sense, they are anti-journalistic to the extent that they 
defend the heritage of literature against the threats of the fragmentation of the discourse; 
but to achieve this goal they accept experimentation with the new media, and up to a point 
it changes the synthetic totality and the linear continuity of the classic structures of the 
novel inherited from the nineteenth century. 
 
 In the realm of images, impressionist and post-impressionist painting, along with 
other contemporary movements, are attempts to face the new context with the tools of 
painting. As I have stated, in the United States the members of the Ashcan School were 
at first some graphic chroniclers of everyday events, and Hopper himself worked as an 
illustrator. In the previous Part, I signalled how Hopper uses metaphorically photographic 
and filmic procedures. George Dyer has written that “Hopper could, with some 
justification, claim to be the most influential American photographer of the twentieth 
century —even though he didn’t take any photographs” (DYER: 2005, 173). But the 
snapshot is “a device for giving events the character of a shock, detaching them from the 
contexts of experience” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 351), and not for integrating them into a 
narrative. This is the origin of the impression that we are not able to fully understand 
Hopper's paintings because “we know very little about the reality depicted” (SCHMIED: 
1995, 40-41). I am arguing that it happens for the same reason that we know very little 
about the people described in the “news items”. 
 
 But I have also emphasised that this does not mean that Hopper’s paintings could 
be reduced to the role that photographs play in journalistic reporting. The final result of 
these experiments belongs to painting, in the same sense that Manhattan transfer or Berlin 
Alexanderplatz belong to literature. Although Hopper experiments with this new frame 
of visual experience, there is an important difference between Hopper’s paintings and 
journalistic illustrations, advertisements and movies: it is obvious that sensationalism is 
excluded from Hopper’s works. Unlike the press headlines, but also unlike the anecdotic 
or picturesque canvases of his colleagues of the Ashcan School’s, space in Hopper is 
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always uniform and repetitive, and the events occurring in them are the kind of facts 
which could never occupy the headline of a newspaper, not even a modest place in the 
“news items” section. There is no sensationalism in Hopper because there are no 
particular sensations or feelings that one can identify, in the same way that no one can be 
identified in the crowd of the street passers-by. That is the reason why every sentimental 
interpretation of the figures’ attitude ends up failing. The inability of the viewer of 
Hopper’s works to find the horizon line or to orient himself in the space-time line of the 
picture is a sign that his works, although they do not follow the avant-garde rule, do not 
arrive at the same kind of spatial continuity or temporal totality characteristic of 
nineteenth-century painting. 
 
 Merleau-Ponty opposes the journalistic procedure of the news items to the literary 
structure of the novel. In a novel, the reader knows the context where the event comes 
from, because the writer “lends himself to the character” and allows the reader listening 
to the inner monologue. The novelist explains through the narration the gestures we see 
and the voices we hear: imaginatively getting inside the mind of the character, we see 
things from that perspective, according to the role of the protagonist or the narrator I 
referred to in the previous chapter. For Benjamin, the essential difference between 
traditional storytelling and the informative discourse of journalism is that the main aim 
of the latter is to inform about the event, whereas traditional narration “embeds the event 
in the life of the storyteller in order to pass it on as experience to those listening”. When 
the informative discourse, and eventually the sensationalism of the striking headlines 
acting like shocks, is substituted for narrative transmission, we are facing one of the main 
characteristics of the poverty of experience (BENJAMIN: 2006, 316). 
 
 I have already argued that the role of the internal spectator of a painting is very 
similar to one of the storyteller (and even to the one that Merleau-Ponty assigns to the 
narrator). In other words, the (ideal) disappearance of storytelling in favour of the 
objective information, in the sphere of discourse, would have its equivalent, in the visual 
sphere, in the (ideal) disappearance of the internal spectator (the one who shares the 
figure’s space and story) in favour of the neutral eye of the camera. And this is exactly 
what Benjamin calls the increasing of the exhibition value which defines the modern 
visual experience, mediated by technology. So, Benjamin’s statement which I have so 
much paraphrased (that journals inform about the events, but do not transmit them), could 
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be translated, in visual terms, as “photography (or film) shows the events, but does not 
tells them”. The very effect of an empty room or a deserted space awakened by the nude 
walls in Morning sun [Fig.51] can also be found in paintings such as City roofs (1932, 
[Fig.13]), Rooms for tourists (1945) or Drug Store (1927, [Fig.37]), where there are no 
human figures and, therefore, no clues leading us to talk about loneliness (if this means 
that the represented figures feel alone). In these cases, one does not face the lack of a 
desired company, but the absence of human presence or, in other words, some sort of 
inhuman presence (as the one foreseen in the darkness or the thickness of Hopper’s trees). 
This could be the reason why, if the rule to assume the existence of internal spectatorship 
is that our identification with it must offer better access to the painting, in Hopper’s scenes 
it does not seem to be working. Not because there is no internal spectator at all, but 
because, in tune with the hypothesis I advanced in the previous Part, Hopper’s internal 
spectator is the camera. This assumption suggests —and that is the origin of the uncanny 
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7.3.  PERCEPTION AND NARRATION IN HOPPER 
 
 In this section I shall explore the way in which the aforementioned crisis of 
perception is related to the representation of space and to the narrative failure in Hopper’s 
works. This failure, I shall argue, marks the difference between a painting like Morning 
sun [Fig.51] and the historical precedents that can be thought to be an inspiration for it. 
My first point regards Hopper’s spaces. 
 
 
 7.3.1. Any-place-whatever 
 
  The scarcity of details and the bareness of the background in Morning sun [Fig.51] 
are noticeable even when compared with other Hopper’s interiors such as Hotel Room 
[Fig.48] (1931), and it has often raised the feeling that this painting is particularly stark 
and abstract. The walls are empty, and the only visible object is the bed, covered with a 
white sheet. There is a conscious rejection of decorative aspects, even the ones which 
could be obtained using colour. The canvas is simplified, with repetitive chromatic 
schemes, and the harmony of colours is subordinated to the tempered sobriety of the tone. 
Volumes and backgrounds become central, with different levels of complexity. Lines are 
sharp and clear, and the geometrical structure is rigorously composed, dominated, as 
usual, by the horizontality, which runs until the limits of the canvas. As Boccali notes, 
also in this case it forces the viewer to imagine elements and forms located outside the 
scene (BOCCALI: 2015, 158). The viewer’s impression is that the room is very small 
and, as in other mentioned paintings, there are no visible entrance or exit. 
  
 In the third chapter, I referred to an “aesthetic of the un-accommodation” in 
Hopper. This has to do, firstly, with the uncomfortableness of the place the figures occupy: 
As Renner signals, the woman in Automat [Fig.47]  would be an example of this 
(RENNER: 1991, 65). Although sometimes the discomfort seems to come from the 
narrowness of the space, in other cases it derives from its excessive amplitude: Troyen 
underlines that the apartment of Room in New York [Fig.41]  “seems impossibly small, 
barely wider than a closet, and shallow, with the door on the far wall firmly shut”, while 
the apparent cosiness of Room in Brooklyn “is called into question by the seeming 
enormity of the room behind the seated figure” (TROYEN: 2007, 86). In Morning sun 
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[Fig.51], the discomfort is emphasized by the stiffness of the woman’s position. Schmied 
signals that Hopper's human figures seem to be always on the move, trying to leave a 
space they will never be able to move away from (SCHMIED: 1995, 84). Maybe for this 
reason O’Doherty suggests that, in spite of the stillness which dominates most of 
Hopper’s images, everything that seems massively stable is, if you look closer, in transit 
(O’DOHERTY: 2004, 89). 
 
 But it is evident that this discomfort comes, in most cases, from the fact that the 
represented figures inhabit what I have called “abstract or generic spaces”, produced by 
the industrial means of transport. The logic of theses spaces —embodied in the road maps 
and railroad schedules— is precisely the one of the temporary place —no longer a starting 
point but not yet the final destination. Most of Hopper's paintings present this kind of 
transitional spaces: stairs105, bridges106, streets107, paths, motorways, railroads108, not 
inhabitable but provisional, almost always with horizontality dominating the scene, 
something that, as I stated previously, characterizes the mechanical movement of the new 
forms of travel (cars, trains and buses) and that every so often suggests that Hopper's 
images are scenes seen from a  moving train or car, which would explain the poverty of 
details. The traveller often observes the new space as a sequence of moving images in the 
windows—the windows of cars or trains on the move, but also the windows of the 
buildings or the storefronts as seen while walking in the streets. And sometimes, as in 
House by the railroad [Fig.15], buildings themselves incarnate these moving images, 
acquiring a mysterious and ghostly presence. 
 
 However, this technological revolution does not merely create a new external 
space, but also a new species of interior: hotels, motels, rooms for tourists, diners and 
cafeterias. Those are spaces strictly constructed to provide a temporary habitation for 
those passers-by and travellers who are in transition and whose displacement has been 
                                                             
105Including, among others: Stairways at 48 rue de Lille (1906), Steps in Paris (1906), The Quai des grands 
Augustines (1909), Stairway (1919), The Baptistery of St Johns (1929), The Barber shop (1931), New York 
Movie (1939), Sunlight on Brownstones (1956), etc. 
106The Bridge of arts (1907), Valley of the Sein, (1908), Bridge on the Seine (1909), The new bridge (1909), 
Bistro (1909), Le pont royal (1909), Queensborough bridge (1913), Train and Bathers (1920), From 
Williamsburg Bridge (1928), Manhattan Bridge Loop (1928), Bridle Path (1939), etc. 
107Examples multiply: Paris street (1906), American village (1912), Night shadows (1921), Early Sunday 
morning (1930), Shakespeare at dusk (1935), Sun on Prospect street (1935), Nighthawks (1942), etc. 
108Railroad train (1908), American landscape (1920), The Railroad (1922), Railroad crossing (1926), 
Freight Car at Truro (1931), House by the railroad (1925), New York, New Haven and Hartford (1931). 
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made possible precisely because of the new transport media. This very character of 
temporariness and inhabitability affects many of the Hopper’s interiors (from train cars 
to hotel rooms, theatre stalls, shops or offices, rent apartments, restaurants or 
cafeterias109): in these places, the occupants or the passengers are constantly replaced by 
other transitory guests as time goes by, and it could be said that the lack of personality of 
Hopper’s figures depends on such substitutability. The figures in these spaces are no 
longer in their place of origin, but they have not yet arrived at their destination. The 
dynamics of the no longer... not yet… is what defines the space that Hopper is trying to 
depict: it could be called the any-placewhatever, and the contrast between light and 
shadows in Hopper’s works is some sort of plastic incarnation of that tension. 
  
  Houses inhabited tell us, in their own architecture, a story (they have, as to say, a 
beginning, a middle part and an ending —the daily routine starts in the kitchen and ends 
in the bedroom), and they have qualified places defined by the different tasks and 
moments of the day, the year or the season. They are full of personal details added by 
their inhabitants: “there is no spot on which the owner has not left his mark —the 
ornaments on the mantelpiece, the antimacassars on the armchairs, the transparencies in 
the windows, the screen in front of the fire” (BENJAMIN: 1996-7, 734). On the contrary, 
transition spaces are serial, monotonous, uniform, deprived of any detail which might 
enrich experience. They have a standardized and repetitive architecture that tells no story, 
and they do not have any background revealing any sort of anecdote, since they are meant 
to have multiple and different occupiers through time. It is often said that, in Hopper’s 
late works, human presence becomes more disquieting —a disturbance within the peace 
of blank walls and half-shaded windows—, and the faces acquire what Updike calls a 
“worried and worried at-sharpness” (UPDIKE: 1995, 191), until this presence disappears 
in Rooms by the sea, painted in 1951, or in Sun in an empty room (1963) [Fig.57]. Of 
course, this disappearance can be seen as a meditation on the painter’s impending demise 
(Hopper was 81 in 1963), but there is no need to insist any further on the fact that these 
spaces (both interior and exterior ones) are the main subject of many of Hopper's paintings 
all along his life (notoriously Stairway [1949, Fig.58]). 
                                                             
109Blue night (1914), New York restaurant (1922), Automat (1927), Chop suey (1929), Table for ladies  
(1930), etc. 




                 
 [Fig. 57] Edward Hopper, Sun in an empty room, 1963, Whitney Museum of American Art 
 
 
                           
 [Fig.58] Edward Hopper, Stairway, 1949, Whitney Museum of American Art 
 
 If most of them awake a feeling of emptiness is precisely because they are 
designed to be constantly emptied and filled again with new hosts: it will happen every 
time the waiter in the diner of Nighthawks [Fig.23] picks up the glasses on the counter or 
every time the housekeeper of Apartment houses [Fig.34] fixes the room, so that if the 
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guest returns to the place after this emptying he will feel as if “someone had obliterated 
‘the traces of his days on earth’” (BENJAMIN: 1996-7, 734). These are spaces which no 
human being can belong to, they remain alien and exterior even to those who occupy 
them, spaces without experience or poor in experience, since the experience of the 
previous inhabitants do not enrich the experience of the next ones, who only come to 
occupy that space when the traces of the previous ones have been entirely erased. 
Contrary to what happens in the room of a house, where the owner of the property would 
feel rather disconcerted if his own traces disappeared, in a hotel room, as I recalled, 





 7.3.2. Any-instant-whatever 
 
 In the third Part I focused on the resistance of Hopper’s paintings to social 
interpretation. Now, I shall argue that it could be only a particular case of a general rule 
underlying his images: Hopper’s paintings do not only reject the kind of script 
characteristic of film noir. They are resistant to any kind of plot and, therefore, to any 
kind of ultimate resolution of the tension that fills the scenes. Hopper’s paintings do not 
make any plotlines explicit. And this, rather than comforting the poverty of experience of 
the inhabitants of modernity, unveils it in an unequivocal way110 
 
 Wells has written that Hopper’s stories “remain insufficiently examined”, but he 
adds that it would be possible to overcome this insufficiency “if only we knew how better 
to read them”. But that “better reading” is difficult because, like the image of the house 
by the railroad suddenly appearing in the train’s window, the scenes are “frozen frames 
lifted from narratives”. Something similar has been stated by Schmied: “On first sight it 
seems easy to think up a plot for Hopper’s scenes, but the impression is misleading”. The 
                                                             
110This may be the reason for the privileged relationship of Hitchcock with Hopper’s paintings (perhaps the 
deepest among the series of film-directors affected by Hopper’s images): Hitchcock was called the master 
of suspense, and what is suspended in his stories is the whole meaning of the plot, often riddled with all 
sorts of false clues to disorient the spectator. However, Hitchcock’s tales, like detective or crime novels, 
finally resolve the mystery. This never happens in Hopper’s scenes, where, in the same way that the horizon 
line remains uncertain, one cannot choose just one possible way to continue the story. 
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plot seems to be hidden “just beneath the surface”, but “as soon as we begin, we realize 
how little we know about the reality depicted. As little as we know about people met on 
the train, in a café or at a party”, and “the deeper we attempt to penetrate into Hopper’s 
world, the more hermetic it becomes. In the end is silence” (SCHMIED: 1995, 40-41). 
 
 Wells attributes this “impossibility of denouement” to the difference between 
narration and painting: 
 
When a moment is frozen, suspended, as in a painting or a drawing, no resolution of 
its underlying narrative is possible. Stories, novels, plays and narrative poems all by 
their nature pass through an increasing complication of storyline toward climax, then 
resolve things (...) Painting, on the other hand, makes the instant permanent, fixing 
it midstory. However much the implicit complication, there is no resolution. The 
narratives that underlie Hopper's paintings, their resolutions blocked by the image's 
fixity, are turned endlessly back in upon themselves, giving them the quality of a 
recurrent dream (WELLS: 2008, 12).   
 
 
 The comparison is very suggestive, and the image of the “endless recurrence”, 
besides matching the Hopper effect, may be another way to mention the essential 
reproducibility of these scenes. But if the only explanation for these features is the 
differentiated nature of literary narration and pictorial representation (or, in other words, 
the limitations of the classic formula ut pictura poiesis), how could it be explained that 
the same irresolution does not affect every painting in the history of art? A comparison 
can be useful here. 
 
 Hopper’s insistence in the theme “woman by the window bathed by the sunlight” 
has made some critics (HOBBS: 1987, 139; OTTINGER: 2012, 54-55) think of two 
classic themes in western painting: Danae impregnated by Zeus in the form of a shower 
of golden rays (as depicted, for example, by Jan Gossaert [1527] or by Rubens [1636]), 
and the Christian Annunciation (as, for example, in the Cestello Annunciation by 
Botticelli [1490] or in the panel for the Isenheim Altarpiece by Matthias Grünewald 
[1512-1516]). In some cases, both themes appear mixed, as in The Virgin Annunciate by 
Carlo Crivelli (1482 [Fig.59]), where the Annunciation comes over the Virgin in the form 
of golden beams. Both references seem to point to a spiritualized or sublimated sexuality, 
something that has been usually linked to this series of Hopper’s paintings. Another 
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possible source often mentioned by some critics is  Caspar David Friedrich, especially 

























[Fig.59] Carlo Crivelli, Carlo Crivelli, The Virgin Annunciate, Panel, 36.2 x 45.5 x 2.0 cm (height 
in centre, 60.2), Städel Museum, Frankfurt am Maine 
 
                                                             
111This last hypothesis is highly influenced by the work of Robert Rosenblum, Modern painting and the 
northern romantic tradition, in which the author follows the expressive line going from the Flemish and 
German painting to Romanticism, and mentions Hopper’s space structure as reminiscent of Friedrich’s: a 
deep foreground inviting the viewer to step onto a vast extension more accessible to the mind’s emotions 
than to the reach of the human body (ROSENBLUM: 1975). 




















[Fig.60] Caspar Friedrich, Woman at the window, 1822, 73x44cm, Altenationalgalerie, Staartliche 
museen zu Berlin 
 
 Concerning the tradition of Annunciations, Boccali, in a phenomenological 
approach to Morning sun [Fig.51], speaks of “suspension of the representation” in favour 
of the pure appearance of the thing (BOCCALI: 2015, 160): the window would show the 
imminence of the mystery without offering a narrative figuration of it (we cannot see what 
is outside), just through the presence of the window’s threshold. Also, Mark Strand finds 
the thickness of transcendence in these Hopperian scenes of women illuminated by the 
light coming from a window. He speaks of a “revelation in the light” and says that 
Morning sun [Fig.51] “is almost an Annunciation” (STRAND: 2008, 68). 
 
 However, the emphasis should be here in the almost, because, after all, Strand 
himself recognizes that, as in Nighthawks [Fig,23], we, as viewers, are watching the 
scenes from the shadows (that is to say, we are outside the circle of light). Although it has 
been said that this light in Hopper creates some sort of aura, as an attempt to restore 
remoteness to what does not have it, truth is that in Hopper’s paintings the opposite 
happens. Rather than transforming and sublimating impoverished spaces, light makes 
their nakedness more visible and plain. The life of the woman in Morning sun [Fig.51] is 
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alien to us, but, at the same time, it is fully exposed in all its nakedness and external 
appearance. Bonnefoy calls these paintings “Annunciations without theology or 
promises” (BONNEFOY: 1995, 155). It means that in Morning sun [Fig.51] there is no 
messenger and, above all, there is no message: the letter received by the woman is a blank 
sheet coming from an unidentified source. But, what is an Annunciation in which nothing 
is announced? Sacred thresholds are supposed to link incommensurable spaces, but the 
space outside (the repetitive windows of the brownstones visible through the window) 
and inside seem to be exactly the same (even colours are very similar inside and outside 
Morning sun’s room). 
 
 It could be said that, until a certain moment in the history of painting, there was 
an implicit narrative —the Bible, Ancient Mythology, great historic events or the routines 
of the season —, virtually shared by every viewer, related to the “multiple conventions” 
what Bataille spoke of in his Manet. Surely, the discredit of these shared narratives in 
modern times, and the divorce between words and images, which I have signalled as the 
third feature of the poverty of experience (“the loss of words”), are some of the main 
reasons why paintings lose a part of their meaning and become mute to the viewers 
(captions, so to speak, are more and more imperative where implicit knowledge is 
replaced by explicit instructions). The loss of the shared narratives is actually a cultural 
impoverishment of artistic images, because it is associated with their loss of cult value. 
This loss, not the differentiated nature of literary narration and pictorial representation, is 
what makes us aware of “how little we know about the reality depicted” and what makes 
it impossible a narrative resolution of Hopper’s images. 
 
 In Christian painting, the pictures show facts or plots that are well known by the 
viewers, and painters never reproduce a timeline from the beginning to the denouement. 
Although these paintings rely on stories that are familiar to the viewer, they do not depict 
the complete story (they cannot do this by definition), but the relevant moments of the 
plot (for instance, The Creation of Adam by Michelangelo). This does not mean that early 
modern painters only represented the crucial or the privileged moment of the story, being 
the task of the viewers inferring what had happened before and what would happen after. 
As Lubbock signals, the painters of Christian art tried to create some kind of synopsis of 
the entire episode, by breaking the scene “into a series of subsidiary events in framed 
cartoon-like images”, or including different episodes “in a single relief panel or painting, 
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the device often referred to as continuous narration”. However, as Lubbock himself 
remarks, the painters’ audience was literate enough to be aware of the plot of the biblical 
or mythological scene represented, “having the knowledge, visual and literary, to 
recognise the subjects of their images and to reflect upon them in an imaginative way” 
(LUBBOCK: 2006, 282-283). So, due to the well-knit course of time underlying these 
narratives, not even the most momentary of their images can be considered as a “frozen 
frame”. The dynamics of the frozen frame points to another experience of time, defined 
by the poverty of stories. 
 
 Concerning the connection with Friedrich —whose interiors also show great 
austerity—, it could be said that his paintings are a good example of romantic symbolism. 
In them, even the tree that appears in Old Oak in Morning Light (1822) symbolises a 
heroic resistance, a meaning reinforced by the poetic light and the suggestion of infinite 
distances. On the contrary, as Nochlin argues, the gas station of Hopper’s Gas (1940) 
[Fig.22] does not represent a transcendental idea beyond the mere existence of the object 
itself (NOCHLIN: 1981, 136). The process of abstraction which drives Hopper to the 
painting does not seem to result in a symbolic image. In a stronger sense, Renner claims 
that Hopper’s paintings are not especially accessible to symbolic interpretation. Rather, 
they focus steadily on the signs themselves. Renner speaks about “an uncomplicated and 
unprejudiced pleasure in the signs of civilization”, common to Americans (Raymond 
Carver or Thomas McGuane) and Europeans in America (Peter Handke, Wim Wenders). 
According to him, this technique is what took Hopper beyond modernism: rejecting both 
mimetic representation and expressionist abstraction, “Hopper’s art rediscovered what 
lays on the surface. And indeed, it is an art that often resists psychological or symbolic 
decoding. A surface is a surface: the signs mean nothing beyond themselves” (RENNER: 
1987, 28). In a similar sense, Koob states that Hopper accords with what Baudelaire called 
“the heroism of modern life”, so he “does not tell stories —he depicts life” (KOOB: 2004, 
58) or, in the words of Schmied, “Hopper told no stories about things or people, he simply 
showed them” (SCHMIED: 1995, 59). And, as I have stated, the natural extensions (like 
forest or sky), which in Friedrich could be considered as a symbol of spiritual grandeur, 
in Hopper acquire a dark aura, like the green colour with strong black pigmentation, low 
luminosity and deep saturation that characterizes his trees. 
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 What a painting like Morning sun [Fig.51] lacks, when compared to its presumed 
mythological, Christian or Romantic inspirations, is aura. Whether aura is defined in 
terms of the cult value supplied by tradition or of the remoteness provided by 
differentiated spaces, it is clear that from the painting have disappeared the shared 
narratives which implied a qualitative experience of time (mythological or theological 
stories) and the aesthetic and symbolic richness of Danae’s bed or of the Virgin’s room 
have become the any-place-whatever of the temporary stay (no longer… not yet…). The 
sunlight coming from the window is not very far from the cold, discomforting and a bit 
distressing illumination of the electric or fluorescent light that bathes train cars, hotel 
rooms or cafeterias. I said that the dynamics of the frozen frame points to another 
experience of time, and this other experience, as it is suggested by the expression itself, 
is in tune with the film reproduction. 
 
 In his comments on Bergson, Deleuze reminds that modern Mechanics, unlike the 
ancient conception of movement, consists of “relating movement not to privileged 
instants, but to any-instant-whatever”; and the emergence of the snapshot, derived from 
this scientific revolution, is the origin of the cinema as “the system which reproduces 
movement by relating it to the any-instant-whatever” (DELEUZE: 1986, 4-6). In 
traditional paintings, the moment depicted is not “frozen” or “suspended”: it represents a 
more or less climactic moment of a process whose achievement synthetizes the beginning 
and the end of the story. It includes, though implicitly, the before and the after of the 
instant depicted. This does not happen in Hopper’s paintings, which never reflect the 
privileged moment of an action or an event, but any-instant-whatever in the course of 
time, because they do not refer to a shared narrative with a beginning, a culminant climax 
and an ending (which is the mark of “experience” in the Benjaminian sense), but to the 
modern temporality of the everydayness as a sequence of empty instants which can be 
filled with whatever events. This would be another consequence of the assumption of the 
camera as Hopper’s internal spectator. Every moment of this time is any-instant-whatever, 
and the snapshot is not like an irrelevant moment of a traditional story; it is another kind 
of image corresponding to an (impoverished) experience of time without culminant 
moments. 
 
 It could be said that the function of light in Hopper’s works is precisely to reveal 
this poverty, illuminating the figure’s metaphorical nakedness. It has been already shown 
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in Nighthawks [Fig.23] : rather than suggesting the different links between the four 
figures located on the right side of the painting (a crowd, if we compare it with most of 
Hopper's works), light seems to be illustrating the lack of any link between them, the 
absence of a plot which could gather them all together in a shared story. It underlines the 
negative fact that they have nothing in common, that they do not share a collective 
narrative. This lack of cultural warmth is, so to speak, the semantic result of the use of 
cold light and cool tones that lower the temperature of the diner. What the scene reveals 
is not a relevant moment in the life of the characters. What light stresses is the irrelevance 
of the scene itself, the lack of a plot, perhaps because, as suggested by Wells, the image, 
though arrested in time, is an isolated frame separated from a whole still unknown to the 
viewer What seems puzzling is the connexion between light and serial or indifferent 
spaces. The same question raised regarding the spaces which seem to be observed from a 
back seat window —the viewer wonders why are they being represented if, at first glance, 
they do not seem to have anything relevant in them at all—, could be asked about 
Hopper’s light. If it has been often called excessive, it is not because there is, formally 
speaking, an excess of light, but because the generosity of light contrasts with the 
apparently irrelevant elements which are illuminated by it. In Morning sun [Fig.51], light 
illumines a space that could be considered insignificant, not worthy of artistic 
representation. If Hopper has turned those spaces into privileged objects it is not merely 
because he tries to show a compassionate glimpse of what is presumably trivial or 
unimportant. The persistence in this motif, the insistence in shedding light on non-places 
is, on the contrary, an attempt to stress the importance of their meaning. To visualize those 
spaces and turn them into a subject worthy of being painted is a way of emphasising their 
relevance: their quantitative relevance (because these are spaces in which modern men 
and women spend an essential part of their existence), and, above all, their qualitative 
importance, since they define the kind of spatiality which characterizes industrial 
modernity. 
 
 So, Hopper’s light is not focused on the action or the conclusion of a story. There 
is no action, and therefore there is no conclusion or resolution. There is not a denouement 
because there is not a tie. Morning sun [Fig.51] is not exactly an Annunciation in which 
nothing is announced, but an Annunciation in which nothing (the lack of transcendence) 
is announced. If thresholds and windows in Hopper are privileged spatial devices it is not 
because of their liminar condition (liminalità) affecting the “grammar” of the sacred 
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space, which communicates the visible and the invisible (CALABRESE: 2006, 49-50). It 
is just because, passing through them, light represents, in Wagstaff’s words, “the relations 
of emptiness and possibility, of within and without” (WAGSTAFF: 2004, 26). Analysing 
Morning sun [Fig.51], Stremmel finds in the canvas what he considers as a “constant in 
Hopper’s pictorial output (...) the relationship between interior and exterior —separate, 
yet linked by the motif of the window” (STREMMEL: 2004, 58). But to this I shall add 
that, linking the inner space with the external one, windows create a familiar form of the 
anyplace-whatever: the window is no longer inside the place, yet not outside it (or vice 
versa).  The viewer’s eye is immediately attracted by what remains outside (if the scene 
takes place in an interior space) or by what is inside (if the window is seen from outside), 
but what stirs Hopper’s interest is not what is outside or what happens inside. Rather, it 
is the window itself what demarcates the frame and shapes the light. And, precisely 
because of this, anecdote is minimized or eliminated112. 
 
 The layout of the figure does not stage a concrete storyline that the viewer can 
unravel.  At the most, it highlights the fact that an existing plotline is needed as an 
assumption to attract the (external) viewer’s attention to a scene. But, at the same time, 
this expectation vanishes as the viewer continues to observe the scene. As a result of the 
intense light, this absence is turned into something starkly visible. Hopper, painter of 













                                                             
112An exception could be Four Lane Road (1956), that seems a kind of parody related to Gas, with some of 
the “caricature” features that disgusted Hopper in “American Scene” paintings. 
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7.7. IN THE FILM SET 
 
 Finally, it is time to implement these observations on Hopper’s representation of 
space in the frame of the interpretation I am arguing. To test my hypothesis once more, 
let us imagine that, in Morning sun [Fig.51], rather than taking the female figure as an 
erotic object for an invisible voyeur, and rather than assuming that, for some strange 
reason (or even for no reason at all), the woman is condemned to a state of loneliness and 
emotional or existential despair, she is merely posing while she is being painted, as 
Josephine Hopper used to do for her husband’s paintings. Perhaps she is looking through 
the window, but not because there is an object outside which catches her attention; her 
attitude echoes the one of the woman in Nighthawks [Fig.23], that is to say, she tries to 
distract herself during a quiet moment: she is bored. Therefore, she is not looking at 
something in particular. She simply occupies her waiting time looking randomly through 
the window. Of course, the painter needs to distance himself from her in order to represent 
her image. But, for the painter, the woman ceases to be Jo Hopper and becomes “any-
woman-whatever”, something very noticeable if we compare Hopper’s female figures, all 
probably modelled on Jo Hopper, with the portraits that Hopper painted of his wife (Jo 
sleeping, 1924, Jo painting, 1936, Jo in Wyoming, 1946), in which we can see actual 
human features, very different from the abstract or mannequin-like qualities of those other 
representations of women. In other words, just like Hopper’s spaces or landscapes are not 
representations of particular places, Hopper’s figures are not portraits of particular 
persons, and this is underlined by the clear distinction between the anonymous and 
generic figures of most of his paintings and the few real portraits he made. 
 
 In order to take one more step towards my hypothesis, let us move now the model 
from the atelier of the painter to the photographer’s studio, to a film set or a theatrical 
stage, in an interlude where there is no action (either the scene has come to an end or 
perhaps it has not started yet). The nakedness of the walls in Morning sun [Fig.51] 
suggests this kind of space, a place that cannot have any particular nature because it has 
the power of being transformed into any kind of place (an eighteenth-century room, a 
marble staircase for a wedding, and so on). I have called Hopper’s space any-place-
whatever, but it is remarkable that the any-place-whatever par excellence is the studio, 
the stage or the film set (in this last case, a space as desolate and undefined as a little 
circle of light in the middle of an abandoned and messy garage), a space that is necessarily 
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a neutral and unqualified place and, for this reason, it is able to receive any quality. This 
space, when talking about the film media, is also dominated by the horizontality of the 
camera, which moves over rails in the travelling shot. 
 
So, the hypothesis of Hopper’s spaces as film sets, without resorting to loneliness 
or to isolation, would explain the reduction of distance or the intensification of exhibition 
value in Morning sun [Fig.51], the make-up in the woman’s face (nobody can be in front 
of the cameras without make-up, it is a technological requirement) and the “cooling” of 
any kind of eroticism because, when translated into explicit exhibition, eroticism becomes 
“sex-appeal” (as it is attested in ordinary language, which does not consider film stars as 
emblems of love or passion, but as “sex-symbols”). And it also makes plausible the 
feeling of the enigmatic presence of an unrepresented viewer (the film actress knows she 
is “confronting the masses”, as Benjamin says, even if the set is nearly deserted). If the 
figures facing the light are bathed by it while its source remains hidden (East side interior 
[1922] [Fig.45], Morning in a city [1944, Fig. 1], Pennsylvania coal town [1947, Fig.31], 
Cape Cod Morning [1950, Fig.35], Office in a small city [1953, Fig.71], People in the 
sun [1960], A woman in the sun [1961, Fig.52]), this sign of transcendence —the light 
source is always beyond the scene— is not necessarily attributable to spiritual reasons. If 
there is a secret concealed in most of those Hopper’s paintings where light bathes the 
canvas without letting the viewer know the source from where it comes (and it happens 
in almost every Hopper’s painting, both in exterior images like a High Noon [1940], 
among many others, and in interior ones, such as Nighthawks [Fig.23] , Hotel Room 
[Fig.48] or, Room in New York, [Fig.41], it could be said that, at least at some point, this 






















                      
 
  [Fig.61] Edward Hopper, Girlie Show, 1941, 81.3x 96.5, Collection de Fayez   






















                    
 [Fig.62] Edward Hopper,  Summer evening, 76.2x106.6, Private Collection 
 
 Here we cannot see where the light source comes from, but the subject that we 
will find in other Hopper paintings which could be considered more serious (Morning in 
a City [Fig.1], A woman in the sun [Fig.52]), that is to say, the naked woman bathed by a 
light beam drawing geometric shapes into the space, is here shown without any sort of 
mystery: light comes from an electric source, and the space is a stage lighted by it; the 
spotlight follows the figure across the stage, assuring that she is always under the light 
circle, as if a travelling was taking place. The painting is turned once again into some sort 
of screen which attracts the viewer’s attention. It could hardly be argued that the 
performance which is taking place in the Girlie Show’s [Fig.61] stage has an argument: 
although it apparently has beginning, climax and denouement, it is clear that the modest 
storyline is only a pretext for something belonging to the realm of “showing” in which 
there is little to tell. If this painting could be considered as a key for those representing 
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the same subject, it could be understood as a suggestion in the sense that both women and 
men in Hopper’s paintings (Office at night [1940, Fig.30], Conference at night [1949, 
Fig.55], Summer evening [1947, Fig.62]) are illuminated like actors in a film set or in the 
photographer’s studio.  Light falls upon the main figure in Girlie Show [Fig.61] (from an 
evident, although unrepresented, spotlight) as it falls upon others Hopper’s figures, 
although this might be some kind of joke on the part of Hopper (“Ah, that was the light 
source!”), so that the fact that the figures are bathed by light from a hidden source reminds 
us that, in films, the light illuminating the scene cannot be visible, since if it was the 
composition would lose its plausibility. And the fact that we cannot look through the 
window in Morning sun [Fig. 51] is, so to speak, a framing problem (and it could not be 
ignored that we could be facing a faux window which is part of the stage design, and this 
could be the reason why we are not able to see clearly the view it may offer). We might 
be observing an actress in a moment where the cameraman is shooting before any action 
takes place. She knows she is being observed, but not as if she was in a harem; she knows 
she is being filmed or photographed (hence the makeup), but at the same time she must 
fake (as an actress or a model who has to ignore the presence of the cameraman), therefore 
the estrangement of the situations that Hopper presents, their artificiality.  And the attitude 
of the actress (the “eyes without a gaze”) is, in turn, a prototype of the attitude of people 
walking or travelling around the city under the watchful eye of unknown citizens. 
However, it is evident that the painting cannot be reduced to the performance represented 
in it. So, once more, where is the difference? 
 
 It could be said, in sum, that the reason why the explanations of Hopper’s works 
in terms of loneliness seem to fail is that they are attempts to fight the main evidence 
coming from his oils. This evidence, which Hopper bluntly reduces to his will to paint 
the reflection of light in a surface, is the impoverishment of the shared narratives 
underlying traditional culture. As the mourning for such impoverishment seems to be as 
essential to modern culture as the impoverishment itself, when we associate the term 
“loneliness” with Hopper’s paintings we are doing two things at once. First, we are 
expressing the pain caused by the diminishing of meaning as a consequence of the ruin 
of the shared stories. Second, we are trying to heal this pain appealing to substitute 
arguments: the social plot of exploitation or the psychological plot of frustration. But, as 
the abovementioned critics confess, perhaps against their will, if these issues are pursued 
to the end, the plot breaks down, because Hopper rejects such substitution.   




 In the case of Hopper, this response cannot be delinked from a peculiar 
consciousness of the fragmentation of the experience, and its main concern is not the 
construction of an alternative plot to those who suffer as a result of the loss of the 
traditional narratives, but the always restarted attempt to make the lack of a common 
argument the argument of his canvases. In the previous chapter, I wrote that the camera’s 
eye does not expect the returning of the gaze (on the contrary, it avoids it), but we do 
expect it (what explains our disappointment). Hopper’s paintings are a human vision of 
the inhuman gaze of the camera (the light in his scenes is subhuman, not transcendent). 
They are not able to give back humanity to those deprived of it (this would be a “trick 
ending”), but painting makes visible its absence —something that the mechanical eye 
cannot achieve by mere reproduction. What makes uncanny Hopper’s trees and what 
makes desolated his interiors is the disembodied eye of the camera. However, such 
uncanniness and such desolation do not come from the camera, but from the gaze of a 
human spectator who paints the inhumanity of such a light. So, Hopper’s images have a 
lot of exhibition value, they show more than they tell, but finally he is a realist, and his 
scenes tell something (something embedded in the affective mood of the paintings), even 
if it is only the impossibility of telling. The transmission of this impossibility as an 
experience has to do with the cultural heritage as a purpose of artistic activity, although 
the conditions of this transmission are substantially different from those of traditional 
societies. 
 
 But, if there is no point in defining this affection containing the cult value of 
Hopper’s paintings as “loneliness”, how should we call this strange feeling linked to the 
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CHAPTER 8. A LITTLE THEORY OF WINDOWS 
 
  
In this chapter, I will first linger on the dominant social readings of Sunday (1926, 
[Fig.62]), in which —as in the comments on other works— the term “alienation” comes 
up over and over again (8.1., “Critical readings of Sunday”). But, what is the precise 
meaning of this term and to what extent does it shed light on Hopper’s visualization of 
situations? To focus on this issue, I return to the roots of the term and of its generalized 
use in contemporary culture (8.1.1., “An excursus on Alienation”). But this genealogy 
leads us to a Hegelian-Marxist intellectual atmosphere which is distant from Hopper’s 
standpoint and from the purposes of most of his critics. So, if we take this term out of its 
context what is its meaning? And what is gained by applying it to the descriptions of 
visual art? Why should it be thought appropriate to Hopper’s oils, which do not seem to 
have a clear social intention? 
           
    [Fig.63] Edward Hopper, Sunday, 1926, 86.36x73.66, The Philips Collection, Washington, D.C 
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 Secondly, relying on a last reflection on the unfinished Arcades Project of 
Benjamin, I will develop a distinction between images and stories which has found 
relevant defenders among filmmakers, and I will suggest that the images that capture 
Hopper’s attention are, so to speak, ones containing the meaningless fragments discarded 
in the process of montage of the city: the waiting, dead time of makings-of and outtakes 
(8.2., “Images or stories”). Another consequence of my hypothesis of the camera’s eye as 
an imaginary internal spectator in Hopper’s paintings is the coldness of Hopper’s interiors 
and exteriors, even if they are bathed in a powerful sunlight (8.2.1., “A man in the sun”). 
This raises the question about the status of time in Hopper’s works and about the temporal 
signifiers in their titles. Moving to the other key element of Sunday [Fig. 63], the empty 
storefronts in the background of the composition (8.2.2., “The empty storefronts”), I will 
discuss the usual meaning attributed to them and I will show that storefronts are part of 
the large collection of windows in Hopper, which make us think of the city as scenery 
composed by shop-windows with a purely representational value. The role of the 
camera’s lens is here associated with window panes, and both are interpreted in the sense 
of the cooling-effect, which drowns objects and people in the icy water of the 
technological production and reproduction of images. I will use the image of the city-on-
display to approach the mannequin-like aspect of most of Hopper’s figures (8.2.3., “The 
city-ondisplay”) and the meaning of their waiting attitude.   
 
 But the main theme of this chapter is the affective coloration of Hopper’s 
paintings. There was a time (perhaps “the age of naïve poetry”) when looking at the 
figures’ faces in a painting was enough to recognize the emotion represented in their 
gestures. But this age came to an end when faces in paintings became blurred, unclear, 
fuzzy, distorted, or when they simply disappeared from the canvases. Is this a simple 
change in the representation of emotions, or does it involve a change in emotions 
themselves? Is there a modern mood that should be added to the list of the human passions 
coming from the classical tradition? Or this addition is not possible because the modern 
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8.1. CRITICAL READINGS OF SUNDAY 
 
 
 First of all, let us familiarize ourselves with Hopper’s Sunday [Fig.63] and the 
main readings of it in critical literature. At first sight, Sunday [Fig.63] seems to be a simple 
street scene. In the centre of the composition, a middle-aged man, in his shirtsleeves, his 
collarless vest unbuttoned, what for Troyen suggests the uniform of an office clerk not 
quite dressed for work (TROYEN: 2007, 86). His arms folded in his lap, he smokes a 
cigar while seated on a wooden sidewalk. A row of what seem to be timber-built shops 
occupies the background. The fact that the shutters of one of the shops is down, and the 
absence of window displays or any other suggestion that the other shops may ever be 
open, plus the fact that there is no movement behind them, signals that they may be 
permanently closed, although it is not completely clear if they are closed just because of 
the weekend. Stasis and silence dominate the scene, as well as horizontality, which leads 
the viewer to believe that the scene may be located in a small town or perhaps in the 
outskirts rather than in a big city where verticality rules, although there are no elements 
that clarify this. Both the sidewalk and the street are empty —indeed, the street is so bare 
that Wells has said it almost looks as if the painting was not finished (WELLS: 2008, 28). 
There are no other passers-by, no cars, no tourists or strangers. The light source is out of 
the composition, falling from the upper-right side of the painting and apparently 
dominating the scene, but it does not seem to correspond with the shadows of the painting, 
especially if we focus on the man’s shadow.  Light has no warmth, and, if anything, it 
seems to bleach the colours of the different elements of the composition. The diagonal 
composition is unbalanced, and for Troyen “the sidewalk, rushing out of the picture plane 
toward an unspecified destination, underscores the sense of the figure being left behind” 
(TROYEN: 2007, 86). Although it has been argued that Hopper paints human figures in 
a small scale, if compared with their surroundings, to reflect the idea that man is nothing 
than a speck in the vast universe (and Sunday [Fig.63] would be an example of this, 
SCHMIED: 1995, 44), the most widespread readings of this picture argue that it concerns 
the maladjustments of the inhabitants of small rural areas and small towns to big cities. 
Reiss argues that Hopper portrayed the quiet desperation of a truly silent majority, 
showing a nation of strangers and exiles as if framed by windows with the “maddening 
memorability of a voyeur’s daydream” (REISS: 1973, 84). Other strategies in this same 
line had been attempted: Troyen claims that the Jazz Age had ignored small business in 
rural areas, focusing only in big cities and overlooking the small ones and the many 
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shopkeepers and small-town workers whom the “economic boom of the 20’s left behind” 
(TROYEN: 2007, 86)113.  For Hobbs, Hopper’s paintings of people staring at light could 
also manifest a mood of the aftermath, the strain and feeling of loss experienced by a 
generation of men and women who once felt important because of their contributions to 
the war effort, concerned with the lethargy and depression often experienced by those 
who have been traumatized by too much change (HOBBS: 1987, 145). 
  
  However, I doubt that the painting has a clear social intention. Hopper's 
observations of social behaviour are generally presented without sentimental 
involvement, and this certainly applies in this case. But, as my interest in this Part is to 
deal with the repertoire of affections in Hopper’s paintings, it is unavoidable to admit 
that, along with loneliness, alienation is one of the affections most commonly mentioned 
in critical reviews of Hopper’s pictures. This is true of the book Alienation by light in 
Hopper (TYLER:1948) and of recent scholarly papers (DALIRIAN: 2005, 
BALLSCHMIEDE: 2014, GULAN: 2014). Let us remember that the title of the Nochlin’s 
article which I quoted in the previous Chapter is “Edward Hopper and the imagery of 
alienation”. Nochlin sees in Gas, for example, “a potent image of a particularly American 
version of the condition of alienation”; she also states that “the spaces of urban recreation 
are equally, for Hopper, the loci of alienation”. As for Hopper’s paintings in which offices 
appear, Nochlin emphasises that “office work, the white collar condition, had often been 
examined in the literature and the sociology of the thirties, forties and fifties as the 
situation in which the condition of alienation reached its most classic form”. And she 
attributes to Hopper a sense of criticism regarding the “objective condition” of the 
subjects of his paintings and the elaboration of a “formulaic reduction, resorting to a 
convention for depicting alienation in which mere isolation of the figure and simplified 
structure of composition, with an accompanying aridity of surface, ‘stands for’ the 
modern existential condition”, adding that other paintings, like Girlie Show [Fig. 61] give 
“an image of alienation that is daring and moving at the same time” (NOCHLIN: 1981, 
136-141). 
 
                                                             
113The man under the sun has been thought as an illustration of the father figure from Booth Tarkington’s 
Alice Adams, the Pulitzer Prize winning novel written a few years before. In the novel, the mood is one of 
pathos. However, in the painting, the sense of enervated neutrality seems ambiguous and modern: the seated 
man is a universal figure, detached, and without motivation, will or destiny (TROYEN: 2007, 86). 
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 Barbara Rose writes: “Hopper is a sufficiently profound artist to have been able 
to generalize the sense of loneliness and alienation felt by many Americans into a 
universal theme” (ROSE:1986, 50). Hobbs also argues that Hopper conveys a feeling of 
alienation which must be experienced by observers in order to understand the true subject 
of his art. Hopper's works would not then be then the illustration of an idea, but an 
equation for feeling (HOBBS: 1987, 59). The photographer Gregory Crewdson, talking 
about Hopper, says that “The sense of alienation is also there in the way he uses the 
interior of the room – the mirrors, the architecture, the décor” (CREWDSON: 2004). In 
sum, as Winfried Fluck says: “whenever scholars, journalists, or students try to explain 
the appeal of Hopper’s pictures, they talk about a world of alienation”, and he finds 
surprising the fact that pictures of alienation can become popular cultural icons. 
Nevertheless, he explains this fact by arguing that Hopper “provided for a ‘cool’ 
redefinition of alienation as gratifying self-possession”114. But, is it clear what are we 
meaning when we use this term and why should Hopper’s figures be associated with 
alienation? How are we to understand alienation? As the result of the social transition 
provoked by the emergence of big industrial cities? As a national crisis of identity? If we 
accept Nochlin’s proposal, should Hopper’s picture be related to “the alienation from 
history as a shared past”? To “the alienation of the worker from the instruments and 
products of his labour” (a Marxist meaning of the term that “Hopper has, perhaps 
unconsciously, bodied forth”)? Or to “the alienation of the man-made and human realms 
from the realm of nature” (these being the three different definitions of the term used in 




 8.1.1. An excursus on Alienation 
 
 
 As I suggested in the Introduction, the term “alienation” is external to Hopper's 
vocabulary. Although we are used to assuming that alienation is a characteristic condition 
of modern life, the origin of the impact of this term is due to the great success of Georg 
                                                             
114“When Hopper’s paintings were shown at the Ludwig-Museum in Cologne in 2004, newspaper reviews 
indulged in the description of this aspect of Hopper’s work. The Berlin newspaper Berliner Zeitung, for 
example, claimed: “His paintings are terribly quiet dramas of alienation and a lack of social relations” 
(Berliner Zeitung 29.10.2004, 26, my translation). And the review in the paper Der Tagesspiegel began with 
the observation: “There it is again, this feeling of being deserted, lonely, alienated: the Hopper feeling” 
(Der Tagesspiegel 11.10.2004, 28, my translation)” (FLUCK: 2004). 
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Lukács’ book History and Class Consciousness, first published in 1923, which I 
previously described (in chapter 1) as one of the readings that determined Benjamin’s 
rapprochement with Marxism. In the long preface to the re-issue of his work in 1967, 
Lukács retrospectively goes over the repercussion of the essay, and he claims that this 
impact can be explained because, in his book, “alienation” (a term “which has its 
theoretical and methodological roots in the Hegelian dialectic”), “for the first time since 
Marx, is treated as central to the revolutionary critique of capitalism” (LUKACS: 1967, 
XXIII). Alienation, then, would be the condition of a historic figure —the factory 
worker— which has been deprived of his physical and psychological features by 
capitalism. That is to say, human characteristics are “objectified” during the process of 
work, and are turned into something external and alien. 
 
 To this, Lukács add anything to the term Entäusserung that is located in the same 
zone of influence of what the young Marx had called “objectification” 
(Vergegenstandlichung), and that, in History and Class Consciousness, it is used almost 
as a synonym for other concepts such as “estrangement” (Entfremdung) or “reification” 
(Verdinglichung). This conceptual constellation refers to what I defined as the 
“dehumanization” of the worker in the industrial process, which reduces subjects to 
abstract and calculable qualities and leads to “the progressive elimination of the 
qualitative, human and individual attributes of the worker”; this dehumanization also 
reaches into the psychological sphere, that in Taylorism separate the worker from 
personality in order to facilitate the industrial rationalization (LUKACS: 1971, 88). 
 
 This was not, obviously, the meaning of alienation in Hegel’s writings. The 
Hegelian meaning can be summarized by saying that the external object of experience is 
nothing but the result of the estrangement of the self-consciousness regarding itself and, 
therefore, what should be an inner quality is understood as an external one. Nevertheless, 
Luckács states that the identification of this philosophical meaning with the worker’s 
“alienation” (the turn of some subjective qualities into objective ones by the 
rationalization of industrial work) would have produced in his readers the delusion that 
“the logico-metaphysical construction of the Phenomenology of Mind had its authentic 
realisation in the existence and the consciousness of the proletariat” (LUKACS: 1971, 
XXIII), as if the proletarian revolution was the consummation of Hegelian philosophy 
and, so to speak, the perpetration by human subjects of the entire appropriation of the 
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world. This culmination of history should be reached, in Lukács work, through the 
acceptance by the workers of the Party’s point of view, which would represent the 
proletariat's objective interests (and, at this moment of the historic evolution, the interests 
of humanity). This identification with the Party would be the means to overcome 
alienation for the working class, that is to say, the means of becoming aware of its true 
interests. 
 
 Lukács himself (in 1967) regrets having given birth (in 1923) to this 
misunderstanding by constructing alienation as a romantic, idealistic and naïve concept: 
“this fundamental and crude error has certainly contributed greatly to the success enjoyed 
by History and Class Consciousness” (LUKACS: 1971, XXIII-XIV). The mistake 
consisted, as Lukács self-critically acknowledges, in defining alienation “in purely 
Hegelian terms” (p. XXII), that is to say, in idealistic terms. The fragility of this 
interpretation is revealed when we ask ourselves how to overcome alienation or how to 
create a non-alienated situation: “As, according to Hegel, the object, the thing [the 
external real world], exists only as an alienation from self-consciousness, to take it back 
into the subject would mean the end of objective reality, and thus of any reality at all” 
(LUKACS: 1971, XIII-XIV). This unsustainable identification of self-awareness with the 
destruction of reality is produced, according to Lukács, when we forget that subjects are 
always partially a result of the social organizations they inhabit. Therefore, the opposition 
between the social organization as something blind and external, and the individual as 
being able to stand outside of these organizations, is not valid, because this static image 
of the man is “the poorest and empty determination of all” (ADORNO: 2003, 440-456). 
 
 The discussion of Lukács’ self-criticism is important because, I think, the same 
defect he describes can be found in almost all the essays that use the term “alienation” to 
explain Hopper's paintings:  it is not possible to infer from these accounts what a 
nonalienated situation would be (let alone how this might be made manifest in visual 
terms). 
 
 There is no need to insist on the fact that neither Hopper nor most of his critics 
operate in this Hegelian-Marxist philosophical and political orbit. When alienation is 
mentioned in this context, Hopper’s paintings are not meant to be understood as part of 
the “revolutionary critique of capitalism”. Lukács mentions one of the reasons why the 
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concept of alienation started to have a different meaning at the same time that History 
and Class Consciousness became so widely read. Around 1927 (when Heidegger's Being 
and Time was published), the conceptual contents of “alienation” are progressively 
translated from Marxism to Existentialism, and the concept loses its social roots and it is 
configured as a feature of the condition humaine: the feeling of a lack of meaning to life 
was the empirical manifestation of transcendental freedom, that is to say, the warning that 
only human free actions can bring meaning into the existence (I discussed this point in 
the previous chapter). Again, most of Hopper’s critics who use the term alienation are no 
more committed to an existentialist interpretation of the concept than to a Marxist one. 
And this is the reason why “alienation” is often perceived as a strange psychological 
disorder (“being out of one-self”) whose causes are unknown, although they are often 
referred to the element of dehumanization as something that characterises modern 
societies, in terms of the loss of the support of traditional communities. It could be said 
then that, if we leave aside the social background (which, although it does not explain 
Hopper's paintings, at least gives the readers some information about their historical 
context), the clichés about loneliness, isolation and alienation are reduced to 
psychological feelings. 
 
 Undefined as a specific disorder, however, and only presented as a vague feeling, 
we know nothing about its concrete origin or, as Lukács would say, about what a non-
alienated situation might be. We feel we are saying something (something relevant) about 
Sunday [Fig.63] when we present it as an “illustration” of alienation in modern life, but, 
does saying that the character is alienated adds anything to the interpretation? There is, 
doubtless, a certain relation between the figures in Hopper’s paintings such as Sunday 
[Fig.63] or Pennsylvania Coal Town (1947) [Fig.31], among many others. Indeed, it looks 
like most of Hopper’s characters share the same condition, but, why should this condition 
be called alienation? Do we gain better access to Hotel by a Railroad (1952) [Fig.53] or 
to Summertime (1943) if we imagine that the characters are facing their transcendental 
freedom or suffering for being out of themselves? Does it add something to our perception 
of the paintings? Under the impression that something significant is being stated, the 
resort to alienation suggests only that something is happening in those scenes and that it 
is not clear what it is; the term alienation reveals the absence of a word to describe what 
is happening to the figures. But this difficulty naming the affection of Hopper’s characters 
remains, as I will show, an interesting clue to discover its nature. 




 In Hopper literature, “alienation” lacks a defined meaning to clarify the 
mysterious air of Hopper's characters; the word substitutes for the impossibility of naming 
the enigmatic emotional charge of Hopper’s images. When the term is used as a 
descriptive or meaningful one, could it be explained whether or not the woman reading 
what seems to be a magazine in Compartment C, Car 293 (1938), and the one opening a 
filing cabinet in Office at night (1940)[Fig.30] or the one fixing a room in Apartment 
houses (1923) [Fig.34] are alienated in the same way? What would be the visual 
appearance of non-alienated characters in such cases? When using this term as if it 
illustrated a previously known idea, what happens is that we fill with a visual content a 
meaningless word. All this suggests that in the critical literature on Hopper, alienation is 
in fact a vague social-psychological term for the notion of loneliness, a notion that I 
analysed in the previous chapter. For this reason, I shall attempt in the next section another 
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8.2. IMAGES OR STORIES 
 
 
 The main questions raised by Sunday [Fig.63] according to the existing literature 
were these ones: what role does the man play in it? Who is he and what is he doing? Is he 
waiting for the store to open?  Does he own any of the stores on his back? Is he waiting 
for the customers to arrive? What will happen next, will it ever even happen? But all these 
questions assume that Hopper’s images are part of a story. I shall argue differently. 
 
 Before taking a last step, and in order to recapitulate the argument that I have 
developed so far, I would say that, in the modern city, we do not only deal with what 
happens in external reality when it is technologically transformed, but also with the way 
in which we can represent this very space. The task of modern individuals is to temporally 
organise these representations of an external reality modified by technology. Focusing on 
reproducibility is relevant in this issue, because this is also the task of “a work of art that 
is completely subject to or, like the film, founded in, mechanical reproduction”. 
 
 In a world where immediate reality has disappeared due to its constant permeation 
by the mechanical equipment, the technological production of movement gives way to a 
new type of impoverished experience (Erfahrung) of external reality: the landscape 
breaks down into shocking images, disconnected or fragmented spaces which change 
suddenly; but the traveller or the passer-by tries to accomplish a reconstruction of the 
wholeness of the trip through the “protective eye”. The result of this reconstruction also 
impoverishes experience (Erlebnis), but differently than fragmentation. The fragmented 
perception is poor because it loses the organic totality of experience. The reconstructed 
perception is poor, in contrast, because in order to rebuild such totality, it leaves a trail of 
more or less important meaningless discarded fragments, a residue of the any-place-




 When it comes to filming, the time of the cinematographic image is what Bergson 
called the “spatialized” or the “mechanical” time, which does not follow the articulated 
and living continuity of a movement with a beginning, a climax and a denouement, but it 
is produced by the imperceptible succession of fixed images (frames) whose speed 
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exceeds the one of the human eye. This procedure, that Bergson named “the 
cinematographic illusion”(the illusion of movement achieved by the  consecutive static 
images) was often considered at the time as the discovery of the secret of movement in 
Marey’s, Muybridge’s or Eakins’ experiments, and consists of splitting movement into  
photographic snapshots, which Duchamp translated into painting in Nude descending a 
Staircase n. 2 [Fig.64], a painting which caused a revolt in the audience when it was 
exhibited during New York’s Armory Show in 1913, not far from the first painting that 
Hopper was able to sell, Sailing (1911). 
 
[Fig.64] Marcel Duchamp, Nude Descending a Staircase n.2, 1912, 147x89.2cm, Philadelphia 
Museum of Art, Philadelphia 
  
The story (its development from the beginning to the ending) is, in the movies, the 
result of the editing process: just like the speed of the succession of frames hides its fixity, 
editing hides the way in which images are tangled to create a meaningful argument. We 
do not register the gap between one frame and the next; we are not properly aware of the 
images, which are subsumed into the flow of the story. It could be said that these unseen 
images, these scenes that are hidden in the editing process of experience, are the ones that 
catch Hopper’s eye. This is why Hopper eliminates the narration which would bind 
together the scenes as a way of telling a story, preserving them only as images. This dead 
time of cinematographic images is the model of the inactivity of the man depicted in 
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Sunday [Fig.63], and it defines modern time at least in such a characteristic way as the 
febrile activity of movement and action in industrial cities. 
 
 In the line of thought that begins in One-way street and which should have finished 
in the Arcades Project, Benjamin was trying to build an intellectual, aesthetic and political 
opposition to the montage of the Erlebnis. When this montage is not considered as a 
merely individual strategy to manage the fragmentation of experience, but as a montage 
of history, that is to say, as a collective attempt to create an illusion of historical continuity, 
it appeared to him as destined to barbarism “in the wrong sense”. Consequently, he was 
trying to design an alternative to this historical montage, different from a return to the lost 
organic totality of nature and society. The key to this alternative strategy would be another 
concept of montage, no longer the one of classic filmic editing (or the factory’s assembly 
line), but that intended by avant-gardism in procedures such as collage, photomontage 
and the like, procedures that Benjamin himself used in One-way Street and that would 
have been the architectural keystone of the Arcades Project. Regarding this project, only 
the first half was achieved (though we cannot know to what extent): a compilation, so to 
speak, of the (literary and visual) images that historiography has discarded as useless or 
troubling for the construction of the world history. The second half, i.e., the editing of 
such texts and images in order to construct an alternative to Erlebnis and which would 
represent a total redemption of the forgotten fragments is, at least in my view, missing 
(that is why I have not speculated about it, about its possible forms or its possible traces 
in Benjamin’s writings here). The first half, however, even if detached from such a plan 
of final redemption, can illuminate Hopper’s work. 
 
 Wim Wenders, who was a painter himself before being a filmmaker, has said that 
images do not necessarily lead to something else, rather, they are able to stand by 
themselves (WENDERS: 1988, 29).  Time in images is not the same time as in a story; it 
is rather an interlude, an eventless time in which action is frozen. The image, when 
isolated from the sequence where it was integrated we feel it as a moment when something 
is about to happen or when something has just happened. “Stories are to me as vampires 
trying to suck the blood from the images”, says Wenders; but, at the same time, he admits 
that stories “make life bearable and are like an assistance against terror” (WENDERS: 
1988, 31).  This is the main reason why images, isolated from their story, in spite of its 
apparent insignificance, have a threatening charge. These reflexions apply to Hopper’s 
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work: not only because his paintings, clearly, save some moments and places which could 
be considered disposable or irrelevant from the point of view of the story, but also because 
this rescue retrieves an essential experience of modern time and space. Hopper’s windows 
are not collages or photomontages, but they are still a recollection of the visual debris of 
modernity, the discarded images threw away by the restless activity of the “gaze without 
eyes” (the montage of the bad infinity of the city), which has never been transformed into 
Erlebnis. So, the task of the painter who experiments with the new images is close to the 
one of the ragman —so often invoked by Benjamin— who collects fragments of discarded 
or disregarded urban views to compensate for the poverty of his experience. As 
Kranzfelder has signalled, the words Hopper used to describe Burchfield’s paintings 
could be applied to his own works: 
 
 No mood has been so mean as to seem unworthy of interpretation; the look on 
asphalt road as it lies in the broiling sun at noon, cars and locomotives lying in 
Godforsaken railway yards, the steaming summer rain that can fill us with such 
hopeless boredom, all the sweltering, tawdry life of the American small town, and 
behind all, the sad desolation of our suburban landscape. He derives daily stimulus 
from these, that others flee from or pass with indifference (KRANZFELDER: 1995, 
137). 
 
 Hopper is certainly not indifferent to the hopeless boredom of the city. If one 
imagines Sunday [Fig.63] as a frame taken out of a film, the man is like an actor without 
a role to play, alien to the montage of the story. This does not represent a situation of 
isolation (except in the sense that the film set or the stage scenery is isolated from the 
public). In the same way that Hopper is interested in the empty spaces and anonymity 
places of geography, he is also attracted by the idle time and the non-narrative holes of 
stories, where nothing has happened yet or where the action is already over, and in which 
the absence of words stresses the exhibitive proficiency of the image. Hopper himself is 
extremely reluctant to explain the meaning of his scenes and he often answered the 
interviewers who asked for this meaning: “I don't have anything else to say”, meaning 
that if he would have been able to say something with words, then there would have been 
no need of painting it. In the abovementioned text, Wenders also said that the word (Wort) 
belongs to an answer (Ant-Wort), and the answer belongs to a story (WENDERS: 1988, 
30).  This idea of an autonomous image is central to the visual arts of the twentieth 
century, and perhaps surprisingly is quite alive in the way Hopper, when paying attention 
to these images which fill the downtime of a story, produces a suspension of the narrative. 
One of the reasons why some frames are discarded in the film editing process is that they 
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are “boring” (they interrupt the continuity of the story). It has been said that Hopper’s art 
is a “mythification of the banal” and that, in this sense, it is linked to Surrealism 
(KRANZFELDER: 1995, 115-116). But, in Hopper’s case, rather than a surprising or 
sensational image, what we find is a rare attention to what is usually insignificant. Rather 
than merely emphasising banal or quotidian situations, most of the innovative and 
distinctive qualities of Hopper’s paintings derive from his will to put the resources of his 
art at the service of spaces and times designed precisely to draw no attention or to go 
unnoticed because their only purpose is to link one place or one instant with another. 
 
 So, what follows from this distinction of images and stories is that, in contrast to 
what I mentioned about Christian painting, the succession of Hopper’s pictures in a panel 
could never result in a “continuous narration”, precisely because they are not the episodes 
of a narrative argument. When the figures do not hold any kind of conversation between 
them it would not mean any particular lack of communication; it may simply occur that 
we are watching a scene without dialogue, maybe one of the frames discarded in the final 
montage. And there is no dialogue because Hopper is more interested in the purely visual 
elements of the scene (the “images” and not the “stories”, using Wenders’ terms). 
Benjamin said that in silent movies, written captions were used to guide the viewer, and 
they were as if imperative orders which indicate the meaning of the story (BENJAMIN: 
2002-2, 105).  We could say then that the titles of Hopper's paintings (Sunday, Morning 
sun) should be taken as passwords which somehow free the images from the story corset, 
so that the feeling of lack of resolution would have, in this case, a positive meaning115. 
For this reason, in the next section I shall call attention to the meaning of the title 
“Sunday”, in order to reopen the debate about Hopper’s representation of time, which 











                                                             
115“Despite their dramatic potency, the stories implied in Hopper’s pictures seem to lack motive or 
resolution. They are strange, unyielding” (TROYEN: 2007 83-84). 
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 8.2.1. A man in the sun 
 
 
 The previous distinction of images and stories can be useful to answer a question 
often raised in Hopper literature: are Hopper’s images an attempt to represent a timeless 
moment? 
 
 Regarding paintings like Sunday [Fig.63], Gillies suggests that the image in them 
represents a “timeless space” (GILLIES: 1972, 404-412). The origin of this suggestion is 
clear: if we think of time as the order of succession of the events, when there are no events, 
the feeling of time disappears. So, it would be more exact to speak, as Schmied does, of 
“an eventless play” (SCHMIED: 1995, 72). But the absence of events —and they 
certainly are lacking in Hopper’s pictures— cannot be reduced to the absence of time. 
While time, in traditional societies, is experienced as something inseparable from specific 
events (planting, harvest, religious ceremonies), the modern experience of time is one of 
a form not linked to explicit contents, a form in which any content can be hosted or, in 
other words, a frame in which anything —any-event-whatever— can happen. If there is 
an attitude in which this specifically modern experience of time is shown, that is precisely 
the attitude shared by most of Hopper’s figures: the attitude of waiting. And the more 
undefined is what the figures are waiting for, the more intense is the perception of time 
passing, to the extent that it could be said that, in many Hopper paintings, time passing is 
the only thing actually “happening”. When there is no action or movement, when there is 
nothing to do but waiting, as it seems to happen in Sunday [Fig. 63] but also in Morning 
sun [Fig. 51], Eleven AM [Fig. 74] Automat [Fig.47], Two on the aisle (1927), Sheridan 
Theatre (1937), Hotel Lobby (1943, [Fig. 65], Hotel Window (1955, Fig.68] or 
Intermission [Fig.53], “the perception of time is supernaturally keen” (BENJAMIN: 
2006, 336). 




[Fig. 65] Edward Hopper, Hotel Lobby, 1943, 81.9x103.5cm. Indianapolis Museum of Art 
 
                    
        [Fig.68] Edward Hopper, Hotel Window, 1955, 101.6x139.7cm, The Forbes Magazine Collection 
 
 To the experience of an unqualified spatiality, poor and anodyne, that Hopper 
seeks out, corresponds a temporality which shares the same characteristics. This is the 
time taken up in long trips (let us think of the never-ending roads and train tracks 
traversing the United States). Lost, unoccupied, free or meaningless time. There is 
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nothing particular in the hours that go by, it is not lunch time or work time or time for any 
particular activity. In Sunday [Fig.63], light constructs the feeling of waiting and the space 
where it happens. The viewer contemplates the scene, is aware of the different elements 
appearing on the painting, but cannot tell what is exactly happening and why (BOZAL: 
2012, 19). Gillies has signalled that the frozen appearance that has been repeatedly argued 
in Hopper's oeuvre is due to the instability of ground that I mentioned when talking about 
House by the railroad [Fig.15]: “In the paintings of Edward Hopper, space has been 
structured so that the horizon line is denied”, and therefore the viewer cannot find the 
point where the sky meets the ground and he is not able to link his own space with the 
one represented in the painting (GILLIES: 1972, 410). But, in the same way that one 
cannot infer from this that Hopper’s painting are “spaceless” (there is space in them, but 
it is an undefined or unstable one), the absence of time cannot be assumed from the fact 
that, so to speak, the timeline is denied (there is time, although without being possible 
fixing the moment, which seems always located after or before a chronologically 
determinable event). 
 
 Hopper seems to represent a break during the working hours, the kind of lost time 
spent in transport media while going from one place to another, in a bar or in the threshold 
of a house, or looking through the window while waiting for a particular event. In the 
same way that the any-place-whatever cannot be located but between one place and 
another (between the inside and the outside, in the windows or in hotel rooms, interior 
spaces which are nonetheless external to their inhabitants), the any-instant-whatever does 
not determine a particular time, but what happens between particular times. Like trivial 
hotel rooms, which do not tell a story (rather, they monotonously repeat the same sets), 
the in between times do not have a specific beginning or ending. The strain caused by the 
no longer... but not yet... is not merely the spatial uncertainty between the inside and the 
outside, but also a temporal vagueness between before and after. Waiting time does not 
have any before or after, because it is between a before and an after which are not 
represented in the painting. Many of Hopper’s external spaces are located at two lights, 
in that time of the day that is no longer day time but not yet night time. And the same 
ambiguity runs through the transient nature of their figures. The couple at New York 
Restaurant (1922) [Fig.66], has just started its lunch or is about to finish it? The same 
question could be asked when analysing Hotel Lobby [Fig.65], Hotel Window [Fig.68 ], 
Western Motel (1957) [Fig.67] or New York Movie (1939) [Fig.69]: has the movie just 
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started or is it about to finish? Indeed, looking through a window of both a hotel room or 
a train or car is a way of wasting time, a moment in the day when there is nothing to do 
but waiting for the time to come to do this or that. It could be said that it is not a time 
which can be measured by a clock: it is not yet the time, or is no longer the time to do 
something. This denies the idea of the Ecclesiastes that there is a time for every activity, 
or the one of Hesiod that each day corresponds to a task. It is a day without work, without 




                              
                   [Fig.66] Edward Hopper, New York Restaurant, 1922, Muskegon Art Museum, Michigan 
 




















   





[Fig.67] Edward Hopper, New York Movie, 1939, 81.9x101.9cm, Museum of Modern Art, New York 
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 Terms such as afternoon, evening, night, sunset, dusk, morning, noon, two lights, 
or even Summer, August or Sunday, often present in the titles of Hopper’s works, are 
vague for a modern viewer (since the inhabitants of modernity use precision watches). 
But in the ages when there were no precision machines to measure time, they were rather 
qualitative definitions, all of them referred to atmospheric or meteorological phenomena. 
Time depended on the movements of the stars, and these movements also signalled 
agricultural labours and religious celebrations (Sunday). On the contrary, the temporal 
determination by means of a number (as in titles like Eleven A.M [1926, Fig.74] or Seven 
A.M. [1947, Fig.70]) refers to the modern notion of time as a continuum, quantitative 
rather than qualitative, which can be cut at any point and has no specific content (anything 
can happen at any point of the line). As I have suggested before, this difference between 
the quantitative and the qualitative time is related to the difference between the images in 
classic painting (where one can always infer what happened before the event represented 
in the image and what will happen next, because the story told is previously known to the 
viewers) and the frames from a film, which, when isolated from the whole, do not reveal 
much information. The ambiguous character of the “hours” in Hopper’s paintings, the 
fact that those hours (whether or not expressed with chronological accuracy), as moments 
of waiting, are not related to any specific action or event, is linked to the ambiguous 
character of the places where they occur. In conclusion, a representation in which there is 
no action or movement is not excluded from time; on the contrary, it is an attempt to show 
“pure” time, without any external reference. 


















   [Fig.70] Edward Hopper, 7 A.M, 1948, 76.7x101.9cm, Whitney Museum of American Art 
 
 
 Let us note that the titles of Hopper’s paintings can hide an ironic wink 
(WAGSTAFF: 2004), playing with literal and figurative meaning. In the case of Sunday 
[Fig.63], it could be said that there is a word play on the literal meaning of “Sunday”, i.e., 
the prevalence of sun in the scene. So, the “day” we are seeing in the picture is a Sunday, 




 8.2.2. The empty storefronts 
 
  
In order to resolve this dilemma, some critical comments turn to the other element 
that, along with the figure and the sunlight, dominates the picture: the storefronts. It is 
noticeable that, in Sunday [Fig.63], the figure is not behind the window or behind the 
glass, but outside; and, notwithstanding the visual relevance of the storefronts, Hopper 
has not represented the glass in the windows, which enhances their apparent emptiness. 
This has been frequently interpreted as the sign of a crisis, which would explain the 
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inactivity of the figure in the sidewalk. But, what kind of crisis are we facing in this 
picture? 
  
 Of course, the mainstream of Hopper literature points to a sociological 
interpretation of this emptiness. Slater argues that the ‘nineteenth-century’ storefronts116 
suggest Hopper’s opposition to modernity and his preference for that age of small, modest 
businesses and its architecture of a more human scale (SLATER: 2002, 149). For Wells, 
the painting is almost discouraging since it was painted on a date in which economic 
prosperity still ruled. “If the painting had been called Thursday or Monday, we would 
think its utter absence of commerce a prescient foreshadow of the Great Depression (there 
aren’t even signs in the windows). Were it painted in 1932, we would jump to political 
interpretation. But it is Sunday in 1926, and each storefront, so far as we can see, is a 
void” (WELLS: 2008, 28). Although Kranzfelder has underlined that the date of the 
picture does not allow to link it to the age of Depression (KRANZFELDER: 1995, 137), 
Schmied suggests that, long before it actually happened, Hopper’s canvases foresaw the 
dispirited mood that would spread through the United States territory and that, when the 
time came, the new circumstances suddenly gave currency to the compositions Hopper 
had been painting since the early twenties (SCHMIED: 1995, 13), which is a mysterious 
hypothesis. As I said in chapter 5 about the presumed influence of film noir on Hopper, 
“foreseeing”, “anticipating” or “foreshadowing” is contradictory with “being influenced 
by”. So, which is the great depression that Hopper depicts in Sunday, in a period of 
relative economic prosperity? Why should we be afraid of or depressed on Sundays? 
What is the difference between work days and Sundays? In modern, mechanical or 
mathematical time, this difference is as difficult to establish as it is difficult to find the 
difference between contiguous hotel rooms or diverse western motels. Sunday is the day 
when one does not have to work, but the hours of the day are exactly the same as the 
hours of a working day, the time of this day does not have a qualitative difference with 
the time of the rest of the week, the sun shines on the street like any other day. The hours 
                                                             
116Evidence of how the storefronts looked like in the late nineteenth century and in the early twentieth 
century can be found in photos such as Brown Bobby greaseless doughnut, dated in 1925, by Harris and 
Ewing; or West Danville, Vermont, Frank Goss, seventy-one year old farmer, in front of Gilbert S. Hastings's 
general store and post office reading his mail, which includes a postcard saying that his last year's hired 
man "won't be around for haying this year on account of he's in Californi' in the Navy, by Fritz Henle, dated 
in 1942. This and many other examples can be found at  http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/fsa/ (last 
checked 19-08-2019). 
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come one after the other in the same sequence they do on workdays, because the 
impoverished time is meaningless. 
 
 The hours are empty in the same way the storefronts and the windows of the street 
we see. We can go back in time as far as we like, the instants of time will be exactly the 
same as the present moment, we will not find difference; we can look over every room in 
the hotel, every motel in the road, we can go across the whole street, as Early Sunday 
morning [Fig.42] suggests; but every room, every motel and every house will be empty, 
because every room is any room and every motel is any motel. A contemporary of Hopper 
who can hardly be accused of incompetence in economic matters, J.M. Keynes, illustrated 
this experience of time, typical of “the strenuous purposeful money-makers”, with a scene 
from Lewis Carroll’s Silvie and Bruno that perfectly identifies the bad infinity which 
pretends to avoid death by means of a forged eternity: in the middle of one of his lessons 
for the children, the Professor is interrupted by a knock at his door. He asks who is calling. 
  
“Only the tailor, sir, with your little bill,” said a meek voice outside the door. 
“Ah, well, I can soon settle his business,” the Professor said to the children, “if you’ll 
just wait a minute. How much is it, this year, my man?” The tailor had come in while 
he was speaking. 
 “Well, it’s been a-doubling so many years, you see,” the tailor replied, a little grufy, 
“and I think I’d like the money now. It’s two thousand pound, it is!” 
“Oh, that’s nothing!” the Professor carelessly remarked, feeling in his pocket, as if 
he always carried at least that amount about with him. “But wouldn’t you like to 
wait just another year and make it four thousand? Just think how rich you’d be! Why, 
you might be a king, if you liked!” 
“I don’t know as I’d care about being a king,” the man said thoughtfully. “But it dew 
sound a powerful sight o’ money! Well, I think I’ll wait” 
“Of course you will!” said the Professor. “There’s good sense in you, I see. Good-
day to you, my man!” 
“Will you ever have to pay him that four thousand pounds?” Sylvie asked as the door 
closed on the departing creditor. 
“Never, my child!” the Professor replied emphatically. “He’ll go on doubling it till 




 So, the strenuous money-makers are the prototype of those “dry dwellers of 
eternity” who wander through hotel rooms, storefronts, motorways and streets looking 
                                                             
117Keynes adds that “The ‘purposive’ man is always trying to secure a spurious and delusive immortality 
for his acts by pushing his interest in them forward into time (…) Thus by pushing his jam always forward 
into the future, he strives to secure for his act of boiling it an immortality (…) Perhaps it is not an accident 
that the race which did most to bring the promise of immortality into the heart and essence of our religions 
has also done most for the principle of compound interest” (KEYNES:1963, 358-373). 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
283 
 
for a Sunday always deferred for the afterlife. The experience is enriched by memory and 
imagination only when tasks have a beginning and an end like a melody or a tale, and the 
end of the task signals the holy day (or, rather, the holy day is the one thing capable to put 
work to an end). But this never happens in compound interest, as it never happens in the 
assembly line: the line stops when the working day finishes, but the work is not done (the 
point of detention is arbitrary). The next morning the line will start again at the same point 
and the same piece of work will appear at the very same place, as if time had not gone by. 
“Time in hell (...) is the province of those who are not allowed to complete anything they 
have started” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 331). What is the man in Sunday [Fig.63] waiting for? 
We could say he is waiting for Sunday, waiting for something that could make Sunday, 
that could give a full meaning to the sequence of the hours and that could only be found 
out of the series of linear time, randomly, as the unexpected incident that creates a holiday 
moment in the assembly line of Chaplin's Modern Times (1936), which I alluded to above. 
Keynes himself was extremely optimistic about the possibility of a generalized Sunday 
for humankind in the here and now, and he predicted (in 1930, just after the 1929 crash!), 
that the definitive resolution of the “economic problem”, (the main problem since the 
appearance of man on earth) could arrive in a lapse of a hundred years. But he was also 
extremely pessimistic about the consequences of such an earthly Sunday: “Yet there is no 
country and no people, I think, who can look forward to the age of leisure and of 
abundance without a dread (…) for the first time since his creation man will be faced with 
his real, his permanent problem  —how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, 
how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him”. 
He mentions the epitaph written for herself by an old charwoman, in which she described 
her life in eternity as “doing nothing forever and ever”, not even singing the sweet songs 
she will listen to in heaven. And Keynes concludes: “Yet it will only be for those who 
have to do with the singing that life will be tolerable —and how few of us can sing!” 
(KEYNES:1963, 358-373). This could be, to my view, a more pertinent commentary than 
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 8.2.3.The city-on-display 
 
 Sunday’s storefronts belong, of course, to the long series of windows in Hopper’s 
oeuvre. And in this long series there is a visual analogy between the windows of houses 
and hotels and shop-windows. In this section I shall sketch a little theory of Hopper’s 
windows, aiming at encompassing the painter’s insistence on this motif. 
 
 Pointing to the difference between the view of Marx on the city as a collection of 
commodities and the one of Benjamin, Susan Buck-Morss writes: 
 
For Benjamin, whose point of departure was a philosophy of historical experience 
rather than an economic analysis of capital, the key to the new urban phantasmagoria 
was not so much the commodity-in-the-market as the commodityon-display, where 
exchange value no less than use value lost practical meaning, and purely 
representational value came to the fore. Everything desirable, from sex to social 
status, could be transformed into commodities as fetishes-on-display 
(BUCKMORSS: 1989, 81-82). 
 
 This observation makes us think of the city as a scenery composed by a series of 
windows with a “purely representational value” —a series, not a synthetic totality. And 
here we come to an explanation about the comments on Hopper’s voyeurism. The 
representational overload not only refers to the commodification process (Hopper does 
not speak about commodities in the Marxist sense, and neither is he a critic of capitalism), 
or —in the pictures of women by a window— to the commodification of the female body 
(powerfully expressed in the windows of the Red Light district of Amsterdam or of 
Hamburg’s Reeperbahn). In Hopper’s paintings, we can also find some male characters 
framed by the light coming from a window, sometimes alone, like in Sunday [Fig. 63] or 
in Office in a small city (1953) [Fig.71], sometimes with female figures (Office at night, 
1940 [Fig.30], Conference at night, 1949 [Fig.55]). And in Nighthawks [Fig.23], as I have 
stated, the entire diner can be understood as an island of light or even as a panoptic or a 
panorama where the characters are trapped. So, what is shown in such windows is not just 
a collection of commodities or, if so, they are visual commodities with a purely 
representational value. Just as the traumatic neurosis of war are the psychopathological 
version of the loss of words observed by Benjamin as a general feature of modern society, 
voyeurism and exhibitionism are the psychopathological expressions of the normal 
operation of the eye in the everyday life of the modern city I have explored in the previous 
chapters: voyeurism corresponds to the scopophilia, the predatory activity of the 
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“protective eye” trained by the camera and severed from its object by the lens’ glass. It is 
the “gaze without eyes” which produces private Erlebnisse one after the other to 
compensate his poverty of experience and to overcome shocks. Exhibitionism 
corresponds to the uncanny or dark aura of the “eyes without a gaze” contained in the 
little boxes of light which are constantly consumed (in visual terms) and discarded as 
waste (visual) material by the city dweller. This visual consumption —the reduction of 
the scenes to purely representational value— expresses, in the field of images, the 
translation of the implicit into the explicit which characterises sex and money. But, as I 
will argue, this is not the role of Hopper’s images and, in this sense, his canvases are not 




[Fig.71] Edward Hopper, Office in a small city, 1953, 71cmx102cm, The Metropolitan Museum 
of Art 
 





 [Fig.72] Edward Hopper, The Circle Theater, 1936, 68.58x91.44cm, Private collection 
 
 It is interesting to notice that, with the exception of Drug Store [Fig.37], painted 
in 1927 —and even there the exposed objects are quite vague—, in most of Hopper's 
paintings where shop displays appear, they are empty (Early Sunday Morning [1930, 
Fig.42], The Circle Theater [1936, Fig.72], Nighthawks [1942, Fig.23], Sunlight in a 
Cafeteria [1958, Fig.46], New York Office [1962, Fig.38]). And this absence of goods, 
more than suggesting the shortage of materials that sociological interpretations of Hopper 
have tried to underline, seems to echo the poverty of experience, in the same way that, in 
Benjamin’s writings, the material scarcity is an allegory of cultural penury. That is why I 
suggested above that Hopper’s gaze is not one of the voyeur. Hopper’s windows cannot 
be reduced to opportunities to steal a furtive pleasure (as Baudelaire says). The “gaze 
without eyes”, as the appropriated device to move around the industrial space of the city, 
frames the shocking images appearing on passing as photographs —“what modern man 
sees”. And the nakedness of those who become objects of such a gaze is, like the one of 
the mannequin, the sign of their lack of a story (and their persistent silence). Like the 
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mannequins of the shop-windows, Hopper’s figures show a very particular kind of 
nakedness, which is not cancelled by the fact that they wear a dress: the mannequin has 
no dress of its own, since only living bodies can actually be dressed or naked, and for this 
reason it can wear any dress without thereby ceasing to be naked. This is exactly the 
nakedness or Hopper’s characters (whether they are male or female and whether it is 
emphasized or not by the explicit nudity of the bodies). 
 
                              
 
 [Fig.73] Edward Hopper, Automat (detail) Des Moines Art Center 
 
 Benjamin suggests that the “rouge on the cheeks” or on the lips (a must for the 
female mannequin’s face) implies the submission to fashion, which (because of its fight 
against natural decay) hides the organic features and approximates human faces to the 
ones of mannequins in shop-windows, an effect also observed in Hopper’s faces. In 
Automat, painted in 1927, the window behind the figure creates an eerie feeling. On one 
hand, all we can see reflected on it is the row of electric bulbs that illuminate the restaurant 
repeated ad infinitum, preventing the viewer from seeing what is outside. On the other 
hand, the window reflection tells us that the woman sits apparently alone in the cafeteria. 
Some critics suspect that the title of the painting itself could have a second meaning: at 
first sight, it names the kind of cafeteria where the woman is, a quite popular space during 
the early 1920s, a non-place in the terms proposed by Marc Augé in 1995, where there is 
no need to communicate or to identify oneself in order to consume a product (AUGE: 
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2009); but it could also refer to the woman's attitude, whose stiffness has been often 
compared with the one of a mannequin. Strand has called into attention the fact that she 
may be sitting in some sort of limbo, for there is no way of locating the scene anywhere 
—-it could be either a big city, a small town or the third moon of Jupiter (the storefront is 
another case of the any-place-whatever). 
 
 The same could be said about a late painting of Hopper, New York Office [Fig.38]. 
Even the tonality used here reminds us somehow of the one in Nighthawks [Fig.23], 
although the scene takes place in daylight. But again, the scarcity of details, the fact that 
the streets are as empty as in any other of Hopper's paintings where a storefront is 
represented, the double barrier which separates the viewer from the figures (first the road 
on the lower part of the painting, second the window glass) creates a feeling of isolation 
and silence. The woman could be either a receptionist or a paper figure, like a sticker 
pinned in a window. 
 
 Just as the mannequin can wear any dress because it has no dress of its own, the 
figures appearing in Hopper’s windows can be (superficially) adapted to any story, 
because, as the anonymous passer-by in the city crowd, they have not a story of their own 
(of course, the passers-by have their private stories as particular individuals, but not as 
“the amorphous crowd of passers-by, the people in the street” [BENJAMIN: 2006, 321], 
that is to say, not as signatories of the social contract). The emptiness of their eyes is, in 
Hopper, the major symbol of this nakedness. In the shop-windows of the city streets, the 
powerful lighting does not avoid the coldness of the space: the blurry objects of Drug 
Store are drowned in the icy water of egoistical calculation, as Marx and Engels said, and 
the glass of the window is made of that ice. 
 
 And the same happens with the camera’s lens; it “cools” what is taken in, in spite 
of the powerful lightning of the set, reducing the image, by means of the technological 
calculation of the mechanic eye, to exhibition value (what cannot be shown does not 
count). I would call this mannequin-like look of Hopper’s figures another consequence 
of the assumption of the camera as the internal spectator in his paintings. As I have shown, 
over-illumination does not warm bodies and objects, it burns colours and cools tonality. 
Just as Benjamin says (in his essay on the concept of history of 1940) that sometimes the 
future acts like a film developer on some images of the past (BENJAMIN: 2006-1, 405), 
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it could be said that, in Hopper paintings, the abusive light is the painting developer of 
the lack of interiority. The figures do not have a story, and therefore any story can be 
“hung” on them. However, although this global focus on Hopper’s windows improves the 
understanding of the figures, it does not seem to make progress the question about the 
nature of the feelings associated with them. It could also be said that these figures do not 
have any particular feeling, and for this reason any particular feeling can be attributed to 
them. The first name of this irresolvable nakedness is poverty of experience. And the any-
feeling-whatever, which so many comments on Hopper’s painting try to capture with the 
terms “alienation” or “loneliness”, is the mood of urban modernity. Just as the writer tries 
to give a name to this immersive but elusive emotion, Hopper tries to paint not only what 
the modern individual sees, but also what the modern individual feels, which does not 
exactly mean reproducing views and feelings (painting requires a distinctive sort of 
distancing), although probably it is impossible if one has not seen those views or has not 
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8.3. NAMING THE UNNAMED EMOTION 
 
   In the previous chapter, I noted that “until a certain moment in the history of 
painting, there was an implicit narrative —the Bible, Ancient Mythology, great historic 
events or the routines of the season —, virtually shared by every viewer”. And I suggested 
that the decline of this homogenous narrative community was one of the problems that 
late modern painting had to face. But to make clear my final position regarding the main 
question of this Part, that is to say, the unnamed feelings associated with Hopper’s 
paintings, I shall in this section give a more detailed analysis of the historical decline of 
pictorial narrative. 
  
 I have stated before that the emotions or impressions (linked to an emphasis on 
colour) claimed by modernist painters cannot be reduced to exhibition value or, in other 
words, to figurative data. But this assertion may seem strange, because there is, in western 
painting, a long tradition of figuration of emotions, which also relies on the transmission 
of experience. For the popular classes, as Benjamin recalls, tradition has been for a long 
time transmitted by means of stories, oral tales and images (especially sacred images), 
and to the tale or the image was usually added moral advice which contained a guidance 
for life. For the upper classes, this apprenticeship of tradition included a selection of texts 
of the classic ancient authors. Since the Renaissance, the so-called Humanities were an 
essential source for the practical knowledge of humankind, because books treasured the 
sapientia or scientia civilis, an experience credited by the authority of great ancient moral 
wisdom, essential for public oratory and for prudence in political decision making. 
Humanities, in sum, taught the essential resorts of human passions; and, without knowing 
these resorts, concepts like freedom, virtue or justice were socially impracticable 
(GRASSI:1988). Such passions were the diverse affections of the mind, the emotional 
drives which are embodied, on one hand, in the voice (traditionally considered as the 
expression of pain and pleasure) and, on the other hand, in the facial gesture. The 
systematic theory of the different passions can be tracked in western culture from 
Aristotle’s ethics to Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, through the works of Descartes 
or Spinoza. 
 
 The practical systematization of these passions, in the field of the human voice, is 
codified in the music of the Renaissance and the Baroque, especially in the tradition of 
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the Italian opera; and, in the field of human visage, it takes part in the apprenticeship of 
painting, as it is registered, for instance, in the work of Charles Lebrun on facial 
expressivity, which puts in visual terms the qualitative distinction of rage, pain, love, 
veneration, hope, admiration, etc. (ROSS, S: 1984, 25-47). The system of the human 
passions guides many visual allegories in painting, in the same way that the system of the 
seasons, the senses or the virtues, and all those systems are an image of the consistency 
of traditional culture. The painters represent these passions, and the viewers recognize it. 
Then, why should it be difficult for them to name an emotion or, in other words, to present 
it in figurative terms? Perhaps because, as happens with shared narratives, since a certain 
historic moment onwards, this scheme is no longer operative to express the feelings of 
the inhabitants of the industrial city. 
 
 In fact, this categorical scheme seems to be entirely damaged when, in the late 
years of the nineteenth century, Freud makes his “dissection of the Personality”. What 
Freud discovered there was not a system of qualified and differentiable emotions 
(jealousy, joy, sadness or melancholy), but a disqualified and abstract flow of desire 
─which he called libido─, disconnected from any particular object and, therefore, 
disposable to charge any real or imaginary one: “We cannot do justice to the 
characteristics of the mind by linear outlines like those in a drawing or in primitive 
painting, but rather by areas of colour melting into one another as they are presented by 
modern artists” (FREUD: 2001: XXI, 79). That means a breakdown of traditional 
Humanities and, therefore, another conception of humanity: this abstract and unqualified 
flow is a new image of man, as it appears in the undifferentiated flow of human labour 
that Marx wrote about, or in the naked humanity expressed in Herman Melville’s story 
about Bartleby, the Scrivener. This crisis in the pictorial representation of affections 
underlies the difficulty of naming the feelings of Hopper’s figures. 
 
 According to Fredric Jameson, in the late nineteenth century, an unknown 
affective tonality took the place of the old system of the human passions; an affection 
which cannot be named, because it is not in the traditional list of these emotions. If it was 
a mere negligence of classic authors, it could be easily remedied, finding its rightful place 
in the classification. But this addition is not possible because the new affection absolutely 
overwhelms the old code. Jameson says that, even if we cannot name it, it is possible to 
listen to this new tonality in the “Tristan’s chord” from the Prelude of Wagner’s Tristan 
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and Isolde (JAMESON: 2013, 39-44). Each time the melody begins, the listener clearly 
perceives the tonality and imaginatively joins the (musical) argument from the beginning, 
anticipating its possible ending; but each time the Tristan’s chord appears, the narrative 
is suspended, the tonality becomes undefinable, and the dominant and tonic notes are not 
identifiable, so the melody seems to dissolve in this uncertainty in the end of the piece. 
In the margin of the music sheet, Wagner wrote in 1859 these very significant words: 
 
Henceforth no end to the yearning, longing, bliss and misery of love: world, power, 
fame, splendour, honour, knighthood, loyalty and friendship, all scattered like a 
baseless dream; one thing alone left living: desire, desire, unquenchable, longing 
forever rebearing itself, ─a feverish craving: one sole redemption – death, surcease 
of being, the sleep that knows no waking! (WAGNER: 1995, 387). 
 
 Reading this sentence, it is clear that, in contrast to the passions excited by Verdi’s music, 
whose names we perfectly know by heart (pride, compassion, anger, fear and so on, can 
be seen in the character’s face and can be heard in his voice), here we confront an 
unnamed and non-representable emotion which has no qualitative divisions but a 
chromatically variable, undecidable and unstable intensive nature, with nothing to do with 
the old calculus of nameable passions. Although in a very different context, Hopper’s 
images are testimonies of this same crisis of emotions 
  
  Hopper’s use of colour range is also peculiar. He explains something of the 
technical procedure he follows in his interview with John Morse in 1959, confirming his 
fascination with light as a means of expression: 
 
I have a very simple method of painting. It's to paint directly on the canvas without 
any funny business, as it were, and I use almost pure turpentine to start with, adding 
oil as I go along until the medium bec omes pure oil. I use as little oil as I can possibly 
help, and that's my method (MORSE: 1959). 
 
 It is, indeed, a very simple method: the solvent, spread over the canvas, thickens and 
builds forms which remain always clear and transparent, because the weight of the colour 
is diluted, vibrating in a neutral brightness. Moreover, Hopper purges light of any traces 
of colour, using a brilliant white (zinc or lead white) without yellow pigment. Duncan 
Phillips, who purchased Sunday [Fig. 63] in 1926, said: “The light conveys the emotion 
which is a blend of pleasure and depression —-pleasure in the way the notes of yellow, 
blue-green, grey-violet and tobacco-brown take on a rich intensity in the clear air —and 
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depression induced by this same light and these same colors as we sense them through 
the boredom of the solitary sitter on the curb” (PHILLIPS: 1926). 
 
 I would say that Baudelaire names this unnamed emotion at the very beginning of The 
Flowers of Evil, in his dedication to the reader. There, the poet lists “the population of 
demons” contained in the human brain (rape, poison, the dagger, arson…), and he warns: 
 
Mais parmi les chacals, les panthères, les lices, 
Les singes, les scorpions, les vautours, les serpents, 
Les monstres glapissants, hurlants, grognants, rampants 
Dans la ménagerie infâme de nos vices, 
  
Il en est un plus laid, plus méchant, plus immonde! 
 Quoiqu’il ne pousse ni grands gestes ni grands cris, 
Il ferait volontiers de la terre un débris 
Et dans un bâillement avalerait le monde; 
  
C’est l’Ennui! — L’œil chargé d’un pleur involontaire, 
 Il rêve d’échafauds en fumant son houka. 
Tu le connais, lecteur, ce monstre délicat...118 
  
  Hopper’s Sunday could be considered as a visual comment on Baudelaire’s 
verses. This is the unnamed emotion whose name those who talk about voyeurism, 
alienation or loneliness seek: the dreadful fear of facing the permanent problem of 
freedom for those who had forgotten how to sing. What I said above about waiting and 
silence is reinforced when connected to boredom: “Waiting is, in a sense, the lined interior 
of boredom (…) we are bored when we do not know what we are waiting for (…) 
Boredom is the threshold to great deeds” (BENJAMIN: 1999-7, 855). 
 
 But, what is the great deed in Sunday [Fig.63]? As I have stated, Benjamin 
associates spleen (as another possible term to refer to the unnameable emotion) with the 
non-accomplished poems or prose texts of Baudelaire, that is to say, those in which the 
poet fails to revive the experience in the streets of the industrial city.  But these poems 
“are in no way inferior to those in which the correspondances celebrate their triumphs”. 
(BENJAMIN:2006, 335). I referred to them in chapter 1, suggesting that, in these cases, 
the poet manages to make out of this failure of poetry a poetics of the failure.  It is, in 
Benjamin’s words, a collapse of the experience which it is implausible to associate “with 
a visual image”, producing, as in Wagner’s Prelude, “a sense of boundless desolation”. 
                                                             
118Translation in Eli Siegel, Hail, American Development (New York: Definition Press, 1968). 
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These words of Benjamin are a comment on one line of Baudelaire poem Le gout du 
néant: “Spring, the beloved, has lost its scent” (Le Printemps adorable a perdu son 
odeur). This phrase could also be interpreted, in my view, in the sense that the word 
(“Spring”) has broken its link with the experience of the thing (the scent) and, therefore, 
it has become meaningless, because no image can fulfil it. And the converse produces the 
same feeling: to see something for which there are no words. 
 
 Seeing the thing without hearing its name and, in general, seeing without hearing, 
is, according to Simmel, an uneasiness “characteristic of the sociology of the big city” 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 341). Something of this kind seems to happen when we compare the 
title of Hopper’s Sunday with the scene represented in the canvas: “for someone who is 
past experiencing, there is no consolation” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 335). This lack of 
correspondence between voices and images is in the basis of the experience of the 
unnamed emotion: the nothingness, the inconsolable yearning of the desire which has lost 
its object, is the affective tonality of modernity. 
 
 Perhaps the most adequate comment to Hopper’s Sunday [Fig.63] was made by 
someone who, probably, never saw the picture: 
  
  
 The man who loses his capacity for experiencing feels as though he has been 
dropped from the calendar. The big-city dweller knows this feeling on Sundays. The 
bells, which once played a part in holidays, have been dropped from the calendar 
like the human beings. They are like the poor souls that wander restlessly but have 
no history (BENJAMIN: 2006, 336). 
 
 Somehow, Hopper captures the stillness of an apparently irrelevant moment where 
virtually anything could happen. Even Sunday. The holy event does not occur in the 
painting, but the failure of poetics could imply, in the painting, a poetics of the failure, as 
the vanishing of aura creates, following Benjamin, an aura of the vanishing. 
 
 Boredom, ennui or spleen are, in fact, possible names for the affective tonality of 
modernity, and they are also the content of the emotional charge of Hopper’s images. But 
the point —and what makes Hopper’s paintings valuable — is that spleen, ennui or 
boredom (words which are also synonyms of “poverty of experience”) are precisely what 
cannot be experienced in the city on display. They are not directly perceivable because 
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they are, so to speak, hidden behind the glass of shop windows; or better, we are protected 
against them by the complex of entertainment, ornament and spectacle, the orgy of 
exhibition value that is Erlebnis. This does not mean, however, that the bad infinity of the 
ornament is a remedy against ennui. The attitude of the passer-by who stops a minute to 
have a look at the shop window is not an alternative to boredom (as was storytelling with 
regard to routines of craftsmanship), but the very core of boredom itself, which shows its 
nature in these meaningless lapses. Paraphrasing Benjamin, it could be said that boredom 
is the quintessence of an entertainment that struts about in the borrowed garb of 
experience. When Hopper opens the windows, or when, as in Sunday, removes the glass 
from them, we can see what the city on display hides, i. e., that storefronts are always 
empty (or, at most, they only contain a cash register or a counter), because they are always 
ready to be emptied and refilled with different —but equivalent— items, just like hotel 
rooms, train cars and gas tanks. In this sense, Hopper’s paintings tell us what windows 
actually show, shed light on their emptiness. 
 
 When analysing House by the railroad [Fig.15], I suggested the presence, in 
Hopper’s works, of a “lost space” or a “lost time”, often submerged in a dark aura. This 
time is not before or after the present time, neither is this space inside nor outside actual 
space, but they are embedded in actual space and time in a seemingly aberrant way; and 
I said that, although perceived as something unattainable or irretrievable, it is as essential 
to the modern experience of homogeneous space and measurable time. In Sunday, this is 
the meaning of the sombre and empty shop windows in the background, in which the 
absence of any reflection makes invisible even the glass —the worst enemy of secrets. It 
belongs to the dark kingdom of that demon uglier than jackals, panthers or serpents, the 
exquisite monster who would “make rubbish of the earth” and would “swallow the word” 
in his yawning. The quiet man in Sunday, sitting on the wooden sidewalk out in the 
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CONCLUSIONS: AN INSTANT IN TIME, ARRESTED. 
 
 In the following pages, as a series of conclusions, I shall summarize the main 
results achieved throughout the dissertation, trying to highlight how it has helped to fill 
some gaps that had been, until now, unexplored in Hopper's literature.  At the end of these 




























 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
297 
 
 Edward Hopper was a silent man. This gives the rare statements he made about 
his work a particular value. Like his paintings, these statements are never spontaneous. 
On one hand, Hopper’s silence and reluctance attest that he did not consider necessary to 
verbalize the meaning of his painting; in other words, for him visual expression was 
enough. But Hopper’s silence before his paintings is connected with the silence that 
dominates most of his represented scenes. It could be said that he wants the viewer to 
listen to the silence. This could be interpreted as a sign of the claim for visual autonomy 
characteristic of modern painting. But it could also mean that the motifs he chooses, for 
some reason, escape words, as if they were beyond or below the verbalization threshold. 
The silence of Hopper about his works and the silence of Hopper’s works might remind 
us of the speechless soldiers described by Benjamin, who return home from the front lines 
unable to tell the things they have seen, because the transformation of the field of 
experience has placed them among things whose names seem to have lost their customary 
meaning —as happens with most of Hopper’s titles: “Sunday”, “Morning sun”, “Eleven 
A.M.”, etc. This loss of words is the key image to Benjamin for what he calls “poverty of 
experience” (BENJAMIN: 1996-7, 732), an expression that seems to match perfectly with 
the atmosphere of Hopper’s pictures (bare walls, empty streets, impersonal rooms, 
stereotyped interiors, deserted exteriors). 
 
 But, on the other hand, when Hopper finally gives up and decides to make a 
statement, he follows the same method as with his paintings: a lot of sketch work and an 
accurate execution. So, the statements are the result of long meditation and a very careful 
choice of adequate words. Once the words are spoken, as once the paintings are finished, 
Hopper gives no more explanations. He repeats them as a long-sought and fortunately 
found formula containing a treasured secret which, however, the audience often finds 
enigmatic. And this also reminds us of the effect of his paintings: they awake the feeling 
that a relevant message is contained in them, but at the same time it seems that this 
message is undecipherable. According to Brian O’Doherty, in the retrospective exhibition 
organized by Lloyd Goodrich at the Whitney Museum in 1964, Hopper asserted one of 
these infrequent comments on his paintings: “Each picture”, he said, “is an instant in time, 
arrested, and acutely realized with the utmost intensity” (O’DOHERTY: 1981, 133). 
Surely, Hopper was summarizing in this sentence something important about his 
intentions as an artist, but the words are far from being easy to interpret. In a sense, we 
could think of every painting, at least from the scenes on the ancient Greek vases onwards, 
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as the immortalization of an instant. However, what happens if, instead of thinking of 
classical artworks, we listen to Hopper’s words while looking at the impoverished 
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1. The ambivalence of the historical artwork 
 
 My critical framework to approach Hopper’s work is Walter Benjamin’s theory of 
the modern work of art, which I have discussed in the first Part of my thesis. The reason 
for this choice is that the conception of art exposed by Benjamin in On some motifs in 
Baudelaire (chapter 1) seems to be very close to the way in which Hopper understands 
the task of the artist, as can be concluded from his approach to visual reality. This can 
also be expressed by saying that Hopper, as an artist, although of course without using 
Benjamin’s terms, is engaged with the essential ambivalence of the artwork. Leaving 
aside what Benjamin calls prehistorical artworks, the historical works of art are composed 
by cult and exhibition values. Even if he is not fully aware of it, Benjamin’s definition 
implies that a painting has always an irresolvable ambiguity, so that exhibition value 
always needs to be “completed” by cult value and vice versa. I have proposed 
reformulating such a condition in these terms: what a painting shows always refers to 
what it tells —although this reference can be ‘dialectical’ or paradoxical, and what a 
painting tells always refers, (although this reference can be enigmatic or puzzling) to 
what it shows. But an explanation is needed to fix the meaning of these terms. 
  
 Benjamin’s expression exhibition value points to the condition of a work 
conceived to be shown to spectators. But it is clear that he thinks of exhibition value not 
only as the condition of a work able to be exhibited to someone, but also as the condition 
of a work which exhibits something. When he argues that photography, because of its 
higher exhibition value, replaced painting as a provider for decorative landscapes in the 
nineteenth century, this not only means that photographs are more accessible than 
paintings, but also that the representational content of such pictures becomes in this way 
more accessible. This reference of exhibition value to figurative data is even more clear 
when Benjamin presents the attempts of “pure art” to give up any representational content 
as attempts to achieve independence from exhibition value. And the German expression 
used by Benjamin to refer to “representational content” (gegenständlichen Vorwurf) could 
also be translated as “figurative content” or “figurative reference”. Benjamin does not 
discuss this question, but I focus on it to clarify the ambivalence of the historical work of 
art. 
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 The Cambridge Dictionary says that a painting or a drawing is figurative when it 
“represents something as it really looks, rather than in an abstract form”. The opposition 
“figurative/abstract” is clear, but the difficulty relies on the expression “as it really looks”. 
Many of the early manifestations of painting, undoubtedly considered as figurative, were 
representations of divinities, angels or miracles, and it is not plausible to think that they 
were based on such beings or events “as they really look”. Furthermore, Romanesque, 
Gothic or Baroque paintings were perceived by their viewers as representing things “as 
they really look”, notwithstanding the remarkable differences between the representations 
of the same subjects in such periods. This suggests that, as Ortega y Gasset wrote in 1950 
about Velázquez, visual reality is never perfectly finished —that is the difference between 
reality and myth (ORTEGA Y GASSET: 1989, 475). This gives the word “figuration” a 
meaning closer to one it has in expressions as “figurative language”: pictorial 
representation is not, thus, reproduction of reality, but a metaphorical or indirect 
figuration of it. This margin of uncertainty, I shall add, is what allows that very different 
representations can be perceived, in different times, as the valid representation of reality 
“as it really looks”, that is to say, as the visual reality that all the viewers share in common. 
But this recognition cannot be the exclusive result of the fact that it has representational 
content. To reduce the margin of uncertainty of reality (i.e., in order to appear as the valid 
representation of it), the picture needs also cult value: it needs to produce in the viewers 
a community of feelings related to tradition (and these feelings are what cannot be 
reduced to exhibition value). This validity is the value of cult value. For this reason, in 
the accomplishment of this validity, an important part is played by artists’ and poets’ sense 
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2. Between caricature and decoration: Hopper and American art 
 
 In the second Part of my dissertation I suggested that, in American painting during 
the early twentieth century, this community of feelings was often thought of as the 
community of American feelings, whether by focusing on American contents (the 
“American scene”) or by searching for the American spirit in the realm of formal features 
(Alfred Stieglitz’s circle). Hopper felt uncomfortable among the American scene painters 
who, in his terms, “caricatured America”. I have recalled that this reference to 
“caricature” might point to some paintings of Benton or Curry, which included Chaplin 
or Disney characters; but as he also suggests that if British or French painters had painted 
“the British scene” or “the French scene” they would have caricatured France or Great 
Britain, the reference becomes more meaningful. In the days when cult value in painting 
could be reduced to the ritual celebration of sacred history, the community of feelings 
gathered around it could be identified as the particular community which shared the 
religious belief. But, even if modern art can be seen as the secularization of religious 
practices, it is clear that, as a consequence or the Enlightenment, something important 
changed in this respect (chapter 1). 
 
 The community of feelings gathered by the artwork acquires in modern culture a 
more universal scope than it had in traditional societies: it is rather an aesthetic 
community which stands as a sensible symbol of the moral community of human beings, 
and therefore it cannot be confused with a concrete political society. This makes 
increasingly problematic the public recognition of the validity of the artwork. On one 
side, the increased complexity of aesthetic judgement produces the effect that some 
representations addressed to a particular community can appear —from an artistic point 
of view—  as “caricature”, that is to say, as non-realistic, paradoxically, precisely because 
they aim at representing a perfectly homogeneous community; on the other side, it widens 
the public discussion about cult value and triggers the birth of art criticism in its modern 
sense. 
 
 This issue is strongly attached to the American debate on cultural identity. I have 
signalled the relevance of Hermann Melville as a dominant figure in Lewis Mumford’s 
writings on American cultural tradition (chapter 3). And Melville wrote that 
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There is something in the contemplation of the mode in which America has been 
settled, that, in a noble breast, should forever extinguish the prejudices of national 
dislikes. Settled by the people of all nations, all nations may claim her for their own 
(…) We are not a narrow tribe of men, with a bigoted Hebrew nationality —whose 
blood has been debased in the attempt to ennoble it, by maintaining an exclusive 
succession among ourselves. No: our blood is as the flood of the Amazon, made up 
of a thousand noble currents all pouring into one (…) for unless we may claim all 
the world for our sire (…) we are without father or mother (MELVILLE: 1850: 214). 
 
 Closer to Hopper, his painting teacher Robert Henri stated: “My love of mankind 
is individual, not national, and always I find the race expressed in the individual. And so 
I am ‘patriotic’ only about what I admire, and my devotion to humanity burns up as 
brightly for Europe as for America” (HENRI: 2007, 141, quoted in chapter 3). In his essay 
on Baudelaire, Benjamin says that experience, “in the strict sense of the word” 
(Erfahrung) is experience of community, of collective memory. But the aesthetical (and 
tentatively ethical) community which recognizes itself in modern artworks is neither the 
traditional community nor the collective of members of a state, a nation or a social class. 
Benjamin himself seems to bear in mind something similar when he describes the 
community in which Baudelaire searched for his “fellow-creature” saying that “they do 
not stand for classes or any sort of collective; rather, they are nothing but the amorphous 
crowd of passers-by, the people in the street” (BENJAMIN, 2006, 321).  So, Hopper’s 
statement about caricature could be understood in the sense that, even accepting that 
feelings are socially constructed, in modern art they can hardly be reduced to national 
feelings. This is suggested by his conclusion that “the question of the value of nationality 
in art is perhaps unsolvable” (chapter 3). Of course, the community of feelings invoked 
by most of the American Scene painters was the restricted community of a white, male 
and middle-class America, but Hopper’s aesthetic opinion would have not changed if the 
‘caricatured America’ had appealed to a black, female or proletarian community, although 
in this case the artistic value had been sacrificed for the sake of good causes, as 
contemptuously said Baudelaire referring to Victor Hugo (chapter 2). 
 
 Furthermore, Hopper also showed his disagreement with the artistic American 
movements that searched for the American Mind in the cubo-futurist language and, later, 
with what he considered “the invention of arbitrary forms” in abstract painting. Goodrich 
says that Hopper never “conceded the fact that abstract art also had emotional and 
ideational content —to him it was just decorative” (GOODRICH: 1981, 126-127). I agree 
with the idea that Hopper overlooked the emotional content of abstract painting, but I 
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think that the reference to its decorative nature hides something deeper. Abstract painting 
uses to be understood as an expression of the inner world of the artist. So, why cannot be 
included in the realm of figuration, if it also seeks out an indirect representation of reality? 
The reason is that inner realities are not spatial beings and, therefore, they have not any 
visual appearance. In figurative painting, these internal emotions can only appear as what 
qualifies, disturbs or upsets the representational contents. But, when these internal 
emotions are to be expressed without reference to such contents, we are not dealing with 
figuration, but with the invention of a “figure” for something that does not have one. That 
is why Hopper speaks of “arbitrary inventions”. He certainly disregards the achievements 
of abstract painting, but although in an unkind language, he is identifying its main 
problem, which is not that the representational content is recognized as valid, but that the 
internal emotions expressed without figurative reference can be experienced by the 
viewers as the feelings of a community. It is when they fail to be recognized in this way 
when they risk becoming what Hopper called “arbitrary inventions”, or just “decoration” 
(chapter 3). It could be said that, for Hopper, when the constitutive ambivalence of the 
artwork is resolved in favour of exhibition value, it becomes a caricature, and when it is 
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3. About Hopper’s realism 
 
 This is a very important claim, because it does not only points to what Hopper 
considered “American art”, but to what he understood as “realist art”. The reason why he 
feels the American Scene as a caricature is the same underlying his view of the most of 
American literary fiction as a “vast sea of sugar-coated mush”, as noted in the third Part. 
Hopper makes this statement in support of Hemingway’s prose, which is generally 
characterized because it shows —with unusual straightforwardness and lack of 
sentimentalism— much more than it tells. There is no need to insist on the fact that, 
moving from literature to painting, a similar effect is characteristic of Hopper’s works: 
they also show much more than they tell, what brings us back to Hopper’s silence and to 
the definition of the pictures as instants arrested in time. Some of the scenes depicted in 
the Greek vases, to which I referred above, are representations of a particularly intense 
moment of an action that the viewer can tell, that is to say, the viewer knows what has 
happened before such moment and what will happen after it. The picture, so to speak, 
more than arresting an instant in time, aims at showing the tension that links the before 
and the after in a complete movement. In contrast, Hopper’s paintings are often described 
as “frames taken out of a sequence”, and it means that what they show is not an integral 
part of a narrative structure which could be evoked from the image depicted, but any 
instant whatever in the course of time —a time, so to speak, marked as non-relevant 
(chapter 7). For example: any assumption about what happened before or what will 
happen next to the scene represented in Nighthawks is arbitrary. In the instant depicted by 
Hopper nothing is happening. The figures are waiting and the argument is suspended. So, 
the weakening of the narrative background produces a decline of cult value and increases 
the exhibition factor, even if what is shown seems to be irrelevant. But paying attention 
to the non-relevant could be a relevant concern. I have suggested that the modern 
representation of time or, in Benjamin’s terms, the impoverished experience of time, is a 
succession of empty or irrelevant instants (chapter 1). What Benjamin calls poverty of 
experience is precisely the decay of the shared narratives which gave cultural time 
beginning, climax and denouement. The point is that Hopper excludes from his paintings 
any storyline and any kind of anecdote because the contrary would mean for him 
“caricature” or “sugar-coated mush”. And, as in the case of Hemingway’s prose, this is 
for him the keynote of realism (chapter 5). But “realism”, in art, cannot be identified as 
fidelity to a permanent and unchanged external reality, as if writers or painters of other 
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periods would have been alien to reality or farther from it than modern ones. It was reality 
itself what changed with technological and social revolutions. And this change operated 
a disruption in the balance of cult and exhibition values which articulated the frames of 
experience (chapter 7). In Baudelaire’s criticism of the Parisian Salon of 1859, the poet 
opposes those representations that “are closer to the truth because they are false” to the 
ones of the landscape painters, who “are liars precisely because they fail to lie” 
(BENJAMIN: 2006, 341). In my view, he is referring in the first case to a certain 
disenchantment of painting (chapter 6). These representations can be called “false” not in 
the sense that they lie to the viewer but, on the contrary, because they contain a self-
declaration of its fictional condition: not only they emphasise the flat surface of the 
canvas, but they also confess to the beholder, for example, that the figure in Manet’s 
Olympia is not a Goddess, but a model. In a similar sense, the explicit stage-design aspect 
of many of  Hopper’s pictures uncovers the painter’s artifice, and in this way they are 
“closer to the truth” than those others which, instead of searching for their 
acknowledgement as the visual shared reality in the community of feelings of the 
anonymous crowd, offer to a preselected community the myth of a perfectly finished 
reality (thus, they lie) and the prefabricated feelings that it explicitly demands (thus, they 
fail to lie)So, the silence of Hopper’s paintings strictly corresponds to what Benjamin 
defines as impoverishment of experience (decrease of cult value), but it also attests that 
this impoverishment is not only a negative phenomenon, but a result of the 
universalization or the community of feelings that the artwork looks for, and of the 
problematic nature that the aesthetic evaluation of the works acquires in this context. 
Taking as an example Monet’s painting Impression, sunrise (1872), I have argued that the 
title of the painting suggests in itself a certain balance of cult and exhibition values 
(chapter 2). The word Impression refers to the form of the representation (which 
concentrates its cult value). This formal treatment of visual reality makes that things seem 
to explode in coloured points. And, as I have recalled, it is not an arbitrary invention: 
reality was actually exploding in separate “impressions” at the rhythm of the 
technological fragmentation of experience, which is responsible for the fact that 
emotions, that in traditional culture were integrated in storytelling, lose an important part 
of their narrative support, becoming some sort of naked sensations. I have also referred 
to this condition as the progressive separation of the two ingredients of the classical 
concept of experience: sensation (direct contact with external reality), on one hand, and 
memory and imagination (integration of individual intuitions in a temporal meaningful 
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sequence), on the other (chapter 1). But, in Monet’s title, the word sunrise refers to the 
collective visual world, still recognizable behind such explosion of light and colour. So, 
although somehow perturbed, the balance between cult value (Impression) and exhibition 



























                                                             
119Although it might be a highly idealized view, probably we all tend to imagine classic artworks as 
examples of a perfect balance between telling and showing (or cult and exhibition), and this is, perhaps, an 
important part of the meaning of the term “classic” in the realm of painting. But probably modern painting 
cannot be thought but as a form of unbalance related to a classical point of equilibrium. 
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4. The rivalry between painting and photography 
 
 In Hopper’s mature paintings, very far from the impressionist palette of his 
Parisian years, one should say that the primacy of exhibition value is so marked that cult 
value (what the picture tells or its emotional charge) is nearly unidentifiable. Does it mean 
that the value of Hopper’s works can be reduced to exhibition value? I have suggested 
above that Hopper’s formula “an instant arrested in time” does not refer to narrative time, 
but to the experience of time as a succession of empty or irrelevant instants, that is to say, 
the modern experience of time. Now, I shall add that the visual experience of such a time 
is the keystone of photography and film technologies and, by extension, of a kind of visual 
perception which finds in technological reproducibility its model (chapter 6). Here is, to 
my view, the reason for the undeniable affinity of Hopper’s pictures with photography or 
film recognised in Hopper literature. After all, is not also the ambition of photography 
arresting an instant in time? Should we assume that, in Hopper’s statement, the “instant 
arrested in time” is not referred to the classical image of the artwork as the eternalization 
of a privileged moment but to the arbitrary dissection of whatever instants by means of 
the snapshot? 
 
  I have signalled in the third Part that many paintings considered as especially 
significant in art history have become visual icons (that is to say, have acquired a high 
exhibition value) because of technological reproduction. But a painting such as 
Nighthawks has not received such an overdose of exhibition value because of its 
signification in the history of art. On the contrary, it has been easily absorbed by 
photography and film as something already photographic or filmic. It seems that, while 
—for example— La Gioconda has lost a part of its original artistic authority because of 
technological reproductions, Nighthawks has acquired a sort of cult value precisely 
because of its reproducibility, giving the impression that the replicas are not the 
reproduction of a work not initially conceived for it, but “the reproduction of a work 
designed for reproducibility” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 106), and therefore prompting the 
notion of an influence of photography and film (specifically film noir) on Hopper’s 
painting (chapter 5). 
 
 But one should be careful with this notion, which I have discussed in the fifth 
chapter of my dissertation. Concerning the narrative arguments of film noir, which come 
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from the so-called “hard-boiled” American literary fiction, there is nothing in Hopper’s 
pictures that could suggest something like a criminal plot. So, the burden of proof for 
such influence lies exclusively with the film scenography. And although many analogies 
can be signalled in this sense, the vast majority of the cinematographic examples adduced 
in support of the claim post-date Nighthawks, and all signs indicate that, if there was an 
influence, it was in the opposite direction (what, in some cases, is documented): it is 
Hopper who influenced filmmakers. For this reason, I have suggested another way of 
thinking about this affinity of Hopper’s images and reproducibility (chapter 6). But to 
explain it I have to return to my argument on realism. I have just written that visual reality 
is never perfectly finished, and that this is the reason of the historic variations of the 
criterions of validity for visual representations. However, the emergence of photography 
seems to question this statement. It could be said that, in a sense, visual reality was not 
perfectly finished before photography, but photography, appearing as reproduction, not 
figuration, is perceived as a perfectly finished and profiled image of reality “as it really 
looks” (this is, I think, the meaning of my quotation of Deleuze in chapter 4 that 
photography “claims to reign over vision”). This claim is, for sure, in the basis of the 
harsh rivalry between photography and painting which was a major issue in the cultural 
debate of the late nineteenth century. According to Benjamin, most of the artistic 
movements appeared since then could be explained as the attempts of painting to create 
for itself a domain into which photography (and, afterwards, cinema) cannot follow 
(BENJAMIN: 1999-8, 6). 
 
 Benjamin suggests that the definition of the artwork given by the Baudelairean 
Paul Valéry is precisely constructed to grant the difference: “We recognize a work of art 
by the fact that no idea it inspires in us, no mode of behaviour it suggests we adopt, could 
ever exhaust it or dispose of it” (BENJAMIN: 2006, 337). To clarify the meaning of this 
sentence it should be added that, for Benjamin, it involves the assumption that artworks 
can be experienced as the only objects that, in the modern public realm, retain “the ability 
to look back at us”. And that is what Benjamin calls aura. I have exemplified this effect 
by the gaze of the figure in a portrait: the moral distance which characterises human 
relations is symbolized in it by the aesthetical remoteness of beauty (chapter 2). What the 
portrait’s figure reflects back to us is, says Benjamin, a gaze “of which our eyes never 
have their fill”, because it is made of the same stuff on which desire “continuously feeds”. 
The inexhaustibility of this gaze is the unapproachability of its remoteness, and artworks 
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live from this never-ending source, namely the aura. By means of the imitation of the 
human ability to look back, says Benjamin, art retrieves the beautiful “out of the depths 
of time”. On the contrary, photography is characterized by the reduction of distances 
(which I have considered, along with the loss of words, a feature of the poverty of 
experience). Photography brings closer things that, before its emergence, could only be 
seen, if ever, from afar, and it turns the inexhaustible remoteness of the gaze into a 
distance which can be reduced as necessary, suppressing ethical and aesthetical 
restrictions. The conclusion follows: “The distinction between photography and painting 
is therefore clear”, writes Benjamin, “to the gaze that will never get its fill of a painting, 
photography is rather like food for the hungry or drink for the thirsty” (BENJAMIN: 
2006, 338), that is, a substitute and ephemeral satisfaction which delays hunger till the 
next frame of the photo (or the film) roll, till the next snapshot, till the succeeding neon 
of “the next whisky bar” (as can be heard in Bertolt Brecht’s Mahagonny) or, it could be 
said, to the next diner, the next hotel room or the next gas station. So, what Benjamin 
summarizes as “the bad infinity of ornament” opposes to the inexhaustible endlessness of 
the aura (chapter 1). 
 
 But, could Valery’s definition be applied to the impoverished landscapes or to the 
empty eyes of the figures in Hopper’s paintings? Where is the remoteness of these 
pictures? Should not it be said, instead, that they are the result of the reduction of distances 
and the vanishing of the aura? Are not the spaces represented in Hopper’s pictures much 
closer to the bad infinity of the serial diners than to the “gaze of which our eyes never 
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 5. Three remarks on Hopper and technological reproducibility 
  
 My first remark on the affinity of Hopper’s pictures and reproducibility is that it 
does not concern the painting itself, but what is represented in it. As with other paintings, 
Hopper insisted on the fact that the diner appearing in Nighthawks is not a particular place 
existing in Greenwich Village or in another New York neighbourhood. At first sight, this 
could be related to Hopper’s method of “painting from memory”, starting from multiple 
direct observations and sketches later depurated in the studio. But in this case the lack of 
particularity involves something else: the object depicted (the hotel room, the diner or the 
gas station) is in itself the result of abstraction (chapter 5). It is a generic space (“the 
American diner”, in the case of Nighthawks). There is not an original diner that other 
commercial premises imitate or reproduce, but a large series of reproductions of a concept 
or a scheme. Because of this, everyone recognizes it as “already seen”: the American 
diner was familiar to most Americans in Hopper’s times, and it has been reproduced all 
over the world with the help of Hollywood movies. So, the affinity of Nighthawks with 
reproducibility has not to do with the form of the painting, but mainly with its contents. 
 
 My second remark on this issue concerns Hopper’s realism, which I have 
characterised by a sort of ‘coldness’ and lack of sentimentalism and by a predominance 
of exhibition value (it shows more than it tells). Now I shall be more precise: one cannot 
paint something which belongs to the sphere of reproducibility in the same way that one 
can paint from nature, because reproducibility has not only transformed reality, but also 
its perception. When Benjamin says that the technological impoverishment of experience 
is a change in the structure of perception, he is not saying that the use of machines 
modifies the neuro-biological organs of sensation. He is saying, I argue, that it transforms 
the way in which human subjects imagine their perception of the world (film technology 
affects “the manner in which, by means of this apparatus, man can represent his 
environment”, BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 114). During the course of history, technology, 
based on the knowledge of nature existing at each period, is not only a tool for adapting 
to the environment or dominating nature. It is also a means for imagining the operation 
of nature. The ancients imagined nature as a large living being because animals were their 
main available technology to manage their environment, in the same way as the moderns 
imagined nature as a machine because machines were their main tool for its 
transformation. Technologies of image reproduction depend on a particular state of 
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scientific knowledge (Mechanics) in which time, in its mathematical formulation, is 
represented as an infinite series of empty, equal and disqualified instants, not linked to 
any contents, and therefore they involve this image, which is the basis of the modern 
experience of time. That is why photography and film technologies condensate the visual 
experience of such a time. 
 
 Benjamin clearly argues that, considered as mere reproductions, photography and 
film have exclusively exhibition value, which for him means that they have nothing to do 
with beauty. On the contrary, they have to do with the practical need for managing an 
experience which, as a result of the technological transformation of the social realm, has 
lost its traditional support and has turned itself into some kind of obstacle course in which 
perception is constantly menaced by the lack of continuity (what Benjamin calls 
“experience of shock”, Chockerfahrung). The paradigm of the perceptual skills required 
to manage everyday life in the urban-industrial space and in the new means of transport 
is, for Benjamin, the technological training of perception. The main achievement of this 
training is what Benjamin calls Erlebnis, a new kind of experience (Chockerlebnis) which 
allows modern individuals to reconstruct, with the fragments captured in their activity, a 
substitute for the lost totality of traditional experience. Erlebnis is, in Benjamin’s terms, 
the protective shell in which the modern gaze —“the protective eye”— looks for shelter 
from the fragmentation of experience. Among other modern industrially constructed 
spaces, the diner in Nighthawks is an architectural incarnation of Erlebnis: a big glass 
window is a defensive tool against an Erfahrung which has become dangerous because 
of the lack of a shared experience (chapter 1). The physical isolation not only means 
loneliness, but also protection from the unqualified risk of the shocks that tear apart 
experience in the street: this indeterminate danger of the city, and not a particular criminal 
event or gangster plot, is the dark mood floating over Nighthawks’ diner. 
 
 And if diners are an urban incarnation of Erlebnis, the inhuman eye of the camera 
is the right way to visually perceive the new mechanical reality of space and time. The 
camera, which is made to reproduce, is the adequate gaze to capture things originally 
made to be reproduced. Benjamin says that “objects made of glass have no aura”. He is 
referring to buildings with “rooms in which it is hard to leave traces” (BENJAMIN: 1996-
7, 734), as seems to happen in the diner in Nighthawks, completely wrapped in glass. And 
I have argued that the protective shell of Erlebnis can be imagined as if made of glass 
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because its vision can be imagined as if safeguarded by the glass of the camera’s lens, as 
an allegory of the coldness of the photographic way of seeing (chapter 6). So, Hopper’s 
painting is not just visual knowledge of reality, but visual knowledge of previous visual 
knowledge, of a reality already transformed into some sort of savage cinema by new 
mechanical media. It could be said that Hopper’s painting is not realistic because it 
depicts an immediate reality, but because immediate reality is no longer accessible but 
through the reproductive mechanism. When photography becomes “the standard 
evidence” for real facts, “because of the thoroughgoing permeation of reality with 
mechanical equipment (…), the equipment-free aspect of reality here has become the 
height of artifice” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 112). And my last remark about this matter is 
that, for this reason, Hopper needs an “inner cinema” as an artifice to paint 
“realistically” reproducible reality (chapter 6). 
 
 Therefore, I have argued an internal connection (rather than a biographical or 
external one) between Hopper’s painting and cinema. And this kind of connection cannot 
be explained in terms of influence but as a way of accounting for a visual reality produced 
by technological media, corresponding with the physical reality of a city erected by 
industrial machinery. Hopper’s realism must be understood as the painting of a 
reproduction. Doubtless, this has contributed to the widespread influence of Hopper’s 
scenes in films and has provided many of his paintings with a high coefficient of 
reproducibility. But this attention to what is represented in Hopper’s paintings has also 
undermined, due to its overexposure, the visibility of the representation of such subjects 
(that is to say, the fact that Hopper does not reproduce, but he paints reproducibility). 
Because the diner represented in the painting belongs to the realm of reproducibility, often 
the painting is overlooked as if it was some kind of a reproduction exclusively defined by 
exhibition value. But the fact that Hopper was aware of visual clichés of his times does 
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6. Art as photography? 
 
 In sum, I am pointing to an alternative relationship between photography (or film) 
and painting, and a different form influence, although in quite hermetic terms, is 
suggested by Benjamin in his Little history of photography. There, he signals an exception 
to his general affirmation that photography destroys the aura: the early photographs from 
the nineteenth century. The essence of his argument is contained in this statement: 
 
No matter how artful the photographer can be, no matter how carefully posed his 
subject, the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny 
spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared 
the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long-
forgotten moment the future nests so eloquently that we, looking back, may 
rediscover it (BENJAMIN: 1999-5, 510). 
 
 It is clear that Benjamin’s vocabulary in this quotation belongs to the realm of the 
aura: the “here and now” takes part in his definitions of the phenomenon120 and, as I have 
just underlined, the capability to look back is also characteristic of it. But I should ask: is 
the “inconspicuous spot” mentioned by Benjamin only a temporary feature of primitive 
photography, which will disappear soon after, “as the exhibition value (…) shows its 
superiority to the ritual value” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 108)? I am not suggesting that, 
contrary to what Benjamin affirms, every photograph retains the aura. I agree with what 
he says when talking about Atget’s photographs, so appreciated by the Surrealists and by 
Berenice Abbot: “they suck the aura from reality like water from a sinking ship” 
(BENJAMIN, 1999-5, 518). Rather I am suggesting that this sinking ship is another 
metaphor for the vanishing of the aura. The same historical reasons which prevented 
Baudelaire from trying to follow the traces of Lamartine, Hugo or Musset in order to be 
a great poet, make the Ferne of the romantic view (Fernsicht) of this ship appear as a lie 
(as Baudelaire felt about the landscapes of the Salon of 1859) or, in other words, as a 
counterfeit experience (Erlebnis). In modern times, the remoteness of that ship can only 
be experienced when it is sinking, and can only be captured as the water which is bailed 
to keep it afloat. 
 
                                                             
120“(…) its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be. This unique 
existence of the work of art determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its 
existence” (BENJAMIN: 2002-2, 102). 
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 Benjamin claims that we must discard the unfruitful debate of “photography as 
art” and turn to look at “art as photography” (BENJAMIN: 1999, 520). How to understand 
this strange turn? I argue that this does not mean that art should be replaced by 
photography (although Benjamin sometimes seems to be inclined to this conclusion), but 
a more complex idea. Whatever had happened in previous periods, now art cannot ignore 
the new industrial reality, the mechanical space and time which has become a sort of 
second nature whose visual perceptibility is being constructed by the new technological 
media. 
 
 Photography no longer rivals with painting for the representation of reality, it aims 
at visually constructing the new (technologically produced) reality. The fact that, even so, 
as Benjamin signals, captions are needed to interpret photographs, attests that 
photography still belongs to the realm of figuration (and, according to the upholders of 
artistic photography, it can never be reduced to a merely mechanical reproduction). Or, in 
other words, it attests that, considered as a mere reproduction, it lacks the dose of cult 
value necessary to awaken a community of feelings. 
 
 This photographic perception is an impoverished experience because it discards 
the “tiny spark of contingency” in order to make manageable the new reality. And this 
can be expressed, in Benjamin’s language, by saying that technological reproducibility, 
so to speak, instilled in perception, results in an image which has only exhibition value, 
with no trace of cult value. In this new environment, art has to search for the 
“inconspicuous spot” wherein the future nests in a long-forgotten moment so that we may 
rediscover it. This spot is what turns into experience (Erfahrung) what had become 
inexperience (Erlebnis). 
 
 By formulating the hypothesis of an “inner cinema” in Hopper, I am not arguing 
that Hopper paints a photographic or filmic reproduction of his subject, but that he paints 
the subject as if observed by the protective eye whose privileged allegory is the camera. 
When analysing House by the railroad in the Part II of the dissertation, I proposed to 
consider it “as if it was an instant photograph taken through the train window” or “as if 
the canvas was a camera”, but I emphasised that I was referring to the metaphorical 
presence of an internal camera (not a direct external influence). In Part III, I reformulated 
my hypothesis in the terms of Richard Wollheim’s thesis that a certain kind of paintings 
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allow the external spectators to enter the represented scene imaginatively if they identify 
themselves with a metaphorical (unrepresented) internal spectator for whom the painter 
would have constructed a place near the viewpoint from which the scene is painted. My 
proposal, thus, is that, if an internal spectator can be located in some Hopper’s pictures, 
such spectator should be imagined as a metaphorical camera, that is to say, as a 
protective eye. 
 
 Notwithstanding the parallelism with Wollheim’s theory, this proposal presents 
some significant differences with it. The main one is that Wollheim’s internal beholders 
are total spectators, i.e., they play, in painting, the same role that the omniscient narrators 
play in literature, so that, by means of imaginative identification with them, the readers 
or the viewers gain total access to the represented space due to privileged spectatorship. 
In contrast, in Hopper’s paintings the position of the total (internal) spectator is excluded 
(or challenged), not in the sense that there is no internal spectator at all, but because the 
internal spectator is the inhuman gaze of the camera: as happens in journalism or in the 
kind of realist fiction that Hopper admired, the “voice” of the storyteller is excluded or 
minimized in order to grant the cold objectivity of the viewpoint. So to speak, nobody is 
looking; or, in other words, anybody — not a privileged spectator, but anybody who can 
peer through the camera’s viewfinder “window”— can look. And this does not only affect 
those who watch, but also those who are watched. Included in my hypothesis is that it is 
possible to gain a better understanding of Hopper’s painting if we imagine the figures in 
the scene as if they were film actors in the studio during a shooting session, what is 
something very different of comparing them to stage actors (chapter 6). The reason is that, 
as Benjamin states, while stage actors are always surrounded by the aura of their 
characters (that is to say, their role in the play), film actors in the studio are not yet any 
character and do not play a precise role (these matters will be only resolved in the editing 
process after the shooting). 
 
 Here lies, to my mind, a possible explanation for the fact that the returning of the 
gaze “of which our eyes never have their fill” is absent from most of Hopper’s paintings. 
If the auratic perception is, according to Benjamin, the experience of the returning of the 
gaze coming from an unanimated being (for example, a painting), what we find in these 
empty eyes is exactly the opposite: the expectation of such returning is disappointed when 
we look at a human being, as it is masterly illustrated in Walker Evans’ subway portraits 
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(chapter 6). My suggestion is that the failure of the returning of the gaze is not a casual 
but a structural feature in modern painting. And this is the strange charm that we find in 
the empty eyes of so many of Hopper’s figures. The appeal of this body without an owner, 
or these eyes without a gaze, constitutes the properly modern experience of the aura, that 
is to say, the experience of its vanishing. And the charm of these eyes which know nothing 
of remoteness is what, in Hopper nudes, detaches sexus from eros (BENJAMIN: 2006, 
339): as it can be especially observed in A woman in the sun, the figure’s nudity is stark 
and almost cruel (although not obscene). This starkness is not only related to the cool 
tones used: it is an effect of the reduction of the distance and the corresponding increase 
of exhibition value, the camera-like coldness which turns the implicit charm of eroticism 
into the explicit appeal of sex (chapters 7 and 8). 
 
 Nevertheless, as happens with Wollheim’s internal spectator, Hopper’s internal 
camera is a spectator in motion (the horizontality or the obliqueness of the camera moving 
over rails as if in a travelling shot). And this mobile (internal) spectatorship, that is to say, 
the assumption of a mobile point of view, could be also the reason of the perspectival 
incongruences observed in the Hopper literature: the rivalry of different horizon lines 
which produces fluctuation between parallel and oblique planes, the unstable position of 
the spectator, the lack of spatial continuity or the visual uncertainty about the standpoint. 
These ‘incongruences’ are the equivalent, in Hopper’s works, of the “tiny spark of 
contingency” or the “inconspicuous spot” mentioned by Benjamin. They are not features 
of what is represented in the painting (its exhibition value), but of the painting itself. My 
aim is not to reduce Hopper’s painting to a camera-like vision of the city, but, on the 
contrary, to argue that the fact of painting (not reproducing) this “inhuman” gaze makes 
it accessible to experience and, therefore, in a certain sense it humanizes such vision. 
 
 What the modern artist looks for is neither the sublime remoteness of romantic 
landscapes nor the infinite snapshots of the flashing neon which mark the blink of the city 
streets, made just to turn all remoteness into a reducible (and reproducible) distance and, 
if possible, in an instant immediacy. In Baudelaire’s writing about the Perte d’auréole, 
the poet’s halo has fallen in the mire of the macadam. Likewise, the broken aura of 
contemporary things does not inhabit the moving red neon sign to which they are reduced 
in the twentieth century’s urban scenery, but the “fiery pool reflecting in the asphalt” its 
light (BENJAMIN: 1996-5, 476). Hopper’s painting is, so to speak, this reflection. The 
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inexperience —the “instant arrested in time”— can be reduced to exhibition value, but 
— this is Hopper’s commitment— it can also be painted. This might be the meaning of 
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7. “With the utmost intensity” 
 
 The camera’s eye does not expect a returning gaze —it avoids such return. But we 
(the external spectators) do. And the fact that our expectation is disappointed is what 
provokes the fanciful projection of possible plots or denouements of the represented 
scenes. All of them are, so to speak, the attempts of the spectator to attract the attention 
—the gaze— of the empty eyes of the figures in the glass cell. And all of them fall apart 
one after the other as we study the painting. The reason is that, for Hopper, such a happy 
end would be a “trick ending”, as he says about the “sugar-coated” American fiction 
(chapter 5). 
 
 Hopper’s silence is hard to bear —not only for critics, but also for viewers. So, a 
lot of soundtracks have been proposed to avoid it. The repeated efforts of Hopper’s 
interpreters to fill the painting with stories are attempts to correct the incongruences 
alluded to above and to ease the tension (or, as we might also say, to ease the pain of the 
poverty of experience), as are the never-ending “re-contextualizations”. These efforts 
express the mourning for the diminishing of meaning as a consequence of the ruin of the 
shared stories and the crisis of the conventions about figuration of emotions to which I 
have referred in Part IV. But they also express the struggle for healing this pain appealing 
to substitute arguments, being the main ones the social plot of alienation and the 
psychological plot of loneliness. The paintings seem to be especially amenable to all these 
readings, in the same way that they appear particularly appropriate for film quotations 
and reproduction in advertisements, popular culture and gadgets. The point is that, 
whereas the viewer fights to reconstruct the storyline as he tries to reconstruct the horizon 
line to stabilize the self, Hopper does not permit this correction. And, as those who make 
such claims confess, if these issues are pursued to the end, the plot breaks down, because 
Hopper rejects such substitution. For this reason, the various readings hung on Hopper’s 
works do not have longevity. In contrast to Benjamin, Hopper did not intend to put art at 
the service of good (or wrong) causes —denouncing alienation and loneliness or 
promoting American identity—, but conceived of his work as a visual investigation about 
the modern gaze (chapter 4). 
 
 Photography and film are the perfect visual embodiment of Erlebnis. And Erlebnis 
implies a reconstruction of experience, based on pragmatic motivations, which I have 
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compared with the film editing process: the isolation of the perceptions that the conscious 
mind can control, and its relocation in a consistent temporal sequence by giving up the 
integrity of experience in order to avoid a traumatic risk. That is to say, Erlebnis is like a 
selective montage of the Erfahrung made of shocks. Although it calms the tension for a 
while, it is “sterilized” for artistic purposes, says Benjamin, because experience is absent 
from it. Benjamin calls this pragmatic reconstruction an impoverished experience 
because, as happens in the film editing process, the price to be paid for the consistency of 
such reconstruction is the removal of the discordant fragments of experience incompatible 
with it —the tiny spark of contingency—, which remain unexperienced. The protective 
eye cannot go beyond the glass of the window —i.e., through the glass of the lens—, 
which is the protective shell of Erlebnis. 
 
 When Hopper paints this protective shell (not only the diner, the hotel room or the 
gas station, but each one of these subjects “as it really looks”, that is to say, the way in 
which they are perceived), the painting of Erlebnis is not itself Erlebnis, but Erfahrung, 
experience, because it makes visible the incongruences set apart in the pragmatic 
reconstruction (so to speak, it shows some of the frames discarded by the editor). I have 
just said that Erlebnis is the montage of experience, but this editing process should not be 
considered just as an individual strategy to manage the fragmentation of experience, but 
as a collective attempt to create an illusion of historical continuity. Also in this case in 
contrast to Benjamin, Hopper does not try to find another kind of montage (i.e., he does 
not appeal to another vision of history). By means of painting, he dismounts the editing 
process —so the incongruences appear— to make a genuine experience of the visual 
debris of modernity, the discarded images threw away by the restless activity of the 
protective eye (the montage of the city), which have never been transformed into Erlebnis. 
These are Hopper’s “instants arrested in time”. So, the task of the painter is close to the 
one of the ragman —so often invoked by Benjamin— who collects fragments of 
disregarded urban views to compensate for the poverty of his experience (chapter 8). The 
fact that such visual fragments are silent scenes could be (metaphorically) explained 
because such fragments are precisely the ones that have been excluded from 
synchronization with the soundtrack of the city tale (so, the voice which tells the story 
cannot be heard in them, or the captions which imprint a meaning to images cannot be 
read). What is represented in Hopper’s pictures  is “what modern man sees”. But the 
(pictorial, not photographic) representation of what modern man sees makes visible in 
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the subjects the “tiny spark of contingency”, the “inconspicuous spot”, the visual 
incongruences or the fissures in the glass lens —in other words, what modern man does 
not see: the failures in the protective activity of Erlebnis. Hopper’s windows are his entire 
recollection of the failures of visual Erlebnis in the modern city (chapter 8). Arresting 
these instants, Hopper liberates them from their subordination to the storyline. That is 
why they are silent. 
 
 Hopper’s scenes are always dominated by homogeneous space and measurable 
time. But, by arresting an instant or by isolating a place, he manages to make appear a 
kind of silent “lost time” or “lost space” that, although excluded from the plausible and 
protective reconstruction of experience by conscious perception, can be recognised by the 
viewers as an unnoticed but extended part of their experience of space and time: the 
waiting spaces of inactivity, the empty times of boredom (chapter 8). Neither is this time 
before or after any other time (it seems to be out of the chronological series, “arrested”), 
nor is this space (like windows) inside or outside actual space. As essential to the modern 
experience as homogeneous space and measurable time, lost spaces and times are 
perceived as something unattainable or irretrievable. Hopper often emphasises this 
condition by a metaphorical visual barrier, like the tracks of House by the railroad or the 
Nighthawks’ glass window which seem to exclude from reality what is beyond such 
barrier (chapters 4 and 6). But, instead of suggesting the kind of remoteness that Benjamin 
attributes to the aura, it surrounds the subjects with a dark shadow or a menacing look, so 
that what lies on the other side of the barrier acquires the condition of uncanny. I have 
argued that this barrier can be imagined as the frontier of modernity (that is to say, the 
transformation of space and time and, therefore, of perception). Once this frontier has 
been crossed, there is no turning back except where there is a failure of the self-defensive 
mechanism of Erlebnis; in such a case, lost times and places return as uncanny, what is 
the same as saying that Hopper tells, by means of them, not a scene without aura, but the 
lack of aura of the scene. I would say, paraphrasing Benjamin, that a picture without cult 
value (a picture which does not tell anything) is one kind of representation, but a picture 
which represents such deprivation is another. 
  
 In the syntactic dimension of the paintings that have been analysed in this 
dissertation, the abovementioned compositional incongruences relate to the vagueness of 
the horizon line, the instability of volumes and the uncertainty regarding the viewer’s 
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position. In the semantic dimension, they refer to the dissolution of the storyline in frozen 
frames without resolution of the tension, and to the impenetrability of the meaning of the 
scene. The painting is not Erlebnis (it could not be, because Erlebnis is aesthetically 
sterilised). The painting is Erfahrung, but not Erfahrung without Erlebnis (which might 
be a definition of abstract painting), but Erfahrung of Erlebnis. That is why it contains a 
high dose of exhibition value, but not only exhibition value. To paint Erlebnis means to 
make the experience of the in-experience, to make in-experience (the poverty of 
experience) accessible to experience. The camera’s eye shows us a scene without aura. 
The painter’s eye, when painting this “inhuman” gaze, tells us the lack of aura of the 
scene (this is the painting’s cult value). The difference between both operations could 
seem a small variance, but it contains the secret of Hopper’s painting. The protective eye 
of the camera-like gaze surrounds the subject in a glass cell; but the painter’s eye cannot 
be a protective one (chapters 2 and 6). Because of this, the instant arrested in time must 
be acutely represented “with the utmost intensity”. Painting breaks the protective shell 
provoking the sombre mood emanating from Hopper’s scenes. 
 
 Precisely because Hopper’s intention is not, as it was the case in avant-gardism, 
to overcome the very notion of “art”, his oils fit in Benjamin’s category of historical 
works of art, that is to say, their exhibition value is referred to their cult value. Of course, 
this reference is shocking, because, given the irrelevance and emptiness of the represented 
“instant arrested in time”, it could be thought that cult value is absent from the picture. 
But even when cult value is (in whole or in part) missing, the painting shows, in the failure 
of the reference, its own inability to tell a story121. If the failure is not a casual 
disappointment, but an intended feature —as it seems to be the case in twentieth-century 
realism—, I argue that it can be interpreted as synonymous with “vanishing of the aura”. 
 
                                                             
121What Hopper overlooks about modern abstract painting is that it also belongs to the realm of the historical 
works of art. In my dissertation, I have used Benjamin’s distinction of cult and exhibition values to develop 
another kind of impoverishment of experience not envisaged by him.  I could summarize it by saying that, 
even if cult value is the main concern of abstract painting, it is never self-sufficient —the canvases are 
conceived for exhibition. What an abstract painting tells about internal emotions always refers, (although 
this reference can be inscrutable or perplexing) to what it shows. And even when exhibition value is 
(completely or partially) missing, the painting shows, in the failure of such reference, its own inability to 
show a shared recognisable and communicable world. In twentieth-century pictorial abstraction this 
frustration is not an unexpected setback, but a systematic result, and this is another expression of the 
vanishing of the aura. This reinforces what I have called the essential ambivalence of modern painting, that 
is to say, its insurmountable twofold condition. 
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 But, how could a non-relevant instant reunite a community of feelings? In the case 
of Hopper, I have argued that this community is closer to what Georges Bataille called 
the community of those deprived of a community (BLANCHOT: 1984, 9) or, as could be 
also said, the community of those who only have in common their poverty of experience. 
This experience (Erfahrung) is what the Erlebnis piously hides behind its strenuous 
protective action to prevent shocks, trying to deny its poverty (its lack of Erfahrung) and 
pretending to fill its emptiness with the ornamental infinity of protective eye; but this 
reparation can never be achieved. Indeed, it cannot even make a modest progress, 
because, as in the Danaids’ punishment, the basin has no bottom and loses its content at 
the same time that is filled, compulsively repeating “the process of continually starting 
over” of the clock from which is trying to escape, blocking in each attempt the access to 
the only thing which could fill the empty vessel or stop the bad infinity of the conveyor 
belt. This thing — which, in fact, is no-thing— is, in the most fortunate case, what I called 
“the accomplished poem”, a compound of poetic time which halts the assembly line or 
the hypnotic ornament; when this accomplishment fails —and perhaps this is the most 
genuine nature of the modern artwork—, the poem or the painting is a procedure to turn 
that failure into a communicable experience. In both cases, art is another way of surviving 
the poverty of experience without denying its reality or, in other words, without rejecting 
or overcoming modernity. 
  
 Although I do think I have answered the major questions I proposed throughout 
the chapters, further developments are possible. I feel that this research has opened the 
road to new fields of investigation which could benefit from the approach I have 
developed. The concept of poverty of experience and the polarity cult/exhibition, as they 
have been reinterpreted in this thesis and as they have been enriched by the analysis of 
Hopper’s works, could inspire the continuation of work at least in two main paths. The 
first one, which I would call ‘historical’, could be an investigation of American modern 
painting in the decades of 1960 and 1970, especially focused on Pop art, which many 
times I have felt very appealing while I was writing my dissertation on Hopper. This 
would deal, so to speak, with the posterity of aura in postmodernism and with the 
conflictive developments towards conceptualism. The other direction, which I would call 
‘thematic’, would consist of an extension of the focus to other European and American 
artists who share the same period considered in this dissertation, which could help to 
 Hopper beyond the commonplace 
323 
 
complete the map of the artistic options in the interwar period and to expand the limits of 
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[Fig. 1] Edward Hopper, Morning in a city, 1944, oil on canvas, Williams College Museum of  
art, Massachusetts, 112.5 x 152 cm. 





[Fig.3] C.Monet, Impression, sunrise, 48 x 63cm, Marmottan Monet Museum, Paris  




[Fig.5]  A. Stieglitz, The hand of  Man,1902 Gelatine silver print, 8,9x11,9 cm The Art Institute 
of  Chicago 
[Fig.6]  R. Henri,  Sylvester – Smiling, 1914,  61 x 50.8 cm., Private Collection. 
[Fig. 7] E. Hopper, Manhattan Bridge Loop, 1928,  88.9 cm × 152.4 cm, Addison Gallery of  
American Art, Andover, MA. 
[Fig. 8] J. Sloan, A Window on the street, 1912, 66 x 81.28 cm.,  Bowdoin college Museum 
[Fig.9] E. Hopper, The City, 1927, 93.98 x 69.85 cm University of  Arizona Museum of  Art 
[Fig.10] J. Sloan, Six O'clock, Winter, 1912, 66.36 x 81.28 cm, Philips Collection, 
Washington, DC, US;   
[Fig.11] E. Hopper, Railroad Train, 1908,61.6 cm × 73.66 cm.,  Addison Gallery of  
American Art, Andover MA 
[Fig.12] J. Sloan, Sunset, West-Twenty third Street , 1906, 61.91 x 92.1 cm, Joslyn  Art Museum, 
Omaha Nebraska 
[Fig.13] E. Hopper, City Roofs, 1932, 73.7 × 91.4 cm,  Whitney Museum of  American Art , 
New York; 
[Fig.14] E. Hopper, Roofs in Washington Square, 1926, 33.34 × 49.37 cm, Carnegie Museum, 
Pittsburgh 
                                                             
122 Unless indicated otherwise, the works are oil on canvas. 
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[Fig.15] E. Hopper, House by the Railroad, 1925, 73.7 x 61 cm , Museum of  Modern Art, 
New York 
[Fig.16] E. Hopper, American Landscape, 1920, Etching, 31.1 x 18.4 cm, Philadelphia 
Museum of  Art 
[Fig.17] E Hopper, Queensborough Bridge, 1916, 88.9x152.4cm. Whitney Museum of  
American Art 
[Fig.18] Edward Hopper, Le Pont Royal, 1909, 61 cm × 73.8 cm, Whitney Museum of  
American Art, New York 
[Fig.19]  E. Hopper From Williamsburg Bridge, 1928,74.6 cm × 111.1 cm,  Metropolitan 
Museum of  art. 
[Fig.20] Edward Hopper, Corn Hill, 1930, 72.39 x 107.95 cm , McNay Art Institute,San 
Antonio 
 [Fig.21] E. Hopper, Railroad Sunset, 1929, 74.5 cm × 122.2 cm, Whitney Museum of  
American Art, New York 






[Fig.23] Edward Hopper, Nighthawks, 1942, 84.1x 152.4 cm, Art institute of  Chicago 
[ Fig.24] The savage eye (Strick, Maddow and Meyer, 1960) 
[Fig.25]  W. Evans, South Street, New York, 1956, Gelatin silver print 16.2 x 25.1cm., Private 
Collection.  
[Fig.26] E. Hopper, Night Shadows, 1921, 17.6 x 20.7cm, etching, Museum of  Modern Art 
[Fig. 27] Dial 1119 (Mayer, 1950) 
[Fig.28] The Killers (Siodmak, 1946) and Nighthawks details (Hopper, 1942) 
[Figs. 29] The Killers (Siodmak, 1946), Nighthawks (Hopper, 1942) and Gas (Hopper, 1940) 
[Fig. 30] E. Hopper, Office at night, 1940, 56.4 cm × 63.8 cm, Walker Art Center, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
[Fig.31] E. Hopper, Pennsylvania coaltown, 1947,71.12x 101.6 cm, Butler Institute of  
American Art Ohio 
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[Fig.32] E. Hopper, Chop suey, 1929, 81.3 x 96.5, Private Collection 
[Fig.33] E. Hopper,  House at dusk, 1935, 127 x 92.71 cm, Virginia Museum of  Fine Arts, 
Richmond. 
[Fig. 34] E. Hopper, Apartment houses ,1923, 60.96 x 73.5 cm, Pennsylvania Academy of  
Fine Arts 
[Fig. 35] E.  Hopper, Cape Cod Morning, 1950, 86.7 x 102.3 cm, Smithsonian American Art 
Museum 
[Fig.36]  E. Hopper, August in the city, 1945, 58.4x76.2 cm, Norton Museum of  Art, Florida 
[Fig.37] E. Hopper,  Drug Store, 1927101.92 x 73.66cm, Museum of  Fine Arts Boston 
[Fig.38] E. Hopper, New York Office , 1962, 101.6 x 139.7, Montgomery Museum of  Fine 
Arts 
[Fig. 39] E. Hopper, Night windows, 1928, Museum of  Modern Art, New York 
[Fig.40] E. Manet, At the cafe, 1878, , 78 × 84 cm., Oskar Reinhart Foundation, Winterthur, 
Switzerland 
[Fig. 41] E. Hopper, Room in New York [193273.66 x 93.02cm, Sheldon Memorial Art 
Gallery and Sculpture Garden, Lincoln, NE 
[Fig..42] E. Hopper, Early Sunday Morning, 1930, Whitney Museum of  American Art, 
89.4x153cm, Whitney Museum of  American Art 
[Fig.43] E. Hopper, Chop suey (detail), 1929 
 [Fig.44] E. Manet Un bar aux Folies Berger, 1882, 96x130cm, Courtauld Gallery, London 
[Fig.45] E. Hopper, East side interior, 1922, 20x25.1cm, Metropolitan Museum of  Arts, 
New York; 
[Fig.46] E. Hopper, Sunlight in a cafeteria, 1958, 102.1x153.7cm, Yale University Art Gallery 
[Fig. 47] E. Hopper, Automat, 1927, 71.4x91.4cm, Des Moines Art Center, Des Moines 
[Fig.48] E. Hopper, Hotel Room, 1931, 152.4x165.7cm, Museo Nacional Thyssen-
Bornemisza, Madrid 





[Fig.51] E. Hopper, Morning Sun, 1952, 101.98x 71.5, Columbus Museum of  Art, Columbus, 
OH, US 
[Fig.52] E. Hopper, A woman in the sun, 1961, 101.9x152.9cm, Whitney Museum of  American 
Art, New York 
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[Fig.53] E. Hopper, Hotel by a railroad, 1952, 101.9 x 79.37, Hirshorn museum and sculpture 
garden, Smithsonian museum 
[Fig,54] E. Hopper, Intermission, 1963, 101.6x152.4, San Francisco Museum of  Modern Art 
[Fig.55] E. Hopper, Conference at Night, 1949, 70x100cm, Wichita Art Museum, Kansas 
[Fig.56] E. Hopper, Study for Morning Sun, 1952. Fabricated chalk and graphite pencil on paper, 
12 1/16 × 18 15/16 in. (30.6 × 48.1 cm). Whitney Museum of  American Art, New York 
[Fig. 57] E. Hopper, Sun in an empty room, 1963, Whitney Museum of  American Art 
[Fig.58] Edward Hopper, Stairway, 1949,40.6x30.2cm Whitney Museum of  American Art 
[Fig.59] C. Crivelli, The Virgin Annunciate, Panel, 36.2 x 45.5 x 2.0 cm (height in centre , 60.2), 
Städel Museum, Frankfurt am Maine 
[Fig.60] C. D. Friedrich, Woman at the window, 1822, 73x44cm, Altenationalgalerie, Staartliche 
museen zu Berlin 
[Fig.61] E. Hopper, Girlie Show, 1941, 81.3x 96.5, Collection de Fayez Sarofim 
[Fig.62] E. Hopper,  Summer evening, 76.2x106.6, Private Collection 
[Fig.63] E. Hopper, Sunday, 1926, 86.36x73.66, The Philips Collection, Washington, D.C 
[Fig.64] M. Duchamp, Nude Descending a Staircase n.2, 1912, 147x89.2cm, Philadelphia Museum 
of  Art, Philadelphia 
[Fig.65] E. Hopper, Hotel Lobby, 1943, 81.9x103.5cm. Indianapolis Museum of  Art 
[Fig.66] E.Hopper, New York Restaurant, 1922, Muskegon Art Museum, Michigan; 
[Fig.67] E. Hopper,  Western Motel, 1957, 7.8x128.3cm Yale University Art Gallery; 
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